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ABSTRACT OF THESIS 
 
   This thesis undertakes a study of human addictions, particularly drug and alcohol 
dependency, from the disciplines of psychology and theology, working towards an integrated 
study.  
   In the first instance it sets out to understand the aetiology of addictive behaviour, as an 
important stage in the process of helping addicted people to overcome their substance 
dependency. Secondly, it aims to provide a well-researched and robust framework for the 
pastoral care of people who are addicted as part of the Christian Churches’ response to 
serious social problems both for individuals and families.  
   It is argued that confusion about the aetiology of addiction, and how best to treat addicted 
people, contributes to the failure of many treatment modalities to provide effective long term 
relief. 
   A new model for understanding addiction is proposed. This model begins in a different 
place: it argues that we would have a better understanding of addiction and how to treat it if 
we began by investigating human desires and aspirations, before attempting to understand 
why for some people desire for drugs becomes excessive or distorted. 
   It is suggested in the final section of the thesis that, in line with Augustinian thought, all 
human longing has its roots in desire for God, even though people may not be aware that 
the ultimate goal of their quest is an experience of the divine. 
   In the concluding discussion and conclusion, we suggest that this model has important 
contributions to make as a discrete element in the clinical care of addicts and in the area of 
pastoral and spiritual care whether in parishes or other institutions where pastoral care is 
provided.   
   The new model is then related to existing models of pastoral care, and examples are given 
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INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY 
 
The Meaning Of ‘Addiction’, and Explanation of The Reasons For This Choice of Subject 
 
   This thesis investigates the phenomenon of addiction from psychological and theological 
perspectives. To clarify the meaning of ‘addiction’, we will give some recent examples from 
the literature of health care psychology1. We argue that there is confusion in the world of 
health care psychology about addiction. Similar confusions appear in the religious and 
theological literature on this subject. Some authors suggest that we are all addicted to 
something; others deny this. Some view alcoholism as a lifelong condition, which will always 
need careful attention; others believe that spontaneous remission can occur, not least when 
problematic life situations change for the better. 
   Can this confusion be satisfactorily resolved? This thesis proposes a new model:  instead 
of beginning with the ‘problem’ of addiction, we suggest that it is more advantageous to 
individuals who are using drugs or alcohol in a harmful way to begin by asking what they see 
as their aims and desires in life, and how those goals might be realised. The ‘problem’ of their 
drinking or drug taking can then be situated within this nexus of personal goals. When that 
process has been initiated first, it is argued, the desire for artificial stimulation through drugs 
may recede. And from a theological point of view, we might be justified in looking at human 
desire, longing, appetite, in terms of longing for God, in line with Saint Augustine of Hippo’s 
statement that: ‘You stir man to take pleasure in praising you, because you have made us for 
yourself, and our heart is restless until it rests in you’2. Is addiction then in some sense a 
frustrated external attempt to satisfy desire which, if Augustine is right, can only be found in 
an internal search that is ultimately God-focussed rather than by the pursuit of external 
                                           
1 Two important classifications of addiction symptomatology are included as an appendix to this thesis, one 
from the World Health Organisation (WHO), 1992, and one from the American Psychiatric Association 
(DSM-IV), 1995. This information can be found in: Robert West, Theory of Addiction, p.15. 
2 Saint Augustine, Confessions, p.3. 
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objects? This thesis will argue that that approach might well help people who seem unable 
to abandon the misuse of drugs or alcohol without assistance. 
   What is emerging from the description of the research project is that we are looking at two 
related concepts: the nature and aetiology of addiction and the ways in which it can be 
satisfactorily treated in a clinical environment. But beside the more clinical aspects of this 
investigation we are placing a quest for appropriate pastoral intervention in the care of people 
with addiction problems, in the belief that a spiritual approach to their care may well have an 
important role to play in this process. This must be offered in a way that is knowledgeable 
and professionally delivered, with the help of well researched teaching provided to those who 
are involved in pastoral ministry on this topic. This thesis is offered as a contribution to this 
educational endeavour. 
 
   It is important to define the term addiction: not every drinker of alcohol is addicted to 
alcohol and not all those who use drugs, either for therapeutic, ampliative or ‘recreational’ 
purposes are addicted to them. Two recent definitions share certain components: 
a) Griffith Edwards3 speaks of ‘an impairment of an individual’s power to choose, a 
state of inner duress, something alien’. This is contrasted by Edwards4 with the non-
addict’s capacity to ‘take it or leave it’. 
b) Robert West5 defines addiction as ‘a syndrome in which a reward-seeking behaviour 
has become out of control’. 
 
   Both writers argue that an addicted person has lost the power to decide whether to perform 
a certain action or not. What they do not do at this stage is to provide a system of guidance 
as to how to identify such an individual compared with a normal user of alcohol, for example. 
Edwards later in his introduction provides a check list to facilitate this comparison. He 
identifies seven observable symptoms of addiction, which are as follows6: 
 
                                           
3 Griffith Edwards, Matters of Substance, p. xxii. 
4 ibid. 
5 Robert West, Theory of Addiction, p.10. 
6 Edwards, op. cit., p. xxiv. 
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 The subjective awareness of a changed relationship with a drug. 
 Tolerance – the increasing amounts of a substance or behaviour needed to achieve 
the same reward. 
 Withdrawal symptoms – which vary in intensity, and can be relatively trivial, or as 
with delirium tremens can be literally life-threatening. 
 Taking more of the drug to relieve withdrawal symptoms  
 Increased ‘salience’ of the use of the drug compared with other activities, such as 
spending time socialising. 
 Narrowing of the drinking repertoire.  
 Rapid reinstatement after abstinent period. 
   When some or all of these factors can be observed in an individual’s behaviour, Edwards 
suggests, the individual concerned is likely to be addicted, or to use the terminology that he 
favours, ‘substance dependent’. 
   We will now explain why this research has been undertaken. 
 Although there have been many studies of addiction from a psychological point of 
view, and some, though not as many, from a theological point of view, searches of the 
relevant literature indicate that no-one in recent times has attempted to discuss the 
relationship between psychology and theology on this topic in detail. Seeking to 
generate and enhance such an alliance is part of what this thesis intends to achieve. 
       It is perhaps relevant in this context to recognise the work of one writer from the 
eighteenth century, Stephen Hales (1677-1761), a Church of England clergyman who 
achieved distinction in the medical sciences, and was, in recognition of this, awarded a 
Fellowship of the Royal Society. He was vicar of Teddington near London for fifty 
seven years: he has a monument to commemorate his life in the south transept of 
Westminster Abbey. His life can be studied in a book entitled Science, Philanthropy and 
 9 
Religion in eighteenth century Teddington, Stephen Hales, DD, FRS7. The reason for including 
him in this introductory section of the present thesis is that one of the subjects that he 
studied, particularly during the last twenty seven years of his life, was alcohol misuse. 
He studied the effects of alcohol on his parishioners, both as a medical expert with 
detailed knowledge of the damage caused to the human body by excessive alcohol 
consumption, and also in terms of the spiritual and ethical problems associated with 
such excess. It is in this sense of approaching the topic from two separate disciplines 
that he is of importance to the writer of this thesis as he attempts, as Hales did 
successfully in his lifetime, to find a way of integrating scientific and theological views 
of the subject of substance dependency and addiction as demonstrated in his book A 
Friendly Admonition to the drinkers of gin, brandy, and other distilled spirituous liquors8. 
      The importance of this eighteenth century contribution to the study of alcohol 
misuse for this thesis is therefore that Hales recognised the significance of the problem 
from two distinct professional bases, that of the research scientist, and that of the 
working parson. It is greatly to his credit that he made this ‘dual diagnosis’ of a medical, 
but also a spiritual and ethical phenomenon. 
          We will argue therefore that there are advantages to be gained by bringing together 
two distinct approaches to addiction, one from psychology, providing a scientific 
approach, and the other from theology, and the next section of this introduction 
explores the relationship between science and theology in detail. There are four 
elements to this which are as follows: 
1) Scientific language.  At the most fundamental, ontological level of discourse, scientific 
language explores the nature of reality through a process of observation and measurement 
of the natural world. McGrath recognises9: ‘The explicability of the world – that is to say, the 
                                           
7 David G. C. Allan, Science, Philanthropy and Religion in eighteenth century Teddington, Stephen Hales, DD, FRS.   
8 Stephen Hales A friendly admonition to the drinkers of gin, brandy, and other spirituous Liquors, sixth edition. 
9 McGrath, Foundations of Dialogue in Science and Religion p.34f. He does not ignore, however, the attacks on this 
approach brought by critics such as Nancy C Murphey, who tends towards a post-modern view of reality. 
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simple fact that there is, or appears to be, some form of ordering of the world, and that 
human beings are capable of uncovering such an order’, making the foundational claim, 
based on a critical realist understanding of reality, that all that we know of the physical world 
is in principle capable of being explained in intelligible human language. He also points out, 
however, that the observations that we make are limited by the reality of the external world 
as it is. So, on this basis, there is an order that governs the way the world is, and in principle 
this order can be discovered and described by humans. Two additional comments need to 
be made in this context: 
1. There is a need to consider to what extent scientific discourse has its own distinctive 
and irreducible ontology. McGrath examines this in detail10 on the basis of an essentially 
critical realist understanding of both religion and science: and Roy Bhaskar11 examines 
how scientific language presents us at a variety of levels with a vocabulary that is universal 
and intelligible, in which ontology precedes epistemology in the discernment process, 
while allowing for a stratification principle, such that each discrete scientific discipline is 
ultimately irreducible, but helps us to build a comprehensive picture of reality. 
    2. There is a need to consider to what extent scientific observation, whether made by 
observation alone, or by the use of experimental processes, leading to observation and 
interpretation, can be considered to be objective. Thus, for example, the ‘Hawthorne 
Effect’ makes the point that in the case of a survey that is used by a scientific researcher 
the willingness of the participants to please the researcher may to some degree affect the 
results obtained. This point is made because it is tempting, though simplistic, to suppose 
that science deals with objective truth whereas theology deals with interpretation on a 
purely subjective basis12. 
2) Theological language. Attempts to define what we mean when we are talking about God 
are complex, as Rowan Williams has pointed out, not least in his recent book The Edge of 
                                           
10 See McGrath, A Fine-tuned Universe, p.212ff. 
11 R. Bhaskar, The Possibility of Naturalism, p. 3, cited by McGrath, A Fine-tuned Universe, p.214f. 
12 More will be said on this complex issue later in this chapter. 
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Words, reminding us that we cannot define God, but can only attempt to find a linguistic 
methodology that moves in the direction of providing us with an understanding of the nature 
of God, an enterprise which can never be anything but partial and temporary. Williams 
recognises in theological language two fundamental levels of communication, i.e. description 
and representation13. Description involves a ‘mapping exercise in which we assume that the 
task is to produce a certain traceable structural parallel between what we say and what we 
perceive’. The representational use of language refers to ‘a way of speaking that may variously 
be said to seek to embody, translate, make present or re-form what is perceived’. What is 
particularly important for us here is the observation that what Williams helpfully says about 
these two terms in relation to theology might also be said about scientific communication. 
   In Christian Doctrine, Mike Higton observes14 that there are two fundamental ways of 
describing God, based on God’s immanence and economy.  This refers to the distinction 
that we make between claims about God as God is perceived in terms of the divine 
relationship with the world, and God ‘himself’ as Trinity of persons, involved in but separate 
from the world, and regarded perichoretically as creator, redeemer and inspirer within 
Godself.15 
  There are difficulties with this distinction with regard to the Immanentist argument, because 
it could be objected that the only way that we can know anything about God’s being is via 
some kind of interaction with the world, including spiritual awareness. Yet Higton is surely 
right to seek to preserve a sense of God’s ontological otherness from the origins of the 
created world. Higton addresses this problem16 by suggesting that ‘to learn to know God is 
to learn to know oneself and one’s world as bathed in God’s love, and that to know God is 
to learn to recognise oneself and one’s world as called to participate in that love’. 
                                           
13 R. Williams, The Edge of Words, p.22. 
14 M. Higton, Christian Doctrine, pp.65-68. 
15 op. cit, p.67f. 
16 op cit., p.68. 
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3) Reasons for linking science and theology.   We have suggested some definitions of 
science and theology, while remaining cautious about such claims as the objectivity of 
scientific interpretations of the known world and the possibility of finding a viable 
definition of God. It might be argued that the epistemological procedures of the two 
approaches are in a sense mutually exclusive; against this, arguments exist such as the 
well-known comment of R. W. Emerson that ‘science does not know its debt to 
imagination’, because imaginative reflection on what has been shown to be the case leads 
to new discoveries. This section of the chapter will look at the first of these two 
questions, i.e. the potential value of looking at some issues from both intellectual 
perspectives. 
  One particularly important reason for looking at scientific issues from both disciplines 
lies in the domain of morality. Many NHS hospitals in the UK have clinical ethics 
committees, both for general and psychiatric medicine, and they frequently invite hospital 
chaplains to be members of those committees. In addition to having an input to general 
issues and specific cases from a spiritual and pastoral perspective, they can be helpful 
when issues arise concerning the willingness of patients to accept certain kinds of 
treatment, when religious beliefs may argue against the practices of blood transfusion, or 
termination of pregnancy, to give two examples. Clinicians usually know what they can 
do for a patient from a purely scientific angle: they sometimes depend on non-clinicians 
to help them with difficult decisions about what they ought – or ought not – to do for 
their patients: and chaplains, along with others, play a useful part in these deliberations. 
Thus science and theology often find themselves in dialogue in order to provide the best 
and most ethically sound methods of treatment. Secondly, we have offered evidence in 
this thesis that psychological clinical medicine alone often fails to cure patients of 
addiction to toxic substances such as heroin or alcohol. But we have also suggested that 
psychological and religious and spiritual counselling, particularly of the kind which begins 
with helping to see the positive options for the patient, may together be one of the most 
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powerful tools we have for helping people who are substance dependent to find a way 
out of slavery to drugs and begin a new and more healthy life, in its personal, professional 
and social dimensions. 
3. Possibilities for and objections to working with scientific and theological ideas 
together. In the 1960’s, Ian Barbour began to look at these, and identified four procedural 
pathways. They are to be found in his book Religion in an Age of Science, beginning on page 
4. They are founded on the ‘critical realism’ approach to knowledge, and they can be 
briefly identified as follows: 
1. Conflict. On this view science and theology cannot address the same issues 
because they essentially have no common language for this task, ‘scientific 
method is the only reliable path to knowledge’17 whereas religion is a subjective 
matter of faith. 
2. Independence. The two approaches can only operate on their own discrete 
territory, functioning in a way that is ‘totally independent and autonomous’18. 
3. Dialogue. On a more positive note, Barbour says that some people argue in 
favour of dialogue between the two disciplines, without ignoring the 
‘intertextual’ problems. 
4. The fourth model is Integration. This is where the concept of natural theology 
comes in to the reckoning, i.e. the belief that scientific observation of the natural 
world and its functioning can help us to move towards an understanding of God.  
   On the assumption that the critical realist approach has something of value to contribute 
to this interdisciplinary enterprise, the work of John Polkinghorne and Michael Welker has 
some useful guidelines to help us to avoid certain possible pitfalls in relating the two 
approaches to one another. We will briefly note four of these19: 
                                           
17 Barbour, p.4. 
18 Barbour, p.10. 
19 See: Welker in J. Polkinghorne and M. Welker, Faith in the Living God, chapter 8.  
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1) The Modernist trap – this problem lies in the assumption that it ought to be possible 
to find one overarching epistemology that works equally well for both science and 
theology. 
2) The reductionist trap – if we concentrate on form and ignore the content of two 
disciplines when looking at them side by side we will avoid unnecessary debate and 
conflict. 
3) The Dualistic trap – this is caused by a process whereby we ignore the internal 
complexities of the two disciplines under review, whereas in reality just as there many 
branches of science, each with its own norms and procedures, the same can be said 
of theology. 
4) The Cliché trap. Put at its simplest, this approach makes statements such as: 
                        Science deals with facts – theology deals with meaning: 
                        Science deals with objectivity – theology deals with individual  
                        feeling.20 
   (As Welker points out, part of the problem with this trap is that there is some superficial 
attractiveness to what it suggests, but it falls down through overgeneralisation and 
overstatement.)  
   There are thus on this view, as expressed by Welker, advantages to looking at reality 
through the eyes of both science and theology, but care must be taken to avoid the problems 
that he has identified. 
  4). A methodology for integrating scientific and theological approaches with particular 
relevance to the subject matter of this thesis. An integrated approach to the alignment of 
scientific and theological approaches to a variety of issues depends, as we have argued above, 
on a capacity for looking at the issue in question synoptically, with both points of view taken 
into consideration, but with neither seen as adequate on its own or superior to the other. In 
                                           
20 op. cit., p.116ff. 
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the case of addiction, we shall be exploring later in the thesis a number of approaches from 
the human sciences, particularly health care psychology, and spiritual and pastoral counselling 
techniques. One important example that we shall examine at greater length later on is the 
work of Deborah van Deusen Hunsinger21, who describes in detail her own integrated theory, 
combining scientific psychological (Object Relations) and pastoral theological (Barthian) 
therapeutic insights, while taking care to see them entirely on their own terms rather than 
confusing them: she gives as a major case study the account of using this type of combined 
therapy when working with a client who has psychological problems and substance 
dependency. 
   In summary, and bearing in mind the caveats expressed, for example, by Welker, the 
interdisciplinary view of the relationship between science and pastoral theology could well 
be highly useful in the case of the care of addicted people. But care must be taken to use the 
two disciplines on their own terms, and without confusing them or ignoring the possible 
traps that can occur when they are related in this way. 
   Before discussing the practical, pastoral, applications of what will be addressed in this thesis 
concerning addiction, it may be helpful to the reader to have a brief account of political and 
social action on drugs and alcohol in UK, including some information about the history of 
legislation on these matters. 
   Legislation on the uses and misuses of alcohol and non-therapeutic forms of medication 
goes back to the thirteenth century in the case of alcohol, and the mid nineteenth century in 
the case of what are now classified as ‘illicit’ drugs (the Pharmacy Act came into being in 
1868). In 1266 an Assize of Bread and Ale act had ‘pegged the price of ale to the price of 
bread, but it was a law that was only applied in the most ad hoc way’22. The history of 
legislation about drinking hours in public houses and other public venues has a long history, 
and the twentieth century saw 14 acts on alcohol control passed. The twenty first century 
                                           
21 Deborah van Deusen Hunsinger. Theology and Pastoral Counseling. 
22 James Nicholls, The Politics of Alcohol, p.6. 
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saw the 2003 act which attempted to deal with what came to be known as ‘binge drinking’, 
although it has also been suggested that regular excessive drinking on a regular basis over  a 
long period of time may be a more harmful activity than the occasional, though often more 
public, misuse of alcoholic beverages.  
   Other ingestible substances such as cannabis and heroin have also been classified and those 
who use them are subject to prosecution, but that has only been the case since the Pharmacy 
Act ‘introduced national controls on the sale of 15 substances regarded as poisons. These 
included cocaine, opium, and opium based products’23. Cannabis, classified for many years 
as a class B drug, has been, during the last ten years, removed to the less serious class C, and 
then put back into class B, because of the perceived dangers of new strains of the drug (such 
as sinsemilla or ‘skunk’) which are thought to be more toxic than the purer form. 
   All of this reflects  a major concern in government about the dangers of the use and misuse 
of alcohol and drugs, and a perception that the people of the UK demand that strong action 
be taken against those who indulge in the use of these ‘forbidden fruits’. Out of that has 
come what has sometimes been referred to as the ‘war on drugs’. Most legislation on alcohol 
licensing hours has, paradoxically perhaps, tended in an increasingly liberal direction24.  
   What then is the intention of this legislative activity, and how far has it been successful? 
The intention is to protect people, perhaps the young in particular, from exposure to drugs 
that may have unforeseen consequences. As Robert West pointed out in Theory of Addiction,25 
one of the problems we encounter in helping people to give up harmful behaviours is the 
‘cost-benefit’ analysis, because ‘the pleasure or escape that the addict obtains from a drug is 
worth whatever short- and long-term costs there might be for the individual’. 
   In recent times, several countries, including The Netherlands, Portugal, Uruguay, and 
several states in the USA, have decriminalised many types of formerly controlled drugs, and 
                                           
23 Leonard Jason-Lloyd, Misuse of Drugs, p.2. 
24 The change in the law about opening hours on Sundays for public houses in 1995 meant that they could 
now, for the first time since the middle of the nineteenth century open all day. See Nicholls, op. cit., p.217. 
25 West, Theory of Addiction, p.30f.  
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although it may be too soon to evaluate these experiments, there is a likelihood that treating 
the misuse of drugs as a clinical rather than a forensic issue may be more effective. ‘Legalise 
and control’ might well be the slogan of this approach, although, with the exception of the 
Liberal Democrat party in the UK, this proposal does not seem to be gaining much ground 
here as yet, perhaps because politicians believe that such a policy would not be popular with 
the all-important electorate. As our current Prime Minister David Cameron is reported to 
have claimed in 2013, “We have a drugs policy that actually is working in Britain”26. One 
wonders where he derives that evidence from: it certainly does not appear to come from 
clinical investigation as reports such as that of Professor David Nutt’s committee in 200927 
on the rationality of drug criminalisation have usually been set aside, and their authors 
removed from office. Nutt was sacked by the then minister of health Alan Johnson, and two 
of Nutt’s professional colleagues promptly resigned. 
   In the thesis there is some discussion, particularly in relation to Kenneth Leech’s book 
Drugs and Pastoral Care, about the legal and political aspects of drug use and misuse. Perhaps 
this is a debate in which the Churches should take a more leading (prophetic?) social and 
political role in terms of the formation and evolution of public policy. 
 In terms of ‘practical theology’28, those who engage in Christian ministry need to have 
a good understanding of the pastoral problems caused by a variety of human situations 
and difficulties. Drug and alcohol misuse feature frequently in our current society: 
These, alongside addictions such as gambling addiction, are phenomena which pastoral 
ministers encounter in their work, whether in parishes, schools, colleges and 
universities, in prisons, in hospitals or the armed forces. In offering a training course 
on the pastoral care of people with drug and alcohol addiction problems, at their 
request, for the Anglican Diocese of Southwark, between 2005 and 2010, and more 
                                           
26 Article in the (London) Evening Standard by Amol Rajan, 05.08.2013. 
27 For the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs. 
28 The subject of alcohol addiction features to a considerable degree as an example of the application of good 
pastoral care in, for example, Richard Osmer, Practical Theology. 
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recently in the Dioceses of Guildford29, and London30, it has become apparent to this 
writer that many clergy and other ministers value training on the pastoral care of people 
with addiction problems: when these courses have been evaluated by the participants, 
they have generally been regarded as helpful. Those who give the training must be well 
informed about the subject: it is believed that this thesis will help the researcher and 
other colleagues to deliver a soundly researched, and evidence based, training module. 
In this way the thesis being offered here is a contribution towards helping the Church 
to have greater awareness of addiction, an understanding of its causes, and current 
methods of treating those who are dependent on drugs, alcohol, or both. 
 Another reason for undertaking this study one is the factor of health care costs. The 
National Audit Office website31 provides detailed analysis of the financial cost to this 
nation of treating people who require health care because of their excessive or 
inappropriate use of drugs or alcohol, or both. Many of the people who misuse these 
substances also receive treatment for concurrent illnesses, both physical and 
psychiatric.  
 
-    Drugs. Let us look at some statistics that are available on the NAO website: 
    The 2008 Drug Strategy Report entitled ‘Drugs, Protecting Families and 
Communities’ made the following assertions about the misuse of drugs in the 
UK –  
 There are an estimated 332,000 problem drug users in England 
 Class A drug use generates an estimated £15.4 billion in crime and health 
costs each year, of which 99% is accounted for by problem drug users 
                                           
29 In April, 2010. 
30 In March, 2011. 
31 National Audit Office, htpp://www.nao.org.uk in the health and social care sector of this website, last 
consulted on May 21, 2010. 
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 Between a third and a half of acquisitive crime is estimated to be drug 
related 
 17% of school children aged 11-15 have used an illegal drug in the last 
year. 
       These statistics indicate that there is a problem in this country in terms of the 
use of illicit drugs and its impact on the life of the country in many ways, not 
least in relation to the amount of money that is spent each year in giving clinical 
care to people who are having problems with drugs. There are other factors, too, 
such as the impact of drug use on families, and the crime that is committed to 
obtain money for obtaining illicit substances. This thesis sets out to explore the 
reasons for drug misuse and addiction from theological and health care 
perspectives. We suggest that whereas there are many factors that combine to 
cause addiction in any individual, there is value in looking at the spiritual 
components of the subject, and the part that religious and spiritual practices may 
play in helping people to overcome their dependency on drugs32.     
-    Alcohol. The report Statistics on Alcohol, England 2009, produced by the Health 
and Social Care Information Centre looked at the number of deaths in England 
in 2007 that were directly related to alcohol consumption, which was 6,541, the 
majority of them as a result of alcoholic liver disease. This represents a steady 
growth (by a factor of 19%) in such deaths between 2001 and 200733. In health 
care costs, this amounts to £1.7 billion per year34, not including other alcohol 
related costs as a result of accidents, for example. This financial cost and the 
amount of time spent by health care professionals in caring for people with 
                                           
32  Jim Orford, who speaks from a psychological perspective, is particularly open to the exploration of 
spiritual values as a possible factor in recovery. See Excessive Appetites 2nd edition, pp. 327ff. 
33 A ‘News Release’ by the Department of National Statistics (Health and Care section) on January 25, 2008, 
presents the evidence for the year on year growth in deaths between 1991 and 2006 occurring directly as a 
result of alcohol use. The statistics show, for example, that there was a far steeper gradient in the case of men 
than women during that period. This information can be consulted on the following website, 
www.statistics.gov.uk 
34 See the Cabinet Office Report (2003) Alcohol Misuse, How Much Does It Cost? 
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alcohol problems suggest that the subject has considerable importance in terms 
of the health of this nation in the widest interpretation of the concept of health, 
and is therefore one that clergy would benefit from understanding to help them 
in caring for their parishioners, particularly when they find evidence of drug or 
alcohol related problems such as domestic neglect, breakdown of families, or 
actual violence towards partners or children. 
       There is therefore also a cost to society in terms of the disruption of the lives 
of individuals, families and communities, and these social costs have been 
investigated in detail by Marina Barnard.35 
 
 Two aspects of this subject present themselves for attention in the light of what has 
already been mentioned, that is to say, firstly aspects of human health and flourishing, 
and the things that hinder these, and secondly the nature and fulfilment of human 
desire and its relationship to the human body and the human will. 
    We will therefore pay attention to Christian writers such as Saint Paul and St. 
Augustine who explored human anthropology in terms of health and flourishing, 
human desire, and its housing within the Christian church, and those factors which 
inhibit health, including spiritual factors. Here a significant link with addiction can be 
made, as people who are addicted frequently experience their addiction in terms of 
conflict: this reveals itself as a desire to find a way of conquering their addiction on the 
one hand, but also a difficulty in doing so, which may well have physiological, 
psychological and spiritual components.  
    The idea of the divided will introduces another important theological dimension to 
the study. Saint Paul, in his Letter to the Romans, chapter 7, explores the nature of the 
human will, in relation to the nature of conflicting desire36: the desire to do the will of 
                                           
35 Marina Barnard, Drug Addiction and Families. 
36 The word ‘desire’ is a translation of the Greek word epithumia, which occurs several times in Romans, 
chapter 7. 
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God as it is perceived by the individual on the one hand, contrasted with the desire to 
do one’s own will on the other. This concern of Paul’s will lead us into a major 
theological exploration of the subject of human will, longing and desire, and the way 
in which Paul relates these ideas to the satisfaction of the needs and desires of human 
beings in the context of their commitment to the Christian ‘Way’. We will therefore 
look at the reception history of Paul’s thought on epithumia and related concepts, 
including Krister Stendahl37, who rejected the psychological conflict model of 
interpretation of Romans 7 that has been prevalent in the work of New Testament 
interpreters since the days of Augustine and Luther in their understanding of what Paul 
is arguing in chapter 7 of Romans.  
    We will also look in detail at Augustine’s study in his Confessions38 in order to achieve 
a better understanding of the phenomenon of the ‘divided will’ and how later 
commentators have interpreted his theology on this subject.  
    A key factor in what is presented here is that addiction may also indicate a deep and 
positive desire, appetite and longing for something good, especially desire for God, 
which has become side-tracked or distorted by the belief that other things (alcohol, 
drugs, sex, gambling etc.) can achieve the kind of emotional or even spiritual ‘high’ 
that Christians and those of other faiths understand as to be found ultimately only in 
relationship with God. These secondary activities may then be seen as taking a short 
cut to the achievement of pleasure or the avoidance of pain. 
    Only two forms of addiction have mainly been referred to, that is to say, addiction 
to alcohol and illicit drugs, such as heroin or cocaine. That choice has been made in 
awareness that there are many different kinds of addiction39. Why then are we 
focussing only on two of them? In the first place, it would be possible to write a 
                                           
37 Krister Stendahl, Paul among Jews and Gentiles and other Essays, in the chapter entitled “Paul and the 
Introspective Conscience of the West”, pp.78-96. 
38 Augustine of Hippo, Confessions, Book VIII, pp. 147ff. 
39 Orford, (Excessive Appetites, p.3), lists a range of activities that can be or become addictive for some people. 
This list includes for example, sex, gambling, shopping, etc. 
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dissertation on each addiction, and there would certainly not be space within this thesis 
to cover all of them, so a choice has had to be made. The researcher has, as has been 
noted in this chapter, prepared and delivered training for clergy on the subject of 
alcohol and drug addiction for three Anglican dioceses, and it is therefore those two 
aspects of addiction that are being explored in depth here, without ignoring the very 
considerable variety and importance of other forms of addiction such as to sex or 
gambling or even the taking of exercise.  
 
Summary 
   This investigation is concerned with the subject of addiction. It has been observed that 
although addictive behaviour can take many forms, such as addiction to gambling, sex, 
exercise, food etc., this thesis deals specifically with dependency on alcohol and illicit drugs. 
These two subjects are those with which this author has most personal acquaintance through 
personal study, teaching, and experience as a hospital chaplain working in the National 
Health Service. 
   Clarification of the word ‘dependency’ is needed at this point: this word has several 
meanings and must therefore be interpreted according to context. Although the addiction 
literature that we shall be investigating regards dependency as a problem, the concept of 
dependency is far more complex than this usage might imply. Dependency is not necessarily 
problematic. Human beings depend on one another for many things, at the personal, social, 
political and economic strata of living. And in the specifically theological sense, we may be 
justified in asserting that dependence on God should be regarded not as a negative or 
problematic phenomenon but one that is in some ways descriptive of an entirely good and 
appropriate relationship. It is necessary to be careful here therefore to recognise this 





   The study of addiction in the thesis will address five principal research questions, which 
are as follows: 
1) What do we mean by addiction? We are here enquiring about ontological 
considerations of the meaning of the term, and whether in fact addiction does really 
exist, or whether it is, as J B Davies claims40, a ‘myth’. And if it does exist, then at a 
more epistemological level of discourse, can we make a robust, indisputable distinction 
between normal and abnormal levels of consumption of alcohol and other substances? 
2) How does the literature of health care psychology understand the aetiology involved 
in the pathway to alcohol and drug dependency and ‘process’ addictions such as 
gambling?  
3) How does the literature of Christian theology understand the process by which people 
become addicted to alcohol and illicit drugs? This will entail consideration of human 
responsibility and sinfulness, and God’s response to this in terms of forgiveness and 
grace. It raises questions also about whether addiction is seen as a disease or a lifestyle 
choice, and whether an alcoholic is an alcoholic ‘for life’. 
4) Recognising the conflicting opinions that we have observed in both the psychological 
and theological literature, what solution can be found? We will look at the possibility 
of providing a New Model for understanding the causes of addiction, and its treatment. 
This model begins with questions about the addiction sufferer’s personal longings, 
desires and aspirations. 
5) From this new starting point, we will ask how the new model could be incorporated 
into forms of treatment of people with addiction problems in the pastoral care given 
by clergy and others in parishes, hospitals, prisons, and schools etc. We suggest that 
the model could also be useful in clinical practice in hospitals and clinics. 
                                           
40 See: John Booth Davies, The Myth of Addiction, 2nd edition. 
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   We have already begun to address the first of these questions in the introduction, and 
references to the question of addiction as a valid term will be addressed in what follows, 
particularly in the review of a variety of theories based on ‘choice’ and ‘disease’ models of 
addiction presented by Robert West in Theory of Addiction. 
 
The Structure Of The Thesis 
   Having established the questions that the research attempts to answer, we will now outline 
the way in which the answers to them are presented in this thesis, on a chapter by chapter 
basis. We aim to present, at each stage, information that is derived from the psychological 
literature on the one hand and the theological contribution on the other, beginning with a 
review of how the two disciplines seek to explain the concept of addiction. We will be looking 
for similarities and differences in what is presented, both within the two disciplines 
(intratextually) and between them (intertextually). 
   Chapter 1: The Psychological literature. This offers a study of addiction from the world of 
secular health psychology, and the definitions of substance addiction already given in this 
chapter evidence the conceptualisation of addiction on this basis as well as suggesting how 
addiction can be detected from a clinical point of view. We will explore the ideas of 
psychologists, who give a range of explanations of addiction. They do not however present 
a coherent and univocal opinion: in fact the competing theories they present suggest 
continuing confusion in the way health care psychology understands addictive behaviour. 
   Chapter 2: Theological perspective. This chapter investigates addiction using the language 
of Christian theology and ethics.  We will look for example at the work of: 
   Gerald May. In Addiction and Grace he identifies ‘attachment’ as the root of the problem: 
‘Addiction sidetracks and eclipses the energy of our deepest, truest desire for love and 
goodness. We succumb because the energy of our desire becomes attached, nailed, to specific 
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behaviors, objects, or people’41. These attachments have, he suggests, the character of 
idolatry, as they divert attention from what is truly worthwhile to what is enslaving and 
destructive. Taking this book as a starting point we will then look at other Christian 
theologians such as James B. Nelson and Kenneth Leech who have presented their own 
views of addiction: here too, however, we find some confusion – such as in the highly 
contestable suggestion of May that we are all addicted to something, and the suggestion of 
Nelson that alcoholics must be regarded as alcoholics for life, as argued by Alcoholics 
Anonymous. 
   Chapter 3: A new model. Having looked at addiction from two discrete but potentially 
related disciplines, that is to say psychology and theology, we will engage in a deeper 
reflection on the concerns that arise out of what has been presented, with particular reference 
to the theological understanding of the human body and its needs, and the role of desire and 
longing, and how these can be housed within a Christian understanding of desire, and the 
relationship between this and addiction. 
   We thus propose the hypothesis that the psychological and theological literature assessed 
here does not adequately answer a number of questions such as: 
 Does addiction exist or is the concept a ‘myth’? (J. B. Davies’ hypothesis) 
 If addiction does exist, is it a disease, or in some way a chosen behaviour? 
 Are alcoholics (and other addicts) alcoholics for life, or can they be cured? 
 What treatment models are most helpful? 
 
   In the light of this unsatisfactory picture we need to find a new and more hopeful starting 
place for the understanding of addiction and the best way to help people with addiction 
problems. What might that starting point be? 
   The answer proposed here is that we are unwise to start by looking at the ‘problem of 
addiction’. What is needed is an approach based not on the premise that something has gone 
wrong, so that people become addicted to drugs, alcohol, gambling or whatever, but on an 
examination of the nature of human desire. The important preliminary question would then 
                                           
41 Gerald May, Addiction and Grace, p.14. 
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become ‘What do you want out of life?’. This question could then lead to regarding the 
person who is addicted as an individual with desires, longings, aspirations, rather than starting 
by seeing him or her as a problem. Once this has been addressed, it is argued here, then a 
number of other questions follow, including ones about how that person views his alcohol 
misuse (to use one example) in relation to his stated goals. It also leads to questions, from a 
theological perspective, about the proper housing of desire within a Christian context, 
particularly about the relationship between the longing for external goods and the interior 
spiritual goods of which, among many others, Saint Augustine of Hippo wrote at length. 
   Chapter 4:  Discussion and reflections. In the last part of the thesis, the ‘discussion and 
reflections chapter’, we will review the ideas that have been presented, and suggest a practical 
application of the New Model in terms of pastoral care for those who have problems with 
dependency on drugs, or alcohol, or indeed both. 
 
Some Other Important Ideas In The Literature    
   Before looking at the work of the main authors with whom we shall be engaging, it is 
necessary to mention one aspect of the subject of addiction that has become more important 
in the last thirty years or so in line with developing understanding of the relationship between 
genetics and human personality42.  Robert Plomin43 and his colleagues engage with genetics 
specifically in relation to addiction. In Behavioral Genetics, Plomin’s team studied the 
hypothesis that monozygotic twins would be more likely to develop alcohol related problems 
in adult life than fraternal twins, even when they had not lived together in childhood. This 
led to the proposition that although genes do not determine the likelihood of developing 
alcoholism in isolation from environmental factors, there is a strong possibility that they play 
a part in the development of alcohol misuse. And David Ball’s article “Addiction science and 
its genetics” sets out to explore the hypothesis ‘that genes are involved in addiction’ and to 
                                           
42 One of the key findings on this subject has been the mapping of the human genome. 
43 Robert Plomin, Behavioral Genetics. 
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‘trace the attempts to identify specific genes, thereby to validate this approach as a means of 
identifying contributing, but not causal, factors’44. 
   It is increasingly being accepted by health care professionals that this kind of research 
indicates a link between certain genetic elements and the likelihood of people with particular 
genetic profiles being vulnerable to substance misuse, although it would be going too far to 
suggest that genes ‘cause’ alcoholism, for example. 
   There is also some positive evidence from the psychological literature for spiritual aspects 
of treatment for addiction. There are some important references to religious practices in Jim 
Orford’s book Excessive Appetites, and in the journals, such as an article by John D. Sellman, 
Michael P. Baker et al.45, which looks at the ways in which the discovery of a higher power 
can assist the recovery process: reference to religious ideas also comes in the form of 
instantiation of a particular type of approach to drug and alcohol pastoral counselling, as in 
Deborah van Deusen Hunsinger’s book Theology and Pastoral Counseling46, which will be 
discussed later. 
   We now turn to the first major chapter of the thesis, which investigates recent literature on 
addiction from the perspective of health care psychology. 
 
                                           
44 David Ball, “Addiction science and its genetics”, p.360. 
45 John D. Sellman, Michael P. Baker et al., “Future of God in recovery from drug addiction”. 
46 Deborah van Deusen Hunsinger, Theology and Pastoral Counseling.  
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1. CHAPTER 1   PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES OF ADDICTION 
 
Introduction To The Chapter 
   This chapter critically assesses the contributions of three writers who are concerned 
with the aetiology of addiction and the ways in which the health care professions try 
to bring relief to those who suffer from addiction, particularly to alcohol or ‘illicit’ 
drugs, such as cannabis, heroin and crack cocaine and other substances and 
processes47. The writers assessed here are John Booth Davies, Jim Orford, and Robert 
West. We will conclude that none of these writings on its own is ultimately satisfactory, 
before moving towards a radically new model that this author believes has a better 
chance of providing a satisfactory methodology for understanding addiction and 
providing effective care for those who are affected by it. 
             The three authors discussed in this chapter have been chosen for these reasons: 
 They are all well respected authors in the field of health care psychology, especially 
in the specific context of the study of addiction. And as well as writing on the subject 
from a theoretical perspective, they have all worked professionally in the care of 
addicted people. 
 They all address the five research questions we are asking, and so have specific 
relevance to the research project. This is particularly important when we consider 
whether addiction exists, how people become substance dependent, and the kind of 
professional intervention that is likely to be most effective, including spiritual aspects 
of change. 
 They represent very clear but widely differing positions on questions such as: 
-   Is there such a thing as addiction, or do people in reality freely choose to use drugs, 
alcohol and other behaviours? Davies argues that the concept of addiction is in itself 
                                           
47 The word ‘process’ in this specific context of addiction refers to forms of behaviour such as shopping, 
gambling, or use of the internet. 
 29 
meaningless; Orford takes the opposite view, arguing that addiction does exist; West 
accepts the reality of addiction and provides an integrative model of his own for 
understanding and treating it. We are asking, then: 
-   Is addiction, assuming it does in fact exist, a disease, or a lifestyle choice, however 
potentially destructive? 
  - Do people need help to end such behaviour, or is it rather a phenomenon that 
generally ceases to be important to the individual quite spontaneously? 
 
   Already, underlying what has been said, there is at least an implicit suggestion that in 
some sense addiction both exists substantively as a health condition, and that it can be 
treated as an illness or disease. In his book The Addictive Personality, Craig Nakken seems 
to take this point of view for granted48: 
Addiction must be viewed as a process that is progressive. Addiction must be 
seen as an illness that undergoes continuous development from a definite, 
though often unclear, beginning towards an end point. 
 
   What follows in this chapter will provide the reader with viewpoints that, in principle, 
support what Nakken is arguing, on the one hand, and on the other, opposition to the 
belief that there really is a disease called addiction that can be treated by members of 
the health care professions whether by psychopharmacological intervention, 
psychotherapy, or both of these approaches working together. 
 
1.1 John Booth Davies: The Myth of Addiction49 
   John Booth Davies was at the time of writing this book Professor of 
Psychology and the director of the Centre for Applied Social Psychology at 
Strathclyde. He had been studying alcohol and drug problems in Glasgow for 
twenty two years at the time, and in light of his contribution to the understanding 
                                           
48 Craig Nakken, The Addictive Personality, 2nd edition, p.2.  
49 John Booth Davies, The Myth of Addiction, 2nd edition. 
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of the ways in which people use alcohol and what are commonly referred to as 
‘illicit’ drugs, he became a researcher for the Scottish Office, the Scottish Prison 
Service, and the Home Office. His work also includes editorship of the journal 
Addiction Research, and he has published many contributions to this field of study. 
Among these is Drugspeak: The Analysis of Drug Discourse50, and an article entitled, 
and specifically on the question of ‘attribution’ in addiction research – “Life stress 
and the use of illicit drugs, alcohol and tobacco”51. As Nick Heather, another well-known 
writer on addiction commented on The Myth of Addiction, it has had the effect of 
reviving ‘debate about the fundamental nature of addiction and its causes, and 
this cannot be anything other than a good thing’.    
 
Exposition Of The Argument Proposed By Davies 
   ‘A Question of Attribution’ - the title of Alan Bennett’s play52 focuses well the 
theme of Davies’ book, which rejects the ‘disease’ model of addiction in favour 
of the concept of ‘choice’ – we drink, smoke or take drugs or engage in types of 
behaviour such as gambling because we enjoy doing so. We are also free to stop 
doing any of these things by an equivalent act of the will. Davies argues that 
when people speak of themselves as addicted to drugs, such as heroin or crack 
cocaine, they are attributing their condition to something called addiction, which 
does not in fact exist; it is better understood as a ‘myth’.  
   Davies argues that by using  disease models of drug dependency, and calling 
the person who has this alleged disease a ‘patient’ we are putting that person into 
a sociologically significant group of people who are helpless, unable to choose 
their condition, which has been visited on them like cancer or diabetes. We then 
                                           
50 Drugspeak: The Analysis of Drug Discourse. 
51 “Life stress and the use of illicit drugs, alcohol and tobacco: empirical findings, methodological problems 
and attributions” in D. Warburton, Addiction Controversies, chapter 22.) 
52 Alan Bennett, “A Question of Attribution”, in Single Spies. 
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treat the ‘disease’ clinically. What this ignores, in the case of drug ‘addiction’, 
Davies argues, is the fact that many people enjoy drug use and it can seem to be 
the best way of coping with a social situation that feels desperate and hopeless. 
They see no way out of a cycle of social and economic deprivation, and the use 
of drugs is one way of coping with the psychological impact of that situation. If 
that is true, then it is the situation that needs to be changed: the use of drugs 
may be discarded should the circumstances of the user improve significantly. It 
is worth remembering that Davies’ clinical experience was largely in Glasgow, a 
city with a particularly high incidence of unemployment and social and economic 
hardship. If that analysis is true for Glasgow, may it not also be more generally 
replicated among the drug using population at large? Davies then asserts that the 
so called ‘disease’ of addiction is created in a medical environment, and thus 
becomes predictive of behaviour. 
   We will now explore this theory in detail. In doing so we will be looking for 
factors that relate the analysis of the meaning of addiction as presented by Davies 
to our attempt in this thesis to generate a viable and robust approach to the 
pastoral care of people who are in some sense dependent on either drugs or 
alcohol, or perhaps both: in relation to this, it will be argued here that Davies’s 
book is very important because it powerfully challenges the ‘disease’ model of 
addiction, thereby identifying important questions about the appropriateness 
and possibly even the danger of treating those who are dependent on alcohol, 
drugs, gambling, or other equivalent behaviours as in some sense ‘sick’. To call 
someone sick, ill, or the victim of a disease, suggests an external force, such as 
may be entailed for example by the notion of bacterial infection: in alleged 
‘addiction’, Davies argues, there is no such external factor: the impulse to behave 
in a certain way in relation to such behaviours has nothing to do with external 
forces, and a great deal to do with personal choice. This is an important 
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contribution to the debate about what addiction really is, when stripped to its 
ontological essentials; we however contend that he has not in fact proved his 
case, although he has important ideas to contribute. 
   The Myth of Addiction is cited here as a psychological theory which takes an 
extreme view by regarding the excessive use of drugs and alcohol as a choice 
made by the person concerned53. Davies redefines and redescribes the concept 
of addiction by using the word myth to do so. In its original sense, the word 
myth refers to a collection of ideas about the human condition that are universal 
and basic to the conduct of all human life, ideas that have been explored by 
religions and philosophies for thousands of years54, and which therefore seek to 
account for what is most universally and fundamentally true in human 
experience. But Davies is using the term in a different sense, that is to say, in a 
demotic or colloquial sense, indicating a concept that is demonstrably false.  
 
                  Attribution Theory 
   So how does Davies argue that addiction does not really exist? His argument 
concerns the manner in which people who are supposedly ‘addicted’ to illicit 
drugs such as heroin or crack cocaine talk about their situation and the 
vocabulary that they adopt when speaking with others. This attribution argument 
refers not only to the substance user, but also to others in her social 
environment. We refer to this aspect of Davies’ theory as the ‘vested interest’ 
element in attribution behaviour, used by both health care workers and the 
family of the person who uses the drug in question. We begin with looking at 
the role of health care workers in promoting the idea that addiction exists. 
                                           
53 Other examples of this group include Vuchinich and Heather’s Behavioural Economics model, and 
Prochaska’s Transtheoretical ‘Stages of Change’ model, both of which are cited with approval by J. B. Davies: 
see Davies, Myth of Addiction, p.155. 
54 There are many excellent books that deal with these matters, such as Carl Gustav Jung’s Man and His 
Symbols, Mircea Eliade’s Myths Dreams and Mysteries, and H. D. F. Kitto, The Greeks, especially chapter 11). 
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   In a highly significant trope to his ‘choice’ theory, Davies suggests that other 
people than the supposedly addicted individual have a vested interest in 
maintaining the idea of addictive behaviour as pathological and thus beyond the 
control of the individual’s control. That group of people includes all the 
personnel involved in the caring professions, such as doctors, nurses and social 
workers, who make a living from labelling addicts as ‘sick’, and then providing 
‘treatment’. If the disease model were to be replaced by one of choice, then, 
Davies argues, the need for these professional helpers would disappear as would 
their jobs. As Davies comments, professional workers are attuned to seeing 
cause and effect relationships between drugs and addiction; but in this regard, 
the alternative explanations based on attribution ‘are not difficult to find if one 
is prepared to concede the possibility of their existence and to look for them’55. 
   One further group is affected by this argument in favour of addiction as 
choice: i.e. the addicted persons’ families. To speak of a member of their family 
as ill may well feel easier to cope with than seeing them as making a life choice 
that is both harmful to the family as a whole (as Marina Barnard argues56)  and 
also illegal and immoral.  
   As these groups - the addict, the social environment of the addict, and the 
professional carers – all, in Davies’ view, make use of attribution language, we 
will now examine this concept in greater detail. 
   The key word here is attribution. Davies makes extensive use of attribution 
theory, as defined by psychologists such as Weiner57, who analyses the 
                                           
55 J. B. Davies, The Myth of Addiction, p.155. 
56 Marina Barnard, Drug Addiction and Families, p.11. 
She points out that ‘even a sideways glance at what it might be like to be the son or daughter, mother or 
father, brother or sister of a loved one whose drug problem takes them into danger or strife, debilitates their 
health and wellbeing, and leads them to steal and fight, can’t help but indicate the price it exacts on families’. 
57 On page 16 of The Myth of Addiction Davies draws the reader’ attention to the following: B. Weiner, et al. 
“Perceiving the Causes of Success and Failure”, in E.E. Jones et al. (eds.) Attribution, Perceiving the Causes of 
Behaviour, B. Weiner, Achievement Motivation and Attribution Theory, and D. Bar-Tal, “The Effects of Teachers’ 
Behaviours on Pupils’ Attributions: a review”, in C. Antaki and C. Brewin, Attributions and Psychological Change, 
where Weiner’s theories are summarised.  
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relationship between people’s behaviour and the explanations they give, in 
relation in particular to the perceived internal and external loci of control of 
behaviour. Weiner provides us with a threefold model of attribution, which 
Davies expounds as follows:58 
a) locus – is the cause of the behaviour seen as originating within the person 
(i.e. drive, energy, ability, enthusiasm, effort etc.) or within the 
environment (family, friends, opportunity, ‘background’ etc.)? If the 
former, the locus is said to be internal; if the latter, external. 
 
b) stability – is the cause of the behaviour seen as fluctuating and variable 
over time (i.e. a cold, luck, the weather, a chance meeting etc.) or is it a 
permanent feature? (non-curable illness, enduring family situation, 
nationality, etc.).  If the former, the perceived cause is unstable; if the 
latter, stable. 
 
c) controllability – is the cause of the behaviour seen as under the volitional 
control of the individual (effort, obtaining resources, making friends) or 
as outwith that control? (task difficulty, victimisation, lack of opportunity 
etc.). If the former applies, the cause is seen as controllable; if the latter, 
uncontrollable. 
 
   This model is central to Davies’ view of addiction as a form of attributional 
behaviour. If the behaviour of a substance user is unstable, and based on internal 
and controllable factors, then the concept of addiction collapses and should be 
replaced by choice theory; if it is based on factors such as uncontrollability, with 
an external impetus such as the supposedly addictive nature of the substance 
itself or the insuperable pressure of life circumstances, then addiction is a 
reasonable description.  
 
 
 Addiction: A Matter Of Choice. 
   The rest of Davies’ book sets out to show that the personal choice model is a 
more accurate explanation of substance misuse than concepts of addiction based 
on external factors. For Davies, the person who exemplifies substance misuse – 
                                           
58 J. B. Davies, The Myth of Addiction, p.16f. 
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which he agrees can be a genuine problem – uses the language of attribution, as 
we have observed, to explain his or her ‘addictive’ behaviour, because there are 
benefits to be gained from so doing, rather than by acceptance that this 
behaviour comes about as a result of free choice, however unwise that choice 
may seem to be. 
   To what then does the addicted person attribute his or her inappropriate use 
of drugs or alcohol? This language varies in content – and this point is essential 
to Davies’ argument – it depends on whom the addicted person is talking to. 
There is a highly circumstantial or ‘functional’ element to the choice of language 
used. Speaking with people who are professionally involved in the care of 
addicts, police or health workers, for example, addicts’ choice of language tends 
to be weighted towards a view of addiction that puts addictive behaviour beyond 
personal control; speaking to their friends and acquaintances however, the 
choice of language loses this ‘pathological’ element and tends towards the 
inclusion of addictive behaviour as an ordinary part of their lives, relative to their 
personal circumstances59. Davies cites his own experiment, undertaken with a 
group of heroin users in Glasgow60. This provided evidence that ‘answers to 
questions depend on the way the interviewee perceives the interviewer, and this 
is especially the case when the behaviour in question involves a moral dimension, 
like theft or illicit drug use’.61 
   This variability factor based on the perceptions of the interviewee about the 
interviewer and the interviewer’s motives highlights an important aspect of 
                                           
59 One important experiment cited by Davies involved the use of a survey conducted with the same group of 
subjects by two researchers, one a clinician, the other a drug user, and a comparison of the data received by 
the two. One element of this is, understandably, the assumptions that the subjects made about the motives of 
the questioners in each case, and how this may have affected their replies to the questions they were asked. 
See: Davies, The Myth of Addiction, p.86ff. 
60 J. B. Davies and  R. Baker, “The Impact of Self-presentation and Interviewer Bias Effects on self-reported 
Heroin Use”, 907-912) 
61 J. B. Davies, The Myth of Addiction, p.88. This idea is intensified when the behaviour in question is not only 
possibly viewed as immoral, but also may have consequences in terms of law enforcement, as in the case of 
heroin use etc. 
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Davies’ thesis, namely the ways in which we remember events and the insecure 
relationship between those memories and the truth. Of great significance here 
in terms of Davies’ hypothesis are the ways in which researchers within the 
discipline of health care psychology obtain information: much of their data 
collection relies on self-reporting by the person with the drink, drug or tobacco 
related problem.  
   As Davies correctly points out, there are difficulties with self-reporting, and it 
is unwise to regard these reports as wholly accurate just because the subjects are 
recalling their own experiences. Our memories are not entirely dependable, he 
argues, and human beings also tend to lie or distort the facts for many reasons. 
One such reason, as we have seen, is that interviews between researchers and 
subjects are not ‘neutral’, they have a context. In a research project with mothers 
who had given birth to babies with Downs Syndrome for example62, when the 
mothers were encouraged to look for possible reasons for their babies’ condition 
- in terms of stressful events during pregnancy, for example – they were easily 
able to produce such ‘memories’:  the idea of there being a cause for the Downs 
Syndrome helped them to ‘understand’ what had happened, whether or not the 
explanation was true. The “I see what you are getting at” factor was therefore 
thought to be at work here: the mothers identified the researcher’s agenda, and 
found it helpful to themselves to proceed as if the suggested explanation were 
true. 
   The same applies, Davies argues, to the concept of addiction. The person who 
is being questioned may well tailor his replies to the context of the interview, 
giving answers that he thinks the interviewer wants to hear, or that will help him 
to gain access to the medical help he is hoping for, and the avoidance of being 
                                           
62 See Davies, The Myth of Addiction, p.95 
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seen as engaging in ‘bad’ behaviour that he chooses to engage in and thereby 
risking social disapproval or legal penalties. 
   Davies also argues that we must recognise the difficulties involved in 
remembering events of varying degrees of significance in our lives. He describes 
in chapter eight a number of experiments designed and carried out with the 
intention of monitoring human capacity for accurate memory of events in our 
lives. These suggest that human beings are not particularly good at remembering 
these things with a high degree of accuracy for a number of reasons. One such 
reason, as common sense would suggest, is the length of time from the events. 
The closer we are to the events we describe, the more likely we are to remember 
them accurately, unless there are other variable factors at work, such as dementia. 
Furthermore, our emotional responses to those events can distort them, such as 
endowing them with more or less significance than they originally had. 
Therefore, Davies argues, we must be cautious about accepting any attribution 
of the cause of addiction to external circumstances or memories of events in the 
addict’s life history which may be distorted by the process of time or other 
factors. 
 
Critical Evaluation Of Davies’ Theory. 
   Although there is much here that seems compelling, Davies’s argument, 
challenging those who readily accept the ‘disease’ model of understanding 
addiction, is not without its problems. Davies’ work follows on from what had 
already been said by writers about alcoholism, and as such it finds its most 
detailed expression in the work of Herbert Fingarette, writing in a book entitled 
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Controversies in the Addiction’s Field, published in 1990, for the American Council 
on Alcoholism about the so-called disease of alcoholism63.  
   Fingarette seeks to demonstrate that with regard to the idea of uncontrollable 
drinking, the concept of control is such a vague one that it no longer has any 
significant content – it can range in intensity from a ‘mild inclination’ to an 
‘overwhelming and irresistible desire’. So why does alcoholism come to be 
regarded as a disease? One answer given by Fingarette is that using this kind of 
terminology makes it easier for people to seek treatment. As he puts it in the 
chapter already cited: (p.52) 
When behaviour is labelled a disease it becomes excusable because it is 
regarded as involuntary. This is an important reason for its 
promulgation. Thus special benefits are provided to alcoholics in 
employment, health and civil rights law provided they can prove that 
their drinking is persistent and heavy. The effect is to reward people who 
continue to drink heavily. This policy is insidious precisely because it is 
well intended, and those who criticise it may seem to lack compassion. 
 
   Fingarette argues that we need to recover the concept of alcoholism from the 
disease model and see it much more as a reflection of psychological and social 
problems, with appropriate treatment to help those whose drinking is 
problematic.  
   So does this argument have traction? We will look at some critical observations 
about the suggestion that substance dependency is not a valid concept. 
 
The Concept Of Memory 
   With regard to self-reporting, although it is undoubtedly true that some people 
distort the truth in reporting events relating to their experience of their addiction 
to drugs or alcohol, nevertheless medical intervention, from that of the general 
practitioner onwards, begins with self-reporting, so what is true about the 
                                           
63 H. Fingarette, “Why We should reject the Disease Concept of Alcoholism” in Ruth C. Engs (ed.) 
Controversies in the Addiction’s Field, volume 1, chapter 6. 
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questionable nature of such reports from addicts is also true a fortiori of the 
population as a whole in terms of primary medical care. Would it, on this basis, 
be a sound argument automatically to mistrust or exclude all patients’ self-
reporting as a principal route to diagnosis? 
 
Clinical Judgement And Treatment 
   A further comment might be made that even allowing for the deliberate choice 
of the addict to use the language of disease for self-serving purposes, in the 
experience of many health care professionals many of their clients show a 
determination to give up the destructive habit of taking heroin, for example, but 
cannot do so without help, whether from drug therapies such as methadone,  
with the use of self-help groups such as Narcotics Anonymous with its 
invocation, in the first instance, of a Higher Power such as God, to deal with 
one’s own personal inability to change unaided, or the support and 
encouragement – and needs – of their families. No matter why the use of the 
drug began, there comes a point for many when the choice to give up is no 
longer possible, because of changes in the chemistry of the brain for example, 
which inhibit the process of positive change in a way that the sufferer cannot 
overcome without help64. At such a point it is, in the opinion of the present 
author, reasonable to refer to the individual’s condition as one of being addicted, 
with a consequent need for treatment. Perhaps the best way of looking at this is 
to see both choice (initially) and disease models (at a later stage) as contributing 
jointly to the production of demonstrably addicted conditions. 
 
The Problem Of Universalisation 
                                           
64 On this physiological argument see for example Avram Goldstein, Addiction: from Biology to Drug Policy, 
especially chapter 6. 
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   There are also questions about the universalisation that is implicit in many 
theories of addiction, both those that emphasize the pathological nature of 
addictive behaviour for some people – across a vast range of such activities, 
including shopping, gambling and sex – and those who prefer to see such 
behaviour as chosen, and to a large extent under the control of the individual 
concerned. It may be that in reality there are those who for whom such 
behaviours are chosen, in the sense that in terms of a ‘cost benefit analysis’, to 
use Davies’ terminology, the life lived under the influence of drugs or alcohol, 
or both, appears to be a better choice than life lived without it, whereas for 
others it would be truer to say that addiction is a disease or condition that is 
largely or entirely outwith their capacity for personal control. Another factor that 
may need to be taken into account here is that of denial. Many people who are 
truly dependent on one or more of a number of substances or activities are not 
consciously aware of the activity in question as being problematic, or hide the 
reality of their situation from others, through shame or other reasons. This also 
suggests, pace Davies, that there is here a behaviour that is out of control. 
Generalisation, on the basis of this argument, may prove to be an unhelpful 
procedure. 
 
The Belief Of The Addicted Person About Addiction 
   People who attend addiction clinics or self-help groups do so because they 
believe they need help, or because someone else, a family member, or a court 
officer, convinces them that they do. They believe there is something wrong with 
them which requires and can benefit from treatment. The experience of 
professionals tends to support this theory: the people who consult them are 
clearly having problems with their lives, or may have been referred to them for 
treatment by the courts because their lifestyle has brought them into conflict 
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with the Law. Although remission of addictive behaviour may be partial65 or 
even temporary66, there is clinical evidence that people do get better, and to that 
extent at least, it can be asserted that such treatments are effective. 
   Davies is right to question the assertion that an addicted person is ill. He argues 
that people who take drugs should be allowed to do so. If their actions cause 
problems for society, as in the case of criminal behaviour to obtain money for 
drugs, then that is a criminal matter. On the other hand, we have suggested that 
regarding addiction as pathological can be shown to be not only a heuristic tool 
for providing help, but also, in a more theoretical sense, a ‘true’ statement. Maybe 
part of the ‘truth’ that Davies is seeking may well have to do with truth in a wider 
sense, that is to say, the truth of what has been experienced by many health care 
professionals to be in the best interests of their clients. Even allowing for the 
danger of collusively ‘pathologising’ such clients, a danger which Davies rightly 
draws attention to, if labelling the individual who has the problem as ill rather 
than bad, immoral, or even criminal makes it easier for them to seek and receive 
treatment, then perhaps part of the ‘truth’ is that using this kind of language has, 





                                           
65 There are situations in which an addicted person may be able to gain better control of their behaviour than 
before treatment, while not accomplishing a complete process of detoxification. This is sometimes achieved 
through the medium, in the case of heroin addicts for example, of the prescribed use of heroin substitutes 
such as methadone or buprenorphine. 
66 It must be acknowledged that although a high percentage of people who present for inpatient 
detoxification treatment at centres such as the Maudsley Hospital in South London can be successfully 
treated, (in as many as 95% of cases) in many cases (70-80%) the remission achieved is temporary, and such 
patients may well need in such cases to be retreated once or more often. Despite this, there is a clear 
understanding on the part of the staff there that they are treating – by clinical means such as the use of 
Librium and cognitive behavioural therapy – people who have a ‘genuine’ illness. 
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   Davies also largely ignores the genetic factor in addiction. While it would be 
gross exaggeration to suggest that genes ‘cause’ addiction in the way that 
pressure on an electric switch ‘causes’ a light to go on or off, there is nevertheless 
a well-researched body of literature that demonstrates a connection between 
genetics and certain kinds of addiction, particularly addiction to alcohol67. The 
research that David Ball and his colleagues have done in recent years at the 
Institute of Psychiatry68 strongly suggests that some individuals do have a genetic 
vulnerability to addiction to alcohol, and a recent paper from the USA makes a 
further link with genetic influences on drunkenness69. Such research is certainly 
not suggesting that anyone who has a certain genetic marker will automatically 
become addicted to alcohol, but they recognise a link between certain genetic 
sequences and a propensity towards addiction. On the assumption that this is an 
accurate evidence based observation, we suggest that such findings weaken the 
argument of Davies and others who think that addiction is largely or entirely to 
do with human choice. 
 
Conscious And Unconscious Factors In The Psychology Of Addiction 
   Perhaps the biggest question that Davies raises, although he does not deal with 
it specifically, is that of the true nature of human choice and volition. Given the 
possibility that people choose their substance dependent state, and attribute it to 
addiction, this seems to invite discussion of a vastly complicated subject. What 
factors motivate us to make choices? There are – as Robert West demonstrates, 
                                           
67 See, for example, David M. Ball, “Genetic Approaches to Alcohol Dependence”. Also Robert Plomin et al., 
Behavioral Genetics, especially pp. 264-27. 
68 The IOP is part of the Teaching Hospital group that is part of King’s College London, based at the 
Maudsley Hospital, Denmark Hill, London SE5. 
69 The article entitled “The Investigation into CYP2E1 in Relation to the Level of Response to Alcohol 
Through a Combination of Linkage and Association Analysis”, Amy Webb, Penelope A Lind et al. 
demonstrates that ‘sequence changes in or near CYP2E1 affect the level of response to alcohol, providing a 
predictor of risk for alcoholism’. At its simplest, this finding about the genetic influence of CYP2E1 can help 
as part of a complex study of why some people get drunk more quickly than others. 
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and we will examine his arguments in greater detail later in this chapter – both 
conscious and unconscious factors in human choice making. As West observes70 
Only a very small proportion of information and forces that act on our 
behaviour are represented consciously at any one time. The conscious 
mind has a very limited capacity. What happens [in addiction] is that 
non-conscious processing of the information creates a representation 
that has particular properties, often called salience, that cause conscious 
attention to be focussed on it. 
 
   This partially conscious salience is problematic, West argues, because ‘most of 
the time we are not self-conscious’71. We do not always have in mind a clear self-
representation of the nature of our interests and motivating drives. These are 
relatively unstable, in the sense that they are ‘held in mind for a while, and then 
replaced when other representations come to our attention’72. Thus West 
recognises the highly complex interaction of conscious awareness and 
unconscious formation of the will to take action of whatever kind, and Davies 
does not appear to allow sufficient weight to the sheer complexity of such 
processes from a psychological point of view73.   
 
Psychodynamic Approaches To The Unconscious 
   One further dimension of this element of conscious and unconscious forces 
at work in human choice making lies in the psychodynamic view of addiction, a 
subject which has not until recently been  systematically addressed by the 
successors of Freud and Jung in the psychoanalytic literature. Some writers from 
within this group have now however begun to explore addiction from a 
psychodynamic perspective74. 
                                           
70 Robert West, Theory of Addiction, p.161. 
71 ibid. 
72 ibid. 
73 There are also considerable theological issues about the nature of the human will and volition. We will look 
that those issues in greater depth in the later chapter on volition as understood in terms of theological 
anthropology. 
74 Examples include Marcus West, Feeling, Being, and the Sense of Self, p.110, which  relates addiction and its 
treatment via Alcoholics Anonymous as related directly to a loss of a sense of personal identity and the 
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J. B. Davies’ Argument Assessed By Other Authors In The Field 
   Davies is not alone in his objection to the concept of addiction. Prochaska et 
al.75 also claim that the term addiction is a false or misleading one76.  There is 
however a substantial body of work that offers either explicitly or implicitly a 
critique of the ‘choice’ theory employed by Davies, Prochaska et al. and others 
who express similar opinions. We will therefore address some of these critical 
comments now. 
 
  Jim Orford 
   In Excessive Appetites77, Jim Orford strongly criticises Davies’ view of addiction 
as a myth or a social construct – a concept that has no reality except that which 
is given to it in order to fulfil certain objectives, such as the receipt of health care 
or the avoidance of criticism. Orford argues that although the idea of addiction 
as an illness or disease becomes problematic if applied too literally, there is 
nevertheless a reality to the concept of addiction – it is not a ‘myth’, and often, 
though not always, requires some form of intervention78:  
Some writers have vigorously attacked the concept of addiction. One of 
the most cogent of such arguments was marshalled by Davies (1992) in 
his book, The Myth of Addiction. There is a tendency, however, for a straw 
man to be set up and knocked down in the course of his criticism. The 
word ‘addiction’ is taken to imply that control over appetitive behaviour 
                                           
powerlessness that people feel when this occurs, and Jean Knox, Archetype, Attachment, Analysis, pp. 149ff., 
which suggests that certain forms of ‘somaticisation’ such as bulimia can be a kind of diversionary tactic the 
unconscious purpose of which is to ‘block out all the painful thoughts’ that such a person may have about 
being a ‘bad person’ (Knox, op. cit. p.152). 
75 J. O. Prochaska, C. C. DiClemente and J. C. Norcross, “In Search of How People Change”. Their 
‘Transtheoretical’ or ‘Stages of Change’ model is a clear statement of the view that people change their minds 
about the use of drugs and in particular the use of nicotine associated with smoking cigarettes in observable 
patterns or stages, but always on the basis of some kind of deliberate cost/benefit analysis in relation to the 
substance in question. 
76 See, for example, Hans Eysenck, in Rebel with a Cause, quoted by Orford, Excessive Appetites p. 5 etc. and 
Craig Reinarman, “Addiction as Accomplishment: the Discursive Construction of Disease”. Reinarman 
argues strongly that the labelling of addiction as a disease confuses the treatment of what is undoubtedly a 
serious condition by placing it in an unhealthy alliance, lying between health services and state controlled drug 
policies, which undermines the possible positive contribution of both. 
77 Jim Orford, Excessive Appetites (2nd Edition). 
78 Orford, Excessive Appetites, p.345f. 
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is totally lost, and that ability to modify behaviour in the light of external 
constraints (e.g. to smoke less if price rises) or to give up appetitive 
behaviour without treatment is inexplicable if addiction is said to exist. 
This may be true of an extreme ‘disease’ view of addiction, but it is 
certainly not true of most views of addiction including the present one. 
 
   Although this choice model is attractive in some ways – its insistence on 
personal responsibility both for using drugs and for stopping doing so provides 
an important counterbalance to views of addiction that emphasize the 
helplessness of the person with the problem – it fails, as Orford correctly 
observes, to explain the entire phenomenon of addictive behaviour which is such 
an evident feature of contemporary society.  
 
  Robert West 
   Robert West’s Theory of Addiction provides an encyclopaedic view of addiction 
theories, some based on ‘disease’ models, some on ‘choice’ models (such as 
Davies’), others using a mixture of choice and disease theories. In reality, as 
Robert West points out79, it is not always easy for young people in particular to 
recognise the long-term danger that they may be exposing themselves to, 
because the immediate pleasure of smoking, drinking or taking drugs is too 
potent for other more ‘sober’ considerations of long-term health damage to have 
sufficient impact. 
   West’s comments on Davies’ The Myth of Addiction are highly critical. He begins 
his evaluation of Davies’ model by recognising80 the importance of his insight 
that ‘[addiction] terminology … serves a function for the user. In this case, 
attributing certain activities to addiction enables the addict or other members of 
society to meet their physical or emotional needs regarding help and 
understanding’81. Nevertheless, West argues, the suggestion that addiction 
                                           
79 Robert West, Theory of Addiction, p.32. 
80 West, Theory of Addiction, p.31. 
81 ibid. 
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language is entirely functional and has no basis in reality flies in the face of the 
evidence. What is being ignored here by Davies and others who argue along 
similar lines is the demonstrable fact that ‘denial of the reality of the phenomena 
of addiction, including the feelings of craving and compulsion are contradicted 
by observation. These phenomena are not myths’.82 West does not want to rule 
choice out altogether. The choices we make in respect of our appetites, including 
economical (in the broadest sense) cost benefit analyses of behaviours, with their 
conscious and unconscious elements remain potent in his analysis. 
   There are also, he claims, pharmacological factors relating to memories of 
pleasant experiences of use of the drug of choice. Ultimately, however, West 
argues that choice alone is not sufficient to explain addictive behaviour, and he 
develops in the course of his own book, as we shall see, a composite analysis of 
addiction that integrates a number of models into one comprehensive theory. 
 
Conclusion 
   It may be that Davies’ use of the word ‘myth’ provides more of a semantic re-
interpretation of the concept of addiction than one that is truly scientific. 
Mythical or not, many hundreds of people come for treatment at clinics where 
non-judgmental care is provided, and in many cases return over and over again 
in the hope that they will conquer the dependency that is eroding the quality of 
their lives: some achieve this without professional help, many cannot. We are 
therefore right to be wary of accepting the whole of Davies’ argument, as West, 
Orford and others point out. 
   Perhaps the most important contribution of Davies’ approach is his 
observation that providing ‘treatment’ for the ‘disease’ of addiction often seems 
                                           
82 West, p.32 
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to fail, or to require many episodes of intervention in order to change the 
behaviour of a drug user. So it is right to question the ‘disease’ concept of 
addiction: if something is not a pathological condition, treating it as such will be 
of no value. This is a valuable caveat which health care workers and public policy 
makers such as Government agencies and lawmakers would be unwise to ignore. 
   Although Davies’ warnings about the fallacy of treating something as an illness 
or disease when it is not an illness are important, there is an alternative body of 
evidence from the world of clinical intervention for those who are addicted for 
the use of medical language regarding their situation and its potential 
improvement or cure. What remains to be attempted in this part of the chapter 
is the relating of the addiction concept as critiqued by Davies in relation to the 
main driving force behind this thesis, which is concerned not only with medical 
or scientific approached to addiction but also to the religious and spiritual 
concerns that are also involved. It is hoped that this process will be helpful when 
addressing the needs of those who offer pastoral care to addicted individuals and 
their families, friends and colleagues – and also in matters of public policy83. 
Unlike Orford, Davies does not present a spiritual analysis of the issues 
surrounding addiction as a major theme. He does however bring spiritual ideas 
into the argument at one significant point in his discussion of the allegedly 
addictive properties of certain substances such as alcohol. On this view, 
Alcoholics Anonymous, which began as a religious response to alcoholism, 
regards any suggestion that an alcoholic can return to ‘normal’ levels of drinking 
as a theory that ‘strikes at the heart’ of their approach84. Why might this be the 
case? The problem is stated quite clearly in Davies’ comparison of alcoholism 
                                           
83 Public policy concerns relate for example to the classification of illicit drugs and issues such as licensing 
laws and the pricing of alcoholic beverages according to the number of units of alcohol they contain. 
84 Davies, The Myth of Addiction, p.66. 
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and gambling85: ‘like the notion of addiction as applied to alcohol (and other 
drugs) the notion of addiction to gambling removes the personal responsibility 
of the heavy gambler for his/her single-minded pursuit of gambling activity’. 
The gambler or alcoholic is in the view of these self-help organisations ‘in the 
grip of a progressive illness’. A small amount of drink, or money spent on 
gambling, leads to further and successively larger amounts, it is argued, and the 
inevitable chain of compulsion can only be broken by acknowledging a sense of 
helplessness and acquiring a sense of dependence on God or some form of 
‘higher power’86. One corollary of this explanation of substance or process 
dependency is then that by the use of disease terminology, the person with the 
problem can both avoid being regarded as ‘bad’ or ‘sinful’, because addiction is 
equivalent to other acquired diseases and not the fault of the sufferer, who 
cannot overcome the dependency without assistance. By implication, Davies 
argues, if we abandon the language of the disease of addiction, because it can be 
shown to be fallacious from a psycho-pharmacological perspective, then we can 
return to the dependent person both the responsibility for their activity, and for 
taking action to overcome it. There is here then in relation to religious thought, 
a challenge to the addicted person to accept responsibility for his or her problem, 
and to take action to avoid the activity in question, a process which might well, 
in conventional religious terms, include the invocation of divine grace to assist 
in the recovery. 
   What is entailed in such an approach however is not simply an appeal to any 
individual to take responsibility for his or her drug use (and by extension use of 
other potentially harmful substances such as alcohol or tobacco). There is clearly 
                                           
85 Davies, op. cit., p.71f. 
86 The Second Step of Alcoholics Anonymous’ Twelve Step Programme states that: 
‘We came to believe that a Power greater than ourselves could restore us to sanity’. This Power might be seen 
as God, but does not necessarily have a religious connotation. See: The Oxford Group and Alcoholics Anonymous, 
Dick B, p.302ff. 
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within Davies’ analysis of drug misuse recognition that the use of drugs is often 
associated with problems that are generated by society. This is particularly true, 
he argues, where in certain parts of the country (Glasgow being an obvious case) 
a part of that society is characterised by social and economic deprivation which 
plays a considerable part in generating drug use as a way of coping with a sense 
of human defeat and despair. A society that wishes to reduce the consumption 
of such substances, and the crime that is often generated by the process of 
obtaining them, needs therefore, in Davies’ view to address the social problems 
which often lead to drug misuse. 
   In conclusion, it will be apparent to the reader that Davies represents an 
extreme point of view. For him, there is no such thing as addiction. People 
choose to take drugs, drink excessive amounts of alcohol or engage in other 
activities that can seem to be addictive, but they do so from choice. Often they 
stop the activity of their own volition. Others, like Orford and West, criticise his 
theory. They too have theories, which are incompatible with that of Davies. So 
which is correct? Or could it be, that, as the author of this thesis contends, none 
of them has the whole picture because they start from the wrong place? If so, 
perhaps what we need to do is to revisit the question of addictive behaviour 
beginning from a new starting point, which is concerned not with the problem 
of addiction, but by asking questions about the individual who is arguably 
misusing certain substances, in terms of his or her own personal desires and 
longings, and then trying to see how the substance misuse related to those 
personal goals. That suggestion will be developed in the final chapter of the 
thesis. 
   For now, we will turn to the second conversation partner in this review of 
psychological theories, Jim Orford.  
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 1.2 Jim Orford Excessive Appetites  
   The second writer we are going to describe and evaluate in this chapter of 
the thesis is Jim Orford.  
 
Introduction 
   Orford is emeritus Professor of Addiction in the department of Psychology in 
the University of Birmingham, having worked previously on research into 
addiction problems at the Institute of Psychiatry. While working at the Addiction 
Research Unit there he obtained his doctorate.  After moving to Exeter he 
established a programme of development of services for people with alcohol 
problems there, before moving to the University of Birmingham. He has a 
special interest in gambling as an addictive behaviour and his most recent book 
explores this in detail87. 
   He describes his work as follows88 
I lead a group within the School of Psychology who are studying various 
aspects of alcohol and drug use and addiction from clinical and 
community psychology perspectives. The group’s research includes: 
study of untreated heavy drinkers; studies of how families cope with 
alcohol or drug problems and how such family problems are responded 
to in primary health care settings; a multi-centre study of treatment for 
alcohol problems; a national study of gambling; and a survey of drinking 
amongst members of ethnic minority groups in the West Midlands. 
 
   Orford’s other publications include contributions to the Journal of Community 
and Applied Social Psychology, and in addition to the book that this chapter of the 
thesis assesses, i.e. Excessive Appetites, “Empowering family and friends: a new 
approach to the prevention of alcohol and drug problems”, and Community 
Psychology: Theory and Practice. 
 
Orford’s View Of Addiction 
                                           
87 Jim Orford, An Unsafe Bet – the Dangerous Rise of Gambling and the Debate we Should Be Having. 
88 www.bham.ac.uk/people-pages/detail.php last consulted 06.06.2011. 
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   Of central importance for Orford is the context within which addictive 
behaviour happens. This approach avoids seeing people in isolation and regards 
them rather as persons living within one form or another of community 
structure. The dysfunctional aspects of such structures may then to some extent 
help to explain the individual addict’s substance or activity (e.g. gambling) 
behaviour. This community based approach is one that has also led him to co-
operate with others doing similar work in Mexico, Northern Territory Australia, 
and Cuba. 
   Orford represents the view that allows for the role of choice in the initial stages 
of drug or process dependency89, but he moves on to suggest that what begins 
as choice, in relation to the use of illicit drugs, for example, becomes, for some 
people, a necessity, and therefore in some sense a symptom of dis-ease, although 
he is careful to reject any suggestion that addiction is to be regarded as a 
‘physical’ disease in the usual sense of that word90. His book91 and article on 
addiction as excessive appetite92 therefore take a very different point of view 
from that of J. B. Davies93, in that, as Orford critiques him,  ‘addiction is “a 
myth”; some have claimed (Davies, 1992). Addiction…is no myth. Each of the 
excessive appetites…spoils many lives, and often shortens them’94. 
 
Definition Of Addiction 
   At the beginning of his 2001 article for Addiction journal, Orford quotes John 
Downame, a seventeenth century English parson who wrote about some of his 
parishioners who were having problems with controlling their intake of alcohol. 
                                           
89 In this sense he shares some of the ideas of J. B. Davies whom we discussed in the last chapter. 
90 Jim Orford, Excessive Appetites, p. 344. 
91 Jim Orford, Excessive Appetites. 
92 Jim Orford, “Addiction as Excessive Appetite”. 
93 Orford, “Addiction as Excessive Appetite”, p.28. 
94 For J. B. Davies’s important contribution, which has already been evaluated in this ‘psychological theories’ 
section of the thesis, see: John Booth Davies, The Myth of Addiction, 2nd edition. 
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It is worth quoting this clergyman in extenso, because, as Orford observes, he 
provides an excellent (and possibly unsurpassed) definition of what addiction 
means95: 
they who addict themselves to this vice, do find it so sweete and pleasing 
to the flesh that they are loth to part with it, and by long custome they 
turne delight into necessity and bring vpon themselues such an 
vnsatiable thirst that they will as willingly leaue to liue as leaue their 
excessiue drinking, and howsoeuer the manifold mischiefes into which 
they plunge themselues serue as so manie forceful arguments to disswade 
them from this vice, yet against all rules of reason they hold fast their 
conclusion that come what come may, they will not leaue their 
drunkenness. 
 
   The key words here are ‘delight’ and ‘necessity’, as they show how in 
Downame’s enlightened perception of the problem, an activity which is at first 
harmless and enjoyable can become something over which the individual 
concerned has incrementally little or no choice or control.                            
   Orford’s article, which develops the ideas in his first edition,96 and introduces 
its 2007 edition97, focuses on a number of related issues, but three in particular 
have relevance to this thesis, i.e.: 
1) The widening of the concept of addiction to include gambling, eating 
and sex as well as alcohol and drugs 
 
2) An interpretation of the concept of addiction based on strong 
attachment to a particular substance (e.g. alcohol) and a sense of 
‘dissonance’, that is to say a wish to give up or reduce the activity 
 
3) The observation, based on good research evidence, that varying forms of 
treatment seem to have comparable outcomes, and that often 
spontaneous remission seems to occur without professional intervention 
of any kind98 
 
                                           
95 Orford, Addiction as Excessive Appetite, p.16. This quotation comes from J. Warner, “Resolv’d to Drink 
No More: addiction as a preindustrial construct”, Journal of Studies in Alcohol, 1994, volume 55, pp. 685-691. 
96 Jim Orford, Excessive Appetites: a Psychological View of Addiction, 1992. 
97 Orford, Excessive Appetites: a Psychological View of Addiction, 2nd edition, 2007.. 
98 Orford looks at a number of such spontaneous remission outcomes, and, significantly from the point of 
view of this research, includes concepts such as spirituality and morality as pressures for change: see 
“Addiction as Excessive Appetite”, p.26. 
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   This recognises that these pleasurable activities, many of which, such as sex, 
are perfectly good in themselves, do for some people have the potential to move 
from the category of ‘pleasurable’, to that of ‘compulsive’:  
   ‘Here we have recognition that, by long usage, an activity that was originally 
pleasurable has become a ‘necessity’; that a strong craving is part of the 
experience; and that despite the many harms that it has brought, neither the 
exercise of reason nor encouragement from others have been sufficient to bring 
about control’.99  
   For Orford the use of substances like alcohol may well be regarded as perfectly 
healthy in itself. There is nevertheless the possibility that in the context of 
interlocking personal and social factors, a point may be reached at which a once 
controllable activity passes beyond the control of the individuals concerned, so 
that they are no longer able to stop the behaviour at will. This is a very different 
model from Davies’ hypothesis, which concentrates exclusively on the role of 
choice, even when to outside eyes those choices (to use heroin frequently, for 
example) seem disastrous for the individual, her family, and for society as whole.  
Orford, like  others who start from the basic premise that addiction is in some 
sense a disease, and definitely not a ‘myth’100, acknowledges the role of choice as 
part of the process of addiction, but also suggests that, in line with Parson 
Downame’s observations, some people move from the enjoyment of alcohol as 
a chosen source of pleasure – ‘delight’, to use his own word – to a point where 
its consumption becomes a necessity, or even a vice, to introduce an ethical 
element into the discussion. At this point, the concept of compulsiveness has 
traction, because the behaviour in question cannot now be controlled at will. At 
this point, Orford suggests, what is generated is a feeling of ‘dissonance’ about 
                                           
99 Orford, “Addiction as Excessive Appetite”, p.16. 
100 See, for example, E. M. Jellinek, The Disease Concept of Alcoholism. 
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the drug taking activity, and about the need for treatment, combined with a sense 
of needing to change101. 
   What then are the factors that interact to cause addiction? Orford identifies a 
number of these. It is important to recognise that Orford is careful not to 
generalise the way in which drugs and activities become addictive. There are 
however, in Orford’s words, certain ‘core addictions’ that bring the syndrome 
and its description into sharper focus, and these include, as we have already 
observed: drinking, gambling, drug taking, eating, smoking, exercise and sex. 
   In order to examine this ‘excessive appetite’ syndrome in more depth, let us 
now look at  one of those activities and the means by which an activity changes 
from one over which the individual has full control to one in which there is 
partial or no control. In analysing nicotine dependency, Orford recalls the work 
of McKennell and Thomas in the 1960’s, whose Government authorised 
survey102 looked at the smoking habits of adolescent and adult smoking patterns. 
They introduced the phrase ‘dissonant smoking’, and Orford regards this phrase 
as highly significant in helping to understand the nature of addictive or substance 
dependent behaviours. As the ideas of McKennell and Thomas have relevance 
for more than one such behaviour, it is worth quoting their findings: 
Dissonant smokers appear to be people who are trapped by the smoking 
habit, somewhat against their will. The majority of them have in fact 
tried several times to give up smoking. One of the most remarkable 
findings that emerges from social surveys of smokers’ habits and 
attitudes is the very large number who express a wish to give up smoking 
or else have tried to do so. 
 
   So what is the reason for this dissonance? In defining addiction Orford 
suggests that the key factor is the degree of difficulty that a person experiences 
in giving up an activity that he knows to be ‘causing harm’103. How does an 
                                           
101 Orford, Excessive Appetites, p.254-255. 
102 A. McKennell and R. Thomas, “Adults’ and Adolescents’ Smoking Habits and Attitudes”, cited by Orford: 
“Addiction as Excessive Appetite”, p.17. 
103 Orford, Addiction as Excessive Appetite, p.18. 
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acceptable desire for sex, for example, become excessive? One important factor, 
Orford suggests, is that if there were no societal restraints on behaviours, many 
more people would graduate from moderate, enjoyable engagement in them to 
excessive and potentially harmful indulgence. It is the presence of deterrence 
and restraint elements in our societies that prevents this from happening. 
Evidence for this theory can be found in the research carried out by Jessor et 
al.104 who discovered a relatively high degree of substance misuse among school 
and university students who are often associated with unconventional or non-
conforming behaviour patterns; the obverse of this also appears to be true – 
where people exhibit a high degree of conformity to the norms of a specialised 
group (such as a religious movement) the prevalence of addictive behaviour is 
correspondingly low 105. 
   Another factor, Orford suggests, is what he terms the developmental theory. 
This suggests that the likelihood of developing addictive behaviour is 
cumulative: in Orford’s words, ‘the chances of proceeding to the next stage, or 
of responding to the next positive influence inclining towards further 
‘consumption’ are greater the more previous ‘stages’ have been passed through 
or the greater the number of previous influences that have been effective’106. 
 
The Relationship Between Addiction And Spirituality In Orford’s Work 
   In relation to the topic of this current research, namely the generation of an 
integrated psychological and theological theory of addiction and care for people 
with addiction problems, we note that Orford also includes spiritual ideas. In the 
final section of his article107 Orford introduces aspects of addiction and care for 
                                           
104 See: R. Jessor, J. E. Donovan and F. M. Costa, Beyond Adolescence: Problem Behaviour and Young Adult 
Development. 
105 See: W. R. Miller, “Researching the Spiritual Dimensions of Alcohol and other Drug Problems”. 
106 Orford, “Addiction as Excessive Appetite”, p.20. 
107 op. cit 
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the addicted using the language of spirituality and morality. Two brief quotations 
will reflect this interest108: 
1) Miller (1998)109 has written of the neglect of the spiritual component in 
the theory and practice of addictive behaviour change despite its clear 
presence in the philosophy of Alcoholics Anonymous and other 12-step 
programmes…. [Miller strengthens] the argument that the change 
process is not to be understood most readily by accepting the supposed 
rationales of modern physical or  psychological treatments, or by taking 
too seriously their techniques, but rather by an appreciation of the 
factors that are common to a variety of forms, whether religious, 
medical, psychological or unaided. 
 
2) Is it too fanciful, then, to go one step further and conclude that giving 
up an excessive appetite is essentially a process of moral reform, or, as 
Gusfield (1962)110 put it, one of ‘moral passage out of deviance’? 111 
(emphasis added). 
 
   In the last chapter of his book112 Orford summarises the point he has made 
earlier about the inclusion of spiritual and ethical aspects of change by suggesting 
a two stage process of change from addictive behaviour, one which is cognitive 
– a perceived wish to change - and one that has an important social dimension, 
conceived in terms that clearly include spiritual and moral elements113. 
   There are resonances here with aspects of more specifically religious thought, 
and in particular the forms of pastoral ministry that involve a theology of social, 
spiritual and moral interaction as the basis of their work; for the Christian 
theologian, this also must take account of the concept of human sinfulness, with 
its counterbalancing features of repentance, forgiveness and redemption, which 
will form an important part of our later discussion of pastoral responses to the 
problems of addiction. For the moment the reader’s attention is drawn to the 
already cited study114 of religious aspects of the recovery from drug addiction by 
                                           
108 Orford, op. cit.p.27. 
109 W. R. Miller, “Researching the Spiritual Dimensions of Alcohol and other Drug Problems”, cited by 
Orford, “Addiction as Excessive Appetite”, p.27. 
110 “Status Conflicts and the Changing Ideologies of the American Temperance Movement”. 
111 Orford, Excessive Appetites, p.332. 
112 op. cit., chapter 14 on ‘Giving Up Excess’ 
113 op. cit., p.343. 
114 John D. Sellman, Michael P. Baker et al., “Future of God in Recovery from Drug Addiction”. 
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John D. Sellman, Michael Baker et al., which concludes that the belief of the 
addicted person in a Higher Power can be shown to have a positive effect on 
recovery.  
 
                   Moral Issues 
   On the moral aspects of addiction, although Orford at several points 
introduces an ethical element115, he does not provide a basis for ethical 
discrimination as to what varieties and amounts of addictive behaviour can be 
considered immoral, and on what philosophical basis this may be inferred. A 
later chapter of this thesis (on theological aspects of addiction) will further 
investigate this moral dimension, particularly as instantiated by the work of 
Christopher Cook. It is also a fair criticism of Orford’s ethical stance that he 
emphasizes the role of the individual within society in terms of moral duty, and 
the way in which societies may help to control anti-social or unhealthy 
behaviour, but does not look, as for example Christopher Cook does116, at the 
role of society itself as a determinant in relation to addictive behaviour, not least 
in terms of the arguably collusive behaviour of governments which enact laws 
designed to reduce drunkenness, while at the same time benefiting greatly 
through tax generated income via the sale of intoxicating beverages. We will 
devote further space to this highly important element of the morality of alcohol 
addiction in the chapter on theology and its contribution to our understanding 
of addiction. 
                                           
115 Orford, Excessive Appetites p. 270, records the attitude of religious (specifically Christian) churches to 
excessive activity in relation to a number of behaviour patterns. Although this particular section is concerned 
with attitudes to sexual excess, he acknowledges that ‘the same may be said to differing degrees about 
indulgence in gambling, drinking, some other forms of drug taking and even of over-indulgence in eating’. 
116 See Christopher C. H. Cook, Alcohol, Addiction and Christian Ethics, particularly in chapter 7 of this book, 
which we will analyse in greater detail in the theological section of this thesis. 
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   As one purpose of this thesis is however to look for analogies between clinical 
and theological concepts to be found within a comprehensive and integrative 
study of addiction it will be worth raising at this juncture some points at which 
the psychological theory of Orford and his understanding of the spiritual 
dimension coincide. What conceptual Christian theological language might be 
available to guide us towards a deeper understanding of addiction from a 
spiritual and ethical perspective? 
   The key word here may well prove to be ‘sin’. As Downame117 observed, there 
is within the phenomenon of addiction a turning away from modes of living that 
are essentially life enhancing to those which have a capacity rather for generating 
a lifestyle characterised by ‘manifold mischiefes’118 and even the danger of death. 
Some people have therefore, in Downame’s view, taken the kind of wrong 
turning in their lives that is, in essence, what Christian theology regards as sinful 
behaviour.  
   There are many ways of interpreting the concept of sin. We will be 
investigating the concept in the theological chapter of this thesis, with particular 
reference to Saint Paul, and Saint Augustine of Hippo, who both have important 
contributions to make to the idea of the proper housing of desire in a Christian 
context. It is noteworthy that Orford draws significantly on the ethical and 
spiritual elements that are often viewed side by side in contemporary attempts 
to give help to addicted people, and although as he puts it via a quotation from 
Glasser119 the ‘mental health professions’ are ‘famously and fashionably 
irreligious’, many of the helping professions draw equally on religious and secular 
models to deliver their care – speaking of the treatment of ‘skid-row’ alcoholics 
                                           
117 See Orford, Excessive Appetites, p.14, quoting the parish priest of that name writing about the behaviour of 
some members of his congregation in 1609. 
118 ibid. 
119 F. Glasser, “Some historical aspects of the drug-free therapeutic community”, pp. 9-10. 
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in a United States city on the west coast, it was clear that ‘Among these [agencies] 
were the county jail, the state mental hospital, a welfare home for homeless  men, 
and, among a variety of others, a Christian missionaries’ work and residence 
centre for handicapped men’120. And in the conclusion to the chapter in which 
this quotation is to be found, Orford advances the theory that because the inner 
conflicts which so often lie at the heart of addiction include ‘mental, social and 
spiritual-moral ones, we should not be surprised that the change process 
involves all these elements as well as changes in behaviour’121. There is then a 
holistic view taken by Orford, recognising the potential of both clinical and 
spiritual/moral intervention to bring help to addiction sufferers. 
 
Critical Views Of Orford’s Work 
   Has Orford’s view an important contribution to make to the debate about the 
origins of addictive behaviours? Reviewing the second edition of Excessive 
Appetites,122 John Macleod observes that this book: 
informs some of these questions. It develops a comprehensive theory 
encompassing problem substance abuse, gambling, eating and drinking 
disorders and ‘sex addiction’. Orford argues convincingly that all these 
problem behaviours have more characteristics in common than those 
that separate them. Centrally, they all involve strong attachment to an 
activity, once positive, that is now costly and associated with personal 
conflict. 
 
   This is an excellent description of what Orford intends, and accomplishes with 
a great deal of success. Its value as a contribution to the theory of addiction is 
also emphasised by Robert West in Theory of Addiction123 in which he says that 
‘this model is extraordinary in its scope and captures features of addiction that 
others do not….combining ideas from Learning Theory with those from Choice 
                                           
120 Orford, op. cit., p.339. 
121 op. cit., p.340. 
122 John Macleod, review article, Family Practice Journal. 
123 Robert West, Theory of Addiction, p.116f. 
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Theory as well as social psychology and sociology.’ At the heart of the theory, 
he notes, is the concept of personal conflict in addicted behaviour, rather than 
the attachment to such activities in itself. 
   West suggests however that the radical nature and the scope of his theory has 
so far made it difficult for the theory to be satisfactorily tested by researchers: 
although it remains intuitively strong as an approach, there is as yet insufficient 
experimental evidence to test its efficacy. But the theory seems to be one that 
has intrinsic value and is well respected by addiction theorists. 
   The internal consistency of Orford’s theory and the potential for making use 
of it in a therapeutic environment lead the author of this thesis to think that of 
the psychologically based addiction theories presented in this chapter Orford 
has the best claim to a clear understanding of addiction. He also recognises that 
in addition to purely psychological theories, it may be of considerable 
importance to include attention to ‘social’, i.e. spiritual and ethical considerations 
in looking at the needs of the addicted person. But there remain some problems 
with his theory which despite its heuristic practicality leave it open to intellectual 
challenge, and these will now be addressed. 
   In the first place, it is striking that Orford does not make any attempt in the 
book Excessive Appetites to evaluate – or even acknowledge to any significant 
extent – the part that is possibly played by heredity in the aetiology of 
addiction124. It is true that when he first published the book, in 2001, genetic 
theories of addiction were very much in their infancy, and so it is possible to 
understand his reluctance to enter that field of scholarly debate at that time. By 
the time of his second edition in 2007, however, the scientific appraisal of the 
                                           
124 On page 344 he does acknowledge briefly and parenthetically that there is a debate to be had about the 
role of heritability in the aetiology of addiction. ‘[T]his is not to deny the probable contribution genetic 
determinants at many points in developing and giving up addictions’, but he does not analyse the genetic 
contribution in any detail. 
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contributory role of genetic heritability of a disposition towards addictive 
behaviour, in the case of alcohol dependency, for example, was much further 
advanced and important links were being made between genes and addiction125. 
One therefore wonders whether Orford’s reluctance to acknowledge the 
contribution of genetic research to addiction study was caused by ignorance of 
the subject, disagreement with its provisional findings, or the belief that what it 
was suggesting, although interesting, was not of great importance. Genetics has 
an increasingly important role in the understanding of addiction, and to that 
extent Orford’s omission of any information on this aspect of addiction seems 
regrettable. 
   In the second place, and again looking at Orford’s work in general rather than 
particular terms, he is clearly in principle on the side of those who believe that 
addiction is a form of sickness or disease such as the model put forward by 
Jellinek and Gelkopf126, in that, as Robert West expresses it,127 addiction ‘involves 
an abnormality of structure or function in the CNS that results in an 
impairment… It can be diagnosed using standard criteria and in principle it can 
be treated’. In this sense Orford, although he is reluctant to define addiction as 
a disease, recognises it as something that is treatable by clinical intervention, 
among other possible treatment methods such as social pressure, and that people 
who are addicted need therefore to be treated either by conventional clinical 
interventions or by the influence of environmental social factors. But is this true? 
                                           
125 See, for example, David Ball’s research on the genetics of alcohol addiction: “Addiction science and its 
genetics”, which builds on earlier genetic research such as Tsuang et al. “Genetic influences on DSM III R 
drug abuse and dependence: a study of  3372 twin pairs”, and describes his own research and its implications: 
and Robert Plomin, whose major work Genetics and Experience  pointed to the complexity of the relationship 
between genetic determination and experiential factors in terms of their power to predict a wide range of 
personality and behavioural factors in the understanding of human motivation. Griffith Edwards in Matters of 
Substance, p.258 also refers to the likelihood of genetic involvement in the adoption of alcoholism. 
126 E. M. Jellinek, The Disease Concept of Alcoholism, and M. Gelkopf and S. Levitt et al., “An Integration of three 
approaches to addiction and methadone maintenance treatment: the self –medication hypothesis, the disease 
model and social criticism”.  
127 West, Theory of Addiction, p.76 
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It is a vitally important question, because to treat something as an illness when 
it is not one is clearly a case of misdirected clinical care. It is as foolish as 
plastering a leg that is not broken in the belief that the leg will somehow benefit 
from this inappropriate treatment. Furthermore, as J. B. Davies correctly 
observes in The Myth of Addiction128 the attribution of a disease concept to 
something which is not in fact a disease places the person who is so diagnosed 
in a ‘patient’ role in which his or her activities are seen as having little to do with 
personal choice, but rather to see them as largely or entirely compelled by forces 
that are beyond their control. This questionable approach may have advantages 
for the ‘patient’ in terms of self-understanding in terms of powerlessness, for the 
individual’s family and other members of the social environment, and for those 
who, from a professional point of view, set out to treat the individual through a 
variety of methods, psycho-pharmaceutical, psychotherapeutic and the 
methodology of the social worker and their contribution. So has Orford, contra 
Davies and others who think like him129 made the case for a clinically based 
understanding of addiction? 
   In answer to Davies, Orford has this to say:130 
Although it is argued that, under the right conditions appetites can 
become so strong that they seem disease-like, there are too many ways in 
which an excessive appetite is unlike a physical disease for that analogy 
to be very useful…. At the same time, the excessive appetites model is 
clear on one central point, and in this it is in agreement with disease 
models. Addiction does exist. It is a reality. There is something that 
cannot be explained simply in terms of reactions to deviant behaviours 
or self-attributions about behaviour that serve to reduce censure. 
 
                                           
128 J. B. Davies, (The Myth of Addiction, p.170) argues that the best way to achieve a better a degree of control 
of chaotic drug misuse is not by labelling people as addicts but by abandoning ‘a response based on an 
escalating and ineffective tariff of legal sanctions against drug use… while handing personal control back to 
those who are involved’. 
129 See for example J. O. Prochaska, C. C. Di Clemente and J. C. Norcross, “In search of how people 
change”. Their work explicates a theory of addiction and its treatment in a conceptual approach usually 
referred to as the ‘transtheoretical model’. 
130 Orford, Excessive Appetites, p.344. 
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   This firm assertion of the reality of addiction as a phenomenon that genuinely 
exists is welcome: what  seems problematic for Orford, in a way that he does 
not satisfactorily resolve, is the question of whether addictive behaviour is or 
can be a form of clinical disturbance that can to some extent be treated by clinical 
intervention such as cognitive behavioural therapy, or whether, as he suggests in 
relation to the decision by an entire village in a Fijian village to give up 
smoking131, the most important factor towards the abandoning of a harmful 
practice is more likely to be that which occurs as a result of  social pressures to 
conform to a more beneficial lifestyle. At times Orford seems to be claiming that 
addiction is a treatable disease, and at others that it is a personal lifestyle which, 
as it is experienced as excessive, leads to internal conflict because it is perceived 
by the individual concerned as harmful or by the society in which the individual 
lives. It is questionable whether Orford ultimately comes down on one side or 
the other, and this leads to some confusion in his understanding of addiction. 
   Two additional issues require some comment. The first is his use of the term 
‘excessive’. How are we to assess whether the practice of drinking alcohol or the 
use of cannabis is excessive? Who makes the distinction between normal and 
excessive? And in the case of some illicit drugs such as heroin (except in its 
medically authorised use for the control of the symptoms of disease such as 
cancer or heart attack) it is possible to question whether there can actually be a 
meaningful distinction between normal and excessive use. The only reliable 
measure offered by Orford seems to be either the highly subjective awareness 
of excess which leads someone to try to overcome their habit, (the ‘dissonance’ 
factor), or the disapproval of a particular society. These are important elements 
in the recognition of addiction but are arguably too subjective and culture 
                                           
131 Orford, op. cit., p.308. 
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specific to operate successfully as universal guides to a robust definition of what 
excess actually means. 
   The word appetite also needs careful interpretation. Human appetite ranges 
over many normal and acceptable activities, eating, drinking alcohol, sex, 
gambling, etc. Some of these activities, such as eating and sexual activity, are vital 
to human survival: others, such as the use of alcohol, are matters of personal 
choice at least in societies which do not proscribe them completely, as is the case 
with alcohol in some Muslim countries. What is troubling about Orford’s use of 
the word appetite in relation to addiction is that, for many people who have 
addiction problems, it could be argued that the word appetite does not really 
describe the experience of someone who is under the power of addiction. 
Appetite suggests something essentially pleasant and rewarding. For many 
addicts however there is only one persistent appetite and that is the desire to 
abandon what is at some level of awareness seen as a harmful activity, even if 
that desire is occluded by a conflicting need to continue it. In this sense it is 
perhaps worth asking the question whether Orford’s use of this ambiguous word 
‘appetite’ in his attempt to define addiction actually clouds the definition rather 
than clarifying it. 
 
Some Conclusions: Addiction – A Disease?   
   There is for the present writer a highly significant question that arises from the 
concerns expressed in this chapter on Orford’s contribution about, for example, 
whether addiction should be seen as a disease or not, and to what extent the 
word appetite is helpful in defining addiction as a clinical or social phenomenon. 
Is it then ultimately more realistic to suggest that neither the disease based 
models of addiction, nor those of the excessive appetite model, nor the choice 
based ‘myth of addiction’ model adequately explain addiction in its entirety, and 
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whether in reality different approaches work best in different situations and with 
different people? For some people, on this view, there may well be a propensity 
to addiction that is determined by both genetic and environmental factors in a 
way which that they cannot easily overcome by their own efforts or without 
clinical intervention, while for others, in difficult circumstances, life with the use 
of alcohol or an illicit drug is more bearable than life without it. However strange 
or illogical such a choice may seem to the onlooker, that may still be the best 
explanation in some cases. It has been observed132 that no particular treatment 
seems better than any other, and it may be that this observation in itself lends 
some support to the supposition that a generalised theory of the causes of 
addiction may well prove to be more of a hindrance than a help in determining 
what addiction really is, and how to give appropriate treatment where it is 
considered necessary. 
   What is perhaps most important in our search for a reliable guide to the nature 
of addiction is the fundamental disagreement between Orford and Davies as to 
whether addiction is a disease or not. Both have strong opinions, and there is 
much to be said on both sides of the argument, one which is so far unresolved 
in the psychological approaches to addiction. Such considerations may perhaps 
encourage us to look for a radically different starting point in approaching the 
subject of addiction. If so, and if, as this thesis will argue, we need to start from 
the position of trying to understand human desire and longing in a positive sense, 
then Orford’s ‘appetite’ based model may well prove to be a strong indicator 
that such an approach may be effective, because it begins with a more positive 
appraisal of the role that appetite plays in the choices human beings make to 
                                           
132 ‘Project MATCH’ is a case in point where different forms of clinical intervention and no intervention at all 
have been demonstrated to have no significance in the sense that they all produce roughly the same outcome 
– see: Project MATCH Research Group (1977a) matching alcoholism treatments to client heterogeneity: 
project MATCH post-treatment drinking outcome. 
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engage positively or destructively with activities that can become for some 
individuals a prison from which they find it hard to escape.     
 
          
1.3 Robert West: Theory of Addiction  
 
Introduction 
   Robert West is currently Professor of Health Care Psychology at University 
College London, and editor in chief of the journal Addiction, which is one of the 
most important current scholarly contributions to the study of the subject. He 
has a particular interest in nicotine addiction, as suggested by a number of 
publications, beginning in 1993, with an article entitled “Beneficial effects of 
nicotine: fact or fiction?”133, and in 1995, an article entitled “Nicotine is addictive: 
the issues of free choice”134, and more recently, a book entitled Smoking 
Cessation135. His personal contribution to the subject of addiction, which can be 
studied in detail on the website www.primetheory.com136, provides the student 
of addiction with an integrated methodology for studying the phenomenon and 
aetiology of addiction in terms of human motivation. 
 
Exposition Of West’s Theory Of Addiction 
   Robert West has provided a comprehensive survey and critical analysis of a 
variety of currently espoused psychological theories of addiction that underpin 
clinical practice. He looks at the various genres of theory, those which regard 
addictive behaviour as a choice, based on a cost-benefit analysis relative to 
                                           
133 Robert West, “Beneficial effects of nicotine: fact or fiction?”. 
134 Robert West, “Nicotine is addictive: the issue of free choice”, in The Effects of Nicotine on Biological Systems II. 
135 Robert West and S. Shiffman, Smoking Cessation. 
136 www.primetheory.com Website last consulted on 14.06.2013. 
 67 
people’s situation in life, and those which emphasise the pathological, 
compulsive factors that arguably play a significant role in causing addiction. He 
also looks at theories which incorporate both ‘choice’ and ‘disease’ concepts. 
   Having analysed the many available theories, he provides us with his own 
theory, which synthesizes what he regards as the most compelling arguments he 
has explored into a motivational model, which he calls p.r.i.m.e theory. 
 
The Main Elements Of West’s Book Described 
   West’s approach in this book is to look at individual theories, evaluate them, 
and then use them to build up a theoretical framework, including what he 
considers to be the useful elements in each, while rejecting those elements which 
he regards as unsubstantiated. In essence, he is discussing choice based and 
disease based theories of addiction and we will look at both of these in turn. 
1) Choice based theories of addiction 
  West’s earlier chapters deal with the role that choice plays in initiating 
and establishing addictive behaviour – to the addict, life with the substance 
of choice is preferable to life without it, because the substance provides 
excitement, or relief from unpleasant symptoms such as anxiety137. 
   One representative of this choice based theory of substance dependency 
identified by West is John Booth Davies’ book, The Myth of Addiction, which 
we explored earlier in this chapter of the thesis, noting critical comments 
on Davies’ work from West himself138. Davies claims in his book, as we 
observed, that people who drink too much alcohol or take mind altering 
                                           
137 On symptomatic relief and addiction as a form of self-medication, West cites P.F. Buckley, “Substance 
Abuse in Schizophrenia, a review”. 
138 See West, Theory of Addiction, p. 31f, where West describes Davies’ ‘myth of addiction’ approach by 
recognising the importance of its contribution, while ultimately regarding it as inadequate because clinical 
observation of the effects of substance misuse on sufferers make it, in West’s analysis, impossible to disregard 
the part played by ‘craving and compulsion’. 
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drugs such as heroin or crack cocaine do so because they want to, perhaps 
because so doing brings some relief in a distressing or seemingly hopeless 
social situation. They do not have a disease: no-one is forcing them to 
behave in this way. 
   West also mentions Prochaska and Di Clemente139, whose 
‘transtheoretical’ choice model suggests a step by step journey towards 
recovery from addiction rather than focussing on the aetiology of 
addiction itself: a journey involving a number of ‘stages’ in the sense of 
travelling through a number of internal experiences in the attempt to give 
up using the drug of choice, from ‘pre-contemplation’ to positive action 
to give up, and the maintenance of that state of abstinence when it has 
been achieved. Therapeutic input according to Prochaska does not 
‘pathologise’ or excuse the behaviour, but provides reinforcement at each 
stage of movement away from the use of the behaviour or substance. West 
acknowledges140 that ‘the model has revolutionised health promotion, 
claiming that interventions that are tailored to the particular state of the 
individual improve their effectiveness’, as Prochaska and Velicer tried to 
demonstrate141. But he addresses problems with the model, the most 
telling of these being the criticism that ‘it neglects the roles of reward and 
punishment and of associative learning in developing habits that are hard 
to break’142. He concludes his analysis of this model by suggesting that it 
is the wrong kind of intervention, partly because of its own internal 
inconsistencies, and partly because the application of the theory as a 
clinical intervention may mask the fact that there may be more effective 
                                           
139 J. O. Prochaska and C. C. Di Clemente et al. “Predicting changes in smoking status for self-changers”. 
This model is referred to in the literature either as the ‘transtheoretical’ or ‘stages of change’ model. 
140 West, Theory of Addiction, p.68 
141 J. O. Prochaska and W. F. Velicer, “The transtheoretical model of health behavior change”. 
142 West, Theory of Addiction, p.69. 
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treatments available, particularly those which emphasize ‘the strong 
situational determinants of behaviour’143. 
   Another element of choice theory explores the role of desire in relation 
to addiction, and this section of West’s chapter on choice models is 
important for two reasons. 
   In the first place it has a common sense feel to it – it seems intuitive to 
suppose that people decide to drink alcohol, smoke cigarettes, use illicit 
drugs and perform other behaviours because they enjoy them, at least at 
the stage when they have active control over them.  
   Secondly, in trying to discover analogies with theological concepts, 
desire and the ‘education of desire’ have an important place in theological 
reflections on human life144. This will be explored in greater detail in the 
chapter on theological approaches to the theory of addiction. For the 
moment, however, we will look at how West understands the role of desire 
in the aetiology of addiction from a psychological point of view. 
   The decision whether or not to act on the basis of desire is influenced 
by several factors, West says. There is a ‘weighing up of the costs and 
benefits of the behaviour, which change over time, and the appreciation 
of which changes over time’145. The problem that we call addiction arises 
because these ‘costs and benefits may involve mental representations to 
which we do not have full conscious access’146. There are influences on 
such behaviours which are propelled by both ‘pharmacological and non-
pharmacological factors’, the latter involving ‘one’s own sense of self and 
                                           
143 West, op. cit., p.71. 
144 See, for example, David F. Ford, Christian Wisdom, Desiring God and Learning in Love. Commenting on I 
Corinthians 13:12, he makes the point (p.178) that the completion of an individual’s capacity for love in the 
presence of God is ‘the fulfilment of transformed desire. It is the deepest motivation for the disciplines of 
desire and action in ordinary life’. 
145 West, Theory of Addiction, p.73. 
146 ibid. 
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what one wants to be, and possibly by biases in attention to and memory 
for stimuli related to the addictive behaviour’ 147. In West’s analysis, 
however, a choice based model of addiction is not ultimately adequate. 
‘The problem with this [choice based theory] is that it does not accord 
with the experiences of many addicts’148, such as feelings of compulsion, 
which as West observes, often occur when the person with the problem is 
actively trying to stop the addictive behaviour149. At such times what is felt 
is not something which can be attributed solely to desire, however 
forceful: something else is happening, which constitutes a craving that 
cannot easily be overcome. In moving from choice based to more disease 
based theories, West seeks to explain this phenomenon in detail, and it is 
to this section of his book that we therefore now turn our attention. 
2) Disease Models of the aetiology of addiction 
   Beginning in chapter 4, West looks at other elements in the aetiology of 
addiction, namely those based not on choice but on some form of 
pathological compulsion. There are issues of non-conscious ‘impulse and 
control’, that is to say, a range of psychological determinants of addictive 
behaviour, including factors related to personality types150, and consequent 
conflicts between cravings and the desire for self-control. There is also the 
question of the influence of drugs themselves on addiction, in relation, for 
example to the ways in which, in neurological terms, substances such as 
heroin, tobacco, and alcohol provide a reward, but also help to generate a 
                                           
147 ibid. 
148 West, op.cit. p.75. 
149 West, Theory of Addiction, p.75. 
150 See in particular, C.R. Cloninger, “A Systematic method for Clinical Description and Classification of 
Personality Variants”. A connected theory, with clinical evidence in support, can be found in an article by 
Natalie Castellanos and Patricia Conrod: “Brief interventions targeting personality risk factors for adolescent 
substance misuse reduce depression, panic and risk-taking behaviours”. 
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physiological tolerance, and therefore the craving for them, which in time 
becomes definable as addiction. 
   West addresses the failure of the ‘choice’ theory, in its purest form, to 
deal with the actual experience of people who are addicted and who 
experience, when they try to give up their habit, ‘a feeling of compulsion 
that is distinct from simple desire. It is not even that it is a “strong desire”: 
it is an urge that they are trying to resist’.151 Here the disease model begins 
to have traction. What then is the reason for these ‘urges’ that are more 
powerful than ‘strong desire’? 
   This disease concept is based on the work of E. M. Jellinek152, who 
proposed ‘that the pathology underlying addiction involves changes in the 
brain that lead people to do things against their will’.153 This cluster of 
symptoms West describes as Irrational Choice Theory154. They still involve 
choice, but also recognition that choice can be eroded by a form of 
compulsion. 
   The chapter on concepts of impulse and self–control155 explains this 
from a psychological point of view. The one that follows it156 addresses 
the question by taking the reader into the area of conditioning and 
instrumental learning processes as examples of what West calls Irrational 
Choice Theory. 
 
                                           
151 West, Theory of Addiction, p.75. 
152 E. M. Jellinek, The Disease Concept of Alcoholism. J. B. Davies in The Myth of Addiction unsurprisingly refers 
unfavourably to this work, because it starts from the unwarranted assumption that there is such a thing as a 
disease of alcoholism, which in some way forces people to abuse alcohol: they do not, so to speak, ‘do it on 
purpose’. See Davies, op.cit. p.107. 
153 West, Theory of Addiction p.75. The word pathology has been emphasized here by the author of this thesis in 
order to mark a change in the language that West is using from one based exclusively on aspects of 
(conscious and unconscious) choice to one that is tending towards a ‘disease’ model of addiction. 
154 West, op. cit., p.75. By contrast, he describes the choice based option that has been previously discussed as 
a Rational Choice Theory. 
155 op. cit., chapter 4. 
156 op. cit., chapter 5. 
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Conditioning 
   The foundational work that underlies modern conditioning theories originates 
in the work of Pavlov, who famously experimented with salivation of dogs in 
response to the sound of a bell that they associated with the delivery of food. In 
West’s adaptation of this theory, in terms of motivation to use drugs to achieve 
a certain psychological state of arousal or satisfaction, it is what the drug will 
achieve for the user that makes it desirable. The process is described in the 
psychology of addiction literature, for example, by D. C. Drummond157. The 
process with regard to alcohol is described in this way by West, paraphrasing 
Drummond:158 
For example, falling blood alcohol level (an unconditioned stimulus) 
induces a withdrawal syndrome including craving (unconditioned 
responses). After a period of abstinence it is possible for the stimuli 
associated with falling blood alcohol levels (conditioned stimuli) to elicit 
a conditioned withdrawal response which resembles alcohol withdrawal. 
 
   In a development of this model159, Drummond replaces the withdrawal related 
craving language, substituting for it the idea of ‘cue elicited craving’. By this is 
meant response to environmental stimuli, rather than simply to internally 
generated moves towards homeostasis. These cues, it is argued, are good 
predictors of a relapse into drug misuse, as they only generate relapse when 
sources of the drug are available. West is sympathetic to the principles that are 
being proposed here, in terms of the initiation of drug dependent activity; he is 
however less convinced of the therapeutic value of these observations160. 
 
                    Instrumental Learning 
                                           
157 D.C. Drummond, T. Cooper et al. “Conditioned learning in alcohol dependence”, and Drummond D.C. 
“Theories of drug craving, ancient and modern”. 
158 West, Theory of Addiction, p.99. 
159 Drummond, “Theories of drug craving…”. 
160 West, Theory of Addiction, p.100. 
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   The second category of theories West explores at this point are defined as 
instrumental learning types. Examples given by West include the analysis of 
these learning types given by N. M. White161. According to White, ‘all changes in 
behaviour, including the development of drug addiction, involve storage of new 
“information” in the nervous system’162. There are three reinforcers at work here: 
those that trigger ‘approach’ or ‘avoidance’ responses: those that produce states 
of feeling that are ‘rewarding’ or ‘aversive’: and those which strengthen or 
weaken the ways in which the information received by the neural system is 
represented163. West points out that in this theory the addictive power of the 
drug is generated to a large extent by its mimetic characteristics, as it replicates 
the action of these three reinforcers. 
   West shows how this theory helpfully integrates classical (conditioning) and 
instrumental learning processes and the ways in which both conscious and 
unconscious mental representations work together in the development of 
addictive behaviour patterns. It also paves the way for other theories, such as 
the Incentive Sensitisation theory as proposed for example by Robinson and 
Berridge in their article “Addiction”164, demonstrating a pathway by means of 
which the use of a particular drug can become compulsive, and therefore can be 
accurately described as pathological. They investigate what types of cues initiate 
behaviours that are generated by appetite, in its widest sense. There is the 
pleasurable effect of the drug on the one hand, but working concurrently there 
is a process of sensitisation which leads in time to a dichotomy between the 
amount of pleasure achieved and the extent to which the individual seeks the 
experience. There is thus a motivation that develops (which is part of the 
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162 West, Theory of Addiction, p.101. 
163 ibid. The diagram that West provides in the text at this point (p.102) comes from White, N.M, op. cit., 
with a discussion of his argument on pp. 981-5. 
164 T. E Robinson and K. C. Berridge, “Addiction”. 
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addictive process) which overrides the reality of how much actual enjoyment the 
use of the drug provides. There is, that is to say, an indirect proportion between 
the two aspects of the behaviour, the hedonic and the acquisitive: its neurological 
locus is in fact within the circuitry of the Nucleus Accumbens of the brain. 
Robinson and Berridge define this phenomenon as ‘incentive salience’.  
   In the next chapter West looks at the part played by drugs themselves in 
generating a substance dependent lifestyle. This is essentially a neurological 
approach, according to which the use of drugs has an effect on the structure of 
the brain itself, which is why, with this physiological change process, it can be 
so difficult for an alcoholic (for example) to voluntarily give up alcohol.  
   We are considering disease models of addiction presented by West in this 
chapter: these argue that addiction is only under the control of the sufferer to a 
limited degree. We are now approaching the position that West himself proposes 
as his own contribution to the debate about the aetiology of addiction. In this 
section, leading to his own theory, he identifies and discusses a number of 
theories, including Orford’s ‘excessive appetites’ theory which he suggests has 
much to offer, although as we have seen, the theory has not yet been sufficiently 
tested to demonstrate its universal potential165. This is partly because unlike many 
other writers, West suggests, Orford deals with a  very wide range of addictions 
both to substances and behaviours, and this contributes to the difficulties in 
scientific, i.e. evidence based, testing of the theory and how it works in practical, 
clinical settings, although that does not rule it out as a possibly important theory. 
   West now suggests a model of his own, which avoids seeing addiction either 
as chosen behaviour, for which neither ‘treatment’ nor legal penalties are 
required, rather an effort to minimise the risks both to society and to the user, 
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or as a disease, for which the user has no responsibility and no hope of recovery 
without regarding himself as a helpless victim, as in the ‘Alcoholics Anonymous’ 
approach. 
 
West’s Personal Contribution To Addiction Theory 
   West identifies a decision making process, in which both impulses and urges 
on the one hand, and inhibitory forces on the other, act as accelerators and 
brakes in terms of behaviour. It is perfectly reasonable, as West points out166, to 
say of someone ‘He was hungry but he did not want to eat’. This raises the 
concept of competing motives. A key factor is the evaluation of the effects 
produced in the individual by the behaviour concerned. In relation to addiction, 
the conflict is between the desire for the experience or sensation provided by 
the substance or activity on the one hand, and the associated dangers on the 
other. The individual can then formulate a plan, requiring a decision about 
whether or not to engage in the activity in question. The problem in addiction is 
that there is a disjunction, as West points out167, between the wish to change a 
lifestyle that is regarded as detrimental to health and ability to initiate that change. 
   There is in his view a sense in which the human mind should be seen as 
fundamentally unstable, and responsive to minute changes in its environment. 
This assertion is an important element in his working towards a theory of 
addiction, and therefore needs to be clearly understood. West explains the 
concept in these terms168: 
 [T]he functioning of the brain has evolved to be inherently unstable; the 
motivational system is built like a ‘fly-by-wire’ aircraft with built-in 
instability that requires constant balancing input to keep it ‘on the 
straight and narrow’. 
 
                                           
166 West, op. cit., p.149. 
167 op. cit, p.156. 
168 op. cit., p.4. Italicisation original. 
 76 
   In the chapter of his book where these ideas are identified169, West points out 
that he is attempting to ‘provide a common framework for conscious choice 
processes and non-conscious motivational systems’170. The word motivation is 
the focal idea in West’s theory. In setting out his ideas in this way, West suggests 
that although both ‘choice’ and ‘disease’ models of understanding of addiction 
have something of value to contribute to the discussion, it is only when elements 
of the two fundamental positions represented by them are combined into a 
synthetic theory that an accurate understanding can be reached. How does he 
reach this conclusion? 
   West argues that what may start as choice to begin using drugs, or to stop 
using them, may in time, with changes in brain chemistry, become behaviour 
that is increasingly harder, or ultimately impossible to end without professional 
help. With this in view, we will now turn to West’s own distinctive contribution 
to the subject of addiction, based on chaos theory. 
   For West, the relationship between chaos theory and human psychology is the 
idea that the human mind is fundamentally unstable: even though the course of 
our decision making may be relatively predictable on the basis of past experience, 
there can be abrupt changes that are hard to explain. This view is based on the 
concept of the ‘epigenetic landscape’, a term coined by Conrad Waddington in 
his book Tools for Thought: How to Understand and Apply the latest Scientific Techniques 
of Problem Solving171. This book originated, West observes, in the quest to 
understand the environment in which embryos develop and the many ways in 
which embryos are affected by their environment during gestation. Of 
importance here is his use of the word ‘chreods’ which signifies a number of 
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quasi geological features of the internal environment best understood as valleys. 
Down these valleys the organism travels, like a falling ball. The actual pathway 
that the ball follows will have determinants that are directly related to its 
environment. This landscape may take many different forms, as West observes172 
The landscape may be quite flat in which case small environmental 
forces can send behaviour in markedly different directions. At the other 
extreme it may constitute a deep V-shaped valley in which case powerful 
motivational forces will move the behaviour some way off its original 
path but as soon as the forces are removed it will revert to its original 
course. The landscape may involve a valley with a flat bottom in which 
case small environmental forces will easily move behaviour about within 
a certain range but it would require a very powerful force to move it 
outside that ‘normative’ range. The landscape may involve a bifurcation 
so that a very small environmental force at a critical period can send the 
behaviour down very different paths. 
 
   Tiny alterations in local conditions can have in a mathematical sense a 
disproportionate effect on objects in that environment173. With regard to 
weather observations in particular, although weather patterns are generally stable 
over time, there are moments when what is observed is, by contrast, experienced 
as ‘violent instability’. 
   This phenomenon, observed from time to time in the natural world with 
respect to climatic conditions, has for West its counterpart in human motivation. 
‘We can find ourselves heading inexorably down a particular path without any 
obvious difference except perhaps for something minor that happened in the 
past’174. This involves a dramatic change in our way of life, such as the experience 
of religious conversion, to use the example that West chooses at this point. 
Similarly, he argues, we ‘are also prone to sudden outbursts that seem to come 
                                           
172 West, Theory of Addiction, p.171. 
173 West draws attention (Theory of Addiction, p.172) to a computer programme ‘designed to model atmospheric 
conditions’ that showed a highly significant change in outcome when the programme was changed slightly. It 
was this accidental discovery that led to the now famous prediction that the beat of a butterfly wing 
somewhere in Asia might have the potential to cause storms in America. The mathematical model for this can 
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174 West, Theory of Addiction, p.173, emphasis added. 
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from nowhere’ or sudden unexpected fluctuations in terms of ‘preferences, 
opinions, or how we see ourselves and behave’175. 
   From an experiential point of view, this kind of theory has much in its favour. 
In particular it suggests possible answers to two questions: 
1) Why did I, at some point in my life, start drinking, gambling, taking drugs 
etc. in a way that was no longer under my conscious control, and that 
could not have been predicted? 
2) Why does it appear to be the case that no one theory of addiction, based 
on ‘choice’ or ‘disease’ models, appears to explain, in every case, why an 
individual became addicted? 
   West points out in relation to the disease model  that just as the choice model 
can be criticised for overemphasizing the role of choice, so the disease model 
can be criticised for failing to take into account ‘issues of choice and identity’176. 
Bringing the two sets of ideas into a creative collaboration avoids the pitfalls of 
blaming the addicted person for their self-destructive and socially detrimental 
behaviour on the one hand, and on the other taking power and control out of 
the individual’s hands by an excessively ‘medicalised’ approach such as that of 
AA which arguably overemphasizes the powerlessness of the addicted person. 
 
West’s Solution To The Problematic Of Addiction – P.R.I.M.E Theory 
   As we observed earlier, West attempted more than a survey of existing theories 
of addictions, which as his reviewers pointed out at the time of publication177, 
he did with exceptional skill. While this task in itself would have been extremely 
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176 West, Theory of Addiction, p.77. 
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‘When reading the chapters that describe West’s theory of addiction you have a feeling that: “it all seems to 
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impressive, he provides his own methodology. His achievement in chapter 8 of 
the book is the provision of a system that uses  existing theoretical 
understandings, but moulds them into  a comprehensive and original schema of 
his own, which he designates p.r.i.m.e theory. We will now therefore describe 
and evaluate this theory in detail. The word itself is an acronym, which we will 
now explain. 
   The letter ‘p’ stands in this context for ‘plans’. In describing what he means by 
this term, West says: ‘Plans provide a structure to our actions but can only 
influence them through motives and evaluations operating at the time when they 
are to be executed’. 
   The second letter, ‘r’, stands for ‘responses’. Reflex response - the simplest 
level of motivation involves ‘reflexes’ in which stimuli directly elicit responses 
(such as a flinch in response to pain). This level of motivation is of limited 
interest here. 
   The next letter, ‘i’, takes us to the next aspect of motivation which he calls 
‘impulses’. This level, which allows greater flexibility of responding, involves 
positive drives or ‘impulses’ and ‘inhibitory forces’. These are motivational 
forces that compete or combine to generate a ‘resultant force’ that starts, 
modifies or stops an action (such as the impulse to laugh in response to a joke), 
generated by internal and external stimuli/information, drives and emotional 
states and by ‘instructions’ emanating from higher levels of the motivational 
system. Impulses become conscious when for some reason they are not 
immediately translated into action. They are then experienced as ‘urges’. The 
next paragraph is concerned with impulses: with urges and inhibitory forces. In 
this theory urges are not the same as desires although in practice they are often 
confused, and often mistaken for one another. 
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   The next feature of this theory is characterised by the letter ‘m’, which stands 
for ‘motives’. Of great importance here in the context of addiction is the 
recognition that as West says178, ‘More than one motive can co-exist at one time 
– even for the same target’179. The implication of this in the current context is 
that a person may well desire or feel an urge to smoke, drink, gamble or take 
drugs, but be at the same time aware of an urge not to do so, either for health 
reasons, or because of some form of social pressure from family or community, 
or because of legal sanctions involved in their use. There is a cost benefit analysis 
that may come into play here, he suggests, in the obvious sense that ‘The more 
contentment something has created, the more we like the thought of it and the 
more we want it; the more distress it has created the more we are repelled by the 
thought of it; the hungrier we are the more we want to eat and so on’. These are 
‘co-occurring motives’. They are emotionally driven, and those with the greater 
valence will influence the decision, for or against the activity in question. 
   Letter ‘e’ is for ‘evaluations’. Evaluations are the final stop on this journey. 
Evaluations of things that we have done come, West points out, in several forms, 
of a broadly aesthetic, utilitarian and ethical kind. West suggests180 that 
‘evaluations do not influence behaviour directly, but only through motives. Thus 
believing something to be good will not cause us to act unless something turns 
that into a motive (e.g. a desire) to do so. Put another way, beliefs drive actions 
by way of feelings’. There is, he concludes, a complex relationship between 
competing evaluations, depending on whether they are all positive, all negative, 
or a mixture of the two. When there is conflict or ‘dissonance’ between these 
evaluations then avoidance action may have to be taken to reduce discomfort, 
and the route that is most likely to be taken is that of a changed belief about the 
                                           
178 West, Theory of Addiction, p.151. 
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activity and how that new belief can change the pattern of our motivation. This 
suggestion resonates to a considerable extent with Orford’s dissonance theory 
of addiction181. 
   There is here then a feedback loop, in which the various levels of experience 
and reflection take us, via impulses, both positive and negative, and evaluations 
of desire in relation to possible costly results of our behaviour, back to the level 
of planning our lives in accordance with what we have observed in terms of 
consequences. The obvious problem here is that even when a course of action 
is recognised to be contrary to our perceived needs and interests, it can be 
difficult to avoid the action because a dependency has been set up which in time 
may have a physiological as well as a psychological basis. West explores this 
aspect of the problem in his final chapter182, and offers some helpful suggestions 
about appropriate clinical interventions183. 
 
                  Criticisms of West, And Conclusions. 
   It is greatly to the credit of Robert West184 that he provides us at a number of 
points in his book with examples of how individual drug users known to him 
interpret their individual experiences185. This gives us an experiential perspective 
to set alongside more theoretical approaches. 
   And West’s Theory of Addiction presents his integrated theory in a way that is 
admirably lucid and clear, avoiding technical expressions when possible and 
giving explanations of technical terms such as ‘epigenetic landscape’ when it 
                                           
181 See for example his discussion of the dissonance between over eating and the desire to stop, in Jim 
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182 West, Theory of Addiction, pp. 174-192. 
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seems unlikely that all of his readers will be familiar with such an expression in 
this context. 
   His overview discards arguments that over simplify, or in his view provide 
insufficient evidence for their claims – particularly in the case of some of the 
more extreme ‘choice’ based theories such as that of J. B. Davies. He takes all 
that is most helpful from each theory he presents, and skilfully weaves it into a 
schematic whole in a manner that is well researched and elegantly presented. The 
crowning glory of his book, as we have seen, is his own personal contribution, 
p.r.i.m.e theory, which takes us to the heart of the problem of addiction, and 
points to ways in which we might take this model forward as a procedural basis 
for providing help for those people who have the misfortune to be addiction 
sufferers186. 
 
Specific Criticisms Of Theory Of Addiction 
   The first of these criticisms has to do with his omission of an engagement with 
issues of heritability. In his second chapter, he does look briefly at the 
relationship between addiction and the individual, various sociologically 
definable strata in society, and ethnic groups and cultures. Thus for example he 
states that prevalence ‘of addictions is higher in men than women, but this is 
subject to cultural and temporal variation’187. He also mentions environmental 
factors such as economic deprivation as an important contributory factor. He 
mentions psychological characteristics such as the propensity to addiction, 
especially to illicit drugs, among types of people who are likely to engage in anti-
social behaviour, or who are vulnerable to anxiety and depression. Childhood 
experiences of abuse and deprivation may also make a contribution to 
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vulnerability to addiction, he argues, as is suggested in the ‘Pathways’ Model of 
pathological gambling188. What he does not acknowledge is the likelihood that 
these sociological or psychological factors have some connection with genetics. 
As Matt McGue observes in his discussion of addiction189, genetic factors can be 
shown, via animal and human twin and adoption studies, to play a significant, 
though by no means determinant, role in the aetiology of the dependence 
syndrome. So it seems strange that West appears to ignore the heritability 
question when looking at the aetiology of addiction. 
   Secondly, there is in West’s work some inadequacy in his use of the 
problematic word ‘conscious’ as it relates to addiction. It seems likely that we 
are all motivated by a mixture of propelling or restrictive forces. Of some of 
these we will be consciously aware. If I am hungry, it is likely that I will be  aware 
of that fact, and will usually attend to it by eating. On the other hand, most of 
us know what it means to say either to ourselves or to someone else, ‘I really 
don’t know why I did that’, or ‘I can’t believe I said that to so-and-so’. Here we 
are dealing with an act the motivational origins of which are beyond our 
immediate knowledge or self-understanding. With a certain amount of deliberate 
self-inspection, the reason often becomes clear, whether it be tiredness, a 
moment of inattention, or even perhaps a somewhat subliminal dislike of the 
person we have offended. That process of self-inspection can be highly 
beneficial in helping people who are ‘hooked’ on drugs, for example, to change 
their behaviour, and some forms of psychotherapy that are currently in use in 
detoxification clinics make use of this in treating patients through Cognitive 
Behavioural Therapy. 
                                           
188 This important suggestion is based on a number of articles, such as Blaszczynski and Nower, “A pathways 
model of problem and pathological gambling”. 
189 Matt McGue, in Behavioral Genetics, Robert Plomin, et al., pp.264ff. He is particularly concerned with 
causative factors in the development of alcoholism. 
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   The difficulty here is that within a substantial section of human psychology, 
words like ‘conscious’ and ‘non-conscious’, or in a more technical sense 
‘unconscious’190, have a different meaning from this. To the classically trained 
psychoanalyst, the word unconscious does not refer to a set of ideas, thoughts 
or memories to which we have access, even though recovering them may involve 
some effort on our part. To such a person, and to those of their intellectual 
inheritors, Jungian, Kleinian, and those from the Object Relations school 
associated with such British psychologists as Ronald Fairbairn and Donald 
Winnicott, the world of the unconscious is one to which the client has no access 
without professional assistance: through the process known as ‘repression’, the 
individual has relegated such material to an area of the mind that is inaccessible. 
It is noteworthy in this context that by contrast Orford, whose work we 
discussed earlier, offers a section on psychoanalytic writing that is relevant to 
addiction191.  
   It is therefore argued here that West’s avoidance of any mention of the 
psychoanalytic approach to unconscious motivation in relation to addiction is 
surprising, and to that extent weakens his claim to provide a total theory of 
addiction. 
   Finally, although West provides us with a wide ranging exploration of the 
psychology of addiction, it is perhaps a weakness of his book that he does not, 
unlike Jim Orford, look at the interpenetration of other factors in the world of 
addiction and its treatment, such as religious or ethical ideas. This might well 
have had a role to play, especially in the final section of chapter 9, in which he 
                                           
190 In his Critical Dictionary of Psychoanalysis, Charles Rycroft observes that Freud uses the term ‘id’ to refer to 
the unconscious, meaning by that essentially mental processes of which the subject is not aware. 
191 See Orford, Excessive Appetites, pp. 176ff., in which he concludes (p.180) that for many psychoanalytically 
oriented writers there is no need to generate a term such as ‘the addictive personality’; it may be better to talk 
instead of aspects of the human personality that make some people particularly vulnerable to addictive 
behaviours. 
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applies his theory to the task of providing clinical help for those who have 
addiction problems, but West restricts his recommendations to treatments 
which are based on psychopharmacology and behaviourally oriented approaches 
without referencing treatment guidelines of a more holistic nature, including 
spiritual concepts. 
 
 1.4 Conclusions: The relevance of this chapter to the thesis 
   One fundamental aim of this thesis is to demonstrate, from a number of points 
of view, including the religious and spiritual dimensions, the complexity of the 
concept of addiction and the multi-factorial aspects of its aetiology. We have 
drawn attention to the competing theories of psychologies about what addiction 
is. In this endeavour West is particularly helpful, in his refusal to adopt a 
‘monothematic’ approach to the subject, preferring one that acknowledges the 
complexity of the ideas behind addiction and the range of treatments available 
to those who suffer from it. As he comments towards the end of his 
discussion192: 
Individual susceptibility to addiction involves a large number of potential 
factors. These include a drive to explore new experiences and so be 
exposed to a potentially harmful addictive behaviour; a lower propensity 
or ability to exercise restraint; a greater propensity to form associative 
links with rewards rather than punishments; an identity in which 
engaging in the addictive activity is valued positively; an identity in which 
being addicted is viewed positively; a propensity to emotional states that 
make the addictive behaviour rewarding; and a physiological 
susceptibility to the effects of the addictive activity. 
 
   At one level the relevance of this chapter on the theory presented by Robert 
West to the flow of this thesis is relatively obvious because we are trying to 
establish a clear understanding of what addiction is. West helpfully reminds us 
of the complexity of this task, as it is understood by psychologists in a variety of 
                                           
192 West, Theory of Addiction, p.183. 
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ways. But there are implications which go beyond the merely psychological, and 
indications have been given during the present chapter about directions in which 
we will wish to turn, particularly when our journey of exploration pursues more 
specifically theological lines of enquiry, such as in analysing, from a theological 
perspective, the concept of desire. At the heart of this endeavour this one word 
stands out above many others. In Robert West’s work there is a clear 
understanding that motivation is a central element in the understanding of why 
we desire to behave in certain ways, and the counter claims of society when that 
society feels in some way threatened – by public exhibitions of drunkenness for 
example. We will now turn our attention to the theologically and ethically 
oriented writings on addiction of Gerald May, James B. Nelson, Ken Leech, and 
Christopher Cook. 
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2. CHAPTER 2   THEOLOGICAL WRITING ON ADDICTION 
 
Introduction    
    This chapter examines the concept of addiction from a theological perspective.     
Although psychology can provide one half of the equation – that of the clinical perspective 
– there is in the attempt to provide holistic pastoral care a need for an interface between  the 
scientific and the religious elements of the problem of ingested substances. 
   Compared with the vast literature relating to the psychology of addiction relatively few 
have been written from a theological point of view. A number of recent books deal with the 
pastoral care of addicted people bringing in to that work theological and ethical 
considerations, however. In the present chapter, we shall consider four of these: Gerald 
May’s Addiction and Grace Kenneth Leech’s Drugs and Pastoral Care, James B. Nelson’s Thirst, 
and Christopher Cook’s Alcohol, Addiction and Christian Ethics. These four books have been 
chosen because each makes a uniquely valuable contribution to the subject.  
   We have mentioned Gerald May first because he was a pioneer in the attempt to give a 
theological infrastructure to the concept of addiction, and to explore the subject fully from 
the dual perspective of a clinician and a religious writer, which is helpful in terms of this 
thesis, which seeks to explore possible links between the two disciplines. 
    Kenneth Leech is of importance because, as we shall demonstrate in the text of the 
chapter, he writes as a highly respected author of books on Christian spirituality and pastoral 
care, including work with addicted people, but has the added advantage of having worked 
for many years with drug and alcohol dependent people in a number of parishes in central 
London, from 1967 until his retirement in 2003. 
   James Nelson also has a double qualification for inclusion in this trio, but for a different 
reason. As a Christian minister, with a record of writing well on theological and ethical issues, 
he engages with demonstrable knowledge and insight about the theological understanding of 
addiction, with particular reference to alcohol dependent behaviour. But secondly, as he 
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states himself, he does so from the personal perspective not just of a Christian theologian 
and pastor, but as a ‘recovering alcoholic’. This makes his understanding of the subject 
personal as well as theoretical. 
   Christopher Cook is concerned both with the theological approach to addiction 
(particularly alcohol dependency) and also with the ways in which, historically speaking, the 
Christian churches have addressed the social and ethical problems associated with alcohol 
misuse. He also – and this is a very important contribution – makes it clear that in addition 
to personal responsibility for the use of alcoholic beverages, there is also a corporate 
responsibility when, for example, governments attempt to engage with the social aspects of 
alcoholic excess while at the same time benefiting greatly from taxation received through the 
sale of such commodities. 
 
2.1 Gerald May, Addiction and Grace  
   Gerald May was the first Christian writer to deal systematically and critically 
with issues of addiction from both clinical and spiritual points of view. He lived 
from 1940 to 2005 when he died from a number of contributory causes including 
cancer. He had been in medical work, particularly psychiatry, for many years 
before turning his attention more towards spiritual matters, and became in 1983 
Director of Spiritual Guidance at the Shalem Institute in Washington DC. The 
Shalem Institute has been providing for over thirty years what their website 
describes as ‘hospitable and inspiring opportunities for people to listen and 
respond more boldly to the Spirit at work in them’193 In this way, guidance is 
offered to ‘spiritual directors, clergy, lay-leaders and individuals who want to 
open themselves more fully to God in their daily lives and work’194 Gerald May 
was also Director for their Research and Program Development, and became 
                                           
193 See: Shalem Institute website, www.shalem.org last accessed on 16.10.2011. 
194 www.shalem.org  
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senior fellow in Contemplative Theology and Psychology. Among his 
publications are, in addition to Addiction and Grace, such books as Will and Spirit, 
The Awakened Heart, and Dark Night of the Soul. 
   May was a practising American psychiatrist at the time that he wrote Addiction 
and Grace, which was first published in the USA in 1988. He explains his interest 
in addiction in terms of self-observation, as well as through trying to treat 
patients with dependency problems, such as misuse of LSD, marijuana and 
cocaine, but also less obviously problematic substances such as generic 
analgesics: other addictive symptoms that came to his attention included the 
overuse of anti-depressants and tranquilisers. Then he began to recognise 
dependency symptoms in himself, including attachment to ‘nicotine, caffeine, 
sugar and chocolate, to name a few’195. He also recognised attachments to ‘work, 
performance, responsibility, intimacy, being liked, helping others, and an almost 
endless list of other behaviors’196. This is not to suggest that for him any of these 
things are essentially inappropriate goals in life, but to recognise that they can 
become attachments that, for the Christian in particular, can take the place of 
attachment to what is of ultimate significance, namely God. But for those who 
have such attachments, whether religious or not, and without the need to be 
judgemental of them or their problems, the word ‘addict’ is an appropriate 
description for May. 
   From a critical perspective, some key criticisms of his book are: 
1) The nature of addiction itself. May often uses the word ‘attachment’ as a 
synonym for addiction. But how accurate is this from an ontological point 
of   view? Whereas attachment can suggest or indicate  a range of 
emotional or physical longings, addiction is a far more technical term, 
                                           
195 Gerald May, Addiction and Grace, p.9. 
196 ibid. 
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implying not a desire for a substance or activity that can be overcome 
relatively easily, but something far more powerful and mysterious and 
needing  medical treatment197. Equating attachment with addiction thus 
weakens his argument. 
2) Grace. The other word in his title is grace, a technical religious term found 
at many points in the Christian Scriptures and theological writing. May is 
to be commended for seeing the potential relevance of the concept in 
terms of divine initiative in providing strength for the individual with 
problems. But it is questionable whether he has adequately understood 
and presented a theology of grace that is soundly based. We will comment 
further on this later in the chapter. 
3) There is a suggestion in May’s book that all attachment is to be seen as at 
least potentially bad. Even the relationship between a mother and her 
child, he suggests, can be problematic if the level of attachment is too 
strong. But is this true? The affectional bonds between mothers and 
children might perhaps be seen in much more positive light, as the work 
of John Bowlby198, Donald Winnicott and others with a professional 
interest in child development and its impact on the future psychological 
health of the individual would indicate. We therefore question May’s 
assertion that attachment is necessarily always a bad thing in itself. 
4) May insists that there is a sense in which everyone is addicted to 
something. This is a highly contestable suggestion. On what evidence is it 
based? Perhaps May is really drawing our attention to the notion (equally 
contestable, perhaps, in the light of modern genetics) that we all have a 
vulnerability to addiction in certain circumstances within the trajectory of 
                                           
197 We may be reminded here perhaps of the Alcoholics Anonymous view of addiction to alcohol as ‘cunning, 
powerful and baffling’. 
198 See J. Bowlby, Attachment and Loss, 3 volumes, Donald W. Winnicott, The Family and Individual Development. 
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our lives. But given our highlighting of the ambiguity of his use of the 
terms ‘addicted’ and ‘attached’, we may wonder whether this suggestion 
of universal addiction is really just another illustration of the problems 
May gives himself by conflating, and arguably confusing, these two terms. 
 
Addictive Substances And Behaviours 
   May includes two diagrams that list the substances and activities that he regards 
as potentially addictive199. Although many of them may be regarded as harmless 
in themselves, when their salience becomes exaggerated, or if they involve the 
likelihood of self-harm (such as in the case of alcohol misuse) then they can be 
regarded as having an addictive potential for the individual concerned. 
   It is worth noting at this point that May divides these activities into two classes, 
which he defines as attraction addictions and aversion addictions. Attraction 
addictions are those where a substance or activity such as gambling has a high 
positive value for the individual; aversion addictions are those in which the 
individual puts effort into avoidance – of anger, for example. May points out 
that although many of the activities mentioned in his list seem superficially to be 
positive (such as a mother’s love for her children) a line can be crossed at which 
point the activity specified has become an addiction rather than something freely 
chosen. As May puts it200:          
no addiction is good; no attachment is beneficial. To be sure, some are 
more destructive than others; alcoholism cannot be compared with 
chocolate addiction in degrees of destructiveness, and fear of spiders 
pales in comparison to racial bigotry. But if we accept that there are 
differences in the degree of tragedy imposed upon us by our addictions, 
we must also recognize what they have in common: they impede human 
freedom and diminish the human spirit. 
 
                                           
199 Gerald May, Addiction and Grace, p.38-39. 
200 op. cit., p.39 
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   This paragraph contains the whole of May’s argument in terms of the 
importance of addictions and the damage that they do to people in spiritual 
terms. Addictions are aspects of functioning that limit human freedom, and they 
act, in the specifically spiritual sense, as barriers between the person and God. 
   The idea of all attachment as a bad thing – even attachment between children 
and parents, to use his limiting case, – is however not universally accepted. We 
mentioned for example in the work of the psychoanalytically oriented 
psychologist John Bowlby a defence of the need for attachment between a 
mother and her child in order to give the child ‘a secure base’201. Bowlby’s work 
is not without its critics202, but it provides an important corrective to the view 
that all attachment is necessarily dangerous. Some positive attachment, in the 
early stages of infancy especially, seems to be essential to satisfactory 
psychological developmental processes. 
 
Definition Of Addiction And Its Aetiology 
   How then does May conceptualise addiction, and how does addiction happen? 
May pays particular attention to the idea of attachment: ‘It comes from the old 
French attaché, meaning “nailed to”. ‘Attachment “nails” our desire to specific 
objects and creates addiction’203. This is the core of his argument. These 
attachments ‘enslave us with chains that are of our own making and yet that, 
paradoxically, are virtually beyond our control’204. The chapter entitled “The 
Psychological nature of Addiction” 205 explores this idea in depth and detail. As 
                                           
201 John Bowlby, A Secure Base, Clinical Applications of Attachment Theory. This theme of attachment as providing 
a secure base and thus guarding against pathological childhood anxiety is the major theme of this book (see in 
particular pp.29-31).  
202 See, for example Jean Knox, Archetype, Attachment, Analysis, p.120, and Michael Rutter, Maternal Deprivation 
Re-assessed. 
203 Gerald May, Addiction and Grace, p.3. 
204 May, op. cit., p.4. 
205 op. cit., chapter 3. 
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it is one of the two chapters206 that contain the main focal ideas of the book, we 
will devote some space to expounding his argument in the two chapters 
sequentially, thereby recognising that they work very closely together rather than 
completely independently of one another – that is part of the subtlety of the 
book.  
 
                  ‘The Psychological Nature Of Addiction’207 
   Chapter 3 sets out May’s argument that addiction has an important 
psychological component. What does he mean by this assertion? He begins his 
discussion by introducing two categories that are crucial to his argument – the 
will, and self-esteem208. The will represents in psychological terms ‘our capacity 
to choose and direct our behaviour’209, and self-esteem speaks of the ‘respect 
and value with which we view ourselves’210. In addiction, he suggests, a process 
occurs in which there is a splitting of the will into two, so that part of it wants 
to continue the activity and another part wants to relinquish it, so that a conflict 
is set up which then in turn damages self-esteem211. This undermining process is 
strengthened by the attempts people make to relinquish addictive behaviour but 
fail to do so. In some cultures, he points out, this failure might have a positive 
component, because it would make people more aware of their oneness with the 
creation and issues of dependency that are not simply weakness but are 
affirmative and positive experiences. In this way, addiction arises out of the 
attempt to control certain forms of behaviour such as the use of drugs or alcohol 
                                           
206 op. cit., chapters 3 and 6. 
207 op. cit., chapter 3, pp. 140-161. 
208 op. cit., p.42. 
209 ibid. 
210 ibid. 
211 In the previous section it was pointed out that in Jim Orford’s book Excessive Appetites this concept of 
conflict has an important place, as it does in the work of May. For Orford it is very much the experience of 
conflict or ‘dissonance’ on the part of the addiction sufferer that constitutes the basis of the pathological 
understanding of what addiction is. 
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(and many other examples could be given) and the awareness of the individual 
of failure to do so. This process is central to May’s attachment argument, and 
the psychological aspect of addiction is, as he explains in a later chapter212, 
reinforced by the chemical dependencies that involve changes in the neurological 
structures of the brain through substance use. 
   Analysing this process further, May identifies in this chapter a number of what 
he describes as ‘mind tricks’213 that promote or reinforce addictive forms of 




   May provides examples of seven kinds of self-deception: denial and repression, 
rationalization, hiding, delaying tactics, the ‘I can’t handle it’ ploy, the ‘I can 
handle it’ ploy, and, ultimately, breakdown. 
   The phenomenon of denial is self-explanatory.214. Like Robert West, he sees 
denial as an unconscious process. Linking the physiological changes that can 
come about through chemical dependency to spiritual states of mind, May makes 
the observation that in what he describes as a ‘perfect irony, the drug becomes 
its own camouflage; its effects cloud and alter awareness sufficiently to prevent 
realization of the person’s addiction to it’. 
 
Breakdown 
                                           
212 See: Addiction and Grace, especially chapter 4, “The Neurological Nature of Addiction”, p.64ff. 
213 op.cit., p.43ff. 
214 See: Robert West, Theory of Addiction, e.g. the chapter entitled ‘Addiction, Habit and Instrumental Learning’, 
pp.91-108, which focuses on the ‘stimulus-response’ theories of decision making that function without the 
involvement of a conscious choice process. West regards this as a particularly helpful contribution to the 
psychological study of addiction. 
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   This is the point at which real danger is encountered. At this stage the person’s 
reason has been ‘cruelly eroded’215. This may lead to other forms of addiction, 
and to manic strategies for dealing with the problems, such as the well-known 
‘geographic’ fantasy – “If I left and went to live somewhere else I could start 
again”. This process can then lead to total psychotic breakdown and other, 
physical health problems, including accidental or intentional self-harm.   
 
2. Collusion 
   In the collusive state of functioning, others unwittingly collude with the addict 
in supporting rather than challenging the addictive behaviour: these may be 
family or friends, or professional helpers from the medical and psychological 
disciplines. Whether or not May knew the work of J. B. Davies216 which we 
commented on in chapter one, there is an echo of his argument here, in the 
suggestion that addiction can be a term that is invented unwittingly by people in 
the ‘addicted’ person’s environment, and is, to that extent at least, to be regarded 
as a ‘myth’. They do so, Davies suggested, for a variety of reasons, including the 
wish to see the addicted person as sick in order to excuse their behaviour. In 
May’s experience as a psychiatrist, this collusion appears because of 
‘contradictory motivations’217. On the one hand, there is the genuine wish on the 
part of the addicted person to stop the behaviour concerned, and this is shared 
by his or her family and by society as a whole. But on the other hand a different 
set of motivations is at work: there is another level of desire in the individual 
concerned that militates against this positive wish. There is, he points out, not 
just a psychological reason for this, but also a biological reason, a quasi physical 
                                           
215 Addiction and Grace, p.50. 
216  J. B. Davies, The Myth of Addiction. 
217 Addiction and Grace, p.51. 
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force residing within the individual that ensures that ‘the addictive process never 
sleeps’218.  
‘Psychoanalytic Insights’219 And Other Psychological Theories 
   In this section of the chapter on ‘mind’, May focuses specifically on two major 
twentieth century contributions to the understanding of human behaviour and 
motivation, the psychoanalytic view and the behaviourist view. 
 
Psychoanalytic Theory 
   It would be impossible to do justice to such a vast subject in one chapter of a 
thesis such as this, but May’s section on psychoanalytic insights220 provides a 
valuable introduction to the subject which gives an idea of the issues involved, 
whether or not his readers have personal knowledge of this approach to the 
human mental processes. At the heart of Freud’s theory is the unconscious, and  
in this present thesis we have already observed both in May’s own writing and 
that of other authors such as Robert West the significance of unconscious forces 
in the process of becoming addicted to substances or other compulsive 
behaviour. In May’s words, ‘The mind uses denial, repression, and a host of 
other defense mechanisms to keep us unaware of the truth of our motivations 
or to justify them falsely’221. This is the key concept for our understanding of the 
unconscious in relation to addiction. What is compromised by repression is what 
May terms ‘purity of heart’222, a highly useful expression, because it brings 
together both psychological and spiritual ways of understanding how we 
function. May links this idea with the experience of the Christian saints, who far 
from conquering their attachments, have found historically that the battle is 
                                           
218 op. cit., p.52. 
219 ibid. 
220 op. cit., p.52ff. 
221 Addiction and Grace, p.53. 
222 ibid. 
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lifelong, and can only be addressed by an increasingly powerful sense of needing 
God’s mercy and grace. 
   Summarising his section on psychoanalytic insights May observes that human 
beings invest psychic energy in activities that bring pleasure or avoid pain; equally 
many of these activities – ‘cathexes’ to use the technical term – involve a process 
designed to keep them unconscious ‘by means of self-deception, so our 
motivations are never completely pure and may be quite contradictory’223. 
   In a short critical addendum to this section, May deals with one aspect of 
psychoanalytic thought that he finds unhelpful, that is to say the ‘Myth of the 
Addictive Personality’224. His critique of this notion is that personality defects in 
an individual cannot create a vulnerability to addiction to chemicals such as 
alcohol or heroin. Those who appear to be, in his words, ‘manipulative, devious, 
and self-centred’ did not seem to be like that before they became addicted, rather 
these phenomena seem to have occurred subsequently, so, in terms of clinical 
observation, there is no evidence for this form of ‘personality disorder’ theory225. 
The same applies in terms of the use of drugs as a relief mechanism for 
symptoms of such neurotic disorders such as anxiety or depression. If the people 
interviewed seemed to have been anxious or depressed before becoming 
addicted, the argument would be robust; however this does not seem to be the 
case. This conclusion is not without contrary opinions226. On this basis, it might 
be wise to keep May’s judgement in view, but to recognise that there are many 
                                           
223 Addiction and Grace, p.54. 
224 ibid. A book with the title The Addictive Personality was written in 1988 by Craig Nakken – the same year as 
May’s book Addiction and Grace was published. He suggests, contrary to what May thinks, that some but by no 
means all people develop addictive personalities, as a response to emotional conflicts over a long period of 
time, (op. cit., p.29). This is a very different approach from that taken by May, who believes that we are all, in 
some sense, addicts. 
225 ibid. 
226 See, for example C. R. Cloninger, “A Systematic Method for Clinical Description and Classification of 
Personality Variants. A Proposal”.  
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different points of view about how personality may or may not be a factor in the 




   Behavioural theory, originating, as May observes227, in the work of Ivan 
Pavlov, does not look for hidden, unconscious (and therefore questionable) 
motivations, but restricts itself to what can be observed in terms of an 
individual’s behaviour, the choices that he decides to make, which can be 
objectively described as behaviour – no matter what interpretation may be 
attached to it228. 
   This way of approaching addiction has the advantage, according to those who 
practise it, of verifiability. It also makes use of learning theory and the science of 
the development of habits of behaviour, which as May comments, ‘have been 
somewhat ignored by psychoanalysis’229. In behavioural theory what is described 
as the ‘law of effect’230 comes into the equation: the experience of pleasure or 
the relief of pain caused by performing an action (such as drinking alcohol) 
reinforces the performance of that action, whereas its opposite, painful or 
unrewarding experience generates, for the most part, negative reinforcement, a 
determination not to repeat the action. Once these habits of behaviour have 
been learned and become habitual, it can become very difficult to break the 
pattern that has been learned231. 
                                           
227 Addiction and Grace, p.55. 
228 A variety of conceptual understandings of Pavlovian and Pavlovian derivative behaviour theory are well 
documented and evaluated in Robert West’s book Theory of Addiction, chapter 5  as was mentioned in the 
discussion of West in an earlier chapter.  




   May looks at this from a spiritual point of view, observing that the behavioural 
approach to addiction may seem to spiritually minded people to be ‘cold, austere, 
unresponsive to the subtle feelings of the human heart’232. He suggests however 
that a combination of psychoanalytic and behavioural theories can help the 
clinician or pastor to understand the attachment process that has propelled a 
client into the attachments that constitute addiction. 
   May now provides a three-stage behaviourally oriented programme for the 
acquisition of attachment behaviour: those stages are Learning, Habit 
Formation, and Struggle. He begins by showing how these work in terms of 
positive attachments, and how they work equally effectively in helping us to 
understand the negative pole of attachment behaviour, that is to say, aversion 
addictions, such as avoiding even a small amount of exposure to such things as 
blood, animals, anger, or intimacy, to give some of the examples he provides233. 
 
Struggle 
   This is for May the point at which addiction becomes most problematic: the 
essential difference between this stage and its predecessors, May argues234, is that 
what has hitherto been unconscious now becomes available to the individual: 
there is now awareness of the craving for the experience that brings pleasure or 
relief. There is a perceived need for frequent repetition of the activity and a need 
for greater amounts (of alcohol or a particular drug for example)235, and this 
increasing need is a symptom of the phenomenon of tolerance, which will 
continue to increase until something interferes with the process, such as the 
unavailability of the drug236. One such interference can be the awareness of the 
                                           
232 ibid. 
233 Addiction and Grace, p.39. 
234 op.cit., p.59. 
235 ibid. 
236 Addiction and Grace, p.59. 
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individual that there is a problem, and the determination to moderate or abandon 
the behaviour237. 
   The most commonly experienced reaction to stopping the addictive activity is 
withdrawal238. The symptoms of withdrawal range, as May correctly asserts239, 
from ‘mild uneasiness to true agony’. The word danger is also appropriate here, 
because withdrawal that is attempted too suddenly (such as going from a large 
excess of alcohol to none at all in one move) can lead to life threatening physical 
symptoms240. 
   One paradox of addiction, May observes241, is that because the use of a 
substance achieves short term relief, the person using it will want to use it more, 
in spite of awareness that this process is ultimately self-defeating. What is set up 
in such a scenario is a set of mixed motivations as ‘attempts to quit continually 
increase [the] desire to continue!’242. 
   There is also here, May observes243, reinforcement of the need for a drug or an 
activity that occurs when that activity is intermittent rather than constant, and 
the conditioning that results from this is also a factor in the difficulty of stopping 
the activity, because it does not have an entirely predictable outcome. This 
unpredictability is a strong reinforcer as it encourages experimentation with the 
behaviour to maximise the likelihood of obtaining the reward associated with 
it244. 
                                           
237 ibid. 
238 The reader will no doubt be aware at this point that a similar pattern was observed in the previous section 
which investigates the phenomenon of addiction form a predominantly psychological perspective. 
239 Addiction and Grace, p.59. 
240 Nicholas Roberts, Working with Addiction Sufferers, a Handbook for Southwark Clergy, (not currently in general 
distribution) 2008, p.18-19. 
241 Addiction and Grace, p.59. 
242op.cit., p.60. 
243 ibid. 
244 See Robert West. In Theory of Addiction, p.138, he writes of the ‘intermittent reinforcement’ syndrome. 
Because a human or animal does not know in an experiment how many chances out of ten there are of 
obtaining the reward, the activity will be repeated many times to maximise the possibility of doing so. 
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   May now provides an examination of the physiological processes involved in 
becoming addicted245, before considering the possibility of a spiritual answer to 
the problem, which is not to be seen as an alternative to other forms of 
intervention, but as a complementary aspect, in which divine grace, as his overall 
title suggests, has an important part to play in the liberation of the addicted 
individual. Like most, but not all commentators on the scientific factors, he maps 
a process of physical neurological change in the brain as part of the natural 
history of addiction246. 
 
Physiological and Spiritual Factors 
   In his chapter on physiological factors, in which he charts the processes in the 
brain which lead to physical dependency, May includes247 a reflection on the 
problems which face the neurologist and the theologian in providing an accurate 
explanation of spiritual, and indeed mystical, phenomena. He identifies part of 
this epistemological struggle as having its location in the immanence and 
transcendence of the human spirit, which, as he puts it, ‘is both pervasively 
indwelling and yet immutably rooted in the eternal; like God it has at once 
qualities of immanence and transcendence. It is our life force as incarnate beings, 
and yet is more. According to Genesis, our human spirit is the breath of God in 
us’248. The question that this generates for May is how ‘to bring spiritual 
understanding into meaningful harmony with the hard data of anatomy and 
physiology’249. This collocation of science and theology in his discourse is of 
great significance in this thesis because it suggests the possibility, perhaps even 
the need, for an integrated approach, combining insights from both 
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psychological and religious disciplines to construct a satisfactory pastoral 
strategy in coping with the problems and opportunities raised by addiction 
issues. This is not necessarily an easy task, as May readily admits250. 
   In the two fundamental elements of addiction that May identifies, that is to say 
self-deception and collusion, we find two theological themes at work, i.e. truth 
on the one hand and agape251 on the other. Truth matters because one of the 
characteristics most associated with addiction is denial. The person who is 
addicted, to alcohol, for example, may well deny the problem, both to himself, 
and also to others, family, friends and colleagues etc. At the heart of the pastoral 
ministry to such a person (as indeed might equally be said of a medical treatment) 
lies the recognition that until the addicted person faces the addiction truthfully, 
little or nothing can be done to help. For an addicted person to come under the 
controlling dynamic of the truth suggests that from a religious, spiritual point of 
view, the way of liberation begins with an encounter with the true situation 
without denial. The situation of the addict, in a spiritual sense has, among other 
factors, the character of – to revert for the moment to the thought world of Jim 
Orford – ‘excessive appetite’ or disproportionate desire, which in Christian 
language can be described as sinful252. Collusion is also destructive from a 
theological perspective. True agape requires the helper to behave in the genuine 
interests of the person for whom concern is being expressed by not colluding 
with her denial.  
 
                                           
250 ibid. 
251 This Greek word is one of the four words for love: it can be used in describing love as a willed, chosen 
form of loving attention. See C. S. Lewis, The Four Loves. 
252 The concept of ‘desire’ and its relevance to theological concerns will be investigated in more detail in a 
later chapter of this thesis. 
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Grace 
   We will now explore the ways in which Addiction and Grace, having looked at 
the psychological mechanisms and neurological aspects of attachment, provides 
a method of helping those whose lives have been damaged by addiction to find 
freedom from their predicament: this method, unlike those provided by 
specifically medical models of care, concentrates on looking for a spiritual 
approach to healing and liberation, one that is based on the availability of divine 
grace. 
   Chapter 3 of the book describes the process by which grace can be a vehicle 
of this healing potential. 
   May takes as his starting point not the situation that obtains when human 
beings ‘lose their way’, as, for example, in severe cases of addiction to drugs, but 
the ideal situation, the Garden of Eden described in the book of Genesis253 
before human rebellion against God had converted it into what May calls ‘an 
empty and idolatrous wasteland’254. May acknowledges that his exposition of the 
theological motifs and ideas associated with grace is presented with ‘some fear 
and uncertainty’255, because he is writing as a doctor with an interest in religious 
matters rather than as a theologian. This disclaimer is important, because it 
acknowledges that there are pitfalls in claiming authority in a field of study in 
which one is not, in a technical sense, an ‘expert’. It is good to have that caveat 
expressed explicitly, but it does create a problem, in a number of ways. Two 
points will illustrate the reservations being expressed here. 
   In the first place, much of what May has to say about the workings of God’s 
grace in the soul of the human being is dependent on his earlier assertion that 
all of us are addicts, excessively or distortedly attached to some kind of substance 
                                           
253 See in particular Genesis 3:1-20. 
254 Addiction and Grace, p.119. 
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or activities. But as we have commented earlier in this chapter, this assertion is 
questionable, partly because to attribute addictive behaviour to everyone 
indiscriminately runs the risk of evacuating the concept of significant meaning. 
   Secondly, although May wisely recognises his lack of formal qualifications in 
the field of academic theology, he must have been aware of many books of 
religious and theological importance written by experts with the non-specialist 
reader in mind. To give one example – May begins his chapter on ‘grace’ by 
quoting from Saint John’s Gospel. But in trying to make use of this text in his 
chapter, he does not refer even to any of the more ‘accessible’ commentaries. So 
we are left with a rather inadequate account of the meaning of the verses quoted 
in relation to grace. And the same could be said more generally about this chapter 
of May’s book. It would have been helpful to have at least been given some sense 
of the wide and varying definitions of grace to be found in some writers of the 
patristic and medieval period such as those of Saint Augustine, with his threefold 
definition of grace256, or Saint Thomas Aquinas, dividing the idea of grace into 
‘sanctifying’ and ‘actual’ grace257. Had a work from a Protestant source been 
needed by way of comparison, he might for example have mentioned a book 
such as Paul Tillich’s Systematic Theology, volume 2258, which was well known at 
the time that May was writing. There is also the work of another fellow 
American, Rheinhold Niebuhr, who might have contributed to May’s 
understanding of grace259. 
                                           
256 See: Alister McGrath, Christian Theology, an Introduction, 5th edition, p.356.  
257 See: Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Prima Secundae, question 110a.1. This reference, presented with 
appropriate citations, is to be found in Alister McGrath, op. cit. p.356, and The Christian Theology Reader, third 
edition, p.432. 
258 See P. Tillich, Systematic Theology, volume 2, p.65f.  
259 On Niebuhr and Grace see J. McQuarrie, Twentieth Century Religious Thought, p.347f. 
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   Having made these negative comments, let us look at how May expounds his 
theory of grace in relation to addiction. The following quotation clearly expresses 
what he is trying to demonstrate260: 
Grace is the active expression of God’s love. God’s love is the root of 
grace; grace itself is the dynamic flowering of this love; and the good 
things that result in life are the fruit of this divine process. Grace appears 
in many ways, which theologians have attempted to categorize… Jesus 
spoke of God as being our intimate, loving parent, and he wished for us 
to receive God’s love like little children. Let me try to use that image, at 
least for a while. 
 
   This description of the ideal relationship between God and humanity as having 
the characteristics of a parent-child interaction is then explored, recognising that 
human approaches to God are often contaminated by attempts to manipulate 
God, just as children try to manipulate their human parents. May notes that the 
human parent image, like all theological images that are founded on analogy, is 
somewhat weak, because of God’s absolute knowledge of each individual human 
soul and its attempts to manipulate, compared with the wisest or most 
knowledgeable human parent. Equally, May proposes, God does not control 
human beings: ‘God calls us, invites us, and even commands us, but God does 
not control our response. We bear responsibility for the choices we make’261. 
This sentence has a great deal of significance in our attempt to understand 
addiction, because although in the early stages of substance dependency the 
individual can make choices and so be held responsible for the decision to start 
or stop the activity concerned, there comes a stage in the process of becoming 
substance dependent when free choice has been eroded by the substance and its 
constitutional effects on the individual. 
   May looks at the ways in which the potential for a grace filled relationship 
between God and humanity can be compromised. At such times, May suggests, 
                                           
260 Addiction and Grace, p.120 
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‘[the] immanent God in us becomes wounded with us, suffers, struggles, hopes, 
and creates with us’262. The locus of this reciprocal process is to be found in the 
Christian church community, where grace is something that is not 
predominantly, or exclusively a private matter, but finds its expression in the life 
of that community263. This is a most important contribution to the 
understanding of the worshipping community as a place where channels of 
healing for addicted people could be available wherever there is in church groups 
an open and non-judgmental attitude to people with various addiction problems; 
one criticism of May is that he does not develop this idea in enough detail. 
   Returning specifically to May’s understanding of grace, one crucial aspect of 
his understanding is the mode of the reception of grace as gift. He makes the 
point that just as human beings cannot manipulate the ‘God-parent’, so they 
cannot earn God’s grace, they can only open themselves to receiving it. Grace, 
and its reception cannot, therefore, be controlled. Here again, there is an 
interesting analogy with addiction, because addicted people are attempting to 
control or manipulate their environment through alcohol, drugs, or other forms 
of addicted behaviour, to produce immediate effects of pleasure or the relief of 
pain. 
   In asserting God’s freedom in the gift of grace, May is not however suggesting 
that human beings can only be passive in their receptivity. There is also space 
for an active form of receptivity, in which prayer plays a part by ‘requesting’ 
grace from God, in a way that prepares the soul to receive and act upon that 
grace when its active presence and availability is particularly apparent. We now 
                                           
262 op. cit., p.124. 
263 Although May is speaking here from a Christian point of view, and using Christian scripture to illustrate 
his ideas, it is important perhaps to recognise that the same could be said of other non-Christian faith 
communities. 
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turn to the specific ways in which, according to May, grace has a part to play in 
the healing process for people with addiction problems. 
   Here, however, we meet one of the paradoxes of human freedom, for May 
insists that there is always room for choice, even for those who seem to have 
reached a point where choice has been almost obliterated by addictive behaviour. 
‘Ironically’, as May expresses this264, ‘freedom becomes most pure when our 
addictions have so confused and defeated us that we sense no choice left at all. 
Here, where we feel absolutely powerless, we have the most real power’. This 
suggestion is of great importance in what follows, so it will be worth expounding 
this idea further. The key lies in May’s use of one word – opportunity. The 
person who is, to use a well-known expression in the world of addiction health 
care, at ‘rock bottom’ has only two possible choices. One is to stay in that 
helpless position, the other is to turn towards anything that can hold out the 
hope of change, however small and unpromising that hope may seem to be. This 
is what May means by his use of the word faith, which he understands not, as he 
makes clear, in terms of intellectual assent to religious dogma, but rather by 
engagement with risk. The content of that risk, in terms of faith, is, in May’s 
words, the possibility of trust. 
   Trust as the vehicle of grace is the theme of the next section of May’s chapter 
on Grace265. This kind of trust is not what might be called a ‘leap in the dark’. 
For May it involves returning to patterns of trusting behaviour that have proved 
helpful in the past, and which therefore offer similar reliability in the present. 
This experience of trust can be, so to speak, programmed into the brain, and so 
the ‘cells of the brain become more accepting of it’266. It thus becomes predictive 
that behaviour that has provided assistance in the past will be found helpful 
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again, and this trust has to do with relationships in both a ‘vertical’ and 
‘horizontal’ sense, to use metaphorical language – a belief that God will not let 
down or abandon human beings no matter how low and despondent they may 
have become, and that fellow human beings will also meet the needs of the 
person with the addiction. This is a dynamic process, he suggests, because ‘For 
each layer of trust that builds up, another, more challenging risk is offered’267. 
   There is here then a reciprocal relationship that lies at the heart of faith and 
trust: on the one hand there is the offering that God continually makes, and the 
human response, a movement of the heart at least as much as of the mind, but 
which must be given freely and without constraint. This reciprocal, free, 
relationship is the key to May’s understanding of the pathway out of addiction 
that can be provided by the dynamic of faith – so how does he explain this 
process? 
   The remainder of the book attempts to do precisely that, and so we will 
summarise his argument at this point. There is a fundamental question, of a 
rhetorical kind, that May uses to lead into a consideration of the process we are 
exploring at this point268: 
We have all had the experience of struggling to break a habit, failing 
repeatedly, and then at some point meeting with success. What was this 
success, and how did it happen? We can say that it was willpower, but 
what suddenly empowered our will? We can say it was finding the right 
strategy, but what enabled that discovery? Did we do it on our own, or 
did grace break through and deliver us, or was it some mysterious 
cooperation of will and grace that we could never have engineered? 
 
   For May it is when we are at our most helpless and vulnerable, in what he 
refers to as a spiritual ‘desert’ that we are most open to the reception of grace. 
‘The desert’, he writes269, ‘is where the battle with attachment takes place. The 
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saga of the desert tells of a journey out of slavery, through the desert, toward the 
garden that is home’. This journey involves ‘purgation and purification’ and a 
‘loving courtship, a homemaking between the human soul and its Creator’270. 
This experience, he suggests, is one that all people have, but it is brought into a 
particularly sharp focus through the problems of addictive behaviour. In all cases 
the same struggle is involved, and the journey, if completed well enough, leads 
from the slavery of the desert of attachment to the freedom of the ‘garden that 
is home’. 
   May is, however, under no illusions about the hardship and the cost of that 
journey:271 
At its mildest, the desert is a laboratory where one learns something 
about addiction and grace. In more fullness, it is a testing ground where 
faith and love are tried by fire. And with grace, the desert can become a 
furnace of real repentance and purification where pride, complacency, 
and even some of the power of attachment can be burned away, and 
where the rain of God’s love can bring conversion: life to the seeds of 
freedom. 
 
   This sense of a hard journey, and a purging of desire through a furnace, is 
illustrated by reference to the lives of some well-known spiritual leaders, 
including ‘Elijah and other great Hebrew prophets’, and the saints of Hinduism, 
Buddhism, especially in the person of Gautama, John the Baptist, the Christian 
desert mothers and fathers, Mohammed, and of course, Jesus, particularly in his 
own Temptation story in a deserted, wilderness environment. Most if not all of 
these historic figures did not choose their ‘desert’ experiences. Conversely they 
were chosen, and then in positive response to their calling, were obliged to test 
their vocation in the desert, whether literal, metaphorical, or both. 
   In the case of Jesus, May suggests272, we have a most important illustration of 
the relationship between attachment and the possibility of overcoming it, in the 
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specific context of the ‘Temptation’273 accounts in the synoptic gospels274. 
Although each writer has his own particular ‘take’ on the meaning of the story 
he tells, and does so with some editorial freedom because of this, there is an 
underlying theme of testing of an individual in preparation for a task that lies in 
the future. Each episode in the account, May says, speaks of the problem of 
attachment275: in Satan’s invitation to turn stone into bread there is a temptation 
to ‘play god’ – to misuse power for personal gain; in the temptation to jump off 
the Temple parapet the issue is one of manipulation; the invitation to become 
master of the world is the invitation to put personal power in the place of God, 
which is, in theological language, the ultimate act of idolatry. 
   The nature of that idolatry, as May points out, is that in the temptations, ‘Satan 
was hoping Jesus would fall prey to attachment: attachment to meeting his own 
needs, attachment to his own power, or attachment to the material riches of the 
world’276. In line with our analysis of May’s comments on attachment as part of 
a self-deception programme, this series of temptations is inviting Jesus to fall 
into the “I can handle it” trap. Rather than fall, he ‘stood firm in his own freedom 
and in his faith and in grace’277. 
   May argues that, in his full humanity, Jesus was undergoing a real, not an 
imaginary ordeal, and that all human beings who are tempted to fall into 
attachment behaviour patterns have to undergo that same ordeal, and meet it 
with the same resources available to Jesus, primarily those of humility and 
trusting faith. In that act of faith, as he shows in the next chapter278, there comes 
the reality of empowerment. 
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   Although May’s book has many highly important things to say about addiction 
in general, there are some aspects of the book that can be criticised. In the first 
place, as James B. Nelson, observes279, May is making a highly controversial 
statement at the beginning of his book when he claims that just as everyone is a 
sinner, so too everyone is addicted to something, whether it be alcohol, drugs, 
or some form of potentially harmful activity, something that falls short of 
concentration on God, thereby running the risk of being idolatrous. This is an 
important criticism, suggesting that May’s definition of addiction is a highly 
personal one with which by no means all would agree. It seems to the writer of 
this thesis that in agreement with Nelson, it would be unwise to move more 
indiscriminately towards a definition of ‘attachment’ that makes it virtually 
synonymous with ‘addiction’. To regard pathological attachments (such as to 
alcohol) as addiction seems to be valid, as such attachments so often cause 
suffering to the addict and his or her environment; it seems unnecessary however 
to see all such attachments as actually or potentially as harmful as that. 
   As discussed in the presentation of May’s views, there is also an important 
question to be raised about how far May has dealt adequately with the theological 
concept of grace, even taking into account his own disclaimer in terms of his 
lack of professional knowledge of theology compared with his undoubted 
expertise as a doctor and psychiatrist. 
   It would also, from a religious perspective, be useful to pay more attention to 
the matter that May raises concerning the community, particularly the Church 
and its congregations, in providing help and support for the addicted individual 
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member, or the member of the congregation whose partner or children are at 
risk from, or already engaged in, addictive behaviour, particularly with regard to 
alcohol and/or drugs. It is important, in the view of the writer of this thesis that 
all pastors should be aware of the problems of addiction that may well affect 
members of their parishes, and that churches would be well advised to offer 
professionally accredited training courses in the pastoral care of people with drug 
and alcohol addiction problems in particular280. 
   Also May does not take sufficient account of social pressures to misuse these 
potentially addictive substances. It is the contention of the present writer that 
the compound effects of availability, relative cheapness, and social approval, 
particularly towards the arguably excessive intake of alcoholic beverages, cannot 
be overestimated, and the cost of this behaviour to society in terms of medical 
care is an important factor, as was mentioned in the introductory section to this 
thesis281. This leads to the view that a holistic view of pastoral care should take 
account not only of the needs of the individual and his family, friends and 
colleagues at a personal level, but also engage with political leaders at both local 
and national levels to work towards public policies on addiction that have some 
chance of making a positive difference. This point of view will be developed 
later in this chapter, exploring the ethical approach to alcohol misuse and 
government responsibility in this context in Christopher Cook’s book, Alcohol, 
Addiction and Christian Ethics. 
   It is a long time since May produced the first edition of this informative and 
helpful book, with its intelligent combination of ideas from both the medical 
sciences and the field of religious and spiritual investigation of human problems. 
                                           
280 Training courses of this kind have recently been introduced in the Anglican Dioceses of Southwark, 
Guildford and London. 
281 It was observed there, for example, that specifically alcohol related death in the UK rose from just under 
10 per 100,000 in 1991 to over 18 per 100,000 in 2006. 
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If he were writing today, he would almost certainly have wanted to include some 
insights from the world of genetics about the heritability of a vulnerability to 
some addictive lifestyles. Equally, that study, as we have mentioned, is still to a 
large extent on the threshold of discovery about how ‘nature and nurture’ 
interact in the formation of human personality, especially in some of its 
pathological manifestations.                     
 
2.2 Kenneth Leech, With Specific Reference To Drugs And Pastoral Care 
 
Introduction 
   Kenneth Leech wrote about addiction in a number of books and articles282, 
and provided guidance for the General Synod of the Church of England when 
it debated the problems of drug addiction in 1998283. His major book on the 
pastoral care of people who have drug problems, Drugs and Pastoral Care, was 
published in the same year284. 
 
   Leech, who died in September 2015, was an Anglican priest, ordained in the 
Diocese of London in 1965, to work as a curate in the East London Parish of 
Hoxton with a long standing Anglo-Catholic tradition. He had a long history of 
working in London, including a substantial ministry at St Botolph’s Church, 
Aldgate in the City of London and its programme of pastoral outreach to 
homeless people and those with drug and alcohol problems. He retired from this 
in 2003. Like Gerald May, Leech was thus actively involved in the care of people 
with addiction problems. Perhaps the best known example of this was his work 
                                           
282 Examples include: Pastoral Care and the Drug Scene and Youthquake: Spirituality and the Growth of a Counter-
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283 Kenneth Leech, Drugs and the Church – a background paper for the Board for Social Responsibility. 
284 Kenneth Leech, Drugs and Pastoral Care. 
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at St. Anne’s Church in Soho, where he was the assistant curate from 1967 to 
1971, developing a programme of missionary outreach to that area with its 
complex and fast changing demographic profile, including the world of 
homelessness, alcohol misuse, drugs, and the sex trade, as well as the fast 
developing entertainment industry. 
 
Kenneth Leech’s Writings 
   The importance of Leech’s work is not however confined to his active 
ministry:  he has also written a number of books on spiritual and pastoral 
concerns, such as Youthquake285, Soul Friend286, True Prayer287, The Eye of the Storm288, 
and Through our Long Exile289. Among other clear statements about his beliefs he 
includes a personal political statement of affiliation, namely that, in his own 
words, ‘I became a Christian and a socialist at the same time, and in my 
innocence, for a while as a teenager, assumed that all Christians were bound to 
be socialists!’290. His commitment to the Christian socialist cause is well 
illustrated by his personal involvement in the founding of the Jubilee Group in 
1974, a group of (generally Anglo-Catholic291) Anglican clergy who were mostly 
though not all socialists292 but all dedicated to exploring the social relevance of 
contemporary Christianity,  particularly in urban areas of poverty and 
deprivation. Leech is a member of the movement known as ‘contextual 
theology’, an approach which regards local concerns and problems as the basic 
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291 The Jubilee Group has roots in both Christian Socialism and also the ‘Catholic revival’ in the Church of 
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material on to which theological ideas and concepts must be inscribed, rather 
than seeing theological statements as objective and universal in their application 
irrespective of the circumstances in which they are proclaimed, preached and 
taught293. The recent book which identifies some of the core elements in Leech’s 
theology in an anthology294 of his writings comes from the Contextual Theology 
Centre in East London. 
 
Leech And Contextual Theology 
   Before looking at the content of Leech’s writing on drugs and pastoral care in 
detail, however, it may be of importance to look critically at the claims of 
contextual theology. One criticism is that the contextual programme has strong 
epistemological links with ‘liberation theology’. Angie Pears’ book makes this 
link explicit in terms of gender theology and other topics. But is liberation 
theology a valid approach to Christian thought today? It is certainly not without 
its critics, especially in those areas where its instantiation is closely linked with 
revolutionary Marxist thought, such as in parts of Latin America. Concern about 
this has come from both within the Protestant churches and the Roman Catholic 
Church. In Modern Theology in 1986, for example, Stanley Hauerwas295 questions 
the whole project of seeing the concept of liberation as identified by Gutierrez296 
as a theological concept on which to build a political theology297. 
   There is here then recognition that to begin theological analysis from the local 
experience can carry with it the danger of distorting the picture. 
                                           
293 This approach to theology has been described in detail recently by Angie Pears (who identifies Leech as a 
member of the movement) in her book Doing Contextual Theology. 
294 David Bunch and Angus Ritchie eds. Prayer and Prophecy, The Essential Kenneth Leech. 
295 Stanley Hauerwas, “Some Theological Reflections on Gutierrez’s use of ‘Liberation’ as a Theological 
Concept”. 
296 Gustavo Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation. 
297 Hauerwas, op. cit, p.70. 
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   From within Gutierrez’s own Church, the Roman Catholic Church, there was 
also both positive and negative response to his liberation theology: the more 
negative kind came not least from Pope John Paul II, as Hans Küng observes in 
his book Disputed Truth298: 
Under the new Pope John Paul II and his German guardian of the faith, 
Joseph Ratzinger, who take a united front against liberation theology, 
they soon have to pay dearly for their attitude. On his first trip to Latin 
America in January 1979 the Polish Pope, stamped negatively by Soviet 
Marxism, vigorously criticizes the liberation theology and “disowns a 
whole group of theologians, pastors and bishops”. 
 
   Küng’s own view was not entirely supportive of a thoroughgoing Marxist 
analysis of the theological needs of Latin America299 and he warns against an 
uncritical acceptance of Marxism as an adequate basis for Christian theology, 
while at the same time opposing the centralising tendency of the Vatican in terms 
of Church order and administration300. 
   There are then many possible objections to the liberation theology that is 
connected with the contextual theology movement. If this were the only possible 
counter-argument to contextual theology however, it might not be seen as such 
a radical departure from orthodoxy. A much more radical critique can be offered 
in terms of its rejection of the concept of theological truth as absolute and 
unchanging, and unaffected in its essential content by issues of time and place. 
A Barthian critique, to be specific, while in no sense ruling out the need for a 
hermeneutics of biblical theology nevertheless argues for the objectivity of the 
biblical witness to God in Christ, and to dialectical confrontation between the 
Word and human philosophies. As he puts the matter in his Commentary on the 
Epistle to the Romans301: 
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The judgement of God is the end of history, not the beginning of a new, 
a second, epoch. By it history is not prolonged, but done away with. The 
difference between that which lies beyond the judgement and that which 
lies this side of it is not relative but absolute: the two are separated 
absolutely. God speaks: and He is recognised as the Judge. By His 
speech and by His judgements a transformation is effected so radical that 
time and eternity, here and there, the righteousness of men, and the 
righteousness of God, are indissolubly linked together. 
 
   In his exposition of Barth’s theology, Hans Urs von Balthasar makes the point 
about the absolute distinction between God’s righteousness and the temporal, 
relative world of human history well in relation to Barth’s thought as the 
following quotation will make clear302: 
The first thing is the pure actuality of God’s Revelation. It cannot be 
compared with any actuality in the temporal world for, scholastically 
speaking, it is the presence of actus purus in the act of Revelation. For 
Barth, the actuality of Revelation means this: everything in it is pure act, 
pure decision, pure sovereignty and pure freedom; hence it is the 
Revelation of the divine in God. 
 
   It is not necessary to discard the whole enterprise of biblical criticism and 
hermeneutics in order to appreciate the force of this argument303. The Word 
contains a direct revelatory statement about God and particularly God-in- Christ 
in Barth’s theological approach, and this statement is absolute, universal in its 
application, and unchanging. It is not dependent on any human instrumentality. 
It comes to all afresh and life-giving; what is needed is for the recipient to be 
open to receive it in faith. Above all, this process is not dependent on local or 
temporal happenstance, as the proponents of contextual theology would seek to 
suggest. On this basis, although it remains – in the view of the author of thesis 
– important to relate theology to the particular, we are right to be wary of the 
kind of theological praxis that seeks to make the interpretation of theological 
ideas solely or principally dependent on contingent reality, even when this may 
have at least a superficial attractiveness in terms of its important contributions 
                                           
302 Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Theology of Karl Barth, p.65. 
303 Barth himself firmly rejected the supposition that he was opposed to analytical biblical theology. 
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in attempting to give the poorest people on earth a voice, both in politics, 
economics, and in the developing life of the Churches. This problematic element 
in the approach of contextual theology will become more apparent when we 
consider Ken Leech’s central chapter on “Pastoral Care and the Christian 
Community”. 
 
The Book Drugs And Pastoral Care Described And Assessed 
   We will now explore Leech’s book, and provide some analysis and critique of 
his views, before relating it to the main argument of the thesis. 
   We begin with a quotation from the review article about this book written by 
James Woodward304. It is perhaps worth noting at this point that Woodward, like 
Leech, is a representative of the ‘contextual theology’ movement, because the 
contextual agenda influences what Woodward has to say about the book. 
Leech provides the carer with a tool for engagement with the realities of 
drug use in our modern society. Clearly written, theologically grounded 
and insightful, this book provides eight chapters which can enable any 
reader to become better informed and explore their own personal and 
professional responses to the use and abuse of drugs. As ever, Leech 
does not disappoint in the quality of his theological reflection. An 
essential addition to any library, but also a good example of how to do 
theology. 
 
   This appreciation of Leech’s book has some merit: both writers recognise the 
need for any pastor to be well and accurately informed on addiction as on other 
aspects of her ministry. That aspect of Leech’s book is highly important because 
it has so much detailed information about the UK drug scene as it had become 
by 1998 when he was writing. But is it, as Woodward also claims, ‘a good 
example of how to do theology’? This confident assertion we may doubt. This 
is where the fundamental problem with contextual theology becomes 
problematic for this book because, beginning with the particular, Leech fails to 
                                           
304 James Woodward, review of Drugs and Pastoral Care. 
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do justice to the complexity of the understanding of the nature of God that 
theology tries to explore. It seems to the writer of this thesis that it could well 
be argued that a far better place to begin looking at the theology of addiction, 
and the pastoral care of people with drug addiction problems in particular, might 
be to begin with the nature of God – exploring for example, the appropriate use 
of God given substances, including legal and illegal drugs, in relation to, for 
example, the theology of creation and the ordering of human desire. It is this 
question that the thesis will address in greater depth and detail in the chapter on 
theological understanding of addiction. 
   Drugs and Pastoral Care has a political agenda, perhaps not unrelated to the 
author’s identification of himself with a socialist approach to politics. For Leech 
criticises the 1987-1997 Conservative British government’s attempts to deal with 
the problems caused by drug addiction305, and their failure, as he sees it. Some 
account of this agenda is necessary in order to evaluate the ideas contained in 
Leech’s book. He does not take the view that the use of non-therapeutic drugs 
and alcohol should necessarily be regarded as a problem. Leech then is highly 
critical of the ways in which public policy makers, and in particular the 
Conservative Government of the United Kingdom between 1977 and 1997 saw 
drug use as a problem and tried to deal with it306. In making these criticisms he 
is not denying that many people who use drugs and alcohol become dependent 
on them and that this sometimes causes difficulty in their lives: he opens his 
chapter on “Politics, Policies and Pastoral Theology” by using the analogy of the 
ostrich that is said to bury its head in the sand in order to avoid looking at 
important but uncomfortable or frightening aspects of reality, in this case the 
                                           
305 It is however doubtful whether the succeeding Labour administration was any more effective in addressing 
the problems of alcohol and drug misuse. 
306 Leech himself in Drugs and Pastoral Care recognises however that the Labour Administration which 
followed this one did nothing to reverse the mistakes previously made, and in some ways made matters 
worse: see in particular his chapter on “Policies, Politics and Pastoral Theology”. 
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damage done by drug misuse. This is what happens both in official and unofficial 
responses to the drug issue, he says, and this policy of denial has been an 
important factor in the development of drug use patterns in our society, because 
it has been followed by an exaggerated reaction, which has done more harm than 
good. This argument is so central to his thesis in relation to pastoral care that a 
short quotation is needed to illustrate what he is saying on this point:307 
(italicisation added). 
It is necessary for pastors to understand the kinds of responses over the 
years which affect the pattern of drug use. Often responses to drugs are more 
harmful than the drugs themselves. Public responses and policies can hinder 
and impede as well as aid and strengthen pastoral work. 
 
   This is clearly a radical and provocative statement, so let us try to understand 
the nature of Leech’s argument at this point. In order to begin this analysis, it is 
necessary to go back one step and look at Leech’s understanding of the nature 
of drug use and how that use, once begun, can for some users of  drug turn in 
to full blown addiction. 
Physical dependence can quickly follow heroin use, although it needs to 
be emphasised that both physical and psychological dependence are very 
variable, and many people do in fact give up the drug at some stage 
without serious ill-effects. There are many generalisations in this area 
which are based on individual experience without adequate comparative 
work. It is perfectly true that many people become dependent on heroin 
very quickly. But there is nothing automatic about it. 308 
 
   He continues in the same passage by observing that the euphoric state that is 
achievable by the use of heroin has a short life span, and that it therefore has to 
be used in gradually larger amounts to obtain the same effect and to avoid the 
unpleasant side effects associated with withdrawal. Here we find the two classic 
elements in substance dependency – ‘tolerance’ and ‘withdrawal’ (with its 
unpleasant or even life threatening symptoms) – side by side. 
                                           
307 Kenneth Leech, Drugs and Pastoral Care, p.118. 
308 op. cit., p.51. 
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   What is already clear from Leech’s account of addiction is that he draws a clear 
line between the use of drugs as such (and one perhaps could argue in a similar 
way in terms of alcohol) and the kind of use that results, for a significant number 
of people, in substance dependency. The move from voluntary to substance 
dependent use is not ‘automatic’: other factors are involved in setting up a 
substance dependent lifestyle. What then, in Leech’s understanding, are these 
factors? 
   There are, he says many ways of looking at this question, and this assertion is 
to be welcomed, because it recognises that we are dealing with a complex subject 
which raises more questions than answers. It has been suggested, for example, 
that for some people the terror associated with abstinence is the most important 
factor – the fear of entering into a stage of what is termed the ‘abstinence 
syndrome’309 when the drug of choice is not available. But this explanation is not 
adequate, Leech argues. The truth involves ‘a complex set of responses and 
conditioning to the drug’310. There are those, for example, he continues, who 
describe the experience of the heroin ‘fix’ in libidinal terms - ‘coming from every 
pore’311. In line with this quasi sexual theme, in a quotation from M Hoffmann312, 
he points to an analogy with masturbation, which has a certain significance here 
in the sense that masturbation, like the use of a drug, is generally thought of as 
being an individual form of sexual arousal and excitement rather than one that 
involves a relationship with another person313. The sexual referent was examined 
in detail by psychoanalytic writers such as Paul D’Orban, writing about female 
prisoners in London’s Holloway Prison, who saw addiction as a symptom of 
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312 M. Hoffmann, cited by Leech, Drugs and Pastoral Care, p.53. 
313 The relationship between the use of drugs and other activities in terms of the satisfying of an appetite will 
be explored in the following section which will analyse the concepts of appetite, longing, and pleasure in a 
more historical, theological manner. 
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psycho-sexual disturbance in which the injecting of heroin takes the place of 
intercourse for the addict314. 
   What this connection with psychoanalytical concepts is suggesting, Leech 
continues, is that there is a danger of treating addiction, particularly drugs 
dependent addiction, as an isolated phenomenon, instead of aligning it to other 
aspects of personal development and its associated problems. Like Gerald May, 
he sees addiction as a syndrome which can appear in many forms, and like May 
he also argues against a facile attempt to link such behaviour too closely to 
supposed ‘pre-addictive personality’ factors315. ‘The history of addiction shows 
an enormous variety of personalities, and their social contexts also vary’316. 
   This caution about over simplifying the aetiology of addiction is therefore 
welcome. One such over simplification, Leech suggests317, is the view that all 
heroin addicts are simply seeking a form of psychological escape. He points out 
that escape via emotional oblivion can be obtained more easily (and legally) by 
the use of other substances such as alcohol. It is therefore unlikely that ‘escape’ 
is inevitably a core determinant of substance dependency, particularly in the case 
of opioid drug misuse. 
   It is likely, Leech says, that relatively underdeveloped personality factors may 
play their part in the establishment of a dependence lifestyle, but he is wise to be 
cautious in looking for isolated determinants: the whole personal, social and 
economic environment of the person with the problem needs to be considered 
rather than individual psychological, or other factors. In the end, perhaps, ‘those 
who cannot establish relationships with people may turn to the drug for security 
                                           
314 Paul D’Orban, “Heroin Dependence and Delinquency in Women”, cited by Leech, Drugs and Pastoral Care, 
p.53. 
315 ibid. 
316 Leech, op. cit., p.54. 
317 ibid. 
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and warmth, though eventually for deliverance from the pain of its absence’318. 
The drug thus becomes a way of coping with a degree of pain that seems 
unbearable without it. As he continues, ‘Yet, whatever the aetiology, once 
addiction has developed there is a state of psychological imprisonment319. The 
world in which the addict operates is drastically reduced, the territory 
increasingly limited with predictable events and ritual repetitions’320. 
   There is, it must be said, an unsatisfactory element to this account of the 
aetiology of addiction, a sense of confusion about what its cause really is. Leech 
himself is aware of this and does not try to minimise the problems. So although 
we may criticise Leech for the inadequacy of his account, it may be that he is in 
reality helpfully recognising the dangers of overgeneralization. 
   In Leech’s work, the reasons for addiction are presented as complex and multi-
faceted. Pastors and other professional carers therefore require a thorough 
knowledge of the individual, and his or her psychological, social, and economic 
circumstances and the interplay between all of these factors. This complexity 
leads Leech to be critical of political approaches to addiction, such as the so-
called ‘war on drugs’, that have been tried by various governments in the United 
Kingdom and in the United States of America and elsewhere, which have either 
failed to improve the situation, or in some cases, as Leech argues, made matters 
worse321. What such legislative attempts fail to do, in his view, is to recognise the 
mysterious element in the world of addiction. ‘Much ministry in the drug scene 
is marked by darkness, silence and uncertainty. It calls us to an apophatic style 
of pastoral care in which clarity and method give way to waiting and 
                                           
318 ibid. 
319 The word ‘imprisonment’ is of great importance here as a powerful metaphor for addiction. It will be 
analysed in greater detail in the section of this thesis that explores theological concepts in relation to addictive 
behaviour in more depth and detail. 
320 ibid. 
321 See: Leech, Drugs and Pastoral Care, p.122.  
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“unknowing”…. In a world where many die alone and abandoned, the central 
task of the Church is to share that darkness and be a powerful witness to life 
beyond the tombs’322. His willingness to acknowledge the mysterious nature of 
addiction is highly important here, as it can help to protect those who approach 
the subject from a religious or theological background from operating on the 
basis of a simplistic – or even judgemental – approach to the pastoral care of 
addicted people. 
   Perhaps Leech knew the views presented by J. B. Davies, whose book The Myth 
of Addiction we assessed earlier. The question might then be for Leech, as it was 
for Davies, not just whether addiction really exists or whether it is a myth, but 
more fundamentally, why taking drugs matters. Could it not be argued, in line 
with Leech’s generally liberal approach to drug using lifestyles, that what is really 
needed for those who want to use drugs is an affordable supply, safe conditions 
for taking them, safe ‘works’, and a society which is far more tolerant of such 
behaviour rather than regarding it as essentially ‘deviant’ or ‘sick’?323 
   This is the direction in which Leech’s thought was moving at the time of 
writing Drugs and Pastoral Care. One highly controversial chapter – entitled “The 
Drug Culture and Spirituality” – addresses the issues raised by Aldous Huxley, 
Timothy Leary and Frank Lake, who proposed that the use of certain drugs can 
induce mystical experience in the user. Commenting on this possibility, Leech 
observes that324  
it would seem illogical, and incompatible with an incarnational and 
sacramental theology, to deny that, in principle, chemical agents could be 
used to enhance religious experience. However, as with fasting, breathing 
exercises, methods of meditation, and other ascetical disciplines, it is 
necessary to distinguish aids and methods from the goal of the spiritual 
                                           
322 Prayer and Prophecy, the Essential Kenneth Leech, ed. David Bunch and Angus Ritchie, p.140. 
323 One very informative book called The Road of Excess by Marcus Boon details the use of a variety of drugs, 
including opium and cocaine on the basis of a historical survey of their use. There is little to suggest that in 
the case of Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s creation the detective Sherlock Holmes, for example, his use of the 
substance had a malignant effect on his health, work or social relationships.  
324 Leech, Drugs and Pastoral Care, p.111f. 
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life. There is enough evidence that the use of drugs can awaken people 
to spiritual realities. There is not much evidence that, as a long-term 
component of religious discipline, drugs can be particularly useful. 
 
   It seems to the writer of this thesis that Leech’s argument at this point is highly 
contestable and open to several objections. Perhaps the most telling phrase 
comes in the section beginning on page 107, in which Leech, discussing 
psychedelic drugs and mystical experience325, quotes Timothy Leary326 in whose 
view the use of certain mind altering drugs such as LSD can, allegedly, take the 
user to ‘new realms of consciousness’. But does this expansion of the horizons 
have anything to do with genuine spirituality? To establish this, Leech would 
have to provide a definition of what a genuine spiritual experience is, and he 
surprisingly fails to do this. 
   It must also be set against any attempt to advance the use of drugs as a gateway 
to spiritual experience that there needs to be for the person who seeks such 
experience a discipline that has been tried and tested. Membership of a church 
group is important here both as a provider of such discipline through communal 
worship, and as a provider of spiritual direction or accompaniment. 
   We may also wonder whether the seeking of spiritual experiences for oneself 
really has any place in authentic spirituality. Such experiences belong to the realm 
of the given rather than that which can be in any sense engineered for oneself – 
which could be seen as an attempt to manipulate God. In her classic book on 
Christian spirituality The Interior Castle, St. Teresa of Avila reminds her readers 
that although a desire for spiritual union with God is a valid element in the 
spiritual quest, it must be remembered that such desire can be orchestrated by 
the devil rather than by God. Such desires must therefore be examined to make 
sure that they are authentic desires for God and not a subversion or perversion 
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of human desire327. It is questionable whether and how the use of mind altering 
drugs and their allegedly spiritual benefits could be rigorously assessed on this 
basis. 
   Equally, the use of psychedelics as a spiritual aid must not be used, it seems to 
the writer of this thesis, to mask the realities both of the health risks of using 
non-therapeutic drugs, and the fact that by using them, people, perhaps young 
people in particular, are in fact breaking the law, and as a consequence could 
find themselves with a criminal record, which could have very serious 
consequences for their lives, partly in terms of employability. Although Leech is 
aware of much of this, his fairly liberal approach to the use of drugs, and even 
the possibility that they may have spiritual value, is one that needs careful 
scrutiny, and may prove to be unacceptable, in terms of the endeavour to 
establish a rigorous theoretical and pragmatic basis for pastoral care. 
 
The Treatment Of Addicts – Setting A Context For Pastoral Ministry 
   We will now address Leech’s approach to treatment for those who have 
addiction problems, and the ways in which pastoral care can play its part in 
providing help for them. The section following the one we have been reflecting 
on is entitled: Treatment for Addiction. 
   Building on his argument for the perception of addiction as a complex 
phenomenon with many interlocking causes, Leech says that in the light of this, 
patterns of treatment focus on different aspects of the problem. Those clinicians 
who favour an integrated approach will seek to offer treatment that has both 
psychological and psychopharmacological elements. In the case of heroin 
dependency, Leech mentions the use of methadone328 as a way of helping heroin 
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 127 
dependent patients to decrease their dependency on opioid drugs without 
suffering unbearable withdrawal symptoms. The use of such drugs as methadone 
and buprenorphine are well established in the United Kingdom. Leech argues 
that treatment is only likely to be effective if the therapists involved attend to 
the social environment of the addicted person329, and this important observation 
will be helpful as we look at the implications of this section for the care of 
addicted people in the community – particularly the opportunities they present 
for effective spiritual and pastoral care.  
   Leech also reflects on the use of the officially sanctioned prescribing of heroin 
as a way of containing the problem of opioid use when it seems unlikely that a 
policy of complete abstinence is going to be successful. Noting that there has 
been ‘a revival of the practice in some places, and it may well be that this will 
spread’330 he quotes research on this approach, which demonstrates a particular 
concern for the dangers of HIV/Aids infection through intravenous routes that 
is likely to be better controlled by an official policy of needle exchange for those 
who are, for the time being, unable or unwilling to stop using injectable drugs331. 
   Heroin is not the only drug that is used for what are usually regarded as non-
clinical or non-therapeutic drugs, and in the next chapter, Leech discusses issues 
relating to cannabis and psychedelic drugs. With reference to cannabis, Leech 
provides evidence of some confusion in thinking about its dangers: there are 
those for example who regard it as so dangerous that ‘In time, marijuana leads 
to incurable insanity’332. Others whom he quotes express uncertainty about the 
effects of the drug. An obvious question relating to cannabis use is why it has 
been classified as a substance that it is illegal to possess, use, or trade. 
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   Linked to all of these debates is the question as to whether cannabis is an 
addictive drug. Leech concludes that ‘the pattern with cannabis seems to be that, 
while there are more regular users than occasional, there seems to be no general 
trend towards increasing the amount used. Most cannabis use is recreational and 
is not at all related to an addictive or destructive lifestyle’333. At the beginning of 
this chapter reference was made to the possibility that Leech’s work needs to be 
approached with considerable caution in the belief that he is setting out a 
political agenda without necessarily acknowledging that he is doing so. It is 
noticeable that in his discussion of cannabis use, he makes a strong case for the 
absurdity of keeping cannabis on the list of prohibited substances. The fact that 
he bases this on the assumption that cannabis is relatively harmless, without 
actually supplying supportive quotations for this argument, may make us suspect 
that he was unaware at the time of writing of the new varieties of cannabis now 
being generally used in the UK, as described by Mary Brett334. 
   It is worth noting from the point of view of this thesis, and the fact that Leech 
argues that Church work in the field of pastoral care has to involve itself not 
only with care of the damaged individuals who need help but also in the political 
structures which can work either to improve the situation or make it worse, that 
in his discussion of the arguments for and against the legalisation of cannabis 
possession and use, he points out that the Church keeps out of the debate. He 
does however refer to a lecture that he gave335 arguing for the decriminalisation 
of the use of cannabis in 1966. Clearly for Leech there is a belief that the 
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decriminalisation process should be promoted, and that the Church should be 
involved in the political debate on this subject. What is clear from this lecture 
and other passages in Drugs and Pastoral Care is that Leech is taking a liberal view 
of the use of cannabis, in the belief that it is a relatively harmless drug when used 
moderately, and that government interference in people’s freedom to use it does 
no good – in fact it causes more problems than it solves. 
   What is less controversial is that in North America, the ‘non therapeutic’ use 
of drugs occurred at the same time as a sense of disenchantment of many people 
with the American way of life336. There was therefore a political process that 
accompanied the LSD experiment, for example, and it is possible that this 
revolutionary approach to the Establishment was guided to some degree by 
those who had, through the use of such perception altering substances, become 
aware of new visions of society as it was, and as it could become. It is difficult 
however to be sure that this suggestion has any verifiable evidence in its favour. 
   As Leech states, the dangers of LSD and other similar drugs must not be 
overlooked. Many have experienced ‘great terror and disintegration, and some 
have never fully recovered’337. Because of these ‘bad trips’ occurring in significant 
numbers in San Francisco, for example, treatment centres began to appear, such 
as the Haight-Ashbury Free Medical Clinic. Leech does not endorse the use of 
LSD and similar drugs, but he does suggest that ‘the incidence of serious 
casualties associated with this range of drugs is probably quite small’338. 
   Leech’s exploration of the world of cannabis and psychedelic drug use suggests 
that, on the whole, although he is concerned about the dangers of irresponsible 
or excessive use of them, he believes that a liberalising, decriminalising approach 
by governments would be a good thing. This leads us to consider what the 
                                           
336 Leech, Drugs and Pastoral Care, p.75f.  
337op. cit., p.68. 
338op. cit., p.69. 
 130 
response of the Church ought to be to the problems raised by drug taking, and 
what theological considerations should help church leaders to formulate a policy 
for the spiritual and pastoral care of people who are having problems because 
of their use of these substances. To that subject we will now turn out attention. 
    
Theological And Pastoral Considerations 
   With all of these factors in mind, how does Leech describe the role of 
theological insight into the world of illicit drugs and drug addiction? His answer 
takes him into some key areas of importance for this thesis, as he recognises the 
salience of ‘theological ideas about sin, grace, human will, the world and the 
Kingdom of God’339. In this section of his book he looks first at the relationship 
between addiction and sin. He argues that much writing about addiction has 
been too accepting of Gerald May’s argument, namely that in line with 
undifferentiated thinking about original sin it is sometimes suggested that 
everyone is an addict, in the sense of being uncontrollably attached to some kind 
of behaviour. This, for Leech, attributes too much responsibility for the addict’s 
behaviour to the individual, failing to recognise the complex interaction of social 
forces that imprison that individual who is in reality as much a victim as a 
perpetrator of sin. We are wise, he suggests, to avoid ‘harmful generalities’ in 
thinking about the causes of addiction and approaching those who are suffering 
from addictive behaviour. 
   There is also a question for Leech about the ways in which our image of God 
can distort our view of the addicted person. He suggests that some religious 
groups who try to work with addicted people do so with a view of God as 
‘dictator and controller’, one who is in danger of becoming another object of 
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addiction, even if God might be thought of as representing a more wholesome 
addiction than drugs; he repeats the warning, originating in Karl Marx’s critique 
of Hegel, that religion can have an opiate like effect on its adherents. 
   The next part of his theological comment denies that there is, or ought to be, 
a specific Christian ministry to drug users. The problem with this for Leech is 
that it falls into a dangerous pattern of thinking that tends to label people, seeing 
them as ‘alcoholics’ or ‘drug addicts’ and in so doing failing to see them as 
individual persons. The word ‘client’ is one that he prefers to avoid, as it over 
defines the relationship between helper and helped, in terms of an unequal 
distribution of power. He concludes this highly important but much abbreviated 
paragraph by suggesting that it would be better to see how ‘the field of drugs 
can help to illuminate neglected areas of ministry, and help us towards a clearer 
understanding’340. There is much in this rather elliptical suggestion that needs 
more clarification. 
   A final element in Leech’s theological commentary on addiction concerns his 
insistence on the mysterious and sacramental aspects of addiction. With regard 
to pastoral ministry, Leech stresses the need for pastors to work on the basis of 
a ‘profound spiritual rootedness in God, and for those essentially priestly tasks 
of Eucharistic sacrifice and adoration, intercession and solidarity in Christ 
through the sharing of silence and darkness’341. This task is not for the ordained 
alone, but for the whole Church: it is vital to engage in this process of darkness, 
silence and unknowing, he suggests, because the care of people with addiction 
problems is not likely to be something that has a speedy positive outcome, but 
will require patience, and staying ‘with the pain, the wounds, the brokenness, the 
repeated crises and the darkness, in faith and trust’342. This highly realistic view 
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of the care of addicted people is familiar to the author of this thesis in the context 
of dialogue with clinicians in the field of drug treatment343. Leech advocates a 
ministry involving the liberal use of prayer and anointing. But he also reiterates 
the need for tolerance of ‘darkness, silence and uncertainty’ in the face of the 
suffering that ministers will encounter in their involvement with addicted people. 
   What is perhaps surprising in the chapter on “Pastoral Care and the Christian 
Community” is the way in which Leech approaches the theological aspects of 
this subject. 
   Leech’s approach to addiction is embedded in a ‘contextual’ approach to the 
subject. There is a problem with drugs: what is the theological answer to it? But 
it might be argued that this methodology is deeply flawed. On p. 100 he begins 
to take a more structured look at theology, asking questions about the kind of 
God we believe in as Christian pastors, and helpfully alerting the reader to the 
approach which sees drugs as an isolated phenomenon, unrelated to pastoral 
issues in general, and allowing positively for the darkness, uncertainty and 
unknowing that forms part of much spiritual guidance and accompaniment, on 
the part of both pastor and ‘client’. 
   Some important criticisms might be offered here. The first is that he does not 
begin to look at the ‘nature of God’ question until well in to the chapter we are 
considering, and that having introduced the God question into the chapter at 
this point, he then tries to deal with the ‘what kind of god do we believe in?’ 
question in one brief paragraph, whereas it should have been given far more 
detailed and analytical attention, even allowing, correctly, for the claims he makes 
about the dark unknowability of God. For someone with such a concern for 
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Matters of Substance, p.268ff. 
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spiritual matters to be so elliptical at this point in the argument seems strange, 
and probably unhelpful.  
 
Criticisms And Conclusions 
   The work of Kenneth Leech has important contributions to make to the 
understanding of addiction, and in particular drug addiction. He correctly asserts 
that the intervention of the Government via the criminalisation (and to some 
extent decriminalisation) of the possession, use and distribution of ‘illicit’ drugs 
have not solved the problems of drug misuse, and may even have inadvertently 
assisted in the creation of a criminal class in which the circulation of drugs in the 
United Kingdom plays a considerable part. 
   On the other hand, looking at the issues from a theological and pastoral point 
of view, much in his writing seems to the author of this thesis to be muddled 
and unhelpful. Whether or not, for example, it is helpful to a particular society 
to ban certain drugs, the fact remains that their use remains illegal in many 
countries. Leech seems largely to ignore this reality in dealing with pastoral 
issues, where he clearly advocates a more liberal and tolerant approach to their 
use. Could such an attitude really be recommended to people who are carefully 
considering their pastoral response to individuals and families with addiction 
issues? 
   At a deeper level, what is the spiritual and theological nature of drug use when 
its aim is not strictly ‘therapeutic’ but intended for the pursuit either of pleasure 
or even spiritual enhancement? There is a whole theology of desire, health, and 
the development of personality and relationships – a theology of the ‘self’ – that 
Leech does not engage with in a satisfactory manner, with regard to drugs (the 
same might be said about the use of alcohol and other addictive behaviours), 
and one of the principal aims of this thesis, which will be offered in a later 
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chapter, is to set the legitimate, and addictive, use of such substances in a proper 
theological context. 
   In his defence, it might however be suggested that Leech is expressing a great 
deal of the confusion that our contemporary society is experiencing about many 
different forms of intoxicants: a major supermarket in the area where this writer 
lives has filled its large display window with cheap bottles of wine, as a way of 
inviting customers into the store. This speaks eloquently of the availability, 
affordability and acceptability of drinking alcohol. There is no mention there of 
the negative personal and social consequences of the excessive consumption of 
alcohol. 
   Leech offers some important insights particularly concerning the complexity 
of the origins of addiction and the need for an accommodation of the difficult 
and demanding aspects of theological insight that often, especially in this 
context, have much more to do with silence, mystery and waiting than with any 
type of quick or obvious – or even lasting - success, however that success might 
be defined. He also makes a very important point (as noted in the text here) that 
the question of the legalisation of the use of at least some non therapeutic drugs 
needs careful thought: it is good to be reminded, as Leech stresses, that the 
criminalisation of drug use, far from helping to solve the problems associated 
with it has arguably contributed to the problem rather than to its solution by 
criminalising people who use drugs such as cannabis to a moderate degree in 
social contexts344. This point of view, while disputable, is one that in the opinion 
of the writer of this thesis needs to be taken very seriously. 
                                           
344 There is however a body of evidence that suggests that cannabis may be responsible for some psychotic 
episodes in users. This evidence is as yet largely untested, but the suggestion lay behind the decision of the 
Labour Administration in the UK in 2009 to reclassify cannabis from class C to class B, with the concurrent 
change in penalties for its possession, use and trading. 
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   We argue, however, that Drugs and Pastoral Care  has serious problems: on the 
one hand it does not provide a robust enough engagement with the theological 
issues it raises in terms of the nature of God, and how this relates to issues of 
the self, desire (particularly the disordered desire that is embedded in substance 
misuse), and health and human flourishing, and on the other hand the more 
complex pastoral and ethical issues that are inescapably moved onto the centre 
of the epistemological stage when people like Leech appear to advocate a 
tolerant attitude to the use of potentially addictive substances in contemporary 
society. This thesis will attempt in the next chapter to provide a more securely 
based theological understanding of these issues. We will look at how the 
conceptual and phenomenological realities of addiction may be seen to relate to 
soundly based theological ideas concerning the human self, health and 
flourishing, and how addictive behaviour relates to these issues, not least because 
addiction can result, for the addict, in a state of being that has much in common 
with the language of imprisonment or enslavement. The theological – and 
pastoral - challenge then is to help the addict to find a way out of that 




2.3 James B. Nelson, Thirst: God and the Alcoholic Experience’ 
 
Introduction To James B. Nelson’s Work 
   James B. Nelson became well known in theological circles in the late 1970’s 
when he began to write on the subject of Christianity and ‘embodiment’, 
particularly in terms of human sexuality. He was personally concerned to help 
the Church to look more sympathetically at homosexuality, and his first 
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contribution on this specific aspect of sexuality appeared in 1977, in the article 
he wrote for the magazine Christianity and Crisis, entitled “Homosexuality and the 
Church”. 
   Nelson was born in 1930, in Windom, Minnesota345. He attended Macalester 
College in St. Paul, Minnesota, which has a history of concern with social issues, 
internationalism and multiculturalism. At Yale University he received a PhD 
degree in 1962. He was ordained as a minister of the Congregational – United 
Church of Christ – tradition of the Christian Church. He served his ministerial 
‘apprenticeship’ at West Haven, Connecticut, and then moved to the church at 
Vermilion, South Dakota, as senior minister. 
 
Professional Career and Publications 
   In 1963 Nelson was appointed as associate professor of Christian Ethics at the 
United Theological Seminary of the Twin Cities346, becoming full professor in 
1968. There he began to explore issues of human sexuality, as a member of the 
University of Minnesota’s Program on Human Sexuality and the UCC’s Task 
Force on Human Sexuality. One of his most well-known books is Embodiment: 
an Approach to Sexuality and Christian Theology347. This spells out the inclusive 
approach to theology with regard to sexuality, and homosexuality in particular, 
that underlies his report to the Presbyterian General Assembly’s Special Task 
Force on Human Sexuality, on which he represented the Center for Sexuality 
and Religion, of which he was a founding member, in 1989. (The report was 
rejected by the Church for being too ‘liberal’). His concern for lesbian, gay, bi-
sexual and transgender people continued into retirement from the United 
                                           
345 The information from which these biographical notes are taken can largely be found in the lesbian, gay, 
bisexual and transgender Religious Archives Network, at www.lgbtran.org/Profile.aspx?ID=142 created in 
2004: last consulted on 28.03.2011. 
346 Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minnesota. 
347 James B. Nelson, Embodiment: an Approach to Sexuality and Christian Theology.  
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Theological Seminary in 1995, as is shown in his preface to Crossing Over: liberating 
the Transgendered Christian348 and a prepublication review of Transgender Good 
News349. 
   James B. Nelson350, in addition to bringing his own individual interpretation to 
substance351 misuse, and regarding addiction as a disease352, looks critically at the 
work of those writers on addiction like J. B. Davies353, whose work we discussed 
in the previous chapter, who deny the reality of addiction: as we noted earlier 
Davies regards the concept of addiction as a myth, invented for its usefulness in 
explaining away certain forms of anti-social behaviour. Nelson also refers in his 
book to the integrative survey of addiction issues provided by Gerald May, in 
his book Addiction and Grace354. He quotes approvingly the passage in May’s book 
which argues355 that all human beings have a fundamental desire for God as it 
were ‘hard-wired’ into the psyche, even though this desire may be repressed. 
This yearning for God can be distorted, Nelson suggests, re-emerging as a desire 
for a lesser god, to be found in such contingent realities as alcohol – ‘trying to 
drink God out of a bottle’, as Bill Wilson, founder of Alcoholics Anonymous, 
had written356. 
 
Nelson’s Work On Alcohol Dependency 
                                           
348 Vanessa Sheridan, Crossing Over: liberating the Transgendered Christian. 
349 Pat Conover, Transgender Good News. 
350 James B. Nelson, Thirst – God and the Alcoholic Experience. 
351 In his case, the topic under investigation is restricted to alcohol dependency: there are however many 
points of commonality as we have already seen between various forms of addiction. 
352 See for example Nelson, op. cit. p.10, where he states that ‘since alcoholism is a disease marked by the 
proneness to relapse, we live one day at a time’. 
353 J. B. Davies, The Myth of Addiction 
354 May, Addiction and Grace. 
355 May, op. cit., p.1. 
356 This phrase is quoted by Nelson, Thirst, p.27. The theme of yearning for God, and its substitute in less 
satisfactory or edifying ways, will form an important part of our exploration of theological motifs with 
relation to addiction later in this thesis.  
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   Thirst, his work on alcoholism, published in 2004, particularly concerns us in 
this thesis. Much in this book is well and clearly written: it also has the advantage 
of being written about alcoholic misuse by one whose own life was almost ruined 
by alcohol. It therefore has the passion and commitment of one who knows his 
subject not just from academic study but from self-observation and his way out 
of that particular form of slavery. At the outset of this assessment however, and 
in light of our focal concern with generating a theological template or paradigm 
for the study of addiction, it will be worth keeping two criticisms in mind. 
 
Preliminary Criticisms Of The Book ‘Thirst’ 
1) In the first place, although his understanding of alcoholism has particular 
authority because of his own personal experience there is also here a 
danger of generalising from the particular. Would all agree that alcoholism 
is a disease or a form of addiction, to be contained, but never cured, by 
lifelong attendance at AA meetings? Would all agree that addiction is 
indeed an illness at all, rather than a lifestyle choice, however 
incomprehensible? There is, as we have observed in the psychological 
chapter of this exploration of drugs and alcohol, a wide range of views on 
all of these questions, and it is a disadvantage of Nelson’s book that he 
does not seem to give sufficient weight to this disparity of views, even 
though by acknowledging the role of choice in the early stages of 
alcoholism, he tries to make room for the concept of sin, forgiveness and 
new life from a theological perspective. He begins his book by asserting 
his belief in the concept of addiction (particularly alcoholism) as disease, 
and does not in our opinion give a satisfactory explanation of why he takes 
this view. 
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    It is the opinion of the present writer that in expressing his belief that 
addiction to alcohol is a form of disease, (in itself a reasonable although 
contentious supposition) Nelson does not provide a sufficiently robust 
definition of the word disease. He does address this in his chapter entitled 
“Disease and Sin”357, but does not really deal adequately with the problem, 
seeming to be more concerned with the pragmatic advantages of looking 
at the problem in this way, as against more critical or condemnatory ways 
of viewing the alcohol misuser. That being so it is problematic, in terms 
of his argument, to decide whether the use of the word disease in this 
context is accurate or not. 
2) Secondly, as a Christian theologian (albeit one who is in a sense perhaps 
trying to write for a wider public) his theology seems at certain points to 
exhibit a certain unevenness, particularly with regard to Trinitarian 
theology. A glance at the index of his book is instructive in this respect. 
There are many references to God in a largely undifferentiated sense, that 
is to say, regarding God in a ‘global’ generative, fatherly, creator role. 
There are many references to Jesus Christ, as son and saviour. There are 
however in the index no specific references to the Holy Spirit, and this is 
striking. In fact specific references to the Holy Spirit are limited to 
appearances only on pages 12, 28, and 34, and although the latter instance 
does provide a little more detailed information, it is still very limited in 
scope. In this sense then, one may argue that his fundamental theological 
programme is somewhat unbalanced.  
 
The Book Thirst Examined In Greater Detail 
                                           
357 See for example his comments about essentialist and social constructionist views of reality, Nelson, op. 
cit., p.51. 
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   Nelson devotes two chapters to exploring the disease concept of addiction. 
The precise focus of these chapters, entitled sequentially ‘Disease and Sin’ and 
‘Sin and Disease’358 is the recognition that if addiction (to alcohol for example) 
is a disease, then the person affected by it cannot be blamed for having it: equally, 
the form of treatment for it needs to take that reality into account. If, on the 
other hand, addiction is a choice, then it may be legitimately seen as, from a 
religious perspective at least, a sinful form of behaviour. One  thing that makes 
Nelson’s analysis particularly helpful as we have already observed is the fact that 
in Thirst he writes not as an outsider to the world of the alcoholic, that is to say 
in a ‘spectator role’, but as a ‘recovering alcoholic’ himself, with developing 
insight into his own condition. While there is a danger of putting too much 
reliance on this factual, autobiographical statement, his own frankness and self-
disclosure puts his work into a very different category from that of the 
‘spectator’, however sympathetic. 
   In the light of the foregoing paragraph, it will perhaps be helpful to quote 
Nelson’s record of the process of his addiction, which he describes as follows359: 
 [S]timulation and blessed calm came from the coffee cup and the pipe. 
But alcohol? I had not the slightest inkling that I would become addicted 
and certainly did not intend that. No one ever does. The cost of 
membership in that club is just too high. When I began to use alcohol 
moderately and regularly, I did so because (for a variety of reasons) it 
made me feel good. After some years, however, I depended on alcohol 
not just to feel good but to feel normal. Finally there came the “oops 
phenomenon” – the surprising, wrenching realization that I was hooked. 
 
   This quotation is of great significance in Nelson’s presentation of the issues of 
addiction, because it brings into the openness of debate a number of highly 
important but contestable ideas. Perhaps the least contentious statement in this 
analysis of his own experience is the assertion that he ‘certainly did not intend’ 
                                           
358 Nelson, Thirst, chapters 3 and 4. 
359 Nelson, Thirst, p. 37. The term “oops phenomenon” is attributed by Nelson (ad loc.) to Alan Leshner in 
“Addiction: a Brain Disease with Biological Underpinnings”. 
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to become an alcoholic, because ‘no one ever does’. Equally probable is the 
assertion that the process of becoming a dependent drinker rather than a 
controlled drinker is ‘deceptively gradual’360, so that ‘even those close to us can 
seldom help us. The change becomes hurtful before they realize it, and they 
withdraw from us in confusion, pity, or disgust’361. 
 
Nelson’s Understanding Of The Causes Of Alcoholism 
   Nelson takes very seriously the influence of hereditary factors as one of the 
causes of alcohol dependence. To put it in his own words362: (italicisation 
original) 
I find the cumulative evidence persuasive. Regarding alcoholism, while 
genes do not predetermine anything, it strongly appears that they do 
predispose. Though my own parents were abstinent, there was alcoholism 
elsewhere on both sides of the family. 
 
   It is clear that for Nelson, although he recognises the contribution that 
heritability makes to alcoholism, genetic influence alone will not be sufficient to 
initiate a process of alcohol dependency: there have to be other complementary 
factors. These he describes as ‘psychological and emotional, sociological and 
cultural, the religious and the spiritual’363. 
   Looking at the psychological dimension to this, Nelson speaks from his own 
experience of using alcohol in order to provide pain relief. He speaks of his own 
struggle with hyperactivity, excessive self- criticism and low self-esteem that 
underlay these attributes in the aetiology of his own pathological relationship 
with alcohol364. In his analysis of these feelings there was too a sense of being at 
                                           




364 Similar complementary elements can be found in Gerald May’s identification of what he understands to be 
pathologically driven addictive behaviours in his own personal case history, particularly the temptation to 
become a ‘workaholic’ (See: Addiction and Grace, p.9f.) 
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risk of unmasking as a ‘fraud’, and yet being unable to speak of these fears with 
anyone else. Alcohol was one way of anaesthetising these painful emotions. He 
speaks of using psychotherapy to explore childhood issues that had helped to 
produce these conflicts, which seem to stem in general from what Howard 
Clinebell describes as ‘heavy-handed authoritarianism, success-worship, 
moralism and overt rejection’365. This was helpful, but it did not prevent him 
from using alcohol to provide additional relief from tension. This use of alcohol 
for the avoidance of painful conflicts has been widely observed in the 
psychological literature, and examples of this have been given above in the 
psychological chapter of this thesis: it plays a significant role in the work of 
Cloninger, for example366. The problem with this kind of relief drinking is, as 
Nelson rightly observes, that in time the drinking sets up a ‘vicious self-feeding 
cycle of increased drinking to overcome the painful effects of previous excessive 
drinking’367. 
   There is however a welcome reluctance in Nelson’s work to be too hasty in 
producing a comprehensive ‘causatory’ theory of addiction, and  he persuasively 
argues that we will never get to the roots of the problem without allowing for  
the ‘mysterious’ and paradoxical element in addiction theory368. From personal 
encounters with recovering alcoholics the present writer is aware that this 
element has an important role to play in the work of organisations such as 
Alcoholics Anonymous369, and it is perhaps no accident that such organisations 
have more investment than other helpers often do in the use of spiritual and 
                                           
365 Howard Clinebell, Understanding and Counseling, p. 60, cited by Nelson, Thirst, p.40. 
366 See: C. R. Cloninger, ‘tri-dimensional personality theory’, in his article “A systematic method for clinical 
description and classification of personality variants”. 
367 Nelson, Thirst, p. 40 citing Howard Clinebell, Alcohol, Abuse, Addiction and Therapy in Dictionary of Pastoral 
Care and Counselling, p. 19. 
368 There are echoes of Kenneth Leech’s interpretation of drug addiction here. 
369 ‘Cunning, powerful and baffling’ is an expression often heard in AA circles about the mysterious force that 
is addiction. 
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religious ideas in their understanding of the paradoxical problems of addiction 
and the route that needs to be taken towards recovery. 
   On sociological and cultural factors, Nelson points to one of the most 
neglected factors in the origins of alcohol dependence, that of social approval. 
Different societies (and religions) view alcohol use very differently. The United 
Kingdom or France view alcohol use with acceptance and tolerance, others, such 
as in the countries where Islam is the main or only religion (such as Saudi Arabia) 
with extreme official disapproval, applying penalties to those who disobey the 
local prohibition, including visitors from other, more alcohol tolerant societies. 
Among the risk factors discussed, Nelson attaches importance to the fact that 
he is ‘male, of Scandinavian descent, and a city dweller – all risk factors’370. The 
availability, social approval and affordability of alcohol all play their part. On the 
other hand, many people who have been exposed in equal measure to these risk 
factors do not become alcoholic, so there must, Nelson argues, be other factors 
at work371. 
 
 ‘Disease’ And ‘Sin’ Explanations of Alcoholism and Their Relationship to One 
Another 
   It is precisely at this point372 that Nelson begins his central task of looking at 
the evidence for the view that alcoholism (and one may of course extrapolate to 
some extent to other forms of addictive behaviour) is a disease rather than a 
chosen way of life, a choice which some writers with a religious background 
might refer to as ‘sinful’. 
   He identifies five possible ways of looking at this question373: 
                                           
370 Nelson, Thirst, p.41. 
371 ibid. 
372 ibid. 
373 Thirst, p.42. 
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1)  It’s purely sin.  
This is the most extreme position from a religious perspective. The 
behaviour is freely chosen, for reasons of human sinfulness. 
 
2) It begins as sin and becomes disease. 
The second position is a modified form of the previous one. He 
mentions two radically different religious bodies, the Salvation 
Army (drinking is wrong) and the Roman Catholic Church 
(excessive drinking is wrong) and suggests that these two churches 
share the view that what begins as a choice can become a 
compulsion. 
 
3) Addiction is sin and disease all mixed together. 
This is the Alcoholics Anonymous position. There is here a 
convergence between moral failure and chemical dependency. 
 
4) Addiction is disease resulting from sin, but that sin is outside a person’s responsibility. 
In this option, sin is seen not so much as a matter of personal choice 
as of the reality of living in sinful societies that are abusive and 
exploitative, whether in terms of family dysfunction, sexism, racism, 
poverty etc. In such societies, where alcoholism is prevalent, the 
ability of the disturbed individual to avoid addiction is eroded – he 
or she is to some extent a victim. 
 
5) Addiction is purely disease; sin is not a factor. 
This is the opposite extreme to position 1). It takes the view that a 
percentage of those who drink are ‘biologically programmed’ to 
become addicted to alcohol, given a set of life experiences that also 
influence the process of becoming addicted. Where there is no real 
choice, to talk of sin is meaningless. 
 
   This collocation of possible positions sets the scene for what follows in 
Nelson’s account. It is also of importance for the present thesis, which sets out 
among other concerns to look for components of a theological account of 
addiction on its own terms and in terms of the generation of a theory of pastoral 
care within a church community. Clearly the adoption of a religious point of 
view that regards alcoholic excess, and other addictive activities, as sinful, will 
approach the pastoral care of those who are affected by addiction, the sufferer 
and his or her family, from a very different set of assumptions from one which 
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regards addiction as being, in Nelson’s words, ‘a matter of disease pure and 
simple’374. 
 
Nelson’s Own View 
   What then is Nelson’s own view, and is he right? He begins by looking in detail 
at the disease concept of addiction, beginning with the work of E M Jellinek375. 
Nelson then identifies five criteria for viewing alcoholism as a disease376. We will 
state these as briefly as possible: 
1) Alcoholism fits the criteria for a disease and has been defined as such by 
leading medical and health organizations. 
 
2) Alcoholism as a disease is marked by brain changes that explain 
otherwise inexplicable behaviour. 
 
3) The disease concept helps us to distinguish between cause and effect.  
 
4) Understanding alcoholism as a disease markedly undercuts moralistic 
judgements and blaming, thus enhancing the chances for recovery. 
 
5) The disease theory reduces our tendency to see evil as “out there” and 
external to ourselves. 
 
   It is necessary to evaluate these points because they are not all universally 
accepted. The first point, alcoholism viewed as a disease, is in one sense a matter 
of fact, as it has been classified by the World Health Organisation and the 
American Medical Association377. The second, relating to brain changes, depends 
on the notion of chemical change in the brain brought about by its exposure to 
alcohol in certain amounts. This constellation of chemical changes reduces the 
ability of the alcoholic to change that form of behaviour. Some psychological 
theorists such as J B Davies reject the evidence for this, however, and it would 
have been instructive to see how Nelson might have approached Davies’ 
                                           
374 Nelson, Thirst, p.42. 
375 See: E. M. Jellinek, The Disease Concept of Alcoholism. 
376 Nelson, Thirst, p.45 ff. 
377 ibid. 
 146 
‘addiction-as-myth’ argument had he commented on this aspect of his work. He 
does however look at other objections to the disease theory, and we will touch 
on those presently. 
   On the third argument, from the standpoint of cause and effect, the argument 
is between those who say that people drink because they are alcoholics, and 
those who claim that people become alcoholics because they drink too much. 
This is a complicated argument, because there are people who exceed the 
recommended daily alcohol allowance for men and women respectively378 
without showing symptoms of dependency – this raises the question of how 
dependency can be defined in contrast to ‘normal’ use of alcohol379. An amount 
that would tip the scales for one person might fail to do so for another: as Nelson 
points out, ‘any alcohol was too much for me’380. 
   The fourth point refers to the advantages that come, from a treatment 
perspective, when the alcoholic is not seen as someone who has behaved 
immorally, irresponsibly or sinfully. On a heuristic, clinically motivated basis, 
there might well seem to be indeed enhanced chances for recovery for someone 
who is treated as a patient rather than a sinner – although that might not 
necessarily be a universal truth: for someone who believes him or her self to be 
culpable, a healthy recognition of that could also be beneficial, as one treatment 
goal can often be to help the ‘client’, to use a neutral term, to be more truthful 
about him or her self and the relationships that have been adversely affected by 
substance or activity dependent behaviour. And we may wonder whether it is 
true, as Nelson suggests here, that the non-judgemental approach actually 
                                           
378 Currently 14 units for women and 21 for men, per week, according to the current United Kingdom 
guidelines, based on the definition of one unit of alcohol as representing eight grams of alcohol. There are an 
estimated 20% of people who currently drink either hazardous or actually harmful amounts of alcohol in the 
UK.  One person dies every twenty minutes because of alcohol overuse (compared with one every four 
minutes because of smoking tobacco products). 
379 The same criteria would have traction in relation to other forms of substance ingestion (including coffee, 
for example) and potentially addictive activities such as shopping or gambling. 
380 Nelson, Thirst, p.46. 
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enhances ‘the chances for recovery’381. There seems to be little hard evidence for 
this, and recovery is a complex and often iterative process with many beginnings 
and endings; on the other hand it may be true that a non-judgemental approach 
helps some people to take the first step of seeking treatment, whether or not 
that treatment is ultimately successful or not. We may find ourselves wondering 
here to what extent Nelson’s argument may be skewed because of his own 
experience. 
   The fifth point is perhaps less contentious in religious terms at least – the 
temptation to see only good within oneself and evil as somehow external to the 
self is clearly a fallacy in religious discourse, going back in the Hebrew literature, 
as Nelson rightly observes, to the theology of the scapegoat382. This finds a 
modern echo, as Nelson observes383 in racist and sexist behaviour. In the case of 
alcoholic behaviour, it may sometimes be that churches which have a high moral 
outlook scapegoat people in their congregations who have this problem rather 
than approaching them with empathy and understanding384. 
   Nelson has been looking in this chapter at the arguments in favour of seeing 
alcoholism as a disease. He now turns to criticisms of that point of view, 
beginning with the robust contentions on this subject of the philosopher 
Herbert Fingarette385, who, like J. B. Davies386 regards the disease model of 
substance dependency as scientifically flawed and unhelpful. The argument here 
hinges on essentialist and socially constructed models of disease: Fingarette 
claims that from an essentialist perspective, there is insufficient scientific 
evidence to claim that alcohol addiction can be defined as a disease compared 
                                           
381Thirst, p.48. 
382 Nelson for this purpose cites the text of Leviticus 16:21. 
383 Nelson, Thirst, p.50. 
384 ibid. 
385 Herbert Fingarette, “Rejecting the Disease Concept”, in Ruth C. Engs (ed.) Controversies in the Addictions 
Field, volume 1, pp48-54. 
386 J. B. Davies, The Myth of Addiction 
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with other conditions that can be so defined. To this argument Nelson presents 
the counter claim that ‘Even though the scientific evidence for alcoholism as 
disease is still less complete than it currently is for some other illnesses, 
something significant has been happening: the disease concept itself has 
stimulated scientific research, which in turn has established the concept even 
more securely among medical professionals and the public’387. Despite the 
awkwardness of this sentence, it is pointing out that, as with many other illnesses, 
the reality of the illness is there long before it can be named – giving it a name 
helps those who are investigating it to be clear about their task of trying to 
understand it and providing a cure where possible. 
   There are other objections that Nelson considers in this chapter to regarding 
alcoholism as a disease, such as the objection that the disease concept can have 
the negative effect of taking away the responsibility of the person with the 
problem for trying to overcome it. In the face of this objection, Nelson 
introduces the important matter of denial. Far from attributing their situation to 
genetic or circumstantial determinants, at least in the relatively early stages of 
dependency, those with the problem invest heavily in denying to themselves and 
to others that they have a problem. Nelson’s reflections on his own alcoholism 
led him to say, ‘I staunchly denied my alcoholism to the end. My increasingly 
heavy drinking was due to the dynamics of the disease itself, including organic 
brain changes. It was not due to a feeling of genetic fatalism’388. 
   At this point, via a short paragraph comparing the views of St. Augustine and 
Pelagius, Nelson moves into an area of addiction theory that brings together, in 
his chapter entitled ‘Sin and Disease’ the medical and theological aspects of his 
subject, and to these we will now turn. 
                                           
387 Nelson, Thirst, p.52. 
388 Thirst, p.56. 
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   Taking a ‘Platonic’ line on the nature of sin, Nelson argues that there is ‘Sin’, 
as an idea, and individual ‘sins’ as instances of that reality. Beneath the things 
that alcoholics do which are sinful in nature, then, there is an underlying reality, 
which Nelson tries to identify. That reality, for him, is to be found in four things, 
perfectionism, control, selfishness, and attachment. Perhaps, ultimately, 
selfishness links all of these things, as it is such a pervasive and complex aspect 
of human attitudes. He recalls that ‘AA’s founders recognized that selfishness is 
more complicated and many-sided than even this. They saw it as a given of the 
human condition, something that people in all great religions attempted to 
transcend but never would completely. Hence its destructiveness should be 
minimized, but its continuing reality should be honestly acknowledged rather 
than dangerously denied’389. It is then from this selfish basis that artificial 
attachments spring, whether to people, objects or behaviours. 
   Going deeper into the nature of this selfish basis of sin, Nelson, with echoes 
of the thought world of Paul Tillich,390 whom he quotes at several points, 
describes sin as ultimately a form of estrangement: ‘It is relational brokenness, 
separation from everything meaningful. It is alienation from ourselves, from 
those around us, and from our environment. Fundamentally it is estrangement 
from God, the source and ground of all that exists’391. Furthermore, although he 
rejects some of the more moralistic views of Augustine (on sexual matters for 
example), and the idea of sin as biologically transmitted, he suggests that sin is 
transmitted from one person to another in societies through attitudes to the 
material world that encourage the wrong kind of dependence on created things. 
On this Nelson comments perceptively392: 
                                           
389 Nelson, Thirst, p.65. 
390 This can be seen in Tillich’s use of the language of ‘estrangement’ as for example in Systematic Theology. See, 
Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, volume 2, passim. 
391 Nelson, Thirst, p.67. 
392 op. cit, p.69. 
 150 
Perceiving original sin as estrangement that is conveyed by social means 
was an important new perspective in the early twentieth century. It is no 
less relevant to a twenty-first-century culture where instant gratification 
is taken almost as a right and where one corporate slogan, “Better living 
through chemistry” has become emblematic for society as a whole. 
 
   The problem then can be seen as having to do with distortion, what Tillich 
describes as ‘heteronomy’, which denotes any idolatrous world view that places 
anything other than God at the centre of its concerns. 
   If this distorted view of truth is at the root of the problem of alcoholism, from 
a religious perspective, what is the answer to it? Here, in the last chapter of his 
book, Nelson draws extensively on the work of the Fourth Evangelist. In this 
gospel there is much emphasis on truth as a liberating, life giving, life restoring 
force: it is more than something that ‘is’, it is something dynamic that we ‘do’393. 
That ‘doing’ process must then include the reversal of the dynamic of denial that 
we observed earlier. To recognise this truth is the beginning of a realisation that 
drinking to excess is a form of slavery – and the capacity for awareness of this 
generates a ‘thirst for the truth that would make me free’. Every pastor who has 
worked with alcoholics and their families will know the reality of this and the 
painful process by which the alcoholic reaches the moment of decision – often 
forced on him by circumstances of health or social disintegration – that leads to 
the acknowledgement of a need for help. Tragically, not every addict makes this 
acknowledgement, but when they do, grace is available, for as Nelson recognises, 
the centrality of the cross in Christian theology is the point at which despite the 
horrors of many forms of abuse and misuse of God’s gifts, there is ‘a compelling 
revelation of the gracious Heart of the Universe’394. 
 
                                           
393 op. cit., p.175. 
394 Nelson, Thirst, p.165. 
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Critical Reflections On Nelson’s Work On Alcoholism 
   Taking a critical look at Nelson’s book, it is evident from what has been 
presented so far that he has provided a full and wide ranging study of the 
problems of alcoholism as one example of addictive behaviour. He takes into 
account genetic aspects of the problem, as well as elements of the individual’s 
social relationships from childhood onwards, and brings in a religious viewpoint 
that argues for the reality of sin as an explanation. Sin is reinterpreted by Nelson 
in non-judgemental language however, adopting the vocabulary of 
‘estrangement’ familiar to those who know something of the theology of Paul 
Tillich in particular. He also helpfully takes the imaginative step of looking at the 
way in which some males, in order to bolster a failed or inadequate sense of their 
own maleness, in traditional or conventional terms at least, use alcohol to boost 
their  confidence or disguise (from themselves and others) their feelings of 
vulnerability. 
 
Specific Critical Comments 
   Inevitably, this book, with the word ‘God’ in its title is much more likely to 
appeal to people who have a religious belief than to those who do not, and the 
way he deals with the sin factor is problematic in the sense that it derives its 
understanding of the phenomenon of sin from one, fairly specific Protestant 
tradition, one that would not necessarily be acceptable to Christians of all 
denominations. It also raises perhaps unanswered questions about the excessive 
use of ingestible materials such as alcohol, in terms of human desire and longing. 
There is little here that helps us to be clear about the distinction between normal 
and abnormal use of such substances. It is on surest ground when the locus of 
addiction is seen not just, or principally, as a matter of the individual, but as a 
sign of a society in which instant gratification is taken as a ‘human right’, and the 
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damage that this philosophy can do when that supposed right involves the use 
of potentially toxic or addictive commodities such as alcohol. 
   One positive comment from Richard Osmer395 is that  although not everyone 
would accept the ‘disease model’ of addiction (with specific reference to the 
misuse of alcohol) the identification of the complexity of understandings, 
genetic, psychological and sociological that Nelson presents to the reader is to 
be welcomed. So we may perhaps conclude that there is no simple answer to 
why people become addicted. There may turn out to be as many reasons as there 
are addicted people, which if it is true, makes the task of providing helpful 
treatment, of whatever kind, in itself a complex undertaking, one that reveals 
itself in a tortuous and often baffling and paradoxical manner. 
   On a more technical note, it seems strange that a book which expressly uses 
the terminology of Christian theology takes little account of the workings of the 
Holy Spirit. This concern has already been raised. His approach to the theology 
of the Spirit seems rather ‘thin’. He does not develop a systematic theological 
approach to this part of Trinitarian theology, and this is regrettable because with 
his emphasis on recovery from addiction (not least his own) as Resurrection life 
or new life, emphasis on the Spirit infused quality of such life seems to be a 
natural linkage. He provides some attempts to relate his work to ‘Spirit’ theology, 
by pointing out for example that396 
The Spirit can teach us an immense amount in every thirst we experience 
every desire in our lives…. The Spirit may some day prompt me to ask 
“What is the desire behind that desire?” If I discover that I desire 
approval and esteem through being seen as conscientious, considerate 
and capable, what is the desire lying deeper than that desire? 
 
   Again, on the same page, Nelson suggests that ‘It is through pressing questions 
that the Spirit takes us deeply into our own woundedness out of which our 
                                           
395 Richard Osmer, Practical Theology, p.121. 
396 Nelson, op. cit., p.34. 
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drivenness and addictions arise’ and that it is in this ‘wilderness’ experience, 
which may continue for years, that ‘the basic healing of our souls can occur’. 
This is a promising line of theological and spiritual understanding in relation to 
the doctrine of God and the Holy Spirit. It seems regrettable that Nelson does 
not develop this line of argument in greater depth and detail. 
 
Situating This Work Among Others On The Subject Of Theology And 
Addiction 
   Two further observations need to be made at this point, on the one hand about 
the relationship of this book to the other writers whose work on addiction also 
forms a substantial element in this chapter of the thesis, and on the other, the 
relationship of Nelson’s work to the project with which the thesis is concerned. 
1) Nelson owes much to Gerald May to whom he refers on pages 27-28, 66, 
71, and 87. He quotes from Addiction and Grace on p.27f, 71 and 87. He 
does not however agree with all that May writes: on p. 71 he takes issue 
with him for example over the question of universal addiction, namely the 
suggestion that we are all addicted to something and that this addiction 
can be equated with the religious concept of sin. Wisely, in the view of the 
author of this thesis, Nelson says that the term should strictly only apply 
in the more specific sense – ‘It is one thing to say that everyone is involved 
in sin. It is another, however, to say that everyone is addicted. This 
stretches the addiction net too far’397. Even this might be a fairly generous 
view of what is probably the most contentious element in May’s work, as 
we observed in the chapter on his writing. It both reduces the concept of 
addiction to another epistemological framework where it hardly belongs, 
                                           
397 Nelson, Thirst, p.71. 
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and also perhaps underplays - or even trivialises - the misery that addiction 
can bring to individuals and families. 
2) The relationship of Nelson’s work to this thesis. 
    There are questions to be asked about how Nelson’s work as described 
in this chapter relates to the purpose of this thesis both in its psychological 
and theological modes. Although we are committed to looking for the 
possibility of constructing a theological paradigm, it would be unhelpful 
to overlook the contributions of people who are writing from a different 
perspective. Tony Adams, the former captain of the England Association 
Football team is particularly relevant to our consideration of Nelson’s 
book because like Nelson, he is someone who describes himself as an 
alcoholic. Like Nelson, Adams regards this description rather in the way 
that another person might describe him as ‘a diabetic’. In other words, 
even allowing for factors such as poor life choices or sinful, disordered 
behaviour, both writers believe that the alcohol dependent drinker is ‘an 
alcoholic for life’ and will need to exercise perpetual vigilance lest this 
disease, ‘cunning, powerful and baffling’ recur and cause further problems 
even many years after the individual has come to believe herself to be 
abstinent. This awareness will entail for example, continuing self-help 
treatment via AA and Adams writes of looking for AA meetings to attend 
wherever he travelled to play football for his club or country398. And yet 
we may perhaps be left wondering whether this approach is necessarily 
one that is needed by all who have an episode of alcoholic dependency. 
There are other treatment modalities that do not make assumptions about 
the ‘alcoholic’ or ‘drug addict’ for life diagnosis, regarding this process as 
                                           
398 Tony Adams, with Ian Ridley, Addicted, p.366. 
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labelling which may be countervailing in helping the individual towards 
personal empowerment and positive self-evaluation. This can be true even 
when people with dependency problems are referred to detoxification or 
rehabilitation units many times, and may never completely break the cycle 
of dependency. There is a debate then about this ‘for life’ element, and 
that is perhaps related to the disadvantage to an individual of regarding 
her as having a disease that is lifelong, like diabetes. 
    Of great importance here is the problematic nature of ‘choice’ as a way 
in to understanding a wide range of behaviours that can for some develop 
into addiction, one that they seem unable to defeat without some form of 
outside intervention, through AA and similar organisations, or 
psychotherapeutic and/or psychopharmacological assistance. Nelson, 
with his AA background, and Adams, speak of alcoholism as a lifetime 
pathological condition which, whatever causes its onset, cannot be cured, 
although vigilance and attendance at AA meetings can control it. 
    Although this is one interpretation of substance dependency, it is open 
to challenge by those who do regard it as disease rather than choice (with 
its possible overtones of ‘sinfulness’) - but one that can be overcome. This 
is mentioned because there is an ongoing debate about these issues which 
has not so far been resolved. 
    This thesis is intended as a contribution to this debate, providing some 
light on the subject from both theological and psychological perspectives, 
and Nelson’s book, despite its problems, offers the reader some helpful 




   In conclusion, Nelson offers the reader a fascinating, informative and often 
challenging route into the better understanding of addiction, one that does not 
avoid the complexities or difficulties of the subject matter. Inevitably, his 
understanding is influenced by his own personal experience, about which he is 
very honest, and this is to be welcomed, although it may be questioned whether 
his own experientially founded epistemology of addiction is in danger of 
generalising from the particular. Different people have different experiences and 
different hermeneutical methodologies for explaining the causes of addiction 
and its treatment. 
 
2.4 Christopher Cook: Alcohol, Addiction and Christian Ethics 
 
Introduction. 
   Christopher Cook is professorial research fellow in the Department of 
Theology and Religion at the University of Durham and based at St. Chad’s 
College, which has a long history of offering training for the Anglican 
priesthood.  He is a consultant psychiatrist who worked for at the Institute of 
Psychiatry in South East London, specialising in addiction. He was ordained as 
an Anglican priest in 2001 in the Diocese of Canterbury. He therefore has 
understanding and experience on the subject of addiction from the perspective 
of the health care sciences, and combines that with his understanding of 
Christian theology and spirituality, which is particularly evident in his recent 
work on the Philokalia399. Let us look in more detail at his life and work to date400. 
                                           
399 The Philokalia is an extensive collection of texts on the spiritual life emanating from the Orthodox 
Churches from the fourth to the fifteenth centuries C.E.  Cook’s particular contribution to the study of these 
writings is concerned with the relationship between the Philokalia and mental health. C.C.H. Cook, The 
Philokalia and the Inner Life: On Passions and Prayer. 
400 The information recorded here is based on information to be found on the website 
www.dur.ac.uk/theology.religion/staff last consulted on 24.02.2011. 
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   Cook trained in Medicine at St. George’s Hospital Medical School in London, 
qualifying in psychiatric practice at Guy’s and St. Thomas’s where he specialized 
in the study of addiction. This led to a lectureship at University College London, 
and from there to the Institute of Psychiatry, and to a professorship at the 
University of Kent – as Professor of the Psychiatry of Alcohol Misuse, a post 
which he held from 1997 to 2003, before moving to Durham. One of his most 
important publications during this period was his co-authorship of a book 
entitled The Treatment of Drinking Problems401. His doctoral thesis was concerned 
with the likelihood of a genetic predisposition to addiction, which while in no 
way determinative, nevertheless points to the likelihood of a heritable 
component in the predisposition of an individual to acquire a substance 
dependency. He points out however that his interest in addiction is far wider 
than the biological elements. He has developed an interest in a variety of 
‘treatments402’ for alcoholism, such as through Alcoholics Anonymous and both 
religious and secular therapeutic and pastoral counselling interventions. 
   His present title is Director of the ‘Project for Spirituality, Theology and 
Health’, a collaborative enterprise between the University’s Theology and 
Medical departments. He has also written, in addition to his books on addiction, 
a chapter on spirituality and addiction in a book entitled Spirituality and 
Psychiatry403. He also chairs the Executive Committee of the Special Interest 
Group in Spirituality at the Royal College of Psychiatrists. He acts for various 
charities that work with addicted people in a consultative capacity. 
   We will now focus specifically on his writing on addiction, especially in Alcohol, 
Addiction and Christian Ethics. 
                                           
401 Edwards, G, Marshall E. J., Cook C.C.H., The Treatment of Drinking Problems, a Guide for the helping Professions, 
4th edition. 
402 The word treatment is put in quotation marks here because AA groups are self-help groups rather than 
regarded by members as treatment. 
403 Cook, C.C.H., Powell, Andrew, and Sims, Andrew, eds.: Spirituality and Psychiatry. 
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   As we have already observed, Christopher Cook writes from the dual 
perspective of a medical practitioner working in addiction care and that of an 
ordained Anglican priest. His major writings are mainly contributions to the 
understanding of alcohol misuse – first from the perspective of a psychiatrist, 
and then increasingly from a theological and ethical point of view – without 
neglecting the more ‘scientific’ understanding of the subject, including genetic 
factors. 
   His ethical outlook comes into the foreground in Alcohol, Addiction and Christian 
Ethics. Of great importance here for Cook is not just the question of individual 
responsibility for the use and misuse of alcohol, but also questions of public 
policy, a matter also raised by Kenneth Leech as we have seen earlier in this 
chapter. 
   In Alcohol Addiction and Christian Ethics Cook wishes to change the language of 
addiction. He prefers the words ‘dependence syndrome’ to ‘addiction’. This is 
important in relation to the questions of personal responsibility that are reflected 
in his ethical approach, because it offers a more comprehensive theory of 
substance misuse, relying on both biological and psycho-social evidence, and  
proposing that at the heart of this syndrome lies an ‘altered relationship’ between 
the user of the substance and the substance itself404.   In respect of the public 
aspects of addiction, he concerns himself, as we shall see later, with the 
ambiguous relationship between the alcohol production and sales industry and 
the need for the government to derive sizeable revenue from taxation of the 
sales of alcohol, which arguably creates a conflict of interests. 
   The book’s chapters illustrate the various aspects of the subject that he wishes 
to consider. These chapters are headed in such a way as to provide a historical 
                                           
404 See Cook, Alcohol, Addiction and Christian Ethics, p.24. He continues this train of thought by arguing that 
‘Whatever the initial reasons for drinking, dependence provides a reason for continued drinking’ (ibid). 
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survey of the uses and abuses of alcohol – as seen in the evidence provided by 
the Bible405, the phenomenon of ‘intemperance’ instantiated in the writings of 
Saint Augustine of Hippo in the Confessions, especially chapter 6, St. Thomas 
Aquinas in the first part of the second part of his Summa Theologica, where he 
explores the concept of the ‘mean of virtues’ as a guide to human activity based 
on the proper engagement of reason and will, Martin Luther in Table Talk: of 
God’s Works (paragraph 699) and George Whitefield’s Sermon 52. He explores 
the nineteenth century temperance movement406. He then examines the concept 
of addiction in terms of human sinfulness and in its appearance as a syndrome, 
that is to say, its understanding within the body of scientific, medical literature. 
Regarding ‘sin’, he draws on the work of Alistair McFadyen407, who relates the 
concept of addiction to the Augustinian doctrine of original sin: human beings 
find themselves, to use Cook’s terminology, ‘embedded’ in sin in ways that 
cannot be explained simplistically in terms of wilfulness or the exercise of free 
will408. 
   One factor that needs to be acknowledged here is his conviction that whether 
one accepts the Pauline notion of the divided self or the Augustinian notion of 
the divided will, it is vital to see addiction, from a theological perspective, as 
embodied in inner conflict that is part of the human condition. Of great 
importance here is the contribution to our understanding of this phenomenon 
provided in the Epistle to the Romans, chapter 7, although there are many 
possible interpretations of this chapter, some of which are discussed by Cook in 
                                           
405 Especially in terms of its appearance in the New Testament as a vice when it is associated with 
drunkenness. The household codes in the epistles, such as at I Timothy 3:1-2 and 8 also give instructions 
about avoiding alcohol excess. 
406 Of particular interest here is the work of writers such as Whitefield as shown in his sermon on “the 
heinous sin of drunkenness”, 1771, cited by Cook, Op. cit., p.70. 
407 See in particular, Alistair McFadyen, Bound to Sin: Abuse, Holocaust and the Christian Doctrine of Sin. 
408 Cook, Alcohol, Addiction and Christian Ethics, p.128. 
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   Cook faces the difficult issue of the legitimate use of religious terms and 
categories in ethical, and particularly in secular ethical, discourse. He cites409 the 
former Bishop of Edinburgh, Richard Holloway, who believes that while 
Christians have a right to engage in secular ethical discourse, the use of 
specifically religious ideas in that context is questionable. This is obvious in the 
case of fundamentalist approaches of the ‘God says, therefore…’ type; in  a more 
nuanced way it raises questions about what type of intervention from a 
specifically theological point of view can legitimately be introduced into such 
dialogues, which can involve people of many faiths and none. Cook makes a 
strong case for bringing such ideas in to the dialogue, though without attempting 
to use them, as some temperance movements have done, to suggest, for 
example, that the use of alcohol is in some way to be seen as evil in itself. Cook’s 
approach attempts to formulate a moral view of when and in what circumstances 
drinking is acceptable behaviour for a Christian, and in what circumstances the 
drinking of alcohol should be avoided410. 
   One problem with this approach as identified by Ryan Topping in his detailed 
review of this book411 is the charge of rhetorical circularity, as it seeks to present 
a theological argument that is worth considering by people who are not 
Christians. The argument might be expressed in terms of inviting the reader to 
look at the results that his theologically motivated methodology achieves and 
                                           
409 op. cit., p.7. 
410 In one interestingly argued section, Cook makes a good case for abstinence as a model of behaviour for 
others to follow – in the sense that setting an example is often more effective than preaching, however 
persuasive. See: Cook, Alcohol, Addiction and Christian Ethics, pp. 174-176. 
411 Ryan Topping reviewing Alcohol, Addiction and Christian Ethics in Studies in Christian Ethics. 
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decide on the basis of those whether or not the arguments are valid. But the 
problem is that he is starting from the assumption that what is being argued is 
valid. Topping says: 
The weakness of [Cook’s] method, however is that it opens the 
theologian to the charge of circularity. At some point, the sceptic must 
simply adopt principles that the theologian has assumed – unless, of 
course, the theologian can show reasons why those disputed principles 
can be argued for on other grounds (traditionally the work of natural 
theology, sometimes called ‘fundamental theology’). 
 
   The fact remains that many people, of a variety of faith backgrounds, and many 
with no overt religious belief, drink far more alcohol than is consistent with 
personal health and social wellbeing, including that of their families412. This also 
correlates to an awareness of excessive drinking as a problem on the one hand, 
but an inability to be more moderate on the other. Cook provides a detailed 
analysis of this paradox, and sees it in terms of Pauline and Augustinian 
theologies of the self, which is so often divided between a wish to do what is in 
the best interests of the individual and society as a whole on the one hand, and 
a desire to drink excessively on the other. Here again, Topping413 has some 
criticism of Cook, because he states that Cook ‘should have included a 
discussion that would make explicit the philosophical presuppositions dividing 
contemporary theological and psychological views of the human person’. To this 
highly important philosophical and theological issue we will return in the next 
chapter of this thesis, which will look at theological models of the self and 
human desire in terms of a fundamental desire for God that can become 
distorted and express itself in ways that are to a greater or lesser extent 
destructive. 
                                           
412 A detailed breakdown of figures comparing sensible and risk taking consumption of alcohol per head of 
the UK population is included as an appendix to this thesis. 
413 Review article, Studies in Christian Ethics 21.1, p.132 
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   Four main theological writers whose work Cook employs in order to generate 
for the purpose of his book a theological understanding of addiction are:   
1) Saint Paul   
2) Saint Augustine of Hippo 
3) Saint Thomas Aquinas 
4) Martin Luther. 
 
1) Saint Paul. 
   In his letter to the Christian Church in Rome, dated approximately 50 
CE, Paul directs his attention to the phenomenon of what Cook refers to 
as the ‘divided self’414, although he is careful to point out that ‘The divided 
self of Romans 7:14-15 is … not a description of addiction; it is a 
description of another kind of experience’ 415. The verses under discussion 
are stated here416: 
We know that the law is spiritual; but I am carnal, sold under sin. I 
do not understand my own actions. For I do not do what I want, 
but I do the very thing that I hate. 
 
   This cautious statement about these verses by Cook in relation to his 
topic of addiction is welcome as it alerts us not only to the allusive manner 
in which he himself uses the verses, but also to the complexity of trying to 
make sense of the passage of Romans under consideration on its own 
terms. For a full discussion of this, and in particular the suggestion that 
modern interpretations have been excessively influenced or even distorted 
through the prism of Augustine’s heavily psychological  interpretation, the 
reader is directed for example to the work of Krister Stendahl417. Stendahl 
sees Paul’s polemic not as some kind of inner wrestling, but as a way of 
accommodating a variety of points of view, faced as he was in a political 
                                           
414 Cook, Alcohol, Addiction and Christian Ethics, p.143. 
415 ibid. 
416 Epistle to the Romans, 7:14-15, Revised Standard Version. 
417 Krister Stendahl, “Paul and the Introspective Conscience of the West” in Paul among Jews and Gentiles. 
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as much as a theological sense, in the light of God’s apparent 
abandonment of Israel, with the task of uniting Christians in Rome from 
Jewish and pagan religious backgrounds418. Whether or not we accept 
Stendahl’s view, he is alerting us to the danger of forcing a modern 
interpretation of the text in a too artificial manner419. We should therefore 
be wise to treat with a certain amount of caution the idea that Paul in this 
passage is in any sense wrestling with his own conscience or expressing a 
personal sense of failure. 
   So how are these verses to be understood and how does Cook use them 
to help us to understand the plight of the person who is addicted to 
alcohol? His procedure involves the introduction of a number of twentieth 
century conversation partners. These are C. E. B. Cranfield420, J.D.G. 
Dunn421, J. Ziesler422 and G. Theissen423. This selection of commentaries 
however immediately poses a problem. There are after all many 
commentaries on Romans, so on what basis has Cook chosen these and 
excluded others? Cook readily admits that he is being selective, and that 
his chosen conversation partners are representative of certain positions424. 
It would however have been better if Cook had given reasons for his 
selection – it is noteworthy that there are no references to some of the 
                                           
418 Stendahl, op. cit.  
419 For a critique of Stendahl’s position, see for example Patrick Henry, New Directions in New Testament 
Interpretation, p.175ff., which is positive about Stendahl’s interpretation,  and on the other hand the more 
reserved position of J.G.D. Dunn, in The Theology of Paul the Apostle, p.7.   
420 C.E.B. Cranfield, Romans: a Shorter Commentary. 
421 J.G.D. Dunn, Romans 1-8, eds. D.A. Hubbard et al. 
422 J. Ziesler, Paul’s Letter to the Romans. 
423 Gerd Theissen, Psychological Aspects of Pauline Theology. 
424 In particular, for example, they take opposite sides on the question of whether this inner debate is the 
concern of the Christian or the non-Christian, with both Cranfield and Dunn arguing for the former 
interpretation, and Ziesler and Theissen taking the opposing view. See Cook, p.138. 
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classical modern commentaries such as those of Karl Barth, Rudolph 
Bultmann, C.H. Dodd, or C. K. Barrett425. 
   What are the focal points that he is seeking to clarify in terms of Paul’s 
argument, and how does this relate to Cook’s exploration of addiction? 
   On the former question, there is a clear issue about human desire and 
moral choice, and the ways in which choice is directed by inner forces, 
those that motivate free choice on the one hand, and those that inhibit 
that freedom on the other. What then are we to make of the context in 
which Paul sets up his polemic, and how does he explain the fundamental 
problem? 
   Romans is a large and in some ways comprehensive document, whether 
we see it as a letter, a thesis, or a ‘Greek letter-essay’426. It deals with many 
interconnecting themes, all related to Paul’s perception of the person and 
salvific role of Jesus Christ. The section of the letter that contains chapter 
7 is one that builds up to a climactic expression of faith, to be revealed in 
the following chapters. At this point, however, Paul is setting the scene 
for what he intends ultimately to say. Paul is addressing an audience that 
has come to faith in Christ from a variety of faith communities, to use a 
somewhat anachronistic expression. Some Church members are of Jewish 
origin; others are not. Paul respects the traditions that all have brought 
with them, to avoid suggesting that one group has any ultimate advantage 
over another – and to this extent he is on a theological knife edge. He 
refutes the suggestion that the Jews are deficient in their understanding of 
the range of God’s promises by asserting the benefits that the Jews have 
because of their foundation on the Law and the Prophets, as we see, for 
                                           
425 Barrett’s book Paul: An Introduction to his Thought is however mentioned in the bibliography, together with 
his commentary on the Gospel according to Saint John. 
426 For this latter helpful suggestion see ed. Karl P. Donfried, The Romans Debate. 
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example, in 3:1-4. This assertion is immediately balanced however in 3:9 
and 3:21ff., in which it is made clear that just as all have in some sense 
failed in God’s eyes, so his offer of forgiveness and grace through Jesus 
Christ as gift available through faith is available to all – on equal terms. 
   Paul is therefore arguing with a view to inclusiveness: his polemic has 
the object of making it possible for the Roman Church to include people 
of Jewish and non-Jewish religious traditions on an equal basis. This 
context is vital to a proper understanding of what the apostle is trying to 
achieve. He is, to this extent, a politician as well as a theological writer. But 
in terms of content, we are faced in Romans 7 with writing that talks of 
some kind of inner debate that faces the individual believer. It is a debate 
that addresses desire and how desire may be consonant with the will of 
God as understood by the believer, or contrary to that will. This idea is 
addressed by Cook using the commentators mentioned earlier: 
 
Cranfield 
   Cranfield427 claims that the kind of inner conflict to which Paul refers is 
experienced by the Christian after her conversion and sanctification by the 
Holy Spirit. What is imparted by this process is twofold, that is to say, 
knowledge of God’s will on the one hand, and the will to live accordingly 
on the other. With this however comes awareness of the power of sin to 
frustrate good intentions. This interpretation is founded on an essentially 
Calvinistic understanding of Paul, in the sense that because of the literal 
reality of the Fall, even good human actions are tainted by the fact of 
                                           
427 Cook’s major exposition of Cranfield’s view of Paul’s theology of inner conflict can be found in Alcohol, 
Addiction and Christian Ethics, p.136 and 142-143. 
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egotism. Ultimately only God can resolve this conflict: thus Calvin (and 
Cranfield) has a thoroughly eschatological approach. 
 
Dunn 
   James Dunn agrees with Cranfield that the locus of the conflicted will is 
to be seen in humanity after conversion to Christianity. For Dunn, the 
essential feature of the problem lies in the contrast between the 
individual’s willingness to follow God’s wishes on the one hand, and 
another ‘I’ who, as a ‘man of the flesh’, is worked on by sin to bring death 
rather than life, in the sense that living according to God’s will is life, 
whereas living under sin is death, from a theological point of view. This is 
a ‘two epoch’ theory. In the first epoch, before conversion, the individual 
is under the power of sin alone: in the second epoch he lives under the 
power of Christ, but this still has an eschatological dimension, because for 
the individual Christian the process of salvation has begun but is not yet 
complete428. It is this tension in the believer that, in Dunn’s view, leads to 
Paul’s agonised cry in Romans 7:24-25 – ‘Wretched man that I am! Who 
will deliver me from the body of this death? But thanks be to God through 
Jesus Christ Our Lord!’ 
 
Ziesler 
   In Ziesler’s view, however, something different is happening here. For 
him the divided self that Paul is describing is not about the situation of the 
Christian person after conversion. For Ziesler it is a state that exists prior 
to that conversion. There are two epochs here as well, but they are not 
                                           
428 Cook’s exposition of Dunn’s theory can be found on pp. 139, and 142-144., op. cit. 
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related to pre and post conversion temporality. They are rather two 
aspects of the narrative of conversion itself, on the one hand recognising 
the competing desire that is part of all human experience429, and on the 
other an engagement in inner debate about which law to follow – the law 
of God as made available through the Gospel in competition for the 
person’s commitment with other laws, whether based on religious (such 
as Jewish, for example) or philosophical (such as Hellenistic) theories430. 




   Gerd Theissen’s book431 is unique among those with whom Cook 
engages in his account of Romans 7 because he incorporates into his 
exegetical enterprise a psychological dimension. There is here a danger of 
interpreting an ancient text through the intellectual prism of modern 
thinking (We have already mentioned Stendahl’s’ warning about this). The 
question remains as to how Theissen uses psychological insights and 
whether he has done so successfully. 
   Unlike Ziesler, and the other writers we have been considering through 
the eyes of Chris Cook, Theissen argues that the conflict which Paul is 
describing has its locus neither in the pre-conversion potential Christian 
believer, nor in the Christian as such, but in something that we might 
perhaps call ‘the human condition’. Theissen bases his theory here, Cook 
argues, on a Greek model of the human personality, one that is associated 
                                           
429 This is instantiated in the verses leading up to Romans 7:20 
430 This is instantiated in the verses following 7:20. 
431 Gerd Theissen, Psychological Aspects of Pauline Theology 
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with the Stoic philosophy of Seneca, as seen, for example, in the latter’s 
analysis of the killing of her children by Medea432. 
   Although Cook does not come down in favour of one of these writers 
in any overall or absolute sense, he does conclude this section helpfully by 
suggesting ways in which an exploration of the relationship between sin 
and addiction to alcohol in the light of Romans 7 might be profitable: he 
suggests that it would be more helpful to focus on the power of sin rather 
than individual sins, a conflict between ‘openness to the grace and power 
of God and openness to the power of sin’433, and the need for the grace 
of God as a means of deliverance from  ‘enslavement or captivity’434 to 
addiction, with or without the assistance of psychotherapy. 
2) The second writer that Cook chooses as a voice on the issue of self and 
conflicting desires is Augustine of Hippo, and he gives a great deal of 
attention to his interpretation of Paul on this point. The main features of 
his presentation of Augustine fall into two main sections. First there is the 
use Augustine makes, in Book VIII of the Confessions for example, of the 
idea of the divided will, in contrast perhaps to Paul’s preference for the 
concept of the divided self. This is how Cook describes Augustine’s 
analysis of this idea:435 
It becomes clear here that Augustine understood himself as 
possessing two wills in opposition to each other. The one will 
commanded that his mind should will that he follow the example 
of Victorinus436. This was evident in his consciousness of 
‘commanding’ himself to do the same. The other will was his 
unwillingness to follow Victorinus. This was evident in the fact 
                                           
432 This debate can be followed through Helen Foley’s journal article “Medea’s Divided Self”, which explores 
the masculine/feminine internal debate in which Medea addresses the murder of her children. As Foley 
explains in her article (p.63), Medea’s ‘internal dialogue is held between a part of herself called thumos … or 
sometimes kardia… and another part that is mētēr’. She is in fact quoting from Burnett at this point – see: 
Anne Burnett, “Medea and the Tragedy of Revenge”. 
433 Cook, op. cit., p.146 
434 ibid. 
435 Cook, op. cit., p 153. 
436 Victorinus is the philosopher whose conversion to Christianity Augustine took as the model for 
conversion, and whose path to Christianity he wished to follow himself. 
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that the ‘command’ was not actually obeyed. He understands this 
state of affairs as reflecting an ‘infirmity of mind’ in which there 
are two partial wills neither of which is ‘entire’ or ‘whole’. 
 
   At first glance this interpretation seems to describe adequately a state of 
subjective internal conflict, the kind of experience that Paul presumably 
had in mind when praying to be delivered ‘from the body of this death’437. 
Further examination however reveals that such a simple argument fails to 
describe the situation adequately. What seems to be happening, in the 
process of Augustine’s thought, has, Cook suggests, the character of dual 
volition, a phrase that he takes from Harry Frankfurt’s contribution to The 
Cambridge Companion to Augustine438. On this understanding of the problem 
of the divided will, there are first order volitional drives, which would 
mean for Augustine the wish to remain in his pagan way of life, and the 
second order drive which wants him to turn away from his old ways and 
embrace Christianity. This is a highly important contribution to the 
theological background to Cook’s theology in relation to addiction, 
because as he observes, Frankfurt himself uses the example of the addict 
as an instantiation of the problem he is addressing. As Cook439 observes: 
For Frankfurt, the narcotic addict may have first-order desires 
both to take the drug and not to take it. The former is in both 
cases, more or less, generated by physiological dependency upon 
the drug. The ‘unwilling addict’, however, also has a second order 
volition to stop taking the drug, and therefore identifies self with 
this first-order desire, while withdrawing from the first order desire 
to stop using the drug 
 
   Cook then develops this idea in relation to ‘salience’ – the technical term 
for the way in which the use of a substance, or engagement in an activity 
such as gambling, can assume increasing importance in the life of the 
                                           
437 Romans 7:24. 
438 Ed. Stump and Kretzmann, The Cambridge Companion to Augustine, p.126-127. 
439 Cook, op. cit. p.156. 
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individual, and this salience conflicts with the volitional drive to abstain 
because of perceived ‘psychological, social and biological harm associated 
with the dependent pattern of drug use’440. Putting this back into the 
language of Augustine, Cook quotes his view that441   
the law of sin is the tyranny of habit, by which the mind is drawn 
and  held even against its will. Yet it deserves to be so held because 
it so willingly falls into the habit. 
 
   Cook concludes his remarks on Augustine by observing that although 
he did not go into detail about the problems of alcohol excess, he did 
‘make it clear that drunkenness is a disorder of the will, consequent upon 
the sin of Adam’, suggesting that the ‘modern concepts of subjective 
compulsion, craving and addiction might be greatly illuminated by an 
application of this aspect of Augustine’s thought’442. It would be difficult 
to dissent from this point of view. 
3) Moving on to the writing of St. Thomas Aquinas, the key to understanding 
his writing in relation to addiction is to be found, Cook suggests, in his 
use of the ‘mean of virtues’ approach to Christian ethics. This presupposes  
an epistemological spectrum of views of the created order, at one end of 
which there is contempt for created things, which in its own way ‘insults’ 
the One who created everything, and at the other is excessive indulgence 
in the use of nature’s goods. Between these two extremes there is ‘mean’, 
by which is meant an attitude to created things that neither denies their 
goodness nor capitulates to excess. Aquinas in the Summa Theologica443 uses 
the word ‘temperance’ to denote the right use of reason in making 
decisions about how to avoid the extremes. With regard to the application 
                                           
440 Cook, op. cit, p.157. 
441 Augustine, Confessions VIII, v, 12, cited by Cook, op. cit., p.157. 
442 Cook, op. cit., p.59. 
443 See in particular Summa Theologica Second Part of the Second Part, Question 47:7. 
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of this theory to the consumption of alcohol by an individual, Cook makes 
the following statement444: 
Notwithstanding the commendability of complete abstinence for 
those who choose it, the application of Aquinas’ mean of virtues 
as an ethical framework to govern moderate drinking behaviour 
also has much to commend it. As a general rule, it would certainly 
seem that it is ‘excessive’ or heavy consumption that is associated 
with the greatest risk of harm, although there is a need to 
remember that the prevention paradox suggests that a moderate 
level of consumption alone will not solve all alcohol-related 
problems at the population level. 
 
   It does seem that Aquinas, as Cook suggests, has a valid contribution to 
make to the study of addiction by his assertion that the appropriate use of 
God’s creation, including alcohol, entails a positive valuation of things 
created and given to us, balanced by a rational decision to use such things 
in moderation – although as we have just observed, that degree of 
moderation is not necessarily attainable by all. 
  4) The last person we shall be discussing in relation to Cook’s ideas is Martin 
Luther, who, he claims, like Aquinas concerns himself with reason as a 
guide to right thinking and right behaviour, whereas states of drunkenness 
should rightly be regarded as ‘a work of the flesh’ that is to say, something 
that is in contra-distinction to the Christian virtuous life. He does not see 
Christian commitment as a guarantee of sinlessness, but attributes to the 
Holy Spirit a means of overcoming temptation445. Drunkenness is a 
phenomenon which Luther sees as a sin of excess, a ‘work of the flesh’446. 
In some ways he, like Aquinas, tends towards a consequentialist view of 
drunkenness. This means that being drunk when committing an evil act in 
no way excuses the individual from responsibility for what he has done 
                                           
444 Cook, Alcohol, Addiction and Christian Ethics, p.176 
445 Cook, op.cit. p.68. 
446 ibid. 
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while in this state of temporary ‘diminished responsibility’. In fact, quite 
the opposite conclusion may be drawn. To quote Luther himself on this:447 
It has been asked: Is an offence, committed in a moment of 
intoxication, therefore excusable? Most assuredly not; on the 
contrary, drunkenness aggravates the fault. Hidden sins unveil 
themselves when a man’s self-possession goes from him; that 
which the sober man keeps in his breast, the drunken man lets out 
at the lips. Astute people, when they want to ascertain a man’s true 
character, make him drunk. This same drunkenness is a grievous 
vice among us Germans, and should be heavily chastised by the 
temporal magistrate, since the fear of God will not suffice to keep 
the brawling guzzlers in check. 
 
   This is a highly important quotation by Cook as it illustrates not only 
Luther’s awareness of excess as sinful in terms of behaviour, but also 
establishes a link between God’s rule and secular authority. The fear of 
God’s wrath or punishment may not be enough to deter this kind of excess 
and its consequences, but fear of secular punishment may encourage 
moderation! Society, in his view, needed legislative protection from the 
dangers of alcohol misuse, and the punishment of those who while under 
inebriation commit further crimes or offences against the law. 
   Cook ends his discussion of Luther’s views on alcohol excess with a 
helpful summary of his argument. Cook suggests448 that Luther:  
saw drunkenness as sinful on the basis that it is expressly 
forbidden in scripture. It is thus analogous with the sin of Adam 
and Eve. Insofar as it was a problem in the ‘created realm’, it was 
matter for the attention of the courts, and one which he believed 
should be treated severely in order to keep the problem in check. 
Insofar as it was a problem in the ‘realm of redemption’, it was a 
sign of the resistance of ‘the flesh’ to the work of the Spirit of 
Christ. The Christian is enjoined to eschew drunkenness, and other 
works of the flesh, out of gratitude to Christ. And yet, Luther still 
recognised that Christians may sin ‘unwittingly’ and that the reign 
of the Spirit of Christ in the believer’s heart may not make him or 
her greatly different from ‘any honest man’. 
 
                                           
447 Cook, op. cit. p.69, citing Martin Luther, Table Talk: Of Offences, paragraph 695. 
448 op. cit., p.69. 
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   Cook’s discussion of Luther’s approach notes his hostility to ‘sins of the 
flesh’ and this viewpoint has strong backing in scripture at many points, 
particularly in terms of Paul’s wrestling with the concept of flesh in terms 
of his theology. As James Dunn has helpfully pointed out449, however, it 
can be argued that Paul’s use of ‘sarx’ in his writings carries a certain 
ambiguity of meaning, and care needs to be taken to avoid an unnecessary 
suggestion that in his view there is a close relationship at all points between 
words like ‘flesh’ and ‘evil’. 
   Luther was thus aware not only of the tendency of human beings to 
drink too much alcohol but also of the social consequences of such excess 
which cannot be excused by a plea of ‘drunkenness’ as if it were perhaps 
the fault of the alcohol that someone behaved wickedly. He therefore 
recommends rational moderation, and is sufficiently concerned about the 
extent of the problem to recommend that it should be a matter for 
legislation and punishment for those who cannot control their 
consumption of alcohol without external constraint. He clearly does not 




   Given the acceptability of a religious dimension to the ethical discourse, 
and taking into account the forgoing historical survey, what specifically 
ethical criteria does Cook advocate in relation to the use and misuse of 
alcohol? From a theoretical point of view, although he does not explicitly 
identify with any particular philosophical ethical position such as the 
                                           
449 J. G. D. Dunn, The Theology of Paul the Apostle. See p.64-66 about Paul’s ‘spectrum’ of usage of the word 
sarx 
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deontological, utilitarian, situationist or ‘virtue’ ethics template, there is a 
fundamental concern with what Cook describes as ‘an interplay of agent 
and environment in such a way that subjects experience themselves as 
“drawn into” an addictive pattern of behaviour for which they are neither 
entirely responsible nor entirely without responsibility’450.   This approach 
is not easy to work with. It is easier to adopt a ‘take it or leave it’ approach 
to ethics for religious thinkers, and it is greatly to his credit that Cook 
attempts to work in this more nuanced way, so that he cannot be accused 
of attempting to use religious language to close down the arguments, as is 
sometimes the case with more fundamentalist approaches. He also 
recognises that although much of the ethical discourse that has been 
directed towards excess of alcohol consumption, such as that of Aquinas, 
has been essentially consequentialist in its concern with the negative effect 
of drunkenness on society, there needs to be a counterbalancing emphasis 
on the pursuit of the good as a positive goal, and that for Christians that 
goal has to be located in the being and nature of God451. This leads to a 
discussion of the Augustinian idea of the summum bonum, which will 
concern us in more detail in the following chapter of this thesis that is 
concerned with theological aspects of human desire. In essence, this 
teaching suggests that all forms of human sinfulness are ultimately 
characterised not so much by the positive evil that they entail as by the 
departure from what is the highest good that humanity, under God’s grace, 
can attain. 
   On the specifics of individual responsibility for sensible consumption of 
alcohol there are many biblical texts that could be brought into the debate. 
                                           
450 Cook, op. cit., p.146, cited by Ryan Topping on page 129 of his review of the book, pp. 129-165. 
451 op. cit., p. 184f. 
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One particularly helpful quotation452 comes from the apocryphal book of 
Sirach453, which counsels the use of alcohol, but in moderation: 
Wine is very life to human beings if taken in moderation. What is 
life to one who is without wine? It has been created to make 
people happy. Wine drunk at the proper time and in moderation is 
rejoicing of heart and gladness of soul. 
 
   There is however a section following this which balances this liberal 
admonition by asserting that the excessive use of wine leads not to 
‘rejoicing’ but to its opposite – “bitterness of spirit”, quarrels, anger, and 
loss of strength’454. This text, in combination with many others in both 
Jewish and New Testament scriptures, notably in lists of vices and virtues 
such as can be found at Romans 13:13, Colossians3:18-4:1, I Peter 4:3, 
and I Timothy 3:3455 warns of the danger of excess. Although all of these 
counsel sensible restraint in the use of alcohol, the practical wisdom of 
Sirach is of great importance as it presents the kind of balanced picture 
that occurs in later Christian theology – the middle way of Thomas 
Aquinas, for example, who, as we have observed earlier, rejects the need 
for total abstinence because God’s gifts are essentially good, but also 
opposes over indulgence as it offends against the deadly sin of gluttony456. 
   Many people, from a variety of faith backgrounds, and many with no 
overt religious belief, drink far more alcohol than is consistent with 
personal health and social wellbeing, including that of their families457. 
Why is that? Cook provides a detailed analysis of this, and sees it in terms 
of Pauline and Augustinian theologies of the self, which is often divided 
                                           
452 op. cit., p.39 
453 Sirach, 31:25-31. 
454 Cook, op. cit., p.39. 
455 For a comprehensive list of these occurrences, see Cook, op. cit., p.46. 
456 For further commentary on Aquinas, see Cook, op. cit., p.61f.  
457 A detailed breakdown of figures comparing sensible and risk taking consumption of alcohol per head of 
the UK population is included as an appendix to this thesis. 
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between a wish to do what is in the best interests of the individual and 
society as a whole on the one hand, and a desire to drink excessively on 
the other. We observed earlier Ryan Topping’s458 criticism of Cook, 
asserting that Cook ‘should have included a discussion that would make 
explicit the philosophical presuppositions dividing contemporary 
theological and psychological views of the human person’. To this highly 
important philosophical and theological issue we will return in detail in the 
next chapter of this thesis. To this criticism we may also add that it is 
surprising that Cook does not draw any explicit parallels with the various 
ethical approaches to health care that have been provided in the last twenty 
years or so by significant ethical figures as Alastair Campbell459, or Raanan 
Gillon’s philosophical approach460. Robin Gill’s survey of medical ethics 
in the same series as his own book may well have been published too late 
for Cook to have referred to it; it does however analyse many different 
religious and secular approaches to medical ethics, and a subsequent 
edition of Alcohol, Addiction and Christian Ethics would benefit from some 
attention to Gill’s work. This is not to suggest that these books provide a 
comprehensive answer to the ethical questions Cook is asking, but 
referencing them would situate his own work within a wider contemporary 
context. From a specifically Christian perspective, he might also have 
helpfully used the ethical views of Stanley Hauerwas, particularly in his 
book Naming the Silences461. 
                                           
458 Review article, Studies in Christian Ethics 21.1, p.132 
459  Alastair Campbell, Grant Gillett and Gareth Jones, Medical Ethics 3rd edition. It may well be that Cook’s  
book was published before the appearance of both this and the useful article by Sidney Bloch and Stephen A 
Green, entitled “An Ethical Framework for Psychiatry”. 
460 Raanan Gillon, Philosophical Medical Ethics. Gillon debates the concept of duty of care to patients from both 
religious and secular philosophical positions. 
461 Stanley Hauerwas, Naming the Silences. He favours the view, following MacIntyre, in an article entitled 
“Patients as agents” in eds. Spicker and Englehardt, Philosophical Medical Ethics, p.210, that trying to sort out 
the ‘quandary’ of what is best for an individual can only proceed from an understanding of that person’s story 
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   With regard to alcohol and public policy, Cook points out that corporate 
attempts to control both alcohol and drug misuse by the ‘body politic’ 
have a chequered history. On March 2nd 2009 the devolved Scottish 
Parliament, in the face of alarming statistics462, decided to introduce, via 
taxation, a minimum price per unit of alcohol. It is debatable what this will 
achieve, except to penalise those who drink alcohol responsibly. History 
seems to suggest that people who wish to drink excessively will find the 
means of doing so no matter what this costs, including the cost incurred 
by society as a whole through petty (and not so petty) crime. At the same 
time, is important to recognise that the number of alcohol related deaths 
per year in the United Kingdom has been rising steadily in recent years463, 
so the makers of public policy are undoubtedly right to be concerned, and 
maybe doing nothing is no longer an option. 
   Cook looks at these public responses to the problems of alcohol related 
violence, disease and trauma in his chapter entitled ‘Alcohol, Addiction and 
Christian Ethics’. Like Kenneth Leech, who as we saw earlier argued that 
pastoral care has as much to do with the formulation of public policy and 
law making, in terms of society’s response to the problems associated with 
the misuse of drugs, Cook regards this aspect of ethical concern as of great 
importance, although, as we have suggested, both authors at times seem, 
justifiably perhaps, somewhat pessimistic about how far such policies and 
their implementation can go towards finding a solution to these problems. 
In the case of alcohol misuse Cook addresses collusion between 
governments and alcohol producing companies which engender a form of 
                                           
as a human being, and that it is unrealistic to suppose that clinicians will in general have access to such 
detailed information. 
462 It was announced in the Press that the number of alcohol related admissions to hospital in Scotland in the 
previous year had risen to an all-time high of 1,500. 
463 See:  News Release from the Department of National Statistics, 25 January 2008. 
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hubris in the response to the problems from official bodies including the 
Government:464 
Examples of the conflicts of interest that arise in practice have 
already been described in Chapter 2, as for example in the form of 
allegations involving the influence of the alcohol industry on 
debate and policy. There is reason to believe that governments also 
are not unconflicted on such matters, when revenue from taxation 
and popularity with drinking voters conflict with particular public 
goods such as that of health. 
 
   This is one of the most important insights of the book because of its 
engagement not only with aspects of personal morality in relation to 
alcohol consumption but with the perceived duty of national governments 
to find ways of tackling the medical, social and criminal problems 
associated with excess. As Cook correctly points out, however465,    
the balancing of health concerns against the benefits of alcohol in 
society will never be an easy matter while health is merely set 
against the pleasures which some associate with alcohol. A point 
of reference is required which lies beyond profit, and even beyond 
health and pleasure. 
 
   In conclusion, Christopher Cook has identified a number of highly 
significant elements in the story of alcohol and its misuse, and attempts by 
both church and state to deal with some of the problems that this has 
caused over the last hundred years, beginning with temperance 
movements, and now attracting a considerable amount of attention from 
governments in the belief that changing the law can be an effective 
instrument of harm reduction. Both Leech and Cook are sceptical about 
how far this will work, not least because both the alcohol industry and the 
government are concerned not only with public health and social harmony 
but also with maximising revenue. 
                                           
464 Cook, Alcohol, Addiction and Christian Ethics, p. 191. 
465 ibid. 
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   On the explicit ethical element in Cook’s book, however, although his 
emphasis on both personal and corporate ethical standards is extremely 
timely and welcome, it is hard to resist the impression that he has only 
begun to touch the periphery of the ethical material, and a far deeper and 
more philosophically grounded foundation needs to be given to the task 
of making valid ethical judgements about these matters. 
2.5     Conclusion to the chapter. 
   Although both psychological and theological approaches to the understanding of addiction 
presented here have provided many important insights into the subject, there remains a sense 
of dissatisfaction with what they demonstrate: there does not seem to be a unified argument 
on either side about the aetiology of addiction or the best way to treat addicted people, 
assuming addiction to be in some sense a ‘disease’. 
    Looking at the theological writing, we find some major areas of debate that are as yet 
unresolved. For May, we are all attached to something, so by extension we are all addicts: 
this seems to reduce the concept of addiction to meaninglessness. For Nelson, with his ‘AA’ 
approach, those who are alcoholics will always be so, a view which is contestable. For Leech, 
generalisation is problematic: we cannot understand an addict’s situation without attending 
to his personal circumstances: equally we must allow for the mysterious and unknowable 
element in addiction in offering a worthwhile pastoral ministry. 
   What emerges from this is the need for a new way of understanding the causes of addiction, 
a new model that promises a better way of offering pastoral help to those who are substance 
dependent.  
   The following chapter will address this in detail. 
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   If we consider the amount of money that is spent on the medical treatment of people 
with addiction problems, we should, as tax payers contributing to the NHS budget, 
ask questions about whether, for example, the current expenditure of £3bn per annum 
on drug problems is having a positive impact. The concern that this raises can also be 
put into proportion by the recognition that, as Sir Richard Branson has observed466, 
the worldwide illicit drugs trade currently generates £200bn of profit annually for those 
who supply them. As long as this profitability remains, the so called ‘war on drugs’ has 
no hope of success, however that success might be measured. 
   Whether we recommend the decriminalisation of the use of cannabis, for example, 
as Branson has argued, or go further and legalise (and presumably tax) the use of this 
and other such substances, the apparent failure of the UK and other countries to stop 
the potentially dangerous use of non-prescription drugs and alcohol raises very 
profound questions about the right way to proceed. 
   What is the essence of that debate? 
   It is the contention of this thesis that there are fundamentally three ways of 
approaching the problem – three possible roadmaps for addressing the issues of drug 
misuse. They are: 
1) The clinical approach 
2) The forensic approach 
3) The spiritual approach. 
 
   In this thesis it is our wish to argue as the major original contribution of the work 
that approaches 1) and 2) have failed consistently, and that approach 3) which starts 
from a quite different place is the only one that will have a lasting beneficial effect on 
                                           
466 See http://metro.co.uk/2013/09/25. 
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the wellbeing of those who are already, or might become, addicted to ingestible 
substances. 
   In other words, the clinical approach fails because it medicalises and thus, as we have 
argued earlier, disempowers, addicted people, instead of giving them responsibility for 
their problems and the means to overcome them by a positive approach: the forensic 
approach is useless because as long as there are people who can make money by 
distributing illegal substances or colluding with governments of all political parties in 
profiting from the taxation of alcohol, the supply of such substances will never be 
reduced or eliminated. 
   Taking the clinical approach argument one step further, the problem is that all 
medical intervention is based on three factors, diagnosis (including the history of the 
problem), treatment, and prognosis. Diagnosis means, according to the medical 
literature467, the determination of the nature of a particular disease, by the use of signs 
and symptoms. But if this is applied to addiction, then we need to be certain that 
addiction is in fact a disease, which we have argued in this thesis is by no means 
univocally accepted by the health care psychologists whose work has been addressed 
here. If we cannot be certain that addiction is a disease, then it makes little sense to 
continue to factor 2 – i.e. the provision of some form of treatment. And if there is a 
question mark about the nature of what if any treatment will succeed, it is hardly 
surprising that so many so-called treatments do in fact fail. 
   Similarly, the forensic approach fails because it works on the basis that the best way 
to treat addicts, including those who commit crimes in order to buy illicit substances, 
is to put them in prison. But with increasing staff reductions in education and 
rehabilitation little is being done to address their drug habit effectively in prison, and 
access to illicit substances seems relatively easy there. So little is achieved by the 
                                           
467 See, for example, Baillière’s Nurses’ Dictionary, p.113. 
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forensic approach, other than keeping the price of the drugs on the street artificially 
high - which provides additional incentive for dealers to make them available. 
   If, then, approaches 1) and 2) are of little value, what is left? 
   The answer, it seems to the author of this thesis, is to be found in a radically new 
model, which looks at drug use and misuse (and similar things could be said, it is 
argued, about ‘process’ addictions) on the basis of a spiritually informed model, that 
incorporates both the life view of the addict herself and ideas from quite traditional 
theological discourses, such as those of St. Augustine. We will now explore this 
approach in more detail. 
   A conversation between this writer and a man with a history of substance misuse 
suggested a new hermeneutical approach to addiction. Its emphasis was not a negative 
one – “What has made you substance dependent?” – but a positive one, that could be 
expressed as “What do you want out of life?”. Some years later, the man commented 
that it was this question, rather than attempts to discover why he had become unable 
to control his substance misuse, that established the beginning of recovery. Although 
it would be inadvisable to generalise from this instance, that encounter suggested that 
both psychological and Christian theological theories, and their apparent failure to 
provide a clear understanding of the subject and a universally valid treatment path, 
might result from a false start, a fundamental concern with the problem of addiction 
rather than a new model based on investigation of positive appetite, longing, desire 
and aspiration. 
   This new model also reflects Saint Augustine’s view of God, as expressed at the 
beginning of his Confessions, as the ultimate source and destiny of authentic desire – 
‘our hearts are restless until they rest in you’468. Are we then justified in seeing all 
desiring as ultimately, if subliminally, desire for God, however distorted or occluded 
                                           
468 Augustine of Hippo, Confessions, 1.1. 
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by external, materialistic desires? This new model presents a positive answer to this 
question. 
   We will also address Saint Paul’s statement in Romans 7:19 ‘For the good I would I 
do not: the evil I would not, that I do.’ Similarly, Griffith Edwards469 includes ‘the 
subjective awareness of a changed relationship with a drug’ as one of seven symptoms 
of addiction.470 
   Human beings can both desire to drink alcohol to excess or use illicit drugs and wish 
to give up doing so while, at the same time, recognising the many ways in which it 
could be harmful to continue. How can we understand this? Consideration of the ‘self’ 
is needed here. 
   Attempts to understand the self in the twentieth and twenty first centuries have been 
pursued by theologians, sociologists and psychologists. Julian Jaynes471 makes the point 
that concepts such as self, person and consciousness are recent arrivals in human 
history.  Consciousness is a subject that is being investigated at many levels today, and, 
as Fraser Watts points out in relation to the relationship between “Consciousness, 
Brain and God”, ‘Consciousness is a topic whose time has come. It is one of the most 
distinctive things about human beings, and is currently the focus of an extraordinary 
amount of multi-disciplinary interest. The human sciences currently see it as one of 
their greatest challenges’472. 
   One challenge to traditional ways of thinking about personality is the problematic of 
whether human beings have a core self or a range of sub-personalities which operate 
according to the circumstances in which we find ourselves and have a fluidity of 
expression that is both diachronically and synchronically multiple. As this question 
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seems to lie at the heart of human conflicts about desiring certain things such as alcohol 
and drugs on the one hand, and recognising their danger on the other, we will now 
explore this concept of unity and plurality. 
   We will look at three books on this topic, those of Léon Turner, Raymond Martin 
and John Barresi, and Charles Taylor. 
 
3.1 As Turner gives an extended analysis of the thinking of both theologians and 
psychologists on this subject we will begin with an exploration of his thesis, later 
published in book form.473 . 
   For Turner, theologians seem to be less hospitable than psychologists to the 
suggestion that the human self is most accurately regarded as multiple rather 
than unified. There is a problem here, Turner argues in the main body of his 
work, because theologians have a tendency to ignore accounts of the self that do 
not agree with their hypothesis474. We will now look at the psychological and 
theological aspects of the self in relation to plurality as discussed by Turner. 
 
The Psychological And Sociological Perspective 
   Twenty and twenty first century psychological models of the self tend to argue 
that there is no unified core self that exists both diachronically and 
synchronically, that is to say over the course of an individual’s life, or in terms 
of a ‘snapshot’ of the person at any given moment in time. 
   On diachronic multiplicity, Turner says475 that ‘the idea that the self is not a 
single static essence or underlying substrate of being but rather changes over 
time, is not novel’. He emphasises this by saying476 that ‘one of psychology’s 
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primary goals over the last century has been to clarify the nature of this 
development’, i.e. the developing view of personal change over time. 
   On the synchronic element he uses the concept of the schema which refers to 
a ‘network of modular units’ which function ‘within hierarchical systems’477. He 
also cites in this context the work of Markus, Nurius and Oyserman who believe 
that ‘the self is more accurately described as a collection of interrelated self-
schemata, each of which organises and encodes particular pieces of information 
about perceived personal knowledge or interpersonal relationships’. 
   The most influential proposal about the plural self, as Turner sees it, comes 
from this concept of the schema. How can this be best understood? As Turner 
comments on this central characteristic of the theory478: 
Collectively, schemata are presumed to be plastic (that is to say flexible 
and easily adaptable), multi-layered cognitive entities that serve both to 
represent relationships between specific concepts and govern and predict 
behaviour on the basis of previously organised knowledge and 
experience. 
 
   There is a predictive element to this concept of multiple schemata co-existing 
within each individual. But we are still far from understanding in great detail how 
the ‘specific concepts of each schema relate to one another’ as this ‘depends on 
the nature of the context in which they were experienced and how they are 
subsequently deployed in its understanding’479. 
   Turner continues by examining how this theory may inform our understanding 
not only of the atomic self, or the self in isolation, but also the social self. In this 
context he observes that480: 
Relationships, particularly close relationships, have a peculiarly strong 
influence upon representations of self. It has even been suggested that 
particularly close relationships determine self-representations to the 
extent that the partners of these relationships are partially assimilated 
into one’s representation of oneself. 
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   Here then we can see in principle how the way in which an individual perceives 
himself depends not only on internal schemata - perceptions of how the world 
functions in terms of the experiencing of the world from within - but also in 
terms of mutual responsiveness between the self and others, and images formed 
within the mind as a result of these encounters and relationships. 
   The reception of these representational images is not merely a passive 
occurrence, however. There is, alongside this process of reception ‘the active 
manipulation and interpretation of this experience as the basis of understanding 




   Turner’s survey of a number of theological writers reveals hostility to the 
multiple personality theory. We will therefore present a brief survey of the main 
points made by some leading theologians, Colin Gunton, Vernon White, 
Wolfhart Pannenberg and Alistair McFadyen. 
   On Gunton’s anthropology, Turner recognises a mode of thinking 
theologically that ‘exemplifies theological anthropology’s recent embrace of the 
philosophical turn to relationality’ on the basis of which he undertakes his ‘social 
analysis’482. Gunton regards much previous anthropology as having missed the 
importance of relationality in the understanding of how humanity actually 
functions, or functions best, a failure which, as he sees it, leads to  ‘instrumental 
objectification’. There is, in other words, much more to relationship than 
individual self-fulfilment. To understand this is to set oneself against current 
experiences of alienation and fragmentation within society. The antidote to this 
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fragmentation is to be found, Gunton argues, in the discovery of ‘an enriched 
understanding of our place in the world based upon a revised theoretical 
doctrine of relationality that is grounded firmly in Christian Trinitarian 
theology’483. The problem for Turner is that this relatedness is hard to reconcile 
with the concept of plurality that we have been addressing in the psychological 
section of the book. 
   These considerations, Turner suggests, take us to ‘the question at the very 
heart of [his] book’484. He says at this point: 
Given the apparent conflict that theories of the discontinuous 
fragmented self pose to a core element of Christian anthropology, are 
not theologians justified in clinging to concepts of self-unity, and 
expressing their antipathy towards the undercurrents of secular 
philosophy that threaten them? 
 
   Turner addresses this problem by reviewing Paying Attention to People, by 
Vernon White. White bases his theology of the self on an ‘inviolable ontological 
unity of each individual person’ which does not ‘preclude the possibility that 
people can experience themselves as disunified’485. He situates this ontologically 
in theological concepts, particularly in the Christian theology of creation and 
(following Gunton) relatedness. This relatedness, he says, ‘grounded in theology, 
provides support not just for the unity of personhood, but also, derivatively, for 
the value and meaning for life that so many observe, but which few attempt to 
defend’486. It is the ‘grounded in theology’ motif here that Turner finds troubling, 
because it is White’s concern with an evangelistic approach to Christianity that 
makes him undertake this methodology instead of engaging with the 
psychological narrative on its own terms. He is guilty, Turner says, of using 
‘slippery’ language about the concept of self-fragmentation and ‘a certain 
                                           
483 op. cit., p.23. 
484 op. cit., p.27. 
485 op. cit., p.29. 
486 ibid. 
 188 
ambiguity about how, precisely, such fragmentation manifests itself in the 
individual’487. He also seems to confuse the terms self-fragmentation and 
pathological self-alienation. But this view of what he sees as the problem, and 
the introduction of a programme of evangelization to restore a kind of pre-
modern understanding of the person in a non-fragmented, and therefore socially 
cohesive form, falls down because it refuses to engage significantly with the 
current consensus of psychological discourse about the self. This is not to 
propose in relation to the current thesis an uncritical acceptance of such 
discourse, but to underscore the need for theologians to take account of it rather 
than attempt to work on the self in isolation from it, as Turner makes clear in 
the final chapter of his book488. 
   Much of the theological writing in Turner’s book engages critically with two 
significant twentieth century theologians, 1) Wolfhart Pannenberg and 2) Alistair 
McFadyen.  
1) Pannenberg.  
   Turner looks in detail at Anthropology in Theological Perspective489. He 
identifies ‘three closely related central themes’490, i.e. ‘the origins of both 
the ego and the self in the social world, the momentary unity of ego and 
self in self-consciousness, and, most importantly, the relationship between 
ego and self in the formation of continuous individual identity’491. An 
ontological distinction is thus made between the concepts of ‘ego’ and 
‘self’. The ego, that is to say, has only a fleeting, momentary existence, 
whereas the self is, in Pannenberg’s argument, the place where a sense of 
historical cohesion is located. For Pannenberg, ‘If both the ego and the 
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self are subject to change over time, then the self, he repeatedly asserts 
throughout his various anthropological writings, must develop 
independently of the ego’492. 
   But Turner argues493 that what Pannenberg says about the self depends 
on his varied ways of understanding the concept of identity. It can be used 
to describe the idea of ‘sameness over time’, or the momentary 
relationship between ego and the self in terms of self-consciousness, or 
even the eschatological aspect of self in terms of ‘the final communion of 
the individual with God at the eschaton’494. This, together with  issues 
about the way in which Pannenberg uses the language of psychology to 
talk about the unity of the self, make his argument complex and inadequate 
for Turner, as we will now describe. 
   From the beginning of a human life, Pannenberg claims, ego and self are 
identical. But the ego becomes an object that can be observed by the self 
over a period of time, and thus envisaged as in some sense ‘other’. It is 
this capacity that distinguishes humanity from other animal life. It implies 
a ‘conscious sense of self’. It is what is involved in the process by which 
identity is formed over a considerable period of time. It leads to the point 
in life at which an individual can refer to him or her self as ‘I’. 
   Pannenberg bases his theory of self-unity not on this ego-self dyad, but 
on something more like continuity of experience. He draws on William 
James’s theory of ‘continuity of consciousness’. In this process, Turner 
suggests, following James, ‘continuity is a function of the connection 
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between individual moments of unified consciousness, whereby each 
successive moment appropriates the contents of the former’495. 
   This consciousness is now, for Pannenberg, closely connected to 
particular societies and their norms and values. The unified self is then 
best seen as ‘that totality of states, qualities, and actions that in the eyes of 
a “generalized other” are to be ascribed to the individual which I am’496 . 
   These ways of looking at the problem of identity and the unity of the 
self are highly complex and, Turner argues, criticising Pannenberg, that he 
has fused together ‘at least three concepts that I have argued ought to 
remain qualitatively distinct’497. These relate in particular to the idea that 
‘the successful formation of identity requires the continuous unification 
of the ego with the self’ to such an extent that ‘in any given moment of 
self-consciousness the ego knows itself to be identical with the self’498. But 
this argument, Turner suggests, cannot be ‘squared’ with contemporary 
psychological insights into identity formation based on the plurality of the 
self, which Pannenberg ignores. 
   For Turner, the fundamental problem with Pannenberg’s presentation 
of the unitary theory of identity is that he is so concerned to argue his 
theological case persuasively that he fails to engage with those 
psychological theories that contradict his view. ‘Pannenberg, though he 
critiques a vast and diverse corpus of self-theories, picks and chooses the 
concepts that appeal to him and incorporates them into his own theory’499. 
   Turner recognises in Pannenberg’s Anthropology a welcome recognition 
of the idea that human personality is to a large extent socially constructed 
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and develops over time500. And he might have found an ally in some of his 
more positive comments on the self and its developmental aspects in the 
work of narrative psychologists such as D.P. McAdams. But the fact that 
he tends to see the idea of a non-pathological plural self as meaningless 
gives his work the appearance of being based on outdated psychology. At 
the same time, Turner wishes to make the point that had Pannenberg been 
able to recognise it, he might conceivably have come to the conclusion 
that there is in fact a ‘compatibility of the notion of the plural self with his 
own theories about the singularity and continuity of identity, and to 
suggest that narrative psychology is well placed to address some of the 
fundamental problems I have raised with his inflexible account of identity 
formation’501. 
2) McFadyen. 
    Alistair McFadyen’s contribution to this conversation is to be found in 
his book The Call to Personhood 502. But his views are to some extent based 
on Rom Harré’s Personal Being - ‘it is clear’, Turner tells us503, ‘that the bulk 
of [McFadyen’s] psychological theorising is appropriated from the work 
of Rom Harré…whose own reasons for finding narrative psychology 
attractive should make McFadyen’s work amenable to such an 
interpretation’. 
    Although McFadyen’s take on this brings him closer to accepting a 
contemporary psychological account of the problems of the unitary self 
than most other theologians, Turner argues, he still finds it impossible to 
break away from ‘an abiding concern with self-unity’504. To this extent, he 
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continues, although in many ways McFadyen and Pannenberg are far apart 
in many respects of their thought, they share a reluctance to look directly 
at the psychological evidence and deal with it systematically. 
    ‘For McFadyen,’ Turner says, ‘persons are “individuals whose 
consciousness, experience of and interaction with the world are internally 
centred”505. This is not, he emphasizes, the same as arguing for an ‘inner 
core’ of personality structure, but is rather ‘the result of holding a belief 
(or theory) about oneself, the origin of which lies in the social world’506. 
The acquisition of this belief is then not innate but learned. This process 
is described as ‘sedimentation’, as layers of experience become organised 
‘into a unified and continuous structure, which transcends every particular 
situation’507. 
    At first glance this seems like a plausible, even elegant methodology for 
overcoming the problem of regarding the self as unitary. But does it work 
at a theoretical level? 
    In Turner’s opinion, this is far from being the case. He makes the 
positive observation that ‘more than any contemporary theologian, 
McFadyen seems prepared to tackle the differences between the 
appearances of the self in different social settings. At any given time, 
McFadyen argues, identity depends upon precisely how the ‘I’ is ‘indexed’ 
in relation to others (‘you’, ‘him’, ‘her’) in the context of a particular 
communicative situation’508. But this apparent welcoming of some form 
of plurality theory is illusory, because in his proposal of the idea of a ‘deep 
self’ at the root of the person ‘he actually takes the observation that people 
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do experience themselves differently in different contexts as evidence of 
a further, more fundamental structure of selfhood’509, which seems to be 
counterintuitive. 
    As Turner later argues510, this idea of a deep self is central to what 
McFadyen is proposing. But he questions how ‘a single “grand theory” of 
self might lead to the construction of a deep self structure and several local 
self models’511. Thus McFadyen, in his ‘deep self theology’, has failed to 
avoid the problem of using the same concept to argue two completely 
opposite points of view. McFadyen is struggling to ‘accommodate or 
explain radical changes in the sense of self from one moment to the next, 
whether these changes ought to be considered pathological or not’512. 
What this suggests is that the defence of a theological concept is at the 
heart of this problem, and what is being defended, Turner suggests, is a 
theology of the imago Dei. Both Pannenberg and McFadyen speak of this. 
Writing on McFadyen’s understanding of this concept, Turner says: 
McFadyen’s interpretation of the imago Dei offers the most 
plausible reason for his rugged defence of personal unity. This, as I 
showed in the previous chapter, is the source of his belief that the 
individual person, as an enduring particularity, has a continuous 
identity. A clearer picture of his understanding of self-unity 
emerges in his descriptions both of the distorted relationships that 
characterise humanity’s fallen state, and of the implications that 
redemption has for the reorientation of human relations. 
 
   The problem for Turner is that although it may well be possible to argue the 
case for personal unity along these lines from a purely theological point of view, 
McFadyen’s views are compromised by his failure to identify any significant 
arguments that contradict the psychological theories that clearly argue in favour 
of the multi-personality theory. 
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   We will conclude this brief investigation of Pannenberg and McFadyen in 
relation to the plural self in Turner’s book by noting his summary to this 
section513. In terms of their concern with the idea of self unity as a feature of 
‘personal wholeness’, Turner says that514: 
This idea is important for two primary and essentially theological 
reasons. First, the absence of personal wholeness is taken to correspond 
to the corruption, or denial, of the image of God. Secondly, the concept 
of personal wholeness in any given moment and over time is deemed 
essential to the concept of the individual as a unique and continuous 
entity that exists over and above its social constitution. 
 
   Like White’s view, which we considered earlier, there is a sense that the 
theological concept of fallenness entails a sense of fracturing not only of the 
divine-human interface but also of the relationship between members of the 
human race in terms of specifically human relationships and also between 
humanity and the environment. What is not clear is how that hypothesis can be 
supported in psychological terms without resort to theological language to 
establish its validity, even when appeals are made, somewhat superficially, 
Turner suggests, to the world of narrative psychology because it is in danger of 
failing to maintain its own ‘distinctive identity’515. 
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Turner’s Own View Of The Plural Self 
   Turner’s own reconfiguring of theology’s dialogue with psychology draws 
significant contrasts between Pannenberg and McFadyen, but although he sees 
some movement towards a potential accommodation with some contemporary 
models of personal psychology, especially narrative psychology, he argues that, 
from a theological perspective, the idea of an enduring self ‘acquires an 
objectivity that grates against the ontological scepticism of some narrative 
psychologists’516. And this, he suggests, comes from a paradigm error in their 
methodology: in attempting to provide a critique of these psychological theories 
of the self, they use not so much the language of psychology itself, as of 
metaphysics. And he maintains that although many contemporary theologians 
and philosophers – such as Arthur Danto, Robin G. Collingwood in the 
philosophical camp, and White, Hauerwas, and others in the theological camp, 
work hard to illustrate the importance of narrative understandings of humanity 
and then those who are arguing from a theological perspective make that their 
basis of an appeal to Christian values and the place of positive evangelism, such 
endeavours cannot ultimately ‘exorcise the spectre of self-fragmentation’517. 
   In the face of this, Turner offers a prescription for overcoming the ontological 
differences between psychology and theology with regard to the plural self. 518: 
It is clear that many modern theologians assume that a sense of 
existential angst accompanies the sense of self-fragmentation as a result 
of the conflict it inspires with prior beliefs in the enduring unity of 
personhood. The typical theological solution has been to redouble the 
search for a secure foundation for personal continuity, and the seemingly 
obvious alternative, that we embrace our self-multiplicity, has been 
largely ignored. However, if self-multiplicity can co-exist in harmony 
with personal continuity, then multiplicity itself no longer carries such an 
existential threat. 
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   If this approach could be adopted, he continues, then resolution might be 
achieved ‘not by seeking to reaffirm a strong sense of self-unity, but by 
surrendering it and accepting that the continuity of personhood is not 
coterminous with the singularity of the self’519. This would, he suggests, have 
both theoretical and practical advantages, and avoid the danger of relegating 
theological anthropology to the same place of isolation that might be associated 
with a theologically based refusal to embrace other scientific theories such as 
evolution. 
 
Critical View Of Léon Turner 
   Is the human ‘self’ a unified entity, or is there a sense in which we are both 
diachronically and synchronically multiple, with no ‘core self’ which identifies us 
as unique and permanent individuals? Turner’s answer to this question is that 
psychologists are far more positive than theologians about the existence of 
multiple personalities existing within each individual, even when these 
personalities have no obvious pathological elements such as in conditions like 
DID520. 
   Turner is right to have drawn our attention to the contrast between these two 
disciplinary approaches, and to have criticised theologians for not taking the 
psychological evidence seriously enough: but he does leave us with awkward 
questions from a theological perspective. If there is no core self, rather many 
sub-personalities within each individual, and if these are also evolving over time, 
to which self does God relate? And which element of a person’s being may be 
said to survive death and relate to God in the eschatological dimension of being? 
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Although Turner does not elaborate these issues, they are questions that 
theology should not ignore. 
   The discussion of Turner’s book presented here attempts in this part of the 
thesis to look at what the study of personality may tell us about the nature of 
human addictions. Whereas Craig Nakken521 argues for the reality of an addictive 
personality, we might follow Turner who suggests that a tendency towards 
competing lifestyles may reflect one sub-personality co-existing with others, 
such as a desire for drugs competing with the wish to avoid addictive behaviour 
for health or other reasons. 
   We have looked at a number of important contributors to the understanding 
of human personality and the possible origin of conflict within the human 
psyche. One factor that has perhaps stood out in this context is that of the 
divided or multiple personality, without making any hasty diagnosis of what 
might be called ‘split’ or dissociative personality in quasi clinical terms. With 
regard to addiction, it seems to us that the contribution of Léon Turner has 
something of particular importance to contribute, in terms of our attempt to link 
addiction with inner conflict between the wish to quit a particular activity and 
the difficulty encountered in doing so. 
   The reason for this assertion is that Turner has found a language in which he 
can express the nature of this phenomenon that resonates with both theological 
and psychological analyses of the multiple personality syndrome. In essence, this 
is because he argues, as we have seen above, that ‘if self-multiplicity can co-exist 
in harmony with personal continuity, then multiplicity itself no longer carries 
such an existential threat’. For the pastoral counsellor, and for the psychological 
therapist alike, in this view of things, and specifically related to our ‘new model’, 
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the methodology in relation to addiction might then be to look for ways of 
encouraging those parts of the person’s psyche that seek new and healthy goals 
and objectives, while allowing the more destructive parts to wither away. 
 
3.2 Martin and Barresi 
   The Rise and Fall of Soul and Self by Raymond Martin and John Barresi, who are 
researchers in the history of the philosophical concept of the human self, has a 
historical section and a more evaluative section later on. 
   They map the historical development of the understanding of the self, taking 
account of Plato, Augustine, Descartes and the ideas generated by the 
Enlightenment. Their hypothesis is that both soul and self are concepts that have 
become progressively limited in meaning – ‘soul’ because its relevance seems to 
lie now only in specifically religious discourse, and ‘self’ because modern 
psychology has proposed the demise of a sense of personal unity in the light of 
the more generally accepted notion of multiple personality. They also discuss 
more recent works, including such thinkers as Jacques Derrida and Daniel 
Dennett, who argues that ‘consciousness should be understood as consisting of 
narrations, produced by the brain, the point of which is to interpret objects and 
events in some coherent way’522. They also look at some  principal figures in 
psychological thinking in the twentieth century, including Erikson and Jung.  
 
The Structure Of The Book 
   The methodology is clear and well structured. They are not looking at any 
specific critiques of the history of the idea of the soul and the self, although they 
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do refer to such writings on the subject, and provide a wide ranging and lengthy 
bibliography for those who wish to pursue primary and secondary aspects of the 
relevant literature. In their final chapter they offer some suggestions about how 
the quest for the understanding of self might be undertaken in the twenty first 
century, although they are not sanguine about the prospects of achieving this in 
the near future. For the moment, it seems to them, we may have to be satisfied 
with the suggestion that the concept of self (unlike that of soul) has a useful 
place in the way we understand the human being but that to try to give a more 
theoretical structure to the concept of self may be still far off and may in fact 
never be possible. 
 
The Foundation Of Their Argument 
   What is presented to the reader is a progression from religious forms of 
understanding of the self which make use of the word ‘soul’, and define the soul 
as something that survives the reality of death, to a more secular interpretation 
of self which then also falls apart because, particularly since the work of 
psychologists such as William James, it has become increasingly impossible to 
view the human self as a unified object. Thus both soul and self are words which, 
it could be argued, have no concrete meaning, the former because the idea of 
the soul has been relegated to purely religious thought, and that of the self has 
collapsed under the weight of the suggestion, common to most scientific schools 
of psychological theory from James onwards, that individuals are constructed of 
a number of sub-personalities which co-exist both developmentally and in terms 
of current social interaction. 
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   In the light of this we can draw a distinction between two things: on the one 
hand the self as a ‘scientifically useful notion’ and on the other as a ‘practically 
useful notion’523. 
   This is their understanding of James’ contribution524: 
In James’ account, after elevating the “personal self” to a very high 
status, even claiming that no psychology that hopes to stand can 
question its existence, he immediately conceded that in cases of 
dissociation an individual can have more than one personal self. 
Moreover, he continued, each personal self may be regarded both as an 
object and as a subject (a me and an I). The self as object may be further 
divided into the material self, the social self, and the spiritual self, each of 
which may be further divided. He said, for instance, that “a man has as 
many social selves” as there are individuals and groups “who recognise him” 
and carry an image of him in their mind. 
 
   This is an important contribution to the modern understanding of the self as 
fragmented rather than unified. It was carried over into the twentieth century 
and the word self now tends to become hyphenated rather than to have any 
identifiable meaning when standing alone, so that we get constructs such as self-
image, self-esteem, self-discovery etc.525. 
   There is also a sense, they suggest, that from this time onwards self tended to 
be interpreted not so much in terms of individual personality as in terms of other 
definable characteristics, such as those of race, gender and political affiliations. 
A person is what she is seen as by others and sees for her self. This understanding 
does not however produce a sense of personal coherence, and it is this trend, 
they argue, that underlies the demise of the concept of a unified, individual self, 
to be replaced by  an understanding that sees only fragmentary elements of 
personality. 
   But – is fragmentation to be regarded as the end of the story of self? Martin 
and Barresi draw their survey about the self and its alleged demise to an end with 
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speculation about what the next step might be. They identify two possible steps 
that we might take in the future and they are526: 
I. The suggestion that we are better off without a theory of the self as a 
unified concept. A healthy pluralism might be a better route towards 
understanding the self than an artificial theory of unity. 
 
II. The suggestion that we are in fact mistaken if we think of the idea of a 
person as a unified self as being something which we once had but have 
somehow lost. This idea, however attractive, is in fact an illusion. To 




Critique Of Martin And Barresi 
   The interpretative element of this book concerns the hypothesis that just as 
the ‘soul’ concept has effectively lost its explanatory force in the understanding 
of what it means to be a person, so the concept of ‘self’ has declined, in terms 
of our ability to give a formal, conceptual structure to the ontology of the self. 
The word self is, they argue, a useful hypothesis, but when we seek to define it, 
it becomes too problematic, because human beings are not unified selves but are 
composed of many sub-selves, which cannot be defined without resort either to 
composite expressions such as self-conception, self-discovery, self-esteem etc., 
or in social terms related to gender, ethnicity, religious or political affiliation etc. 
Embedded in this suggestion is a diagnosis of fragmentation, with regard to the 
self, which may mean that some sense of personal unity which we once had has 
been lost, or that the idea of such unity is illusory – we have not lost it because 
it was never a reality in the first place. To shed such an illusion might then be 
seen a form of human progress527. 
 
                                           
526 op. cit., p.301. 
527 See: Martin and Barresi, op. cit. p.301. 
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This is an interesting and well written book. But there are some problems with 
it, which we will now address. 
   In the first place, it may seem to some readers that the material presented in 
the historical overview offered here is not so much inaccurate as unnecessary 
because the information it presents is easily available already in other forms. 
   Secondly, they argue that the idea of the soul is obsolete because religious ideas 
and beliefs – which incorporate the notion of an immaterial, immortal soul – 
have become a sideline, and in some ways a toxic sideline528, in the history of 
human thought. There is a post Enlightenment, materialistic humanism 
underlying the writing, but one wonders whether in reality the world religions 
are in decline as these authors think, and whether in consequence the idea of 
soul is really redundant. 
   Finally, but in some ways most importantly, does their vision of the concept 
of the self as having declined while remaining a useful pragmatic concept have 
any real value, or is it just speculation? As Mark Freeman comments529: 
With all due respect to Martin and Barresi, it is truly remarkable that they 
can speak in this context with such confidence. Their convictions, it 
would appear, are not a matter of faith at all: they are speaking the 
unvarnished truth, with materialistic science providing the needed, and 
largely unquestioned foundation. But in speaking in this way, they are 
failing to see just how faith-ful their own proclamations are. What’s 
more, they are failing to see just how thoroughly the theoretical status quo 
has permeated their own conclusions. Their conclusions are themselves a 
sign of the times, and it is not at all clear that they know it. 
 
   Perhaps what we have here then, in this book’s interpretative aspects at least, 
is the presentation of a theory which is regarded by its authors as scientifically 
self-evident, but without taking the trouble to find enough supportive evidence 
to make their case in a way that has empirical validation in its favour. It is 
                                           
528 op. cit., p.303, where Platonic forms of Christian thought in particular are alleged to be a force for holding 
back progress in materialistic modes of thought by insisting of the primary importance of the doctrine of the 
immortality of the soul. 
529 Mark Freeman, “A Case of Theory: Abby, Brittany and Us”. 
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   We have looked at the book The Rise and Fall of Soul and Self, which, like 
Turner’s Theology, Psychology and the Plural Self suggests that we have to be very 
careful not to make assumptions about the unitary self, because when examined 
more closely, the idea of the self as unified diachronically and synchronically 
appears more arbitrary than was once thought to be the case. This in turn may 
help us to see, in our quest for understanding of addiction, how it comes about 
that human beings can both desire the use of substance such as alcohol to excess 
and at the same time wish for abstinence.  
 
3.3 Charles Taylor: Sources of the Self 
 
Introduction 
   Charles Taylor presents an account of how western thinkers from classical 
times onwards have understood human personality and the ways in which they 
prepared the way for the ‘modern identity’. His thematic survey includes many 
giants of Western thought who have addressed the ‘self’, from Plato, via Aristotle 
and the Stoics, by way of Augustine, Descartes and Enlightenment figures such 
as Immanuel Kant, up to present day interpreters  such as Sigmund Freud, Karl 
Marx, Alasdair MacIntyre, Iris Murdoch, and  writers from the world of modern 
fiction such as Marcel Proust. 
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   Taylor is particularly concerned with the ethical implications of what he is 
addressing in terms of the search for the meaning of ‘self’: as he says in his 
preface530 (emphasis added): 
I focus on three major facets of [modern] identity: first, modern 
inwardness, the sense of ourselves as beings with inner depths, and the 
connected notion that we are ‘selves’; second, the affirmation of ordinary 
life which develops from the early modern period; third, the expressivist 
notion of nature as an inner moral source. 
 
   He chronicles a moral dimension to the modern understanding of the self, 
‘from its origin in the late eighteenth century through the transformations of the 
nineteenth century, and on to its manifestations in twentieth-century 
literature’531. For him some modern concepts of liberal ethical thinking, such as 
that enshrined in utilitarian ideas532, are problematic for Taylor as they seem to 
him to rest on an inadequate philosophical infrastructure. 
                       On human personality, which he speaks of as ‘identity’, Taylor addresses the 
                  important question “Who am I?” Speaking from a communitarian viewpoint on  
                  morality, he says that:  
                                 ‘My identity is defined by the commitments and identifications  
                                  which provide the frame or horizon within which I can try to  
                                 determine from case to case what is good, or valuable, or what  
                                 ought to be done, or what I endorse or oppose533’.  
 
                     When such identity is lost, he continues, the individual is unable to make an 
assessment of the ‘significance of things’534. This significance is not to be found 
in what he calls the exercise of ‘disengaged reason’, a theme that Taylor addresses 
in this book, and has commented further on recently535. It is an important 
concept in terms of this thesis and its connection between human desires and 
                                           
530 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self, p. x. 
531 ibid. 
532 He comments for example that what made many people dissatisfied with the utilitarian principles of 
morality was the difficulty in regarding without incredulity ‘the picture of a world in which virtue and self-
interest came so neatly together’ – Taylor, op. cit., p.322. 
533 Taylor, Sources of the Self, p.27. 
534 ibid. 
535 See: Faith Rationality and the Passions, ed. Sarah Coakley, pp.18ff. 
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addiction, with emphasis on the inner quest for an experience of God. Taylor 
opposes the view that reason, free of passion, is the only true gauge of the good 
life, or ethical decision making, because in his view the way we interpret our lives 
and their meaning is made up of both reason and emotion, and that they are 
inseparable536. And from the point of view of this thesis, we are here entering 
again the field of ideas in which human desire, and the education or re-education 
of desire, is an important motivator. Reason unaided will not help people to 
conquer addictions; a reordering of priorities on the basis of a deeper longing 
might potentially be more effective. 
   A hermeneutical key for understanding the book in its breadth and complexity 
of argument can be found in Taylor’s assertion that the moral or spiritual order 
of things must come to us indexed to a personal vision 537. 
   Against the ideas of naturalism, and in contrast to approaches drawing from 
Enlightenment thinking about the relationship between ethics and selfhood, 
Taylor refuses to see modern fragmentation of religious ideas about ethics as a 
reason for rejecting subjective viewpoints about the nature of the good: instead 
he introduces a new concept into the debate about ethics, namely ‘identity’.  
   It is in the quest for identity that Taylor invokes one of his most powerful 
themes, that of the ‘affirmation of ordinary life’, which he regards as a highly 
significant aspect of the creation of ‘modern identity’.  
   On this basis, questions about what constitutes the ‘good’ have a context 
within the person and her place within a social, professional, national 
environment, and within the experience of belonging to a particular family with 
its own norms and practices. This environmental experience is irreducible: it 
                                           
536 op. cit., p.21. 
537 Taylor, Sources of the Self, p.428. 
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cannot simply be set aside as an irrelevance in discussing how people come to 
make distinctions between what is good and what is not. 
   Is there then to be found an objective good which, in his words constitutes 
something ‘the love of which empowers us to do and be good’538? 
   For Taylor Immanuel Kant is perhaps the name most associated with the 
intellectual movement known as the Enlightenment, which emphasized in a 
radically new way ‘its emphasis on the ability of human reason to penetrate the 
mysteries of the world. Humanity is able to think for itself, without the need for 
any assistance from God. Unaided reason is able to make sense of the world – 
including those aspects of that world traditionally reserved for theologians’539. 
Kant, like Rousseau, rebelled, Taylor notes, ‘against standard Deism along the 
lines of the anti-levelling objection. Enlightenment naturalism and utilitarianism 
make things worse, in his view540’. Kant claims that they effectively rule out any 
kind of intelligible ethical discourse, and thus they are ranged against human 
freedom, as freedom requires a moral framework ‘dictated by the very nature of 
reason itself’541. And this moral framework is not teleological or consequentialist 
in essence. Its true motivation has to do only with the driving force behind moral 
actions, independently of their actual outcome542. 
This Enlightenment movement, Taylor argues, has done much to create the 
modern identity: although it has some good contributions to make, Taylor argues 
that Kant’s moral edifice is weakened by its rejection of naturalistic or revelatory 
aspects in favour of human dignity as a function of rationality alone. 
      In this context the concept of the ordinary life has force for Taylor, and he 
draws the attention of the reader to thinkers like Hutcheson who have 
                                           
538 Taylor, op. cit., p.93. 
539 Alister McGrath, Christian Theology: an Introduction, 5th edition, p.67. 




emphasized the importance of the experience of people in living their lives as 
the true means of expressing identity against those (going back to Descartes) 
who suggest that reason, quite distinct from the natural world, can give us the 
meaning of what human nature is really about543. And for Hutcheson, as earlier 
for Locke, the clue to this ethical model was a sense of the world as an 
interlocking system, designed by God, in which benevolence is a God given 
instinct which in itself produces, through engagement with it, the greatest 
happiness – a theme which would be taken on, but in a less theologically founded 
manner, by the Utilitarians. 
   This book is a rich source of information about, and critical commentary on, 
the process by which humanity over many centuries learned what it means to be 
a person and how persons ought to behave. He is highly critical of post 
Enlightenment views of these things: such a view leads, he suggests, to two 
particular unfortunate trends, that towards instrumentalist ideas about attitudes 
to the world on the one hand, and liberal individualistic interpretations on the 
other, neither of which, he suggests, claim to refer to deeper, more universal 
human ‘goods’. 
   In place of such developments, he would argue in favour of an inward, 
reflexive turn, in relation to which humans approach moral issues by what he 
calls indexing to a personal vision544: 
But something has undoubtedly changed since the era of the great chain 
of being and the publicly established order of references. I have tried to 
express this by saying that the metaphysics or theology comes indexed to 
a personal vision, or refracted through a particular sensibility. 
 
   This vision he finds articulated in many ways in contemporary society but 
especially in the world of poetry, particularly that of outstanding contributors to 
that art form in the twentieth century such as T.S Eliot and Ezra Pound. It also 
                                           
543 On Hutcheson, see pp. 248-285. 
544 Taylor, op. cit., p.491. 
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occurs in other modern literary endeavours, as in the series of novels by Marcel 
Proust, A la Recherche du Temps Perdu. The enduring value of such great authors 
is that they provide us, in a public sense rather than a merely subjective one, with 
‘an articulation of personal vision’545. 
   In his final chapter, Taylor suggests a new model that will overcome the 
instrumentalism and consequent fragmentation of modern liberal Western 
society. What is needed, he suggests, is a return to the pattern of living that is 
embedded in the Judeo Christian theological and ethical formulations that were 
rejected by the great thinkers of the Enlightenment period. He argues that the 
Judeo Christian tradition, with its emphasis on divine agapē and the instantiation 
of this quality in human life, far from having been disproved or proved obsolete, 
is one of the principal ways in which the post Enlightenment relativization of 
human values could be overturned and replaced by something of greater depth 
and potentially universal application. Taylor concludes his work by rejecting 
purely subjective, rational, instrumentalist views of the good life and arguing that 
there is hope for the future of humanity. ‘It is a hope that I see implicit in Judeo-
Christian theism (however terrible the record of its adherents in history), and in 
its central promise of a divine affirmation of the human, more total than humans 
can ever attain’546.  
Critical Reflection On Charles Taylor, Sources Of The Self 
   Having looked at some section headings in Taylor’s book it is time to make 
some critical comments about the work and how it might connect with the 
overall purpose of this thesis, namely to derive from this and other books that 
have been consulted a better understanding of the origins of addiction. 
                                           
545 op. cit. p.492. 
546 Taylor, Sources of the Self, p.521. 
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   The first, and in some ways most significant criticism to be offered here, relates 
more substantially to what has just been mentioned about Taylor’s introduction 
of  religious ideas, particularly those related to the ethics of the Judeo Christian 
tradition, into his prescriptive vision for modern society. The intention here is 
not to deny this possibility or criticise Taylor for introducing it; in fact the 
intention is exactly the opposite. 
   What is being suggested here is that from an ‘architectural’ point of view, the 
section on possible remedies for the regrettable situation we seem to be in with 
our contemporary understanding of morality, is far too elliptical, and needs more 
emphasis. An analogy might be that it is as if he has written a very long overture 
to a rather short opera. 
   Secondly, what does Taylor actually means by ‘self’?  We may question 
whether, when for example he uses the language of ‘indexation’ of ethical views 
in terms of the inward turn to the person, he is being too neglectful of arguments 
against the unity of the person. Whereas this approach might be attractive to 
theologians, for example, it has largely passed out of use in the psychological 
literature about personhood547. Which of these personalities then is the one that 
is at the heart of this reflection about values and morals? Taylor tends to neglect 
problems about the concept of the unitary self548. In our search for meaning in 
terms of addictive behaviours, this question of the unitary self is highly 
important, because often addicted people have competing personality 
components: some aspects of their being want to be free of substance or 
behaviours that can enslave the individual, while other parts of the self seem to 
be at times utterly dependent on them. We are reminded of Paul’s anguished cry 
in Romans 7, and his longing to be freed of the conflict of will that it entails. 
                                           
547 This argument was advanced in our discussion of Turner’s book Theology, Psychology and the Plural Self. 
548 See Taylor, op. cit. p. 463, 480. 
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What is of interest here is the ways in which these conflicting elements of the 
self operate, and how the disconnect between the two can be resolved. Taylor 
does not deal adequately with this problem. 
   ‘New model’ thinking acknowledges the idea of conflict within each person, 
and offers, as we shall observe, a way out of the problem in relation to addiction 








   Having looked at the self, we now turn to desire as an aspect of selfhood. How 
is desire best understood both psychologically and theologically? 
 
The Appetites Of Animals 
   It is probably true to say that desire is ‘hard wired’ into animal nature. Animals 
know the instinctive force of desire, for food, drink, reproduction or the 
company of other living beings, principally though not necessarily exclusively of 
their own species. Desire for nourishment or reproduction is embedded in the 
need to survive, either as an individual or as a species. 
   Human desire or appetite goes back a long way in the history of thought, 
finding expression, for example in the work Heraclitus and Plato. In the 
Symposium Plato argues, via a conversation between Diotima and Socrates, that 
in line with Heraclitus’ philosophy of ‘flux’, all things, including ‘traits, habits, 
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opinions, desires, pleasures, pains fears – none of these things is ever the same 
in any individual, but some are coming into existence, others passing away’549. 
   There is probably only one species that also experiences a desire for spiritual 
experiences: that is the human species. That is not to restrict the understanding 
or terminology within which such spiritual desire could be housed to a particular 
religious affiliation, Jewish, Christian, Muslim, or any other: it does not require 
that the spiritually aware person professes belief in a creator-God, as we know 
from the doctrines of Buddhism. Together with physical appetites, spiritual 
desire and longing also demonstrably exists - and only human beings are 
undeniably in touch with this dimension of living. How can we explain human 
desires, physiological, social and spiritual, and how can such understanding help 
us to find a more satisfactory theory of addiction than those critiqued previously 
in this thesis? We will now explore the nature of addiction with the ideas we 
have been looking at about human desire as the focal background to this task. 
   One way into this might begin by suggesting that addiction is a ‘problem’550, 
whether we interpret this problem as that of the individual or society as a whole, 
or whether we look at it from a physical, psychological, sociological, economic 
or even spiritual point of view in the first instance. 
   There is however an alternative and potentially more helpful way into the study 
of addiction as we have been suggesting. This is the new model proposed in this 
thesis. This new ‘road map’ for the study of addiction starts not with addiction 
as a problem, but by looking at the whole concept of human desire, appetite and 
aspirations, and discovering thereby much that is at least neutral in its effect and 
can often be creative. Alcohol – to give one particularly relevant example – can 
be enjoyed as an accompaniment to a meal, taken either alone or with others; 
                                           
549 Plato, Symposium, quoted in Martin and Barresi, The Rise and Fall of Soul and Self, p.12. 
550 The surveys of psychological analysis of addiction and religious writing as discussed in the earlier party of 
this thesis all proceed in this manner. 
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but it can also be enjoyed as a way of increasing the pleasure of socialisation, as 
is evidenced in the works of some great writers of the past, such as Plato551 and 
Eubalus552. The description of the enjoyment of feasting with good food and 
wine and intellectually stimulating conversation perhaps reached its highest 
literary expression in Plato’s Symposium. That is not to ignore the often 
catastrophic effects when alcohol is taken in excess. But it re-orients the 
discussion of desire by beginning with the positive – ‘God saw all that he had 
made, and behold, it was very good’553. 
   It seems to the author of this thesis that this positive understanding of desire 
and the ways in which human beings seek to satisfy their desire is a vital 
component in the task of making sense of addiction to ingestible substances or 
processes. It will therefore be argued that the inadequacies of the addiction 
theories – both psychological and theological – that we recognised earlier can be 
overcome by restructuring the conversation, beginning not with pathology but 
with the positive desires, appetites and aspirations which actually motivate 
human beings. We can then move beyond that to see what distorts or 
exaggerates this longing so that it often becomes a problem for individuals and 
societies. 
   We have looked at the various aspects of addiction from two disciplinary 
points of view, the psychological and the theological, consecutively. We will 
continue by investigating the concept of human desire from the same two 
perspectives. 
                                           
551 The practice of coming together in groups for banqueting and conversation in classical Greece is well 
known (see, for example, The Symposium, mentioned earlier). In this work, as R.H.S Crossman observes, we 
find that ‘Plato was convinced that love is the basis of true philosophy’. See: R.H.S Crossman, Plato Today, 
p.121. 
552 See Eubalus, who recommends a maximum of four cups of wine at each meeting, lest the consumption of 
greater quantities may lead to ‘hubris, uproar, prancing about, black eyes, the arrival of the police, vomiting, 
insanity, and finally the hurling of furniture’, (fourth century BCE, cited in N Roberts, Working with Addiction 
Sufferers, a Handbook for Southwark Clergy, 2008, not in general circulation). 
 553 Genesis 1:31. 
 213 
 
    3.5 Understanding of desire: psychological viewpoint. 
   Modern psychology554 began with the revolution in thinking that occurred in 
1900 following the publication of Freud’s The Interpretation of Dreams555. That is 
not to suggest that there was no psychology before Freud’s time, but that his 
writing about the role of the unconscious, whether or not we accept his ideas 
today as he expressed them, constituted a revolution in how psychology would 
be understood from then onwards. At the heart of this revolution was the 
concept of motivation initiated by forces of which the individual is not 
consciously aware. 
 
3.5.1 Freudian approach 
   How does Freud understand human desire, longing, appetite? Freud 
uses a ‘conflict’ model of personality: intrapsychic conflicts between 
different parts of the mind, (super-ego, ego, and id) compete so that 
natural desires such as the sex drive are countered by the individual’s 
introjected attitudes based on prohibitions and taboos imposed by 
society556. Freud says that the prohibitions that society erects set limits to 
the ways in which human beings can actively express their appetites. There 
is nothing wrong with such desires in themselves; but society places a limit 
on how, for example, sexual desire and hostility to enemies or rivals may 
be expressed, otherwise ‘civilised’ (to use Freud’s own term557) society 
would not be possible. The unconscious repression of these desires 
                                           
 554 That is to say, the psychological understanding of the twentieth and twenty first centuries. 
 555 Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, Standard Edition, volumes 4 and 5. 
 556 On this process see: Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, Standard Edition, volume 2, p.144. 
Freud here deals with the ways in which civilised society has to place a check on the expression of human 
desire in terms of the libidinal and aggressive appetites. 
557 One of his most important books was entitled Civilization and its Discontents, Standard Edition, volume 21. 
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generates neuroses, according to this view, and it is these repressed desires 
and the ways in which they can be brought to the attention of the client 
that are the subject of classical psychoanalytic theory and psychotherapy. 
   Sigmund Freud thus originated the psychoanalytic understanding of 
human psychology, and his proposition of the sexual nature of the origins 
of human desire (the libido) is the key to this in Freud’s thought, in which 
appetite, particularly sexual appetite, is seen as a biologically driven 
function within the psyche. Desire, located in the ‘id’558 is fundamentally 
diffuse and uncontrolled until societies need regulation (of sexual 
activity/incest etc.). This is the origin of civilisation and the beginning of 
repression. Repression is the price we pay for living in a civilised society 
in which incest and murder are kept at bay through legal restraints and, 
where necessary, punishments. These arguments can be followed in detail 
in his writings, in Civilization and its Discontents, for example559. 
Psychoanalysis constitutes a form of ‘talking treatment’ which aims at the 
resolution of inner conflict by helping the client to rediscover the 
instinctive desires that have been driven in to the unconscious by societal 
restrictions, and to help him to redirect these energies into more socially 
acceptable patterns of behaviour in a process known as ‘sublimation’. 
   The post-Freudian psychoanalytic movement, and in particular the 
contribution of the Object Relations school of psychoanalytical theory 
represented by such writers as Melanie Klein, Ronald Fairbairn and 
Donald Winnicott has moved away from a biological, libido driven view 
                                           
558 That is to say, the part of the psyche that according to strict Freudian theory only responds to the 
‘pleasure-principle’ rather than acknowledging other principles such as the ‘reality-principle’: see Charles 
Rycroft, A Critical Dictionary of Psychoanalysis, p.66. There is thus, for example, no sense of moral obligation 
within the ‘id’. 
559 The discussion on pages 61 f. is particularly relevant here as Freud tries to make sense of the human 
experience of guilt, something that is not shared by other animals. One element of this, in Freud’s estimation, 
is that humans fear loss of love by people who are significant in their lives, and the guilt instinct helps to 
protect us against behaving in ways that would endanger this experience of being loved. 
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of human desire towards one that is more focussed on the need for 
intimacy and emotional fulfilment560. It is noteworthy in this context that 
in his book The Fix, Damian Thompson suggests that in substance 
dependent patterns of addictive behaviour the desire for such intimacy can 
become replaced by a ‘relationship’ with the substance in question. 
 
3.5.2 Carl Jung 
   How does Jung interpret desire? He emphasizes the spiritual content of 
desire in reaction against Freud’s ‘materialistic’ biological approach to it. 
Jung emphasizes different kinds of desire561 which can be ‘instinctual, 
compulsive, uninhibited, uncontrolled, greedy, irrational, sensual etc., or 
desire may be rational, considered, controlled, co-ordinated, adapted, 
ethical, reflective and so on’. He rejects the central governing hypothesis 
of Freudian psychology that all behaviour is driven by the libido. What 
then, essentially, is desire in Jungian thought? Having rejected the 
Freudian view that the libido, the expressly sexual element of appetite, is 
the powerful motivating force behind all human desire and behaviour, on 
a more positive note he cites the work of Cicero562 who proposes that ‘all 
men naturally pursue those things that seem good and shun their 
opposites. Wherefore, as soon as anything presents itself that seems good, 
nature herself impels them to obtain it’. This process can be limited, as in 
the case of Stoic philosophy by the influence of ‘moderation and 
prudence’, he continues, and this limitation is the definition of the what it 
means to be, in Stoic thought, a truly wise man. 
                                           
560 See Deborah van Deusen Hunsinger, Theology and Pastoral Counseling, pp.45-58.  
561 See Jung, Symbols of Transformation, p.84f.  
562 See Jung, op. cit., p.129f, quoting from Sallust, The War with Catiline, VII, pp.14-15. 
 216 
   We can see therefore that for Jung, desire and appetite are natural 
instincts, but they are far wider in scope than Freud had thought in 
promoting the notion that the libido alone is the motivator of action. He 
also links these ideas about the human tempestuous appetites such as lust 
for revenge with the work of St. Augustine563, whose spiritual 
understanding of desire we shall address later. 
    
3.5.3  Behaviourist models of desire 
   Behaviourism, an approach to psychology and psychotherapy associated 
with names like B.F. Skinner and H.J. Eysenck, challenges psychoanalytic 
concepts of desire and motivation based on the notion of the 
‘unconscious’. The form of therapy known today as Cognitive Behavioural 
Therapy developed from this approach to psychology – emphasising  
‘unlearning’ and ‘relearning’ at a cognitive, ‘educational’  level564. 
   It is within this body of behaviourist literature that the work of the 
Positive Psychology Movement belongs565. Its importance for the study of 
addiction is that unlike other forms of psychological interpretation of 
human distress and its treatment, positive psychology begins not by 
focussing on distress (questions of the ‘what went wrong?’ variety) but on 
questions of positive motivation. At its best, this positive psychology 
movement, with its origins in behavioural psychology, and working closely 
with such pioneering psychologists as A.T. Beck566, takes the view that 
                                           
 563 Jung, op. cit., p.130f.  
564 See, for example Stephen Briers’ book Brilliant Cognitive Therapy. This book explains his reasons for 
rejecting more psychoanalytic theories of the self, and treatments based on this model, in favour of a learning 
based model. 
565 There is a difference between positive thinking as instantiated by Norman Vincent Peale and positive 
psychology. Seligman observes that positive psychology depends on ‘a balance sheet, and in spite of the many 
advantages of positive thinking, there are times when negative thinking is to be preferred…Positive 
psychology aims for the optimal balance between positive and negative thinking’: See Seligman, Authentic 
Happiness, p.288, note 96. 
566 See, for example, A.T. Beck, A.J. Rush et al., Cognitive Therapy of Depression. 
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psychological intervention can fail when it emphasizes the uncovering of 
the past with its traumas and miseries, rather than emphasizing the 
opportunities that the client may currently have, maybe in a form that he 
or she does not yet recognise, to enhance ability and performance in many 
areas of life567. 
   How might this positive approach to human psychology relate to our 
quest for a better understanding of addiction? 
   Martin Seligman568 explains his understanding of addiction by referring 
to experiments on rats, which were induced by electrical stimulation to 
prefer this stimulation to ‘food, sex, and even to life itself’569 – they became 
addicted to the sensation. 
   Seligman addresses the difference between addictive pleasure in its most 
simple, physiological form, which can, in his terms, be a matter of 
‘habituation’, as in the case of his non-human subjects on the one hand, 
and on the other, the genuine and persistent experience of ‘savoring’ 
experiences in a way that is consciously present to the individual as a willed 
and genuinely enjoyed experience that does not depend for its potency on 
craving. Thus there is a vast difference between the experience of drinking 
wine in order to enjoy the wine itself or as a positive aid to socialisation, 
and its use to self-medicate or to become deliberately intoxicated. 
   Having raised the topic of addictive behaviour Seligman continues by 
proposing a way of viewing experiences that have the potential to cause 
harm in a more positive light when they are seen as part of a programme 
of what – in Buddhist thought for example – would be named 
                                           
567 In fact Seligman goes so far as to suggest that in some cases psychodynamic intervention may be 
detrimental to the individual who is suffering from depression, resulting in extreme cases in attempted or 
actual suicide. See: Seligman, Authentic Happiness, p.69. 
568 op. cit., p.105f. 
569 ibid. 
 218 
‘mindfulness’. He cites Bryant and Veroff570 in this context as pioneers of 
this way of perceiving what he calls ‘the awareness of pleasure and of the 
deliberate conscious attention to the experience of pleasure’571. 
   It is this deconstruction of the concept of pleasure, and the 
establishment of a positive psychology of pleasure that concerns Seligman 
in this chapter of his book, in terms of his investigation of what brings 
happiness. The categories that have most traction for him are those of 
‘savoring’ experiences, such as mountain climbing or reading letters from 
one’s children, mindfulness, (contrasted with mindlessness, which he 
believes pervades much human activity), and gratifications which go 
beyond the mere experience of fleeting pleasures. 
   Since Seligman wrote his guide to authentic happiness, many other 
books mention and build on his ideas, notably the excellent overview of 
positive psychology by Alan Carr572. In terms of our pursuit of analogies 
between secular (psychological) and theological frames of reference within 
which addiction may be understood most comprehensively, it is 
noteworthy that Carr includes in his major work several references to 
religious and spiritual elements in humanity’s search for happiness. 
   Current treatment forms for psychological disorders (such as 
alcoholism) are often of the type known as Cognitive Behavioural Therapy 
which is a derivative of behaviourism573. As a move away from 
psychoanalysis, towards an educational model, Aaron T Beck established 
this form of treatment of depression from the time of his book Cognitive 
                                           
570 Seligman, Authentic Happiness, p.107. Fred B. Bryant and Joseph Veroff’s book (at the time unpublished: it 
was in fact published in 2006) entitled Savoring: A process model for positive psychology stands in Seligman’s view 
alongside Bryant’s article “A four factor model of perceived control”. 
571 Seligman, op. cit., p.107. 
572 Alan Carr, Positive Psychology: the Science of Happiness and Human Strengths, 2nd edition. 
573 See, for example, Stephen Briers, Brilliant Cognitive Behavioural Therapy.  
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Therapy of Depression in 1979574. And CBT is used now particularly in alcohol 
treatment centres. Its focus is on positive ideas about the self, which we 
welcome because it seeks to uncover people’s positive desires and 
motivations by helping them to make different and arguably more realistic 
sense of the meaning of their life and relationships. 
   It may however be argued against this form of treatment that although 
it offers some success in terms of short term relief, it may be inadequate 
in the sense that it concentrates on relatively superficial symptom relief 
rather than looking for deeper psychological meanings in the addictive 
behaviour. That criticism is supported by the author of this thesis both at 
a theoretical level and in relation to his experience as a working therapist. 
 
3.6 Theological theories of desire 
 
Introduction 
   We have used at various points in this thesis the assertion of Augustine that 
we are made for God, and that are hearts are restless until we find God. 
   Is there a universal awareness of or desire for God?  Léon Turner explores in 
his article “Psychological Innateness & Representations of God575” the 
contention that all human beings have an awareness of God ‘built in’. Turner is 
reluctant to claim too much for the assertion that religiosity is innate, but he 
suggests that ‘the formation of God-concepts may be an inevitable feature of 
human cognitive development’576. This would link neatly with Augustine’s claim 
                                           
574 A. T. Beck, A.J. Rush, B.F. Shaw, and G. Emery, Cognitive Therapy of Depression. 
575 Léon Turner, “Psychological Innateness & Representations of God”. These ideas are also explored by 
Fraser Watts: see, F. Watts, Theology and Psychology, p.90, where he explores the question of universality of 
religious experience, and concludes that there are important ‘common elements’ and ‘diversities’ in religious  
 experience between different religious traditions worldwide.  
 576 Turner, op. cit., p.98 
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that we are ultimately ‘made’ for God, i.e. to have a relationship with God. And 
earlier writers than Turner, such as ‘God’s Biologist’, Sir Alister Hardy, began 
working on this theory in the 1940’s577. In 1979 Hardy produced what is perhaps 
his most comprehensive survey of the spiritual aspects of human living in his 
book The Spiritual Nature of Man578. 
   Christian theology investigates the concept of human desire for God, but 
warns of a certain moral ambiguity and thus need for circumspection in its use 
in theological discourse. As Nicholas Lash observes, ‘Desire is just as dangerous 
and, often, as destructive as are the surrogates of sight in glibness and illusion. 
Hence, once again, the need for pedagogies of discrimination, cultures of 
ascesis’579. But in order to begin our approach to the positive elements of desire 
in human living, and relate it to the question of addictive behaviours, we need 
to set the scene in more detail by relating it to two of the theological giants of 
the New Testament and Patristic eras, Saint Paul and Saint Augustine of Hippo. 
 
3.6.1 The Theology of Paul the Apostle in relation to Human Desire 
   In order to ground the theological concept of desire, and consider the 
part it has to play in our understanding of addiction, we will go to Saint 
Paul, who has much to say about human desire, and how desire can be 
properly housed within the life of the Christian Churches. At the heart of 
the Gospel he presents there is a strong emphasis on the freedom of the 
human being to choose her actions: Paul is concerned however that 
freedom must not be mistaken for what might be termed ‘licence’ – 
freedom to do exactly as we please. Much of his epistolary effort has the 
aim of promoting unity in the Church, and, as his hymn to ‘charity’ in I 
                                           
577 This refers to the recent biography of Hardy: David Hay, God’s Biologist.   
578 Alister Hardy, The Spiritual Nature of Man. 
579 Nicholas Lash, The Beginning and End of Religion, p.211. 
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Corinthians 13 makes clear, mutual concern among the Christian 
congregation is highly important, and takes precedence over individual 
judgement as in the requirement not to behave in ways that cause 
stumbling blocks to what he described as the more vulnerable members580. 
   The words ‘desire’, ‘freedom’ and ‘grace’ are important in this context, 
and we shall now explore them in relation to the argument being presented 
in this part of the thesis. These words lie at the heart of Paul’s theology of 
desire and its ambiguities on the one hand, and the divine intervention - 
God’s grace - which alone can ‘order the unruly wills and affections of 
sinful men’ on the other, because human effort unaided is powerless to 
achieve the life that is line with God’s will. 
   Paul acknowledges the power of human desire for food, wine, and 
intimacy. He sees these as good but needing to be ordered according to 
Christian principles, especially in areas of sexual morality. He also 
acknowledges the existence of conflict here in that ‘the good I would I do 
not; the evil I would not, that I do…581’. Appetite can be divided between 
different and competing wishes or desires. There are issues of biblical 
theological interpretation here582 but this epistolary writing suggests a 
problem which all have to address in terms of, for example, protection of 
‘weaker brethren’ as a counterbalance to the gospel of freedom in the 
Spirit (food offered to idols etc.). We will now look in greater detail at 
Paul’s theology in relation to human desire. 
 
The Meanings Of The Words To Be Considered 
                                           
580 See, for example, his concern that the freedom to eat meat formerly offered to idols might cause offence 
or a stumbling block to some. Paul pursues this argument in I Corinthians 8:1-13. 
 581 See Romans 7:15-25. 
 582 see C. C. H. Cook in his book Alcohol , Addiction and Christian Ethics on this,  
      as discussed in detail earlier in relation to alcohol dependency. 
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   We will now examine the meaning of some key words in Pauline 
theology that are related to our concern with 1) desire and 2) freedom. 
 
1) Desire 
The word group to be investigated here is based on the Greek noun 
epithumia which may be translated as ‘desire’, a word that is in itself 
essentially neutral, in a moral sense, although it acquires a certain 
pejorative connotation in both Hellenistic (especially Stoic) thought 
and (generally speaking) in the New Testament, though not 
normally in the Hebrew scriptures as represented by the Septuagint. 
   Perhaps the most important exception to this generally negative 
sense of the word desire as found in the New Testament is the 
saying of Jesus at the Last Supper (see Luke 22:15) in which he 
declares that it is with desire (Greek: epithumiā with ‘iota subscript’ 
indicating the dative case, used instrumentally) that he has desired 
to eat this Passover with the disciples before his time of suffering. 
 
The Background To Epithumia In NT 
   In its verbal form, this concept of desire is found seven times in 
the synoptic gospels (especially Luke) and Acts. It occurs also in 
Paul’s letters (four times) and once each in I Timothy, Hebrews, 
James, I Peter and Revelation. As a noun, its thirty four appearances 
are mainly to be found in the letters, plus one example of each in 
Mark, Luke, John and Acts. There are ten examples of the use of 
the word in Paul’s seven authentic letters (five of them in Romans) 
and nine in the secondary Pauline literature. 
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Derivation Of The Word Epithumia 
   The Greek noun thumos underlies epithumia. Its meaning is given 
by the lexicons as ‘spirit’, ‘courage’, or ‘wrath’. It therefore suggests 
passionate desire (this would certainly fit its use by Jesus in Luke 22, 
noted earlier). 
   Its use in the scriptures can be morally neutral, as in Genesis 31:30, 
positive (Luke 22:15) or in connection with evil intentions (Romans 
7:7 etc.). Desire is thus a highly ambiguous concept in biblical 
theology. 
   Taking a positive view of the word, the Septuagint provides a 
number of occurrences in connection with human need. Genesis 
30:31 talks about Jacob’s longing for his father’s house; 
Deuteronomy 14:26 of the provision for whatever kind of food and 
drink (including wine and ‘strong drink’) the people need in their 
new life of freedom after their time of slavery in Egypt. 
   Paul however mostly uses epithumia in its negative sense to express 
the immoral aspects of desire (though not in Philippians 1:23 and I 
Thessalonians 2:17583). It is noteworthy despite this generally 
negative tone that when he wishes to speak of desire in a positive 
sense, he normally uses a different word, based on the verb epipotheo, 
to distinguish evil desires from good ones. The use of epipotheo 
occurs at Romans 1:11, II Corinthians 9:14; Philippians 1:8, 2:26 
etc., expressing ‘longing’ in an entirely favourable way.  
 
                                           
583 Philippians 1:23 is the place where Paul contrasts his longing to die and be with Christ on the one hand 
and his recognition on the other hand that it is beneficial for him to remain alive in order to be of service to 
the Church. In this context Paul chooses the word epithumian to designate his desire to be with Christ. In I 




   When Paul addresses human freedom he has to consider the 
danger that those who believe themselves to be liberated from 
following the Torah, basing their faith and lifestyle instead on the 
promptings of the Holy Spirit, may fall into the opposite trap of 
becoming ‘antinomians’, people who regard any kind of desire or 
behaviour as acceptable for the Christian man or woman once 
‘Law’584, both ritual and moral, has been shown to be ineffective in 
leading, of itself, to salvation. 
   Law also has for Paul a negative contribution to make in terms of 
the central feature of this study, i.e. human appetites. For as Paul 
observes more than once, it is Law that paradoxically encourages 
human sinfulness, by creating as it were a catalogue of requirements 
against which it is natural for human beings to rebel. This is brought 
into focus powerfully in passages such as Romans 5:20 and 7:7-9. It 
is therefore our contention that Paul’s critique of the Law is based 
not only on its failure to achieve salvation through human effort at 
keeping it, but also on his awareness that Law in itself generates 
human disobedience to God by creating a series of commandments 
that human beings tend to rebel against: remove those 
commandments, or reduce them to a minimal place of importance, 
and that temptation is diminished or removed. This is an extremely 
realistic and compassionate view of what human beings are like, 
                                           
 584 The Hebrew word ‘Torah’, which is often translated as ‘Law’ is best understood as both ‘defining    
       sin’, as catalysing faith, and its social function in terms of community discipline, alongside its  
       ambiguous role of ‘bringing sin in to consciousness’. See J. D. G. Dunn, The Theology of Paul the  
      Apostle, pp.719ff. 
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although it would perhaps be more within the expertise of a 
psychologist than a theologian to explain the human tendency 
towards the desire that is embedded in ethical rebelliousness. E. 
Erikson585 is perhaps helpful in this context when writing on stage 
based conflicts, especially in relation to adolescence. At all events, 
this interpretation of Paul’s negative view of the Law will be of great 
importance in our attempt to assess desire, motivation and choice 
from a theological perspective. 
   We now focus on interpretation of Paul’s views on the concept of 
freedom as expressed in his ‘Hauptbriefe’ letters, i.e. Romans, 
Galatians, and I and II Corinthians. 
 
The Background To Paul’s Theology Of Freedom 
   What does Paul mean us to understand when he speaks of the 
Christian’s freedom of action? And - perhaps even more pertinently 
in relation to our overall topic - what does he not mean? The Greek 
word for freedom as a concept in the New Testament is eleutheria. 
The verb eleutheroo in its verbal form is found seven times in the New 
Testament. Five of those occurrences are in Paul, and two in the 
Gospel of John. In its substantive form, eleutheria, it occurs eleven 
times, with seven appearances in Paul: other instances are in James 
(twice) and once each in I and II Peter. The verbal adjective eleutheros 
occurs twenty three times, and of these, fourteen examples come in 
Paul’s undisputed letters: two further instances appear in Ephesians 
and Colossians. 
                                           
585 E Erikson, Identity and the Life Cycle,  and exposition of this in terms of Christian ministry in  Fraser Watts, 
Rebecca Nye and Sara Savage, Psychology for Christian Ministry, pp. 106-108. 
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   There is one example (albeit highly significant) of the word 
apeleutheros denoting someone having been set free: this is in I 
Corinthians 7:22. 
   From the preceding survey, which has as yet offered no 
interpretation of the passages where these words occur, the most 
striking fact is that in all cases, verbal, nominal and adjectival,  the 
most numerous examples of the word eleutheria and its cognates are 
found in the letters of Paul: in other New Testament writings they 
are comparatively rare. We therefore seem to be dealing with a range 
of expressions that are peculiarly Pauline in their subject matter. 
 
The Background In The Septuagint 
   In the Hebrew Scriptures as represented by the Septuagint the 
word eleutheria is used in a number of senses, such as: 
In the context of slavery (e.g. Exodus 21:2, 5:27;  
Leviticus 19:20; Deuteronomy 15:12) 
 
Referring to prisoners of war (Deuteronomy 21:14) In 
relation to exemption from obligations (I Samuel 17:25). 
 
   This last example is of particular interest because, as the NIDNT 
observes586, the people were in general terms not freemen but 
essentially slaves of the king. I Kings 21:8,11 and I Samuel 8:10-18 
suggest this. In this constitutional setting, ‘only a few privileged men 
stood out as free’587. 
   Nevertheless, in a more ultimate sense, people do have a freedom, 
not through their birthright but as a gift of God, which can however 
be taken away because of their rebellion, as in the examples of II 
                                           
586 New International Dictionary of the New Testament, p. 718  
 587 ibid. 
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Kings 17:7-23 and the Babylonian captivity (see II Kings 21:10-15, 
22:19f, 23:25ff.). 
   What then is the meaning of ‘freedom’ for Paul? 
   One important factor in determining this meaning must, as the 
lexicons consulted emphasize, be the overarching conceptual focus 
provided by the eschatological factor in the New Testament in 
general, and in particular in the thought of Paul, because of the 
centrality of the ‘Christ event’. Because of this eschatological factor, 
the churches for which he had responsibility had a sense of living in 
an interim period, a time characterised by awaiting an event that was 
yet to take place. They were to be awake and alert in their 
expectation of this event (Romans 13:11ff). The event in question 
was the Parousia, the return of the exalted Christ as Lord in the fullest 
cosmic sense. Their worship was therefore characterised by 
expectancy, which remained a factor throughout the New 
Testament period, despite the change of horizon implied in the later 
writings which, unlike those of Paul, set out terms and conditions 
of church management alongside ethical and liturgical 
considerations for an indeterminate future: the work of W.G. 
Kümmel588 on the contrast between Paul and John is relevant in this 
respect. 
   The freedom that Paul writes about can only be understood in 
terms of that expectation, even though it is unlikely that Paul himself 
had any clear view as to when the Parousia was likely to take place. 
Freedom is limited by that expectation – that is why he concerns 
                                           
588 W.G. Kümmel, Theology of the New Testament, p.329 
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himself (especially in I Corinthians) with the recognition that 
although it is perfectly acceptable, for example, for slaves to seek 
their liberty, (see I Cor. 7, especially verses 21-22, 26, 29) there is no 
need to demand this ‘freedom’ because the end of historical time is 
approaching, and then everything will change. It is important to 
keep this example in mind because, as will be demonstrated later, 
the idea of the release – the freeing – of slaves has an important role 
to play in the interpretation of the biblical concept of freedom. 
   In origin, the word eleutheros denotes one who belongs to a 
particular group or nation with the full rights of citizenship of that 
group. This condition of belonging is to be seen in contrast with 
others in that group who do not share those rights, that is to say, 
aliens, non-citizens, members of conquered populations and slaves. 
In its Greek form, the word later acquires more philosophical 
overtones, in relation to human freedom.  Stoic philosophy, and the 
possibility of some cross-fertilisation between this and the theology 
of Paul, may perhaps be relevant in this context589. 
   In Paul’s writing, there is a recurrent contrast between freedom 
and its opposite in terms of the polarity between the freeman and 
the slave (see: I Corinthians 7:21, 12:13; Galatians 3:28, 4:22; 
Ephesians 6:8; Colossians 3:11; and cf. also Revelation 6:15, 13:16 
and 19:18 for non-Pauline examples). 
   There is in this context a paradoxical reversal made explicit in 
Paul’s thought: one who has been ‘set free’ by Christ becomes his 
slave – the apeleutheros Kyriou becomes the Doulos Christou (see 
                                           
589 See: J.N. Sevenster: Paul and Seneca. 
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especially I Cor 7:22 as an example of this play on words). This is 
part of what was alluded to earlier in terms of the eschatological 
character of the nature of freedom as understood by Paul: it is a 
calling into a new relationship with God through Christ, which will, 
as we shall see, have implications, among other things, for the ethical 
behaviour of the baptised Christian. 
 
The Love Command 
   As noted above, the new style of living that is consistent with the 
eschatological calling to new life as a member of the Church has ethical 
implications590. Those who are liberated through faith in Christ are not 
thereby set free to live according to the promptings of desire without 
qualification; on the contrary, they are expected to balance this freedom 
by a willing fulfilment of the ethical demands of the Law, without falling 
back into a reliance on this obedience itself as a means to salvation – it 
might be better seen as a way of maintaining the wellbeing of the individual 
within his or her life as a member of the Church, a new form of 
‘covenantal nomism’ with the aim of maintaining the community. To 
uphold the Law in this particularly ethical sense therefore does not mean 
subservience to legalism (see Galatians 6:2; I Corinthians 9:21). 
   It is however an important element in Paul’s thought that human effort 
alone cannot achieve the kind of life that the Love Command enjoins on 
the Church members. Had such effort been adequate and achievable 
through observance of the Law alone, then the Christ event and all that it 
implies would be unnecessary. A new Church might have been formed, in 
                                           
 590 See: V.P. Furnish, The Love Command in the New Testament, pp.96-98 & 111-113. 
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which, as some still thought necessary, Gentiles would simply embrace the 
Jewish law in its ritual and ethical dimensions, and this would be enough. 
What Paul proposes is radically different from this: he treats the old Law 
as helpless in terms of achieving salvation. The key to this difference lies 
in grace, made available not through any human striving but simply 
through faith in the effectiveness of the work of Christ as the bringer of 
salvation to Jew and Gentile alike without any need for observance of the 
Law. 
   The study of Paul’s theology of grace is thus of high importance in 
establishing the driving force behind Paul’s thought on human nature, the 
choices people make – their desires, both noble and sinful, their freedom 
to behave as they choose, limited as we have seen591 by the ‘love 
command’, and the ways in which God provides a remedy when things go 
wrong in human dealings with one another and God. This point is made 
forcefully by Dunn592 who asserts that ‘No other word expresses his 
theology so clearly on this point593 as “grace” (charis)’.  
   From the point of view of linguistic analysis, this word has a wide and 
rich variety of uses in the Greek literature of the period. Arndt and 
Gingrich594 suggest three principal meanings of the verb charizomai, based 
on its appearance in a number of biblical and other contemporary religious 
writings595. 
   The first meaning (for example in Romans 8:32 and Philippians 2:9) 
refers to the act of giving freely, as a favour, gracious giving. It can be used 
                                           
591 Furnish in particular engages with the aspects of freedom that relate to mutual responsibility 
592 Theology of Paul the Apostle, p.319 f. 
593 That is to say, on the New Testament idea of salvation as interpreted by Paul 
594 Arndt and Gingrich. Greek English Lexicon p.1078ff. 
595 see, for example 3 Maccabees 5:11, Josephus (Antiquities) 3,87; 4,317; Romans 8:32; Philippians 
       Luke 7:42; 2:9; 2 Clement 1:4; Didache 10:3 etc. 
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in ‘civil’ speeches in praise of a generous benefactor who gives freely of 
his or her wealth or influence for the common good. In its Pauline, 
‘religious’, context it speaks of the God who can be relied on to provide 
all that is necessary to the Christian believer, because he has even given up 
his own Son on their behalf596, and the act of bestowing on Christ the 
‘name above all names’ 597 because he submitted himself in total obedience 
to God – even to the shedding of his own blood. 
   The second meaning given by Arndt and Gingrich598 is that of the 
cancellation of the debt of a sum of money that is agreed by the creditor. 
An example of this can be found in Luke 7:42 ff in the parable of the two 
debtors – perhaps better referred to as the parable of the forgiving 
creditor. 
   The third meaning given in the same place involves the act of pardoning 
a wrongdoer and thereby showing oneself to be behaving in a gracious 
manner.  This meaning occurs both in Jewish literature of the 
intertestamental period599, and the New Testament itself600. 
   There is a close relationship between grace and righteousness in Paul’s 
thought: grace, made available as a gift through the redeeming work of 
Christ, re-establishes the proper relationship, based on right or righteous 
behaviour, between God and humanity, which human beings are unable 
to achieve by their own efforts. This question of human effort introduces 
a vast subject in terms of the way in which Paul (who it will be 
remembered regarded himself as ‘impeccable’ in terms of his own personal 
keeping of Torah) approached the question before and after his 
                                           
 596 Romans 8:32 
 597 Philippians 2:9 
 598 Arndt & Gingrich op. cit. 
 599 see, for example Josephus, Antiquities 6,144 
 600 see, for example Colossians 2:13; II Corinthians 2:10, 12:13; Ephesians 4:32 
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conversion to Christianity. As Stephen Westerholm has pointed out with 
many illustrations,601 there is no reason to suppose that the ‘Jewish’ Paul 
had a negative or pessimistic view of human ability to keep the 
commandments – despite lapses into sinfulness – on the basis of his 
knowledge of the rabbinic writings, the views of biblical writers such as 
Tobit or Sirach, and the Maccabean Literature, and the evidence from the 
Qumran texts602. In other words, the decision whether or not to ‘hearken’ 
(with its suggestion of obedient listening603) is one that human beings are 
free to make, according to the mainstream Jewish theology with which 
Paul would have been intimately familiar. There are of course problems of 
dating with some of this writing, and yet it is hard to find texts of the 
relevant period that diminish this sense of human beings’ freedom and 
responsibility for their actions, rather than supposing them to be, so to 
speak, controlled by external, demonic forces, the forces often 
hypostasized by Paul under the name of sin. Human beings are able to 
keep the Law if they so choose, and this, says Westerholm, is the 
understanding that Paul had before his Damascus Road encounter with 
the risen Christ604. It was only after this momentous event that he changed 
his mind about human ability to live righteously by their own efforts, with 
a consequent need for an act of God to put things right. 
   There is then a sense, as more than one commentator has pointed out, 
that the step taken by God through the sacrifice of Jesus Christ is the key 
to understanding the plight in which humanity stood before the ‘Christ 
                                           
 601 Westerholm’s chapter “Paul’s Anthropological ‘Pessimism’ in its Jewish Context”, in Barclay and 
Gathercole, Divine and Human Agency. 
 602 extensive examples of each category are given by Westerholm, e.g. the Mekilta de-Rabbi  
 Ishmael; 4 Maccabees (1:1,3,5 etc.); 1QS II,11-17, V 10-13 etc. 
603 See Rabbi Vayassa I in the second volume of Lauterbach’s three volume work on rabbinical writings,   
quoted by Westerholm ad. loc. 
 604 Westerholm, op.cit. p.80. 
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event’. This plight, in Paul’s post-conversion phase, is linked to a new 
understanding of what Louis Martyn605 refers to as the third actor in the 
cosmic drama as seen by the Christian Paul – the quasi hypostasized 
character of Sin which inhibits human beings from making right decisions. 
   From a linguistic point of view, James Dunn links the word charis and its 
use in Paul’s writing not so much to the Hellenistic usages of charizomai 
and its cognate forms, as to the context of the word grace in the Jewish 
Scriptures. The key words here, as Dunn observes606, are the Hebrew 
terms chen, and chesed. Both words are used to indicate acts of gracious 
favour or kindness performed by one person to another. Both words 
suggest favour shown by someone in a superior position to someone of 
lower rank or importance: there is a difference of nuance however, in the 
sense that whereas chen has a more specific connotation – in the sense of 
being observed in relation to a clearly defined situation, and being in a 
sense conditional, chesed conveys more of a sense of equality in the 
relationship between the two parties. Dunn, quoting the Theological 
Dictionary Of The Old Testament (5.62-63) refers his readers to a number of 
passages which illustrate this argument particularly well – Exodus 34:6; 
Numbers 14:18; Nehemiah 9:17; Psalms 86:15 and 103:8. In each of these 
examples it is chesed that is used by the author. 
   What is of great significance in this respect is that the initiative lies at all 
times with God, not with human beings, and there is a recognition that 
there is nothing human beings can do in response to what God is freely 
offering that is any quantifiable way equal in value to what is being offered. 
 
                                           
 605 See Martyn in Barclay and Gathercole, Divine and Human Agency… chapter 10, p.175f. 
 606 Dunn, p.320 
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Biblical Contexts For Desire, Freedom And Grace In Paul’s Writings 
   The next part of this chapter looks at the passages in which these three 
key words appear in Paul’s writing and pays particular attention to the 
context in which they are to be found, both in the overall purpose of Paul’s 
theology, and in relation to his own theological and cultural 
environment607. Here again we will be looking for recurring and central 
themes in Paul’s thought. 
   We begin with some reflections on his use of the word group associated 
with freedom – eleutheria and its cognates. 
   A particularly good example of the nominal and verbal forms occurring 
in the same sentence is found in Galatians 1:5, in which Paul exhorts the 
congregation to ‘stand fast in the liberty (eleutheria in dative form with iota 
subscript) wherewith Christ has made us free, (eleutherose) and be not 
entangled again with the yoke of bondage’ (King James translation). This 
is a sentence that could be taken as a summary of the argument of 
Galatians as a whole, with its highly significant combination of an 
imperative based on an indicative – this is what Christ has done for us; 
therefore this is how we should conduct ourselves608. Of central 
importance for Paul in his polemical interface with the rebellious elements 
in the Galatian church is his insistence that the condition of being a Jew 
does not of itself promise or provide any route to salvation; anyone who 
submits to circumcision is required to observe the whole of the Law. What 
matters most to Paul here is his insistence that only a total re-orientation 
of a person’s spiritual allegiance to Christ as the bringer of salvation is 
valid, and the acceptance of this is equally necessary for Jew and Gentile 
                                           
 607 See: Barclay & Gathercole, Divine and Human Agency. 
 608 this is mentioned, for example, in Barclay’s introduction to Divine and Human Agency 
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alike. It is this radical re-alignment, rather than any previously held beliefs 
or practices, that is the sign and the significance of what freedom as a 
Christian man or woman really means, and as in Romans, this proposition 
is fundamental to Paul’s theology. 
   This line of thought is further worked through in Galatians in 5:13, 
where Paul engages with the possibility that his exhortation to live 
according to freedom might be misunderstood – seen, that is, as a radically 
libertarian principle. Paul refutes any such interpretation of his ideas, 
insisting that true liberty brings with it not a free-for-all ethical system, but, 
on the contrary, an entirely new ethic based not on the slavish fulfilment 
of rules or conventions but on the mutual responsibility that is at the heart 
of what is meant by love in its Christian sense. The free man or woman 
has exchanged slavery to the Law for slavery to Christ, which paradoxically 
makes people free so that they become, in effect, slaves of one another609. 
   One of Paul’s emphases when thinking of the Christian in relation to 
God through participation in Christ is his use of the words technon (child) 
and huios (son). These words are to be found for example in I Corinthians 
10:29; Galatians 2:4 and I Corinthians 9:1. Participation in the Spirit 
confers these eschatological gifts of ‘son- and daughter-ship’ in the present 
to the believer, who is now the inheritor of God’s promises. Freedom is 
true citizenship of God’s Kingdom with its promise of an eternal destiny 
begun in this life and to be harvested in its fullest sense at the end of time. 
These realities and promises are not in any way dependent on, or 
achievable by, any works of the believer, whether Jew or Gentile, but 
                                           
 609 see on this V. P. Furnish, Love Command in the New Testament which gives a detailed analysis 
     of texts in which the love command is to be found in the New Testament in  a variety of   forms –    
      not only where the word agape or its cognates appear as such. Chapter 3 of his book focuses on    
      Paul’s ideas on this. 
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through the freedom won by Christ through the Cross, and transferable 
to the individual Christian by faith alone 
 
Use Of Words Explored In Their Context In Greater Detail 
   Eleutheria. Chapter 6 of Romans uses this idea frequently. Paul, with a 
rhetorical flourish – ‘mē genoito’, meaning something like ‘not on your life!’ 
-  sweeps aside the possible interpretation of his vision of grace abounding 
as God’s response to human wickedness that sees sin as somehow a good 
thing because it leads to grace610. His way out of this dilemma involves the 
application of the ‘imperative based on an indicative’ argument – “How 
can we who have died to sin still live in it?” The Christian who has been 
brought into a special relationship with Christ through Baptism will 
naturally live according to the principles of Christ. 
   The person who has ‘died’, he reminds his readers, is free (eleutheros) from 
sin, that is to say, the power that a personalised conception of sin formerly 
had. Through incorporation into Christ that power has been destroyed on 
our behalf by Christ’s death. From now on, in the paradoxical sense that 
Paul often employs, we are slaves still, but now we are slaves of 
righteousness.  In a rhetorical sense, then, Christians are free from the 
power of sin. But men and women do not live in a way that is fully 
determined by the fact of their participation in Christ. There is abundant 
evidence in many of Paul’s letters, notably I Corinthians, that the actual 
behaviour of the members of the churches falls short of the ideal in many 
respects. As we have seen, Paul laments the fact that he cannot always 
                                           
610 though see aspects of rabbinical literature of Paul’s time that could indeed be seen in this light: 
    attention is drawn to these passages by Phillip Alexander in his account of the ‘two wills’ i.e.  good  
    and bad inclinations which are both implanted by God in the human soul, in Barclay and  
    Gathercole, Divine and Human Agency, p.36. 
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(ever?) behave in a way that is aligned to the freedom that has been gained 
in Christ; there is therefore a constant need for repentance and forgiveness 
and the possibility of a new start611. 
   As we have already observed, the idea of eleutheria, wrongly interpreted, 
can seem like an excuse for any kind of behaviour that people may wish 
to indulge in, and this is not just an ethical matter in a narrow sense, it also 
has implications for the ways in which Christians behave in relation to 
non-Jewish cultic activity. As we know from Luke’s account of the Council 
in Jerusalem described in detail in Acts 15 there was a tendency for 
Christians to assert that the eating of meat bought from markets that were 
sourced from pagan temples was to be regarded as acceptable behaviour 
for a Christian who has been set free from any narrow set of regulations. 
While concurring with the idea of freedom in principle, Paul stresses that 
these people must recognise that in doing so they may set a stumbling 
block before other (Jewish?) Christians, who find such behaviour 
unacceptable. Acts 15 concludes with a rather weak compromise, whereas 
Paul is adamant in I Corinthians 10 that individual freedom must be 
subject to, and qualified by, the good of the worshipping community as a 
whole. 
   We now look in detail at Romans 7, where Paul works out his theology 
of freedom in terms of the tension between the wish to do what is good, 
as a sign of freedom in Christ, and the frequent experience of making 
choices that militate against the will of God as revealed in the life of Jesus 
Christ and his commandments. 
                                           
  611 It is striking however, as Dunn points out (The Theology of Paul the Apostle, p.327) how little time  
       Paul devotes to the idea of forgiveness and repentance; there are only two occurrences of these   
       words – one in Romans 4:7, and one in Colossians 1:14. It is interesting to note (as Dunn does)  
       that this ‘reticence’ on his part in the letters is in sharp contrast to its frequent occurrences 
       on his lips in Acts (13:38, 17:30, 20:21, 26:18 & 20). 
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   Our principal guide for this task will be a recent author who comes from 
the twin perspective of theological and psychological disciplines, 
Christopher Cook612. In this way we will begin to be able to see how the 
two disciplines shine individual but related lights on the questions Paul is 
raising in his letters. 
   On the section we have referred to in Romans 7, Cook refers to the 
commentaries and to the work of writers such as Gerd Theissen, who 
approaches theology with a complementary attention to psychological 
insights. The problem that Cook is addressing is the Pauline idea of the 
‘divided self’613. As we have seen earlier, the key text here is Romans 7:15-
25, which addresses the difficulty that human beings have, not in 
ascertaining what the right course of action is in a given situation, but in 
doing what they perceive to be right. The exponents of Paul whom he uses 
as the ‘key’ commentators on this passage differ about whether this sense 
of inner conflict in Paul’s thought refers to people in their pre-Christian 
state or subsequent to their conversion to Christianity. 
   In this context he quotes Cranfield614 and Dunn615 among those who 
take the view that Paul is referring to the Christian with her inner struggle 
to conform to God’s will on the one hand, and Ziesler616 on the other as 
an example of those who identify the ‘strugglers’ as those who are in this 
divided state but outside the Christian Church, because he cannot accept 
the idea that Paul would have such a negative view of the Christian life.617 
Theissen618 concurs with Ziesler’s view, suggesting a ‘three tribunal’ view 
                                           
 612 Christopher C. H. Cook, Alcohol, Addiction and Christian Ethics  
 613 Cook, op.cit. p.136-147 
614 C. E. B Cranfield, Romans, a Shorter Commentary. 
615 J. G. Dunn Romans 1-8. 
616 J.  Ziesler, Paul’s Letter to the Romans. See also Ziesler, Pauline Christianity. 
617 See Cook, op.cit. p. 140 
618 G. Theissen, Psychological Aspects of Pauline Theology, p.244. 
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of the dilemma in which the individual self stands at the mid-point 
between two urges, the urge to follow God’s commandments on the one 
hand, and the urge to follow the law of sin on the other. 
   This last view is highly significant for our study in terms of the way in 
which Paul appears to give a quasi-personal significance to the concept of 
sin. Sin, for Paul, can be the subject of an action performed on human 
beings, diverting them from what they know to be right and good towards 
actions that are against God’s will. This idea is discussed in detail by Simon 
Gathercole in his chapter on “Sin in God’s Economy” in Barclay and 
Gathercole (eds.) Divine and Human Agency619- ‘The agent who dominates 
most of chapter 7 is clearly the mysterious figure “Sin”’620. This comment 
is highly significant: it both personifies the concept of sin by the use of the 
word ‘who’ and then renders the concept – or person – of sin as in some 
sense incomprehensible and unknowable. And in this unknowability we 
are, as Gathercole reminds his readers, reminded of Romans 1, where the 
presence of sin is responsible for a ‘darkening of the mind’ and ‘inability 
to discern’ which is caused by a failure to glorify God.  Sin also has the 
effect, he continues, of deceptively presenting ‘a picture to “me” that sin’s 
own work is in fact entirely consonant with the Law. In other words, sin 
is at this stage not recognised as sin at all’ - by the pre-conversion person621. 
And the hypostatised sin ‘character’ thirdly has the force, as we have seen 
earlier, of actively provoking prohibited desires. We have here then a 
sustained working out of the idea of sin as an actor in the drama of the 
relationship between God and humanity. 
                                           
619 see pages 167-172 
620 Barclay and Gathercole, op. cit. p.168. 
621 op cit., p168f. 
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   This leads to a number of questions, such as from where Paul derived 
this idea of a personalised concept of sin, on the one hand, and on the 
other, questions about how far human beings can be held responsible for 
their actions, especially those that are against God’s will, when they are to 
a greater or lesser extent under the power of sin even, if we follow 
Cranfield and Dunn’s argument, after their conversion to Christianity.  
Turning to the question of where Paul derived his theology of a 
personalised concept of sin from, the commentators suggest a number of 
possible answers to this question. 
   Fitzmeyer622 points out that ‘Paul often personifies both Death and Sin, 
depicting them as actors on the stage of human history. Hamartia is thus 
an active evil force that pervades human existence. It “dwells” in humanity 
(Rom. 7:17,23) deceives it, and kills it (Rom.7:11).’  What this neat 
exposition leads on to is the question of what Paul meant when he spoke 
of a personal ‘being’ named Sin. Was he accepting an Old Testament view 
based on Genesis in which the Devil is seen as literally walking in the 
Garden of Eden, or is his thought more sophisticated, more metaphorical? 
   Looking at the passage under discussion, that is to say Romans 7 
(passim), the commentaries provide us with some clues about how Paul 
understands this personified figure called Sin. Karl Barth623 and C. 
Kingsley Barrett624 make much of the idea of rebellion as the key to 
understanding what sin does, and the ways in which it is instanced in 
human history, and they rightly link this rebellion with the act of defiance 
of Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden. For Barrett, this act comes from 
the seed of doubt placed in Adam’s mind by the serpent. In consequence, 
                                           
622 New Jerome Bible Commentary, p.1403 
623 The Epistle to the Romans, see p.167ff. 
624 The Epistle to the Romans, p.111. 
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Adam tried to ‘set himself in the place of God’625 and sin was born in that 
moment, causing the entry of death into the cosmos as a direct result of 
his action. Barrett’s use of the word ‘born’ is particularly significant here, 
suggesting the arrival of a new being with quasi personal status. It is 
however interesting to note, with Barrett, that Paul does not suggest that 
universal sinfulness is somehow acquired by literal inheritance, despite the 
evidence from 4 Ezra that this idea was known within the contemporary 
Jewish theological understanding of the Fall. 
   One suggestion that helps us to understand the idea of sin from a more 
psychological perspective was suggested, before the recent work of 
Theissen, and this is to be found in the commentary of C H Dodd on 
Romans626 chapter 7. Dodd is here particularly interested in the impact of 
law on human response to God, suggesting that at a deep (i.e. 
unconscious) level, the injunctions against certain forms of activity (he 
quotes Rabbi Eleazer ben Azariah on this point) such as the use of 
clothing with mixed textiles, the eating of pig’s flesh and the desire for 
illicit sexual activity creates a climate in which such wishes are repressed 
and therefore ‘form a “complex” below the threshold of consciousness, 
and can at a later time break into the conscious life in fresh and perhaps 
even more deleterious forms’627. Repression is itself an activity which takes 
place, as Dodd recognises, at an unconscious level and this point is of great 
significance in terms of human choice. It raises, for example, a question 
about the extent to which human beings are, from a psychological point 
of view, responsible for the content of what is contained in the 
                                           
625  ibid. 
626 The Epistle of Paul to the Romans, C. H. Dodd, commenting on Romans 7, in particular 
   verses 8ff. (see page 128 of the Fontana Edition, 1968). 
627 ibid. 
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unconscious part of their psyche, and the destructive choices they make 
as a result. 
   At a more theological level, Dodd suggests that the personified 
characterisation of sin that we find in Paul relates to the potential the Law 
has to cause a rift between humans and God by setting up an opposition 
to God within the individual because God’s commandments are in 
conflict with human desire: the desires then become problematic, and 
instead of enabling humans to engage with the problem at a conscious 
level, the desires are driven down into the unconscious where we can 
deceive ourselves into believing that they no longer have any power. It is 
this process of deception that reveals the existence of sin as a personalised 
concept. 
   Paul would not have expressed these ideas in the language of modern 
Freudian psychology. It is nevertheless true that in his view the divinely 
given Law has the ambiguous role of both revealing God’s 
commandments and at the same time demonstrating human fallibility in 
observing them, a situation which requires the operation of grace to 
resolve it. This, for Paul, is where Christ achieves what the Law is 
powerless to do. 
   Bultmann628 draws an important distinction between the reality of 
human sin, for which people are individually responsible and of which 
they can be personally guilty, and Original Sin, for which people of their 
own generation cannot be personally responsible in the general, 
retrospective sense of being responsible for Adam’s apostasy. Bultmann 
finds the idea of this Original Sin theology of Paul coming at least partly 
                                           
628 Rudolph Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament volume 1, sections 15:4b and 25:2. 
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from a Gnostic background: as Bultmann puts it,629 ‘Gnostic mythology 
serves to characterise man’s situation in the world, as a life which by its 
origin is destined for destruction, a life that is prone to be ruled by 
demonic powers’ and the descending and ascending Redeemer has the task 
of liberating humanity from those powers. It is however questionable how 
far we should agree with Bultmann in detecting hints of Gnostic thought 
behind Paul’s own views, not least because of the difficulty of dating the 
Gnostic writings with sufficient certainty. 
   Commenting further on the personal nature of sin itself, rather than 
individual experiences of it, W. G. Kümmel630 identifies the ways in which 
Paul in Romans regards sin as the subject whose impact on humanity as 
object can be seen at work: these actions include ruling (5:12, 21; 6:12), 
making people slaves (6:6,17,20), paying wages that are death (6:23) and 
misuse of the Law to deceive and slay (7:9,11). Kümmel does not however 
comment on where Paul derived this personalisation of sin, he simply 
presents it as a key element in Paul’s presentation of man’s plight before 
God – the sinful attitude and behaviours that lead to death for us as it did 
for Adam, and the remedy for this in the life restoring, once for all work 
of Christ. 
   Perhaps it needs to be emphasized that Paul, in presenting the force of 
sin as a real determinant of human action does not analyse the nature of 
this concept in any detail. He prefers to take for granted that his readers, 
whether Jewish or Gentile, will understand what he means without the 
need for detailed explication. It may be that in our own times, by contrast, 
when the word sin is less used in ordinary human discourse in secular 
                                           
629 op.cit. p.174f. (italics original) 
630 W. G. Kümmel, Theology of the New Testament, p.180.  
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society, the ideas that underlie this theology of a personalised ‘sin’ 
character in the human drama need more clarification. 
   Mention was made earlier of the possible influence on Paul of writings 
from a Hellenistic, Stoic background that may illuminate the idea of choice 
and freedom, and one influential book on this topic was Paul and Seneca631, 
which explored this relationship in detail, as have other more recent 
writers on Paul, such as Troels Engberg-Pedersen in Divine and Human 
Agency in Paul and his Cultural Environment632. He examines the writings of 
Epictetus looking for a resonance between Paul and Epictetus as a 
significant representative of Stoic thought in relation to the relative part 
played by freedom and determinism in the choices that people make. He 
concludes that there are both similarities and differences in the ways in 
which they address these issues. Ultimately, we have to beware – as we 
have seen before in this chapter – of the danger of attempting to 
understand ancient texts from the standpoint of modern interpreters. 
Having said that however, the conclusion is reached in Engberg-
Pedersen’s article633 that in both Pauline and Stoic (as evidenced in 
Epictetus) writing that ‘there is an idea of a self which is able to reject the 
world because in being directed towards and aligning itself with God it has 




                                           
 631 Paul and Seneca, (1961),pages 180-183, quoted by V. P. Furnish, The Love Command in the     
     New Testament, p.69. Furnish also quotes the idea of ‘surrendering one’s freedom to God’         
     as one aspect of finding ‘freedom from the burdens of finite existence’. However, for  
     Epictetus, this freedom involves, according to Furnish, a freedom from involvement with  
     other people – a concept which would have presumably been alien to Paul’s thought. 
  632   Chapter 7, pages .133 ff. 
  633 op.cit. p.139. 
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Conclusion 
   Paul firmly believed that leading an immoral life could not be an option 
for the Christian man or woman. What is more questionable is the idea 
that only by divine inspiration could such a moral life be possible. Equally, 
however, a balancing factor must be kept in mind which regards human 
activity, however noble, and whether or not in some sense autonomous, 
as powerless to procure salvation for any individual. Only a faithful 
response to what God has done for humanity in the person of Jesus Christ 
can achieve that purpose. When we come to consider the choices we make 
in relation to addictive substances and behaviours this line of enquiry will 
help us to detect what goes wrong when the fulfilment of human desire 




3.6.2 The Theology of Saint Augustine with respect to desire: introductory  
          section. 
 
   This section of the thesis, which investigates Augustine’s theology of desire with particular 
reference to his books The Confessions and De Doctrina Christiana (henceforward referred to as 
DDC), aims to provide a theological reconstruction of his views on the nature of human 
desire, based on the premise that although desire for material objects such as food and drink 
and sexual relationships are in some sense good, they cannot bring human beings the ultimate 
blessings of a relationship with God. The Confessions express this in terms of Augustine’s own 
developing self-understanding, and DDC deals with the subject of desire in terms of the 
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language, and in particular what would nowadays be called the ‘semiotics’634 of human 
discourse635.  
   There are four parts to this section, and they are as follows: 
1. Genre. It is tempting to assume that The Confessions is essentially an introspective, 
autobiographical literary work. Most translations and commentators take this view: 
Henry Chadwick speaks of the work as autobiographical, but recognises that it 
‘carries harmonics of deeper meaning’636. The assumption that the book is 
characteristically autobiographical is not however without challenge, as for example 
in the chapter written by Brian Horne in the book Persons Divine and Human637. 
Following some thoughts of Rebecca West on Augustine638, Horne makes an 
interesting link with the work of Marcel Proust, who also presents an extended 
meditation on life with autobiographical details put in so that what might otherwise 
have been a purely theological treatise (in Augustine’s case) becomes a narrative 
based on autobiographical details, without being an autobiography as such. This is 
perhaps easier to recognise in Proust’s case, because he is writing a work of fiction 
that contains indirect reference (and in some ways perhaps misleading, with regard 
to sexual orientation) to his own personal history: on the other hand, Augustine is, 
presumably, being as true to his own personal memory as it is possible to be. But he 
is not writing autobiography as such; he is rather, as Horne expresses it, ‘discovering 
meaning in a life and imposing order on chaos by means of relating and forming into 
a narrative… selected pieces of previous experience’, rather than recounting his 
personal history for its own sake. The difference in genre suggested by Horne is 
                                           
634 See: Alexander L. Zachary, “Interpretative Desire: Augustine’s Semiotics and the Transcendental 
Signified”. Columbia Journal of Literary Criticism 2 (2004): 25-34, and R. A. Markus (ed.) Augustine. 
635 One recent translation of the DDC is entitled Teaching Christianity, and is part of a series entitled The Works 
of Saint Augustine, a Translation for the 21st century’ – translated by Edmund Hill OP and published in 1996. 
636 H. Chadwick, Confessions, a New Translation. 
637 Christoph Schwöbel and C. Gunton. Persons Human and Divine 
638 Rebecca West. A Celebration, pp.165-166. 
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subtle and nuanced, but it is important, as it helps us to understand better Augustine’s 
true theological purpose in writing his Confessions. 
2. The language of Augustine as related to desire – how do we set about understanding 
the language of a book written long ago and in a very different culture from our own? 
It would be a mistake to ignore this question, just as it would in attempting to 
understand the books of the New Testament or other ancient texts. Our discussion 
of this relies considerably on the work of Robert Ayers639 and Rowan Williams640 on 
Augustine’s use of language. 
   Ayers focuses on Augustine as a thinker and rhetorician. And in doing so he makes 
the important point that the background to Augustine’s thought as demonstrated, 
for example, in the DDC in his explanation of the nature of ‘signs’, depends to  a 
large extent on Stoic thought641. So, for example, ‘natural signs are those which, apart 
from any intention or desire of using them as signs, do yet lead to the knowledge of 
something else, as for example smoke, when it indicates fire’642. On the other hand, 
conventional signs have been made to stand for other things by people ‘for the 
purpose of showing … the feelings of their minds, or their perceptions, or their 
thoughts’643. Ayers comments on the triadic nature of signs in Augustine, as he adds 
to the concepts of the thing itself, and what is signified, a third, which is the meaning 
attributed to the sign by its interpreter. In this way, Augustine the theologian typically 
imports an essentially Trinitarian element into his discussion of signs. 
   Williams devotes an article to the language of the DDC644, exploring the nature of 
Augustine’s thought in this work in relation to desire, which is the main interest of 
this section of the chapter. We will therefore look at what he says in more detail. 
                                           
639 Robert Ayers. Language, Logic and Reason in the Church Fathers. 
640 Rowan Williams. Language, Reality and Desire in Augustine’s De Doctrina. 
641 Ayers, p.69, citing DDC, 2.1.2. See also John Rist, Augustine, p.168f. 
642 Ayers, op. cit., p.69. 
643 Ayers, p.69, citing DDC, 2.2.3. 
644 Rowan Williams, op. cit. 
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   At the heart of Williams’ discussion is the distinction between res and signum. The 
essential point for Augustine, as Williams observes, is that God can only ever be res, 
never signum. All else but God is signum, because it has the capacity to reveal 
something of God’s being and nature. The only exception to this is the Incarnation 
of the Word, where at a particular point in history – ‘The incarnation manifests the 
essential quality of the world itself as a “sign” or trace of its maker’645. 
   What leads on from this is Augustine’s teaching on the precise nature of how we 
may rightly engage with the created order. This has two components, which he 
characterises by using two Latin verbs uti and frui, referring to our capacity for making 
use of the created order and desiring and enjoying what it has to offer. Williams 
observes that the relationship between these two pairs of words – res/signum: uti/frui 
in fact becomes an element which ‘pervades the whole of DDC’646.  
What does he mean by this suggestion?  
   To investigate this we begin by referring directly to the DDC. In 1.3.3, Augustine 
explains what he means when he draws a major distinction between the use of things 
and their enjoyment. ‘Things that are enjoyed make us happy, things which are to be 
used help us on our way to happiness’. Merely using things as needed creates no 
problems, in terms of the happiness they afford, in so far as they point beyond 
themselves to their creator, God. So for Augustine, happiness is in itself a legitimate 
experience for the Christian man or woman. The problem is that our deliberate 
enjoyment of created things, our instrumentalisation of them to provide true 
happiness, as Augustine sees it, blocks our way to ultimate happiness: ‘we are 
impeding our progress, and sometimes are also deflected from our course, because 
we are thereby delayed in obtaining what we should be enjoying, or turned back from 
it altogether, blocked by our love for inferior things’647. So for Augustine, there is a 
                                           
645 op. cit., p.141. 
646 op. cit., p.139 
647 DDC 1.3.3. 
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clear dividing line between experiencing pleasure from making use of the created 
order, and actively seeking that pleasure in a way that distracts us from what is of the 
greatest value – the summum bonum – the God, who in distinction from the created 
order is both eternal and unchanging648. We may perhaps put this in terms of a more 
recent commentator on the world from the perspective of poetry – it is not enough 
to enjoy the good things of the world in and for themselves as such: what is needed, 
in Joseph Addison’s words, is the capacity to recognise that ‘the hand that made us 
is divine’. 
   Because of this danger of distraction, what is needed, he continues649, is a process 
of purification of the mind in order to perceive the light which is provided by the 
Trinitarian God, by which we see the truth ‘which is unchangeably alive’, by means 
of  a journey towards our home country, involving ‘honest commitment and good 
behaviour’650.  
 
3. Conflict in relation to desire. Historians of Christian thought have observed that 
although Augustine moved away from a Manichean, dualistic and essentially negative 
view of the creation of the universe, he nevertheless remained concerned about the 
appropriateness of fleshly desire for the Christian man or woman, particularly with 
regard to sexual acts651. It is questionable whether he ever resolved this tension either 
theologically, or in his own spiritual life, as Margaret R Miles has speculated in her 
book on Augustine’s view of human desire and pleasure, Desire and Delight, suggesting 
that Augustine deliberately leaves the question of how we should regard the created 
                                           
648 DDC 1.22.20 
649 DDC 1.10.10 
650 ibid. 
651 See, for example, Paul Tillich’s A History of Christian thought, especially p.109f.  Desire and pleasure are 
discussed at greater length later in the thesis, using Meilaender’s article “Sweet Necessities” as a guide to 
Augustine’s thought on this subject. 
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order – its enjoyment and its dangers – unanswered, in order to be provocative652.  
This view is however contestable. 
       Of considerable importance here also is the complex subject of the will in 
Augustine’s thought, particularly in the sense that in his work, and especially in the 
Confessions, book 8, the human will is regarded as divided between a desire to follow 
God’s requirements, and a competing desire to follow one’s own wishes, which may, 
as they did for Augustine, lead in a completely opposite direction, not least in terms 
of his desire for sexual intimacy which he came to see as ultimately incompatible with 
the vocation he had personally been given as  a Christian. The divided will features 
prominently in Confessions, book 8. Augustine looks back at his conversion 
experience, and particularly the role that lust, and habituation to lustful behaviour, 
held him back from embracing the Christian faith:653 
               For this was what I was longing to do; but as yet I was bound 
               by the iron chain of my own will. The enemy held fast my will, 
               and had made of it a chain, and had bound me tight with it. For 
               out of the perverse will came lust, and the service of lust ended  
               in habit, and habit, not resisted, became necessity. By these links, 
               as it were, forged together… a hard bondage held me in slavery. 
               But that new will which had begun to spring up in me freely to 
               worship thee and enjoy thee, on my God, the only certain Joy, was 
               not able as yet to overcome my former wilfulness, made strong  
               by long indulgence. Thus my two wills – the old and the new,  
               the carnal and the spiritual – were in conflict within me; and by  
               their discord they tore my soul apart. 
 
   Christopher Cook points out654 that ‘it is the “service of lust” which leads to habit, 
and the failure to resist habit that leads to necessity. The sequence seems to be: will 
– desire - behaviour. Where actions are repeated they lead to habit and a sense of 
compulsion’. And of course the opposite is equally true, because, to continue his line 
of thought at this point, ‘Where habit is resisted (implicitly by the will) that sense of 
compulsion may be broken’. What this implies for Augustine in his process of 
                                           
652 Margaret Miles, Desire and Delight: a New Reading of Augustine’s Confessions, p.52f. 
653 Confessions, Book 8, cited by C.C.H. Cook, Alcohol, Addiction and Christian Ethics, p.151. 
654 Cook, op. cit., p151. 
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conversion is a conflict of the will between his desire to follow the example of 
Victorinus, who had become a Christian, and his competing will to follow his old, 
lustful way of life.        
                
   We will therefore briefly pay attention to this notion of the divided will, looking in 
particular at Harry Frankfurt’s exposition of the notions of primary and secondary 
volition655. His use of the idea of first order volition (or desire) refers to the way in 
which the human will directs action, in one way or another: on the other hand, second 
order volition refers not to what a person might will to do, but what she might will 
to will. An example of this is given by Eleonore Stump, namely the desire of a would-
be vegetarian to form a volition to will not to eat meat656. Such direction given by the 
will to itself, so to speak, is the essential meaning of second order volition. So how 
does this way of thinking influence Augustine? The key concept here, Stump 
asserts657, is the idea of free will, which humans have, even in their ‘fallen’ state. But 
this raises problems about the relationship between human effort to overcome evil 
and the divine grace which, Augustine recognises, is the only thing that can achieve 
this conversion of the will.  
   The problem here is, as Stump points out, that if God can act directly on our 
second order volitions, so that we decide to follow the ‘good’ path – she cites the 
example of ceasing smoking – then it seems that our free will is thus eroded. Stump 
suggests a way out of this problem by arguing658 that although ‘Augustine grapples 
with the problem of making God the sole source of goodness in the post-Fall human 
will without taking away from human beings control over their wills’, which might 
suggest that God is then responsible for evil, this conclusion might be avoided if it 
                                           
655 See: H. Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, and commentary on this by Eleonore Stump, 
in The Cambridge Companion to Augustine, chapter 10. 
656 Cambridge Companion to Augustine, p.126. 
657 op. cit., p.130. 
658 op cit., p.139. 
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is also claimed that God ‘offers to every person the grace that produces the will of 
faith, but it is open to a person to refuse that grace’, so that ‘Since a human willer can 
refuse grace or fail to refuse grace, a human willer has alternative possibilities 
available to her, even if God alone produces any good in her will’659. 
4.   Relevance to thesis. The thesis presents a view of the best way to help people 
who are addicted to drugs or alcohol, or both, and it could be argued, by extension, 
that the same ideas might have traction in relation to a much wider variety of 
compulsive behaviours, not just those that involve dependency on substances. The 
fundamentally new contribution takes as its starting point the idea that if we begin 
our work with such people by looking at positive goals, desires, and aspirations, that 
may be a better place to start our therapeutic intervention than by focussing initially 
on the pathological, aetiological elements of investigation of the problem implicit in 
the notion of a divided will to use, or not to use, drugs. In a word – we aim to focus 
on the person, rather than the problem. 
   But that does not go far enough. If we are to look at human desire, then we need 
to understand which desires can realistically be expected to provide for people a 
genuine, lasting and satisfying experience of living, and that is where, we are arguing, 
the writings of Augustine – especially in DDC and the Confessions - have a suggestion 
that has transformative potential. It begins with his famous assertion that God has 
made us for himself, and that only by relating to God can we find the fulfilment that 
we desire: all other objects of desire only provide temporary and fleeting occasions 
of delight. One way of putting this is to argue that there are ultimate and penultimate 
desires – and only desire for the one eternal and unchanging God is the ultimate, and 
therefore most satisfying pursuit in which human beings can engage; this is the 
message of Augustine, and if it can find a home in the heart of the addicted person, 
                                           
659 Cambridge Companion to Augustine, p.142. 
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viewed from pastoral and spiritual perspectives, we suggest, that may be a highly 
valuable aspect of holistic treatment. 
3.6.3 Augustine on Desire – main section. 
   Saint Augustine, in the Confessions, looks at his journey  from desire 
experienced in physical and sensual terms as in his relationship with a 
woman (outer reality) to concern with spiritual longing for God (inner 
reality). Also in Augustine the concept of the divided will appears, with 
primary and secondary desires or motivations and conflict between 
them, as in Augustine’s own battle for chastity, leading to his belief in 
resolution of conflict as only possible when we come to ‘rest’ in God. 
   With regard to our quest for the theological understanding of desire, 
Andres Niňo660 sees a link in this context between Augustine’s 
understanding of desire and the work of the twentieth century 
psychoanalyst Heinz Kohut who ‘focussed on the self, the significance of 
the search for the realization of values and ideals…’661 This resonates well 
with Augustine’s understanding of the search which, sees God as the real 
goal towards which all human striving is ultimately oriented. Augustine 
also suggests that our God-desire is partly to be understood as ‘memory’, 
although he distances himself from an over Platonised view of memory in 
this context662. 
   We are looking at the phenomenon of addiction from a new angle – 
namely seeing addiction as having its roots, paradoxically perhaps, in 
something which is potentially good, or at least neutral, in itself – and that 
is human desire, longing, appetite. Without a deeper understanding of 
human desiring, we may misunderstand its distortions, from either a 
                                           
660 Andres G. Niňo, “Restoration of the self: a therapeutic paradigm from Augustine’s Confessions”. 
661 Niňo, op. cit., p.10 
662 See: Louis L. Martz, The Paradise Within, p.xvi. 
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psychological or theological point of view. As Augustine wrote in a 
number of places about human desire, we therefore now turn our 
attention to the place of human desire in Augustine’s thought. For 
Augustine the idea of human desire as good or neutral must be balanced 
by his belief that such intentionality has been damaged by the ‘Fall’ which 
to a greater or lesser extent compromises human desire and the will. 
 
How Does God Implant Desire Into The Human Psyche? 
   It is important to recognise at the outset the complex and nuanced view 
that Augustine takes of bodily desires and needs of human beings and how 
he relates these to spiritual desires: in his letters, for example, he describes 
the relationship between the physical and the spiritual in positive and 
symbiotic language663 (emphasis original). 
So great a power does the sweet companionship of the flesh and 
soul have! For no one ever hates his own flesh (Eph.5:29), and for this 
reason the soul also does not want to leave its weakness even for a 
time, though it trusts that it will receive its flesh for eternity 
without weakness’. 
 
   There is then a kind of temporal indissolubility of the close relationship 
between body and soul, a ‘sweet companionship’ which nevertheless must 
be regulated by the avoidance of sin. 
   The starting point for Augustine is the creation of humanity which he 
interprets theologically as God’s will to create humanity ‘for himself’ not 
from a selfish or power loving motive, but because the human heart will 
be restless until it finds  a resting point ‘within’ God. Thus the true life of 
human beings consists in hearing the divine call and responding positively 
to it. ‘You stir man to take pleasure in praising you, because you have made 
                                           
663 Augustine, The Works of Saint Augustine, Letters 100-155. See Letter 140, p.252. 
 255 
us for yourself and our heart is restless until it rests in you’664. Henry 
Chadwick’s footnote at this point in his translation of the Confessions links 
this idea to Plotinus, who speaks of the soul finding rest ‘only in the 
One’665. This sentence of Augustine’s, Chadwick emphasizes, ‘announces 
a major theme of his work’666. It recurs frequently, such as when Augustine 
speaks of his desire for God in terms of ‘the satiety of your love [being] 
insatiable’, a recognition that with God alone is ‘utter peace and a life 
immune from disturbance’. By entering into God, then, we ‘enter into the 
joy of the Lord’667. Then the human being does not have fear but is ‘in’ 
the supreme Good ‘where it is supremely good to be’668. This rather 
compressed language make us wonder what precisely it means to be ‘in’ 
God and how to achieve it: this theme is perhaps the supreme essence of 
the autobiographical narrative of the Confessions. One hint lies in his theme 
of wandering away from God, suggesting perhaps that being ‘in God’ is 
our natural state, but that we can abandon that state, for one reason or 
another, but in particular by our desire for lesser ‘goods’ than the summum 
bonum. 
   For Augustine it seems therefore that longing is a basic function of the 
human personality. But what is meant by this is not simply longing or 
desire in the natural sense of longing to be fed, clothed and generally cared 
for in a physical, materialistic sense but in terms of  a ‘holy longing’669. 
Longing, he explains670, is characterised by a sense of delay, longing for 
something not yet available in its entirety, but which is known about and 
                                           
664 Augustine, Confessions, translated by Henry Chadwick, p.3. 
665 Plotinus 6.7.23.4 
666 Confessions, p.3. 
667 Confessions, p.34 
668 ibid.  
669 See: Augustine, Tractates on St. John’s Gospel and Epistles, Tractate 4, p.179 
670 ibid. 
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richly desirable. In this state of longing for something yet to come, he 
argues, ‘you are made capacious so that when what you are to see has 
come, you may be filled’671. In this state, he continues, God performs a 
stretching exercise, just as one might stretch a pocket in a piece of clothing 
to make it able to contain more things. The postponement of spiritual 
delight is, he says, God’s ‘postponing’ activity in the soul, which in a 
spiritual sense, by analogy with the pocket imagery, makes the soul more 
capacious. He models this theological idea on the words of Saint Paul672, 
‘Not that I have already attained or were already perfect; brothers I do not 
think I have already apprehended’. The stretching that accompanies this 
insight is described by Paul as a process of ‘following on to the prize of 
the high calling’673. What is implied here is a calling by God to humanity 
to have less regard for the pleasures of the flesh and more concern with 
spiritual or heavenly delights. God, so to speak, desires to fill us with 
honey, but the vessel that will contain the honey ‘must be cleansed; it must 
be cleansed even though with toil, with rubbing, in order that it may 
become fit for a particular thing’674. Augustine proposes that God implants 
in us a particular kind of longing that exists alongside the natural desires 
of the human heart, and is destined in time to become far more significant 
by  a process by which ‘we have pruned our longings away from the love 
of this world’675. 
   In Confessions book IX we follow this process in the mind of Augustine 
as in response to Christ’s piercing of his heart with love, he moves further 
away from the Manichean teachings towards the full embrace of what he 
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672 Philippians 3:12-13. 
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674 Augustine, Tractates, p.180. 
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came to regard as true Christian Catholic teaching. Embedded in this 
experience for him was a recalibration of the notion of desire, and the 
sense of inwardness replacing desire for external realities: 
But now the goods I sought were no longer in the external realm, 
nor did I seek for them with bodily eyes in the light of this sun.” 
(Confessions, p.161) 
 
   Augustine is beginning here to recognise that true pleasure, the satisfying 
of human longing, is not to be found in anything in our external 
environment. He sees that the eternal is inward676, if only people could see 
this inward reality. He records of himself at this point:     
I had tasted this, but was enraged that I was unable to show it to 
them677 even if they were to bring their heart to me, though their 
eyes are turned away from you towards external things, and if they 
were to say ‘Who will show us good?’ In the place where I had 
been angry with myself, within my chamber where I felt the pang 
of penitence, where I had made a sacrifice offering up my old life 
and placing my hope in you as I first began to meditate on my 
renewal:  there you began to be my delight, and you gave me 
‘gladness in my heart’. 
 
   How have later commentators viewed Augustine’s understanding of 
desire and pleasure in terms of the contrast between the temporal and the 
eternal? We will now look briefly at three contemporary writers on this 
topic – 1) Charles Taylor678, 2) Ian McFarland679 and 3) Bonnie Kent680. 
 
1) Charles Taylor 
   For Taylor, Augustine embodies a crucial turning point in the 
history of the understanding of the ‘self’, the theme of his extended 
study Sources of the Self681. Augustine is the pivotal point between 
                                           
676 Augustine, Confessions, p.162. 
677 that is, others who have not yet experienced Christian conversion, such as the Manicheans 
678 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self, chapter 7 – “In Interiore Homine”, pp.127-142. 
679 Ian McFarland, In Adam’s Fall, chapter 3, pp.61-87. 
680 Bonnie Kent, in The Cambridge Companion to Augustine (Eleonore Stump and Norman  
     Kretzmann, eds. Chapter 15, pp. 205-233, “Augustine’s Ethics”). 
681 The overarching theme of Taylor’s book is the important change in direction that  
     occurred at the time of the Enlightenment, particularly in terms of humanity in its  
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Plato, as we look backwards to classical antiquity, and forward to 
Descartes, whose radical dualism stands at the threshold of 
modernity. The focal point of that unique position held by 
Augustine is what Taylor refers to as a ‘turn’, that is to say an inward 
turn towards the self as the place where truth is to be encountered 
in  a ‘first person standpoint’ or  perspective rather than by an 
examination of external objects or realities. In this inward turn, 
characterised by his invitation ‘Noli foras ire: in teipsum redi; in interiore 
homine habitat veritas’682, Augustine builds on his understanding of 
Plato, filtered through the writings of Plotinus, so that where for 
Plato the pursuit of the Highest Good is the greatest human 
endeavour, for Augustine it is necessary to go to an even higher 
source than the Good, namely God himself. The Good has 
meaning, but it has, to use the language of Paul Janz that we will 
mention later, penultimate, not ultimate truth as its goal. 
   In this context what is established in terms of human perception 
is thus the ‘first person standpoint’ or ‘radical reflexivity’683. Whereas 
Plato sees the outer world as pointing towards ultimate reality, 
‘Augustine is always calling us within’684. 
   To continue this line of thought, following Taylor’s analysis685,  
our principal route to God is not through the object domain 
but ‘in’ ourselves. This is because God is not just the 
transcendent object or just the principle of order of the 
nearer objects, which we strain to see. God is also and for us 
primarily the basic support and underlying principle of our 
knowing activity. God is not just what we long to see, but 
what powers the eye which sees. So the light of God is not 
                                           
     embracing of the concept of an anthropocentric autonomy with regard to behaviour. 
682 From Augustine’s De Vera Religione xxxix.72, translated by Taylor (op. cit., p.129) as “Do not go    
    outward; return within yourself. In the inward man dwells truth”. 
683 Taylor, Sources of the Self, p.130. 
684 op. cit., p.129. 
685 ibid. 
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just ‘out there’, illuminating the order of being, as it is for 
Plato; it is also an ‘inner’ light. It is the light “which lighteth 
every man that cometh into the world”686. 
 
   This vivid contrast between Platonic and Christian philosophical 
thought avoids on the one hand the Manichean trap of devaluing 
the world and setting up an eternal conflict between good and evil, 
light and dark, matter and the domain of the spiritual, and on the 
other any kind of theological reductionism that over emphasises the 
capacity of the material order to say all that can or needs to be said 
about God at the cost of the vision of divine truth that belongs in 
the inner man. What is suggested here also is that there is a divinely 
implanted longing for a vision of God, which in turn can be 
experienced by the God given “light that lighteth all”. The longing 
– the appetite for God - of which Taylor speaks in relation to 
Augustine is important to our thesis: it suggests here that there is a 
universal longing which is implanted by God, and made available to 
all in terms of a vision of the truth to be experienced because it is 
God-given. To continue Taylor’s reflection on this, and by way of 
summary687: 
Augustine’s turn to the self was a turn to radical reflexivity, 
and that is what made the language of inwardness irresistible. 
The inner light is the one which shines in our presence to 
ourselves; it is the one inseparable from our being creatures 
with a first person standpoint. What differentiates it from 
the outer light is just what makes the image of inwardness so 
compelling, that it illuminates that space where I am present 
to myself. 
 
   The importance of this suggestion is hard to overestimate. It is a 
moment which could be seen as the beginning of modern thought, 
                                           
686 The scholarly consensus, however, seems to favour a version which says that “the light  
     which lighteth every man was coming into the world”, rather than the version presented by  
     Taylor. See, for example, Raymond Brown, The Gospel according to John, volume 1, p.9. 
687 Taylor, Sources of the Self, p.131. 
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with its emphasis on the individual as distinct from the more 
collective understanding of what it means to be human that held 
sway from the beginning of human experience of selfhood to the 
individualism which has come to be the mark of modern 
sophisticated – though arguably fragmented – societies. It was a 
landmark on the path to Descartes, as Taylor suggests, and beyond 
him looking towards the highly ambiguous intellectual upheaval 
associated with Kant and the Enlightenment, leading, at least in one 
way of interpreting it, to the excessive individualism (the 
enthronement of the ‘I think’ as having ultimate significance), 
nihilism and despair of Nietzsche. That, perhaps, is why Taylor 
ruefully comments on the link between Augustine, Descartes, ‘and 
all that has flowed from it in modern culture… to the point of 
aberration, one might think’688 (emphasis added). 
   Augustine, despite his absolute refusal to dethrone or demystify 
God, is not unproblematic concerning the source and content of 
human desire and longing, even though he sees these as God 
inspired. For it is in some ways an individualistic rather than an 
ecclesiastical picture of the search for truth that Augustine presents 
to the reader at many points, and it also conveys a kind of elitist 
spirituality, which may be fine for a medieval celibate scholar-
bishop, but would be hard for an ordinary layperson to achieve with 
all the demands of family, professional and social commitments. It 
also marks  a watershed in the understanding of the writings of Saint 
Paul, (one followed some centuries later by Martin Luther) who is 
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perhaps regarded by Augustine as engaging in deep psychological 
reflection on his religious persona in a way that may say more about 
Augustine’s perception of Paul than about the apostle himself689. 
 
 
2) Ian McFarland. 
   Ian McFarland’s book In Adam’s Fall 690 is a study of the concept 
of original sin including a chapter on the Augustinian view in a 
chapter entitled “Augustine of Hippo: Willing and the Ambiguity of 
Desire”. He locates the Augustinian material on desire and sin in the 
context of Augustine’s debate with the Pelagians. As Maurice Wiles 
correctly observed691:  
The prayer of Augustine from the Confessions, “Give what 
thou commandest and command what thou wilt”, shocked 
Pelagius. It seemed to him to undermine the foundation of 
that moral effort which was the primary need of the times. 
For Pelagius the essence of the moral life was the 
determined exercise of the human will. 
 
   For McFarland this is the essential conflict between Augustine and 
Pelagius. The problem concerns the nature of human will, and 
McFarland treats this complex subject with clarity of insight, 
suggesting a bipartite view of the will, in which ‘desire’ and ‘will’ 
have a close relationship but are not coterminous or functionally co-
existent in time, because desire precedes the operation of the 
conscious will, whether or not the individual acts on the basis of 
what her desire suggests. 
                                           
 689 This is the essence of the critique of ‘psychological’ exegesis of Romans 7 found in the commentary 
      of Augustine and Martin Luther, provided by Krister Stendahl in his essay “Paul and the   
       Introspective Conscience of the West” reprinted in his book Paul among Jews and Gentiles, pp.78-96. 
690 Ian McFarland, In Adam’s Fall: A Meditation on the Christian Doctrine of Original Sin.  
691 Maurice Wiles, The Christian Fathers, p.176. 
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   In relation to Augustine’s anti Pelagian polemic, he points out692 
that ‘Augustine suggests that the will is intimately connected to 
[both human nature and God]. Because for Augustine will is shaped 
by desire, it is an integral part of human nature, which is the seat of 
those desires (e.g. for health and happiness). But insofar as those 
desires are also shaped by grace… the will is also subject to God’. 
In the light of this duality, it can be claimed that the will does not 
lead us in any direction but actually follows (in logical sequence) our 
desires – ‘we will what we are inclined to will, whether by nature or 
grace; and in so willing, we both experience and acknowledge our 
lives in all their many dimensions of action and passion as our 
own’693. 
   For McFarland desire in Augustine’s thought is rooted in the God 
given creation, and is not somehow separate from God or an 
alternative mode of experiencing the self. It could therefore be said 
to be a divinely given gift or implantation. Equally it leads to a 
situation in which choices can be made, so it is possible to choose 
the path of action which is believed to accord with the divine will, 
and to follow that path, although such choice and action are not the 
result of human willing unaided, but the result of divine grace at 
work in the soul. 
   Secondly, wrong choices can be made when the experience of will, 
secondary to desire, is activated in a way that is known to be contrary 
to the will of God: it is then distorted desire. 
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   And thirdly, when this wrong turning has been taken, it is only the 
call to the soul from God that can restore the person to the right 
path: this cannot be initiated by human beings, it can only occur by 
way of response. Desire then can be both oriented towards good 
and bad actions. Response to God’s call can redirect the individual 
to God, just as God redirected Augustine after his time of 
wandering away into Manichaean religion and concurrent sinful 
lifestyle. 
 
3) Bonnie Kent 
   Kent analyses the concept of will in her chapter entitled 
“Augustine’s Ethics” in the Cambridge Companion to Augustine 694. At 
the heart of her discussion of will in Augustine’s writing is the 
concept of the divided will, and this approach was, as we saw in the 
discussion of Christopher Cook’s book Alcohol, Addiction and 
Christian Ethics, predicated on the epistemological understanding of 
will as having primary and secondary functions which can come into 
conflict when two forms of motivation are opposed.   Augustine’s 
approach was a radical one, she argues695, in comparison with the 
view of will generally held in antiquity in terms of morality in relation 
to human psychology. By this she means that for Aristotle, and 
others with a similar understanding of morality, the main focus of 
their discourse tends not to be issues around appetite and decision 
making themselves, but the issues of rationality and irrationality in 
relation to choice696. 
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   On this basis ‘different emotions might even be understood as 
different kinds of volition’, a suggestion found in De Civitate 14.6, 
where Augustine addresses the question of ‘the quality of a person’s 
will’ which may be rightly ordered or perverse. The rightly ordered 
love that is entailed by this bifurcation is at the root of human virtue, 
and is itself a divine gift697. 
   But this raises a question for the reader about what exactly 
Augustine means by the word ‘will’. Bonnie Kent discusses the 
meaning of this word for Augustine in her chapter on “Augustine’s 
Ethics”. Her view of his understanding of the word is clearly 
articulated698. Although she is sceptical about the possibility of 
finding a formal definition of the will (in relation to Augustine), she 
is more optimistic about viewing it pragmatically, in terms of what 
‘the concept of the will is needed to do’699: 
If human beings sin, and God justly punishes us for it – two 
assumptions Augustine considers indisputable – then we 
ourselves must be morally responsible for sinning. It is 
precisely to explain moral responsibility that we must posit 
the will. Pause to reflect upon Adam and Eve, the premier 
example of human sin. They had no unsatisfied needs; they 
suffered no agitations of mind or body; and God gave them 
only a single command, supremely easy to obey. How can 
we explain why they nonetheless disobeyed?.... The only 
explanation Augustine can conceive is that their sin arose 
from an evil will which itself had no prior or external cause. 
 
   This explanation has a certain internal logic, but it raises questions 
about the origin of this fallible will, for which, in Augustine’s view, 
human beings (typified by Adam and Eve), are personally 
responsible. On the basis of the Eden story as told in Genesis 3, the 
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question would have to be where did that part of the human psyche 
that could be manipulated by the Serpent come from? Obviously 
not from the Creator who is totally good. So we have here another 
problem to solve. How does Augustine deal with this? 
   It would have been helpful if Kent had tackled this subject directly 
at this point: what follows however is a consideration of the will in 
terms of the human capacity for following one of two paths, either 
that of ‘love’, to use an Augustinian, theologically embedded 
concept, or ‘duty’ for those who follow a Kantian line, with their 
consequential attributes of reward and punishment for courses of 
action that are deliberately chosen. This approach does not 
adequately deal with the problem of where wrong choices originate; 
the possibility of making such wrong choices seems to have become 
a foundational concept which either cannot or need not be 
explained, and this is regrettable. It leaves the reader on something 
of a ‘cliff edge’. So can we go further at this point? 
 
Why Then Does The Human Will Become Distorted? 
   There is a problem here then that Augustine has to solve. If God offers 
us only good, why do we, and why did he too, at first, reject what was 
being offered in favour of external modes of satisfying desire? 
   This rejection is something he describes in the Confessions as a journeying, 
a wandering away from God, just as the Prodigal Son in the parable of 
Jesus wandered away from his earthly father. On this, Augustine 
comments700 
The younger son in your gospel did not look for horses or 
carriages or ships:  He did not fly on any invisible wing, nor did he 
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travel along the way by moving his legs when he went to live in a 
far country and prodigally dissipated what you, his gentle father, 
had given him on setting out (Luke 15:11-32), showing yourself 
even gentler on his return as a bankrupt. To live there in lustful 
passion is to live in darkness and to be far from your face. 
 
   It is of great importance here to recognise that as Augustine reflects on 
his own journey away from God he comments that this departure was 
caused by a mimetic element – ‘When one considers the men proposed to 
me as models for my initiation, it is no wonder that in this way I was swept 
along by vanities and travelled right away from you, my God’701. This 
mimetic element in the rejection of the supreme Good is highly significant. 
In his book Discovering Girard, Michael Kirwan examines this construct of 
mimesis in relation to Augustine and his haunting claim that ‘Our hearts 
are restless till they rest in thee’702: 
The fact is, people do not know what they want – therefore they 
imitate the desires of others. We need only reflect upon the vast 
expenditure and creativity which goes into advertising - a medium, 
incidentally, which is becoming ever more forthright about its own 
mimetic strategies… In fact, any kind of market is nothing other 
than a mechanism for the harmonious mediation of desire… A 
number of economic theorists have in fact attempted to utilise 
mimetic theory in their analyses of market behaviour. 
 
   We thus fit our desires (from childhood onwards) to what others  think 
is in our best interests rather than a truly independent assessment of what 
really motivates us, and this is at the heart of what Augustine means by 
proposing that his journey away from God was  dependent on a wish to 
conform to the ideas of other people around him rather than on the 
promptings of his own personal, individual spiritual awareness. 
     Augustine comments for example that he can dare to complain that 
God was ‘silent’ during this wandering away703. There were warnings, not 
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least from his mother, about evil behaviour (such as adultery), but he 
continues704: ‘[I] went on my way headlong with such blindness that among 
my peer group I was ashamed not to be equally guilty of their sexual 
exploits’. Those who behaved in this depraved way were often admired by 
others, and so Augustine ‘went deeper into vice to avoid being despised, 
and when there was no act by admitting to which I could rival my depraved 
companions, I used to pretend I had done things I had not done at all, so 
that my innocence should not lead my companions to scorn my lack of 
courage, and lest my chastity be taken as a mark of inferiority’705. 
   As the topic of this thesis is addiction, we might recognise a possible 
analogical link here with what has just been advanced as Augustine’s own 
understanding of his youthful excesses. Why do people today drink 
excessively or misuse certain pharmacological substances so that they 
become their ‘slaves’? This question is central to the thesis as a whole. But 
perhaps Augustine is here giving us a clue from the fourth century as to 
why things happen in the twenty first century. It has been proposed by 
some psychologists706 that there are a number of psychological types of 
personality that make people particularly vulnerable to substance 
dependency, particularly in the adolescent phase of development, such as 
group pressure. For some people, according to this theory, there is a need 
to be admired as an outstanding performer of whatever the group regards 
as its characteristic activity, and when that activity is, for example, drinking 
alcoholic beverages, the person who can drink most heavily may well be 
regarded as having some kind of exalted status. The writer of this thesis 
                                           
704 ibid 
705 ibid.  
706 See for example the article by Castellanos, N., P. J. Conrod and Clare Mackie, “Personality-targeted 
interventions delay the growth of adolescent drinking and binge drinking”. 
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has heard a man in his sixties, for example, boasting of being able to drink 
a bottle of whisky every day, and the implication seems clearly to be that 
doing this gave him a particular status among a group of hard drinking 
companions. The man concerned destroyed his liver and died within a few 
years of retirement, which may well reinforce our sense of the tragic 
element in addiction. But the mimetic, even competitive element at work 
here can perhaps help us to explain (in a way that Augustine would surely 
recognise looking at his own life) the extent to which peer group pressure 
can influence people in their behaviour, not least when this is self-
destructive. 
   And in raising the relevance of Augustine with specific reference to 
addictive phenomena, it should perhaps also be recorded that his mother, 
Monica, as a young woman had her own personal struggle against the use 
of alcohol as is recorded in the Confessions,707 where he describes her as 
being at one stage in the grip of a ‘foul addiction’ from which she was 
rescued by the intervention of a family servant who denounced her in 
front of her parents for her drinking habit. This fact may well have 
influenced Augustine, at least in the sense that as we shall see, he was 
opposed to the idea of taking nourishment for its ‘pleasure’ value rather 
than its use in a quasi-medicinal sense. 
   Having raised the issue of sensual enjoyment, and how this can be a 
perversion, at least in Augustine’s thoughts, of what bodily enjoyment is 
meant by God to be, it may be helpful to look at the article “Sweet 
Necessities” by Gilbert Meilaender708. 
                                           
707 Confessions, p.168. It is her struggle in this respect which has led to her being recognised as a patron saint of 
alcoholics, although her brief encounter with alcohol as described by Augustine may not have been as serious 
as that perhaps suggests. 
708 Gilbert Meilaender, “Sweet Necessities: Food, Sex and Saint Augustine”. 
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   It may seem to us strange that Augustine, as represented by Meilaender’s 
article, takes such a negative or admonitory view of the delight humanity 
can take in food and sexual activity. With regard to the former, he must 
have been aware of the charge brought against Jesus Christ that he was, to 
use the language of the King James Version of the English Bible ‘a glutton 
and a winebibber’, and that he was challenged on this aspect of his lifestyle, 
answering by reference to the apparently ‘demonic’ asceticism of John the 
Baptist contrasted with his own relaxed attitude to eating and drinking and 
the company of tax collectors and sinners709. What is significant in relation 
to this thesis is that Meilaender takes eating as an analogy for sexual 
relations. Both are natural human activities, and both have, in different 
ways, an element of necessity to them, as well as pleasure and desire, hence 
his title. We need to eat in order to survive as individuals; we need to 
reproduce in order to survive as humanity. This is true, even though some 
are called to a life of celibacy, as Augustine clearly believed himself to be. 
So what is the problem that Augustine is addressing when he considers 
human pleasure in eating and sexual intercourse?  Although Augustine 
does not in any quasi Manichean sense regard them as essentially morally 
suspect in themselves, he nevertheless concerns himself with questions 
about the legitimacy, in theological terms, of experiencing pleasure from 
these activities. Meilaender cites two particular loci for this concern, 
namely City of God, Book 14, and Confessions, Book 10. In the former, he 
describes human sinfulness, the sinfulness that goes with any kind of over-
indulgence, as having both physical and spiritual dimensions. There can 
                                           
709 Matthew 11:19//Luke 7:31-35.In this article, Meilaender’s objective is to demonstrate that Augustine is 
wrong in his assertion that sexual activity must at all times be linked to the wish to reproduce. He also 
suggests that the Roman Catholic Church has always been in error in using Augustine’s (as he thinks flawed) 
argument as a basis for rejecting the practice of contraception within marriage. 
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be overindulgence in the engagement in sexual activity or the taking of 
wine, but also in the kind of sinfulness towards others that is entailed in 
such attitudes as quarrelsomeness and jealousy. Augustine is right, 
Meilaender argues, to reject ‘the Stoic ideal of apatheia’ on the grounds that 
it is not necessary ‘for us to try to live without experiencing the passions 
of bodily life’ even though some of the more unpleasant ones (such as 
fear) will be absent in Heaven. What Augustine is asserting, in his analysis 
of pleasure in connection with the ‘sweet necessities of life’ is to be seen 
as the separation of pleasure from the true purpose of the act being 
considered. In the case of food, he argues, food is a necessity rather like 
forms of medication. Sex is necessary because it reproduces the human 
species. But to take food just for the pleasure of eating, or to engage in 
sexual intercourse just for the pleasure it provides while deliberately 
separating it from the will or means of reproduction, puts these activities 
into an area which is capable of being regarded as sinful. 
   The other main example of his thought on pleasure reported by 
Meilaender is the section in the Confessions, Book 10, 30-41, where, in a 
section described by Robert O’Connell as ‘some of the most depressing 
reading in all of Christian literature’710, Augustine reviews, in  an essentially 
negative way, his personal record of behaviour since his conversion. His 
guidelines for doing so come from the First Epistle of St. John, in relation 
to fleshly lust, the ‘lust of the eyes’, and pride711. This self-analysis, 
O’Connell says, has to do with Augustine’s worries about the pleasure he 
takes in sensual experiences. Why then is he so troubled? This is at the 
heart of the article by Meilaender who then proposes a solution to the 
                                           
710 Robert O’Connell, St. Augustine’s Confessions, The Odyssey of Soul, p.133, cited by Meilaender, op. cit., p.5. 
711 Meilaender, “Sweet Necessities”, p.5. 
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problem, which contains similarities in his discussion of pleasure in 
relation to both food and sex. There is then in Augustine’s thought, and 
notwithstanding his refusal to adopt the solution that rejects fleshly 
pleasures on principle, a belief that the pursuit of pleasure is in some sense 
to be regarded as morally or spiritually suspect. Why did Augustine believe 
this? The answer lies for Augustine in the relationship between the 
external material world and the interior spiritual world in which human 
beings relate to and enjoy God. It is when the individual indulges in the 
outward pleasures to excess that the true pleasure which is internal and 
spiritual is put into the background, and it may perhaps be that Augustine, 
the trained rhetorician, is deliberately exaggerating his case to emphasize 
what for him - and as he hopes it will become for his readers - is the delight 
of the soul in heavenly rewards. To desire God is the greatest good; 
anything other or less than this is in a sense a false good, a distorted desire. 
 
                           What Then Can Be Done To Remedy The Situation When Desire Has  
                           Been Distorted? 
   It is perhaps in his debate with the Pelagians that Augustine’s answer to 
this question comes clearest. As Chadwick points out712, ‘The two men 
were agreed on far more than that on which they disagreed’, but Pelagius 
significantly denied that original sin was literally inherited from one’s 
parents, a view with which Augustine could not agree partly because of his 
‘belief that no pain or loss is undeserved’713. Neither could he concur with 
Pelagius’ view of the possibility of escaping sinful behaviour by free 
choice. Human beings can ‘only be grateful for grace they had done 
                                           
712 Henry Chadwick, Augustine, p.109. 
713 ibid. 
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nothing to deserve’714.The concept of will is clearly embedded in this 
process, and Christopher Cook draws attention to this in his book Alcohol, 
Addiction and Christian Ethics in the chapter where he gives extended 
attention to Augustine’s ideas about the divided will715. The problem is 
also, as Cook observes, discussed in detail by Eleonore Stump716 in The 
Cambridge Companion to Augustine. What is addressed here is the concept of 
first and second order volition. What is meant by this is that, to use the 
example she gives, a person may have a desire to smoke cigarettes (first 
order volition) and a desire to quit smoking (second order volition). What 
is entailed in this is a conflict between the two elements of the will, and 
the question then becomes what can be done to resolve it in a way that is 
acceptable to the person with the conflict. This has implications for the 
phenomenon of addiction, if we accept the premise that at some stage, 
before becoming psychologically or physiologically addicted (to alcohol 
for example), the individual has choice about whether to indulge in the 
activity or not. 
   What we are dealing with here may well be the kind of thing that is meant 
by the concept of ‘ultimate and penultimate reality’717. Paul Janz and David 
Ford describe these two realities in detail, basing their views on the 
theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, suggesting that the true goal of pursuit 
for the Christian will be the ultimate reality which is the enjoyment of 
                                           
714 ibid. 
715 See Christopher Cook, Alcohol, Addiction and Christian Ethics, pp.53ff. 
716 Eleonore Stump in The Cambridge Companion to Augustine, chapter 10, pp. 124-127. She is commenting on 
and extending the argument of H. Frankfurt in his article “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibilities”, 
originally published in the Journal of Philosophy, 1969, volume 66, pp. 829-839. 
717 See: Paul Janz, God, The Mind’s Desire: Reference, Reason and Christian Thinking. 
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God, in contrast to the enjoyment of lesser, contingent realities such as 
can be provided by the external world718. 
   When the individual has been ‘seduced’ into desires that are penultimate, 
therefore, and have journeyed away from God, to use Augustine’s 
language, what can be done to deal with the problem? This was not simply 
a theoretical concern for Augustine. Much of his own journey, his struggle 
towards the life of a faithful Catholic Christian, was embedded in his 
conflicting desires with regard to the desires of the flesh, and sexual desire 
in particular. This journey is detailed for us supremely in the Confessions, 
which Brian Horne regards as epoch making in its significance as a work 
of literature because of its extraordinary and original capacity for self-
reflexivity719. 
   It was therefore essential for Augustine in terms of his spiritual 
development to initiate a return journey from where his outward journey 
had led him, namely into the Manichean world in religious and 
philosophical terms, and the world of sexual experience and commitment, 
to the point of forming a long term relationship with an unnamed woman 
and fathering a child, Adeodatus. 
   The key elements of this return journey were not for him just a matter 
of intellectual speculation, although, as he tells us in the Confessions, he did 
find the teaching of a leading Manichean remarkably unsatisfactory720. In 
fact this Faustus’s ignorance on many subjects on which Augustine 
                                           
718 See David Ford, The Future of Christian Theology, p.113ff. on this as well: Ford and Janz base their approach 
on Bonhoeffer’s Ethics in relation to penultimate desires. 
719 Brian Horne, “Person as Confession: Augustine of Hippo”, in Christoph Schwöbel and Colin Gunton, 
eds., Persons Divine and Human, pp. 65ff. Horne is however cautious about the extent to which we should 
assume that the book is ‘altogether faithful to reality’.  
720 Augustine, Confessions, p. 77f, where he describes the arrival of the teacher Faustus, whom he found 
‘gracious and pleasant with words’ but concluded that they ‘who had promised that he would be so good 
were not good judges. He seemed to them prudent and wise because he charmed them by the way he talked.’ 
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consulted him alerted him to the Manichean’s lack of genuine knowledge 
and understanding that were to some extent (though not to the sharp 
witted Augustine) disguised by his eloquence and agreeable nature721. 
   Certain significant people however helped Augustine to make what he 
himself describes as the return journey of the Prodigal Son in relation to 
his own spiritual enlightenment. Chief among these were his mother 
Monica, the great Bishop of Milan Ambrose, and Augustine’s friend 
Victorinus. 
   We have been addressing these issues of example in terms of 
Augustine’s return journey, and this idea of a return journey has 
considerable importance in our attempt to make sense of human 
addictions – distorted or excessive desires, or desire for things of lesser, 
penultimate importance than the ultimate goods we can enjoy – because 
it points out that the return journey may be connected with exemplary or 
mimetic factors. One obvious parallel to that lies in the observation that 
most drug and alcohol treatment and rehabilitation programmes are led 
by people who have had similar problems in the past but have found ways 
of escaping from the problems associated with substance and process 
addictions, drugs, alcohol, gambling, and many others. We learn best, it 
seems, not just by word but by example. 
 
3.7 Contemporary Writers 
 
Introduction 
                                           
721 Confessions, p.79. 
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   We have explored the writings of Saint Paul and Saint Augustine on the 
question of desire, and their ambivalent view of how expressions of desire might 
be accommodated within the Church. Furthermore, there is a sense, particularly 
in Augustine’s writing, that the ordinary human desires that motivate behaviour 
may perhaps best be seen, to use a Platonic style of vocabulary, as at best 
shadows of a greater reality, which is a fundamental human desire for God, 
because ‘Our hearts are restless until they rest in you’. 
   We will now look to the early years of the twenty first century to see how some 
contemporary theological writers have looked at the issue of desire and its place 
within Christian life. The writers to be considered in this context, chosen 
because it is believed that each has a distinct and valuable contribution to make 
to the quest for understanding desire, are David Ford, Timothy Gorringe and 
Christopher Cook. 
 
3.7.1 David Ford. 
   David Ford is currently Regius Professor of Divinity in the University 
of Cambridge. He was born in Dublin, and studied theology in Dublin, 
Cambridge, Yale and Tübingen. He was for some years a lecturer in 
theology at the University of Birmingham before moving to Cambridge. 
His many publications include Jubilate: Theology in Praise (with Daniel W 
Hardy) Self and Salvation: Being Transformed. He is particularly interested in 
transformation theology in relation to human desire – for example he uses 
the expression the ‘re-education of desire’ in his recent books. In order to 
understand his theological background here we will briefly, in relation to 
our pursuit of the concept of desire, consider Christian Wisdom722 and the 
                                           
722 David Ford, Christian Wisdom. 
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Future of Theology723. In Christian Wisdom he articulates a contemporary 
Christian wisdom theology that builds on and complements what is to be 
found in the Tanach, particularly in the book of Job, where we find a 
detailed ‘theodicy’ unlike anything else in the Jewish scriptures, as it sets 
out a quasi-philosophical dialogue between one human being and God, as 
a result of Job’s intolerable suffering. In this situation, and despite the 
inadequacy of the contribution of his so-called ‘comforters’, Job wrestles 
with his desire for God set against the temptation to believe that God has 
abandoned him. 
   Ford shows how just as the heart of Jewish wisdom can be found in the 
cries of Job in the midst of his spiritual testing, so in the New Testament 
we may look to the work of Saint Luke to find a wisdom literature that has 
traction for today’s Christian. What is meant by this, to use Ford’s own 
vocabulary, is ‘the embracing optative mood of Christian wisdom’724. In 
the account of the birth of John the Baptist Zechariah and Elizabeth have 
longed for a child, and made this the subject of their prayer. Their prayer 
has been heard, and the covenantal relationship between God and his 
longing people is confirmed both in their parenthood of John and in the 
calling of Mary to be the mother of the saviour Jesus, so that the two birth 
narratives are interwoven. What is at stake here is a creative mingling of 
human desire and longing and the will of God: ‘[Mary’s] optative response 
became for much subsequent Christian theology and spirituality the core 
model of human desire attuned to divine desire725’. And this collocation of 
human and divine desire found, Ford continues, a further and even more 
profound expression the ministry of Jesus, so that we find, for example, 
                                           
723 David Ford, The Future of Christian Theology. 
724 Ford, Christian Wisdom, p.153. 
725 op. cit., p.156. 
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that the coming to him of the Holy Spirit at his baptism occurred – 
specifically – when he was praying. 
   In The Future of Theology Ford develops this line of argument in terms of 
the contrasting moods of experience identified as the ‘indicative’, which is 
essentially narrative in content, and the ‘imperative’, which focuses on 
theologically centred ethical demands. For Ford, this double dynamic 
avoids two pitfalls in theological discourse: on the one hand it steers clear 
of a rigid dogmatism of a kind that has a ‘heavy investment in telling 
members exactly what to believe and what to do, and in limiting any scope 
for questioning and exploring’726; on the other it refuses types of liberalism 
that have no fixed point and are therefore so ‘fragmented that they seem 
to lack the capacity to make definite affirmations or give any clear guidance 
for living’727. 
   Ford describes The Future of Christian Theology, as a ‘manifesto’728 for the 
task of theology for the next generation. In chapter 4 he explores the 
concept of desire in greatest detail. As a way into this line of thought Ford 
brings to the attention of the reader the ideas contained in the longest of 
the psalms, Psalm 119. This psalm is about the passionate desire of 
humanity for God729. He gives many examples of this730: they are all 
concerned with the deepest desires of humankind, in terms of ‘mercy, fear, 
faithfulness, steadfast love, wisdom, sweetness, light, praise, joy, salvation, 
justice, cries, promises, truth and memory’731. In other words, this psalm, 
                                           
726 Ford, op. cit., p.70. 
727 ibid. 
728 This word can be found for example in David Kelsey’s comments inside the front cover of the book, 
under the heading ‘Praise for The Future of Christian Theology’ and in the introduction to the book by Ford 
himself (p.xi). 
729 Ford, The Future of Christian Theology, p.73. 
730 ibid. Verses 14, 15, 32, 47, 49 and 66, have this theme, for example, but he makes the point that the 
language of the whole psalm is full of images of longing for and delighting in the will of God. 
731 ibid. 
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perhaps more than any other, encapsulates the whole range of human 
desiring and emotional response to life and to God. And at the heart of 
this is what Ford calls the ‘leading mood’, the ‘optative of passionate 
desire’732. 
   There is no obvious sense here of passionate desire as being evil or even 
suspect; on the contrary, it is a vital element in the spiritual life of the 
worshipper whether Jewish (as in the case of those who wrote and sang 
the original Hebrew version of Psalm 119) or Christian (those who have 
adopted the Jewish scriptures as part of their own pattern of worship). 
Does Ford therefore mean to imply that there is no problem with human 
desire? That is clearly not the case because as we shall see, Ford speaks 
later not just of desire in a generic sense, but as something which needs to 
stand under the judgement of God: desire, in some way needs to be 
transformed, and that idea is what we will now investigate. 
   Ford expresses the problem in these terms:733 
The problem – which is more good news than a problem – is God 
and God’s initiative. Theologically, our affirming depends on the 
divine voice – us being affirmed by God; our commanding and 
obeying depend on us being commanded by God; our questioning 
is premised on us being searched and questioned by God; our 
exploring springs from confidence in the abundance and endless 
surprises of God; and our desiring is a response to being attracted, 
desired, and loved by God. 
 
   This divine initiative has two particular formats: in addition to the 
initiative-taking, active, commanding God, there is also, Ford 
acknowledges, a side of God that is characterised by silence, because it is 
within the space created by God’s silence that God, ‘without 
compromising the priority and freedom of God’ becomes also a listener, 
and this capacity of God as a listener is what ‘draws us into our own ever 
                                           
732 Ford, op. cit., p.73. 
733  op. cit., p.82. 
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more attentive listening to the affirmations, commands, questions, 
possibilities and desires’734. 
   How might this theological approach help us with our overall concern 
with addiction as an example of disordered or excessive desire? What Ford 
is suggesting is that desire, far from being in some way at war with 
appropriate ways of engaging with God, is actually at the centre of the 
picture for the Christian man and woman. In fact there is a need for 
intensification of God centred desire, fuelled by praise, that expresses – 
and even expands – our capacity for relating to God735. What is entailed in 
this, on a positive note, is the possibility of the spiritual enhancement of 
life by turning from an earthbound set of desires (food, drink, clothing 
etc.) towards a way of thinking that is formed by an encounter with the 
kingdom values of the Gospel, attitudes focused by divine love and justice 
towards the world, and challenges the believer to follow that path. 
   There is perhaps room for some dissatisfaction with what Ford has 
offered in the current book. It is a positive, affirmative and optimistic type 
of theology. There seems to be an underlying assumption that human 
beings are in principle reasonable, good, honest, creative and responsible 
and can freely choose which path to take, not least in matters of ethical 
concern. But is that really a tenable argument? There is in Ford’s writing 
much engagement with the theology of Bonhoeffer, particularly in terms 
of the Cross as a sign of redemption, not least when we consider the evil 
embedded in the Nazi régime that Bonhoeffer opposed. And yet there 
seems here to be some disconnection from the reality of such evil and the 
flawed, ambiguous moral nature of humanity as whole. We need perhaps 
                                           
734  op. cit., p.83. 
735 He links this for example with St. Augustine’s idea of the soul being stretched in its capacity for    
    engaging with God. See Ford, op. cit. p.82. 
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to return at this point to the earlier work, Christian Wisdom, where Ford has 
more to say about the need for desire to be transformed. In this context, 
what is being proposed is that desire alone is not enough. Ordinary human 
desire is categorised in St. Luke’s Gospel for example in terms of striving 
to obtain earthly rewards and blessings, food, drink, clothing, and the 
worry that can so often accompany the pursuit of these objectives736. 
Transformed desire entails striving not for these things but for the values 
that can be associated most readily with the pursuit of God’s kingdom, 
and can be characterised in terms of love and generosity rooted in the 
compassion of God, and hospitality given to those who need it, not to 
those who will repay it’737. This re-education of desire has an 
uncompromising element to it, Ford argues at this point, because 
ultimately, as in the case of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, it may call for the 
ultimate personal sacrifice, the laying down of one’s own life rather than 
compromise with the kingdom values of the Gospel. In Lukan terms this 
is clearly expressed by the words ‘What does it profit them if they gain the 
whole world, but lose or forfeit themselves?’738. This ethic of the absolute 
demand is extreme, and yet there is a logical progression at work: to 
embrace the kingdom values of the Gospel is to be utterly open to the 
transformation of desire from a concern with worldly things to a life of 
complete trust in God that even embraces death when necessary rather 
than compromise what one has committed oneself to. 
   The person who has been caught up in a pattern of life characterised by 
addiction is perhaps at that stage of his or her life a long way from the 
state in which such positive commitment can be made, at least in terms of 
                                           
736 See Ford, Christian Wisdom, p.159, citing, for example, Luke 12:29-34. 
737 Ford, Christian Wisdom, p.159. 
738 ibid, citing Luke 9:25. 
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religious commitment. And yet the testimony of many addicts bears 
witness to the possibility of addiction being overcome and life being 
transformed in a variety of ways. Kelly Smith, the England women’s 
Football player, expresses it in her autobiography, writing of her own 
personal battle against alcohol dependency739: 
When my drinking was spiralling out of control, my life was 
spiralling out of control. I was lucky. I got the help and the 
support to get through it. I had to learn and grow before I could 
move forward. I had to become stronger in myself so I did not 
have to rely on drink for my happiness. 
 
   Many people who have experienced the hard journey from substance 
dependency to freedom and a new beginning would recognise their own 
journey here. From a theological point of view, what is perhaps most 
significant is the suggestion made here that addiction, to use Kelly Smith’s 
expression, has an element of reliance in it, reliance on something that is 
harmful, whereas desire for, and dependence on worthwhile objects, 
human and divine, may well prove to be an effective means of escaping 
from the prison of addiction into freedom and creativity. 
   It remains open to speculation, however, whether Ford really deals fully 
in either book with the concept of human choice when that appears to be 
seriously flawed, and whether he overestimates human capacity for 
returning to a more constructive manner of living through one’s own 
efforts. For the orthodox Christian it might well be objected here that only 
divine grace, freely given and humbly accepted can rescue an individual 
from destructive lifestyles such as addiction to alcohol or the kind of non-
therapeutic drugs we have been considering. There is then much that we 
can take from Ford’s positive, wisdom based approach to human theology 
                                           
739 Kelly Smith, Footballer: My Story, p.150. 
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and ethics and his future oriented manifesto in The Future of Christian 
Theology. But his books raises some unanswered problems about the nature 
of the human rebellion against that kind of co-operative interaction with 
God which is called sin, and the capacity of human beings to deal with 
that negative element themselves. It is perhaps true to suggest that despite 
his profound humanity and engaging theological insight, Ford’s work is 




3.7.2 T.F. Gorringe  
   Timothy Gorringe is the St. Luke’s Professor of Theological Studies at 
the University of Exeter. His book The Education of Desire 740 sees concern 
for expression of human life through senses - hearing, sight, touch, taste 
etc. - as consistent with Christian spiritual experience, but recognises need 
for ‘education of the senses’ as well as valuing what is purely instinctive. 
He attempts to place a positive interpretation of human desire within the 
framework of Christian theology, as opposed to a view of sensual 
experience which is either neutral or negative in tone. It therefore sits well 
within the approach that is taken in this thesis, namely that we will fail to 
understand the pathologically disordered use of certain substances or 
activities unless we begin by recognising their positive value in human life 
from a theological perspective. 
   Gorringe looks at human desire as a ‘given’ in terms of human 
experience and regards the expression of desire through physical enacting 
                                           
 740 T.F. Gorringe, The Education of Desire: towards a Theology of the Senses. 
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of desire as belonging to a range or stratification of evaluation from the 
most basic to the most spiritually enlightened741. This gives us a platform 
from which to view human desire as a good and necessary thing, before 
asking what has gone wrong when desire becomes addictive – as in the 
case of a person becoming a slave to alcohol or drugs for example. 
   So what does Gorringe have to offer by way of interpreting the 
expression of human desire in this positive light, and what does he mean 
by his suggestion that desire may be in need of ‘education’? He links desire 
with the physical senses: 
 
1) Hearing. The concept of hearing is fundamental to the Christian 
proclamation, as instantiated in the opening line of St. John’s 
Gospel, itself providing an echo of earlier scriptural examples of 
God ‘speaking’ in a way that can be heard and interpreted, 
principally through the prophets742. And although Plato, Gorringe 
says, prioritised sight over hearing, Gorringe starts with hearing 
because he is speaking ‘within the Judaeo-Christian tradition’743. It 
is through hearing that we can have some conception of ‘the 
graciousness of God’s presence’744. That presence is frequently 
heard as a ‘still small voice’ rather than something more ‘stentorian’ 
in volume. Thus the voice of God ‘has usually been taken to be the 
voice of conscience or of reason’745. But there is a sense in which 
language ultimately fails to convey the nature of God with 
                                           
741 One might think here perhaps in a secular model of the ‘hierarchy of needs’ psychology of Abraham   
Maslow, such as he describes in his book Towards a Psychology of Being. 
 742 Gorringe, op. cit., p.13. 
 743 ibid. 
 744 Gorringe, op. cit., p.15. 
 745 ibid. 
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recognition here of the defeat of mere language which lies, for 
example, at the heart of the poems of St. John of the Cross746. And 
despite Plato’s strictures on music747, Aristotle sees it as a way of 
expressing human emotions, and also as contributing to ‘the 
cultivation of our minds and the growth of moral wisdom748. 
Looking at music from a theological viewpoint, Gorringe749 makes 
a case for God as:  
the origin of music’s power to express emotion, to lead us to 
dance, to reduce us to tears. All this has its origin in God, 
and we explore the depths of God’s world and of it 
imaginative possibilities in making music. Barth famously 
said that the music of Mozart caused us to hear the peace 
past understanding in creation, but there is joy and tragedy 
to hear as well, stemming from the depths of God’s 
imagination. 
 
   In light of this, we are seeing an argument that will apply equally 
to the other four senses, concerning the physical attributes as having 
the capacity to be disclosers of the person and nature of God, 
whether in a literal verbal sense, or through the medium of art or 
music. Desire for these experiences is then linked to a desire for 
God. 
 
2) Sight.  Gorringe points out that ‘more than any of the other senses, 
[sight] is responsible for giving us our world’750. He speaks of the 
many well used phrases, and figures of speech, that refer to sight, 
such as ‘seeing is believing’ and ‘I couldn’t believe my eyes’. This is 
                                           
 746 The reference given here by Gorringe is to the writings of George Steiner. He is here quoting  
       from G. Steiner, “Silence and the Poet” in Language and Silence, p.58. 
 747 He was of the opinion, Gorringe says, that music casts a spell and this is something that is clearly 
       opposed to the exercise of pure reason. 
 748 op. cit., p.16, citing Aristotle, Politics, 1337a. 
749  ibid. 
750 Gorringe, op. cit., p.18. 
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linked in his view with a medieval understanding of the significance 
of light as ‘the most direct manifestation of God’751. And in a 
Platonic sense, as Otto von Simson is recorded as saying, ‘light is 
the most noble of natural phenomena, the least material, the closest 
approximation to pure form’752. What is at stake here is an awareness 
of the ability of light and vision to provide human beings with a 
reflection of the very beauty of God in God’s most fundamental and 
gracious being. This of course in no way is meant to suggest that 
people who do not have physical sight cannot experience these 
aspects of God, and Gorringe later explores the senses in relation 
to those who are partly or wholly deprived of one or more of them. 
But it does suggest that the enjoyment of sight is an experience that 
takes us very close to the experience of God, an experience 
described very vividly in Ezekiel in terms of fire and brightness753. 
 
3) Touch. Gorringe points out that, surprisingly perhaps, Aristotle held 
touch in very high regard, because in touch we are able to reach 
‘exactness of discrimination’754. It is in fact because of this sense 
above all, Aristotle believed, that humanity can be seen as ‘the most 
intelligent of animals’755: the idea of touch as a revealer of truth on 
the same level at least as sight and hearing is important in this 
context. 
   In theological terms, Gorringe continues, it is Emmanuel Levinas 
who recognises, followed by Enrique Dussel, the importance of 
                                           
 751 ibid. 
752 ibid, quoting from O von Simson, The Gothic Cathedral, p.49-55. 
 753 Gorringe, op. cit., p. 19, quoting from Ezekiel 1:4. 
 754 Gorringe, op. cit., p.20, quoting Aristotle, On the Soul, II, 9, 421a21. 
 755 ibid. 
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physical intimacy in relation to touch. Thus the idea of the ‘caress’ 
is brought into sharp focus, not least in the recognition of the 
important part played by affection appropriately provided for a child 
by her parents in our sense of ‘security and self-worth’. This can be 
recapitulated in adult life in the touch of a lover, and Gorringe 
quotes Dussel on this point, who observes that there is a gradation 
of touch from the cautious exploration of the early part of the 
relationship that is part of a journey towards full sexual intimacy756. 
   Furthermore, touch is the medium through which healing can be 
effected, not least in the Gospel stories of healing on the part of 
Jesus Christ. Such healing overruled - in a way that many found 
shocking -  the rules of the society of his day about touch, 
particularly in the touching of a leper757. This perhaps has a modern 
counterpart in the difficulties that some people have felt over 
touching a person with Aids. And he records the alienation felt by a 
European woman who when living in India was very  aware of the 
physical deprivation she felt because touch, particularly, one 
assumes, between people of the opposite sexes, was not permitted 
in most social situations. 
   Gorringe quotes at length a passage from a book by Ann Briggs758 
that brings the theological importance of the desire for and 
experience of touch into the foreground because she is clear that 
although religious experiences of the kind that come from time to 
time in worship and elsewhere are of great importance, it is in the 
                                           
 756 op. cit., p.21, quoting E. Dussel, Philosophy of Liberation, p.81. 
 757 The story of the healing of a leper as recorded in Mark 1:41-42 is given as an example of this by 
      Gorringe. 
758 See: A. Briggs in K. Galloway (ed.) Dreaming of Eden, p.42-43, cited by Gorringe, The Education of Desire, 
p.22. 
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physical embrace of a lover that she knows herself ‘loved and 
accepted for what I am, not what I pretend to be, that I know there 
is a God who enjoys life!’. She thus accepts vulnerability in such 
situations  only because there is an underpinning sense of being held 
at such times and therefore willingness to take the risk of openness 
to another being, even though such openness can be – and often is 
– abused. Touch is therefore at the heart of the experience of 
intimacy. And in such intimacy the joy of God is found for many as 
well as human joy. 
 
4) Taste. Unlike the other senses taste is much more susceptible to 
change because the taste buds are, he informs us, renewed on a 
regular basis, about every ten days. But taste has its importance, not 
least when, as in the case of Dominique Bauby, the editor of Elle 
magazine who suffered from locked-in syndrome following a 
stroke, taste acquires the character of memory because normal 
feeding methods are no longer possible759. 
    Taste has in Gorringe’s understanding an important 
discriminatory role. We talk about people who have good taste or 
do not: in a theological sense it can be used in terms of our 
relationship with God as is instanced in the language of the Psalms, 
and other books of the Bible where we are bidden as in Psalm 34:8 
(and in Job 20:18) to ‘taste and see that the Lord is good’. 
    Although Gorringe does not devote a large section of this chapter 
to taste, he does make the important point760 that: 
                                           
759 Gorringe, The Education of Desire, p.23. 
760 op. cit., p.24. 
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Taste, in its infinite richness, is a sign of grace, the overwhelming 
abundance and goodness and beauty of what God has given us,  
which is why it is so beautiful and proper to ‘say grace’ before 
meals. 
 
    This is a highly important point with respect to the subject of 
addiction. Damian Thompson, in The Fix, regards taste as a 
collateral casualty of addiction when the enjoyment of such things 
as good wine because of their flavour collapses into a need for 
continual replacement of the effects of alcohol: so taste becomes a 
subsidiary or ultimately redundant part of the experience of 
consuming the drink. 
 
5) Smell. The sense of smell is the final category in this chapter of 
Gorringe’s book. Here too, there are both literal and metaphorical 
aspects, as when we speak of perverse human acts that ‘stink to high 
heaven’761. Smell is a much more ambiguous factor in the range of 
the senses; although there can be this negative side there is much 
about smell that has positive connotations, not least in terms of 
religious experience, as Gorringe reminds us762: 
With his profound classical education I am surprised that 
Freud did not know the elder Pliny’s remark that ‘the 
pleasure of perfume is among the most elegant and also the 
most honourable enjoyments in life’. Paul seems to have 
shared the same view because he describes the Church as 
‘the aroma of Christ to God among those who are being 
saved (2 Corinthians 2:15)’. 
 
   He continues by noting the varying assessments of people as 
disparate as St. Francis of Assisi and Aldous Huxley, both of whom 
seem to have discovered more reality in dirt and ‘foulness’ than in 
the fragrance of artificial perfumes. 
                                           
761 op. cit., p.25. 
762 ibid. 
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   Gorringe concludes his discussion of the theological significance 
of smell by relating it to what he terms ‘the economy of grace’763. 
What he means by this is that in many ways smell is irrelevant, in 
evolutionary terms, to human beings, but it is gifted to us by God 
without a discernible need for its existence in our human 
environment. 
   We have been reviewing in this section of the discussion of human 
desire the ways in which the physical senses play their part in desiring and 
appreciating the natural world, in terms of hearing, sight, touch, taste and 
smell. What conclusions does Gorringe himself draw from his own 
discussion, and what does he then mean by emphasizing the need for what 
he terms the education of the senses? In a lengthy quotation from Bishop 
Jeremy Taylor, Gorringe observes that in contrast to a more puritanical 
assessment of the role of the senses in theology, Taylor was positive about 
enjoyment of sensual experiences, and stated that ‘God has given us leave 
to be delighted in those things, which he has made to that purpose, that 
we may also be delighted in him that gives them’764. The senses are then 
(as Barth observed), he continues, the means by which human beings may 
be regarded as co-creators with God, and therefore constitute ‘God’s way 
of exploring the possibilities and reaches of God’s creation, precisely in 
and through the senses’765. Furthermore, he says766: 
The kingdom is God’s project, and in that project all the senses are 
passionately, and sometimes wildly, affirmed. In and through 
bodies, and through the exercise of our senses, God moves 
towards the creation of a new world, a world of the celebration 
and affirmation  of bodies, and therefore of the creator who 
                                           
763 Gorringe, op. cit., p.26. 
764 from Jeremy Taylor, Sermons, “The House of Feasting’, cited in S. Schimmel, The Seven Deadly Sins, p.122, 
quoted by Gorringe, op. cit., p.26. 
765 Gorringe, op. cit., p.27. 
766 ibid. 
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imagined them and gave us them materially, as the consummate 
sign of the grace of God’s essential nature. 
 
   All of this is of course very positive in its theological interpretation of 
the role of the senses in relation to creation and God’s future kingdom. 
But that is not the whole picture for Gorringe. Our engagement with the 
senses can become distorted in a number of ways. It is when this occurs 
that we need what he defines as the ‘education’ of desire, a concept which 
he explores in detail in chapter 4 of the book. So how can the use of the 
senses go astray, and how can our engagement with the physical world of 
the senses be educated, or perhaps re-educated? 
   The problem, Gorringe argues, is that in our contemporary society the 
human senses provide pleasure and enjoyment of life but are also the 
means by which we can become enslaved by hedonism and consumerism, 
which are the negative poles of sensuality. As we walk in our cities and 
towns, ‘From every window larger than life-size pictures of children, 
young women and young men, but especially young women, urge you not 
only to buy clothes, soaps, perfumes, sportswear- items naturally 
associated with the body, but cars, houses, beer, wine, holidays, garden 
equipment, insurance – you name it’767. The problem with this, he 
continues, is that ‘Consumer capitalism exploits the body, as John O’Neill 
argues, by teaching us “to disvalue it in its natural state and to revalue it 
only once it has been sold grace, spontaneity, vivaciousness, bounce, 
confidence, smoothness and freshness”’768. What is being presented here 
is an implicit narcissism in which the ways in which our imperfect bodies 
can be enhanced to fit some notional template of excellence or even 
                                           
767 op. cit., p.84. 
768 ibid, citing Jon O’Neill, Five Bodies, p.101. 
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perfection solely for the purpose of maximising the profits of the 
companies that supply these goods. 
   It might seem that this rejection of the consumerist driven 
encouragement to buy to enhance our bodies is a kind of neo-Puritanism. 
But to refute this claim, Gorringe explores the concept of basic human 
desire in theological terms, not rejecting such concepts as desire and 
pleasure in themselves, but recognising that they can lead away from 
enjoyment of what is most important in life. He argues this case with 
reference for example to Paul’s concern, expressed in Romans 1:24, that 
the pursuit of pleasures (a pursuit paradoxically seemingly implanted by 
God) locates such pursuits at the place in our lives which actually belongs 
to God: to worship a lesser God is to become enslaved to things that can 
bring no ultimate satisfaction. 
   This perhaps gives a rather negative view of desire and pleasure, and this 
negative view was pursued by some early Christian writers such as 
Augustine of Hippo, as we observed in his theology earlier. Gorringe 
however turns at this point to the secular writings on desire to be found 
in Plato and Aristotle, where the subject is analysed in detail. For Plato, he 
says, desire is principally to be seen as indicating a lack of something, as 
would be the case with the experience of hunger or thirst, for example. 
On the other hand, Plato is sceptical about the value of pleasure; it has at 
most a tertiary role to play in relation to the first order reality of what is 
measured and appropriate and the second order which refers to what is 
‘proportioned and beautiful, and what is perfect and satisfying’769. This, 
says Gorringe, echoes the New Testament ‘suspicion of pleasure’ 
                                           
769 Gorringe, The Education of the Senses, p.87. 
 292 
suggested by the fact that the word for pleasure, rarely used in the New 
Testament, always has a negative spin. Again, for Plato, there is the danger 
that excessive concern with pleasure may lead human beings into a form 
of slavery, as he comments in The Republic770. There is also a lowly place 
assigned to erotic love, which is compared unfavourably with the 
attainment of ‘the very soul of beauty’771. 
   Aristotle also concerned himself with desire, and uses the word ‘appetite’ 
to define it, Gorringe continues. He seems to have placed a higher value 
on pleasure than Plato did, but he too expressed concern about excessive 
appetite. This, Gorringe comments, he regards as ‘self-indulgence and a 
form of childishness’772. There are however authentic pleasures, which 
have their proper place within the totality of what it means to be human. 
   The Christian literature that followed from Plato and his contemporaries 
is discussed next by Gorringe, and in particular the writings of St. 
Augustine. As Gorringe observes, Augustine concerns himself with the 
problem of ‘concupiscence’. At the heart of what Augustine proposes, 
however, is the argument that is being put forward in this thesis in regard 
to addiction, namely that whatever we may see as the object of our desires 
as human beings, the fact is that underlying all desire, and not always 
recognised, there is in all human beings a deep desire for God. Gorringe 
cites Augustine himself in the opening lines of the Confessions: ‘To praise 
you is the desire of man… You stir man to take pleasure in praising you, 
and our heart is restless until it rests in you’773. Gorringe shows how within 
                                           
770 Plato, The Republic IV, 442a, cited by Gorringe, op. cit., p.87. 
771 Plato, The Symposium, 211d. Gorringe refers to the work of Catherine Pickstock at this point, who argues 
that in The Phaedrus Plato gives a more positive value to physical experience and enjoyment, so there is some 
ambiguity in Plato’s thought, which fed, via Plotinus, into Christian thought. See: C. Pickstock, After Writing, 
p. 14. 
772 Gorringe, op. cit., p.88., citing Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, 3.11. 
773 Augustine, Confessions, p.1, quoted by Gorringe, The Education of Desire, p.88. 
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the canon of Christian literature, from Augustine through Bernard of 
Clairvaux and Thomas Aquinas, there is this sense of the human heart and 
its desires being directed towards the loved object, and this object, in its 
highest form, is about union, about a relationship not with inanimate 
objects but with another living being, and ultimately God – ‘the true object 
of our desire’774. And this train of thought continues in more recent 
studies, Gorringe continues, such as in the work of the Benedictine Dom 
Sebastian Moore, who argues, like Augustine, that ‘Real desire is what the 
cross empowers, bringing us to the death that its liberation entails. The 
death is the death of our present ego, whose perpetuation is the work of 
egoism posing as desire’775. Could addiction, then, be one form that this 
self-perpetuating egoism takes? What is being argued in this thesis is that 
addiction comes about when the ultimate desire is replaced, for some 
reason, with what is penultimate and - ultimately - unable to deliver the 
rewards that it promises, hence the need to engage in the activity more 
and more to find a satisfaction that it can never bring. 
   Gorringe recognises the important nature of desire in human activity as 
a motivating force, and it is something which can be both humanly and 
spiritually creative. But that is not, he argues, the whole picture. From page 
91 of his book, and for the rest of that chapter, he interprets desire in 
terms of the way in which many societies deliberately set about the task of 
educating desire to make sure that the activating of desire does not work 
against the ‘goods’ that that society believes to be worthwhile – ‘All high 
societies recognize that the non-divine imagination needs training and 
exercise. This work is called education, and this introduces the normative 
                                           
774 Gorringe, op. cit., p.89. 
 775 ibid, citing S. Moore, Jesus the Liberator of Desire, p.93. 
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dimension of desire which Plato sets out in the Symposium, and Augustine in 
the Confessions’776. This is very important in terms of our study of addiction. 
It recognises and supports the good elements in desire; on the other hand 
it argues that in both Greek and Christian philosophy of the ‘good’, desire 
can be chaotic and destructive of societies without an educating system 
that helps their members to live in accordance with principles that are vital 
to the proper ordering of those societies, whether fundamentally secular 
or religious. Addiction represents a situation in which the expression of 
desire works against the moral grain of that society. In Christian terms, 
Gorringe suggests, it is that process of education that Jesus is concerned 
with when he calls his followers to be ‘disciples’, which literally implies a 
calling to be ‘students’. 
   There is much here that makes an important contribution to the 
understanding of desire which we are examining in this thesis from both 
psychological and theological perspectives. 
 
3.7.3 Christopher Cook 
   We have encountered the writings of Chris Cook in the chapter of this 
thesis that was concerned with providing a theological insight into 
addiction. Alcohol, Addiction and Christian Ethics was one of the principal 
books in that part of the current work, included in part because, as we 
noted earlier, he looks at the ethical implications of alcohol misuse in 
British society in the twenty first century, and his reflections on what may 
well be seen to be a collusive approach to the problems on the part of 
governments and the beverage alcohol industry. 
                                           
 776 Gorringe, The Education of Desire, p. 91 (italicisation original). 
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   The book to be briefly considered now is a new development of Cook’s 
work, a study of the Philokalia777. Within this newer work he refers to a 
number of contemporary writers who look at addiction from within the 
Christian Orthodox tradition, such as Victor Mihailoff778, who combines 
the Twelve Step programme with spiritual practices such as confession, 
holy communion and prayer, Meletios Webber779, who sets out to enable 
people with a spiritual understanding to incorporate the Twelve Steps into 
his vision, and a chapter in the Handbook of Psychotherapy and Religious 
Diversity780 which has a chapter on Orthodox traditions of spirituality 
which is more general in scope but sets out to ‘support better awareness 
of religious and spiritual traditions and to enable more effective working 
with clients/patients from particular faith traditions’781. 
   The reason for including this book in this survey of theological ideas 
about human desiring is that Cook is also particularly concerned to 
investigate the topic of the human passions in a positive sense, using the 
writings of the Philokalia as a guide to the Orthodox Christian 
understanding of the role of the passions in spiritual discourse. He 
explores this in his chapter on ‘Mental Well-Being’782. One instance of the 
relationship between the passions and mental health, seen from a spiritual 
point of view, is the writing of Saint Maximos, for whom, Cook says, ‘the 
source of all well-being is found in God, but human creatures are free to 
                                           
777 Christopher Cook, The Philokalia and the Inner Life: on Passions and Prayer. The literal meaning of the word 
Philokalia is ‘love of the beautiful’. The writings described by Cook represent, in his words, ‘a particular 
anthology assembled by two Greek monks in the eighteenth century’, collating ‘spiritual writings from the 
Eastern Christian tradition, spanning the fourth to the fifteenth centuries CE’ – see Cook, op. cit., p.xv. 
778 V. Mailhoff, Breaking the Chains of Addiction. 
779 M. Webber, Steps of Transformation: an Orthodox Priest Explores the Twelve Steps. 
780 P.S. Richards and A.E. BerginThe Handbook of Psychotherapy and Religious Diversity. 
781 Cook, The Philokalia, p.255. 
782 op. cit., chapter 4. 
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accept or reject the gracious gift of well-being’783. Maximos identifies a 
process that occurs in the spiritual life, which leads from temporal well-
being, via a sense of eternal well-being, to its ultimate goal which is 
deification. As this concept is so closely linked to our idea of the explicit 
and implicit longing of the soul for God as expressed by Augustine, it is 
perhaps worth exploring this concept of deification in a little more detail. 
Cook explains the process in these terms784: 
At this point we might conclude that both health and well-being in 
the Philokalia are concerned with achieving a life of dispassion and 
virtue. Well-being, however, appears to be the broader concept of 
the two, and it connects in turn with the doctrine of deification. 
Deification is a state of well-being, but it is much more than just 
this. It is an eternal, largely eschatological, but also very present 
and real, participation in God through Jesus Christ. 
 
   This is clearly a radical statement about the deification process, one in 
which our eternal destiny is known in an embryonic state in the here and 
now, and, as Cook comments, it recalls the language of Saint Athanasius, 
who dared to suggest that ‘as God in Christ became human, so by grace, 
human beings are called to participate in Christ’s divinity’785. If we are to 
take that claim seriously, then it seems to further underpin the statement 
that is central to this thesis that human desiring is not just a longing for 
the ‘goods’ of this secular world, or even for a pre-death glimpse of eternal 
truths, but a desire for, and to a limited degree actualisation of, real 
participation in the life of God, both in this world and for eternity. 
   There is however a darker side to desire, as the Philokalia asserts, drawing 
for example stark contrasts between what may be regarded as ‘virtues’ and 
                                           
783 op. cit., p.165. This reflection is based on Maximos’s work in the Philokalia, although as Cook comments 
on p. 163, the text in question is thought by some to be by an unknown author rather than Maximos himself. 
784 Cook, op. cit., p.166. 
785 op. cit., p.160. 
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what may be seen as ‘vices’ in the spiritual quest786. These negative 
passions, as Evagrios regards them, can be remedied to some extent by 
superimposing the opposite, positive attitude. Other remedies, Cook says, 
include ‘tears for sins, meditation on death, “the commandment of love”, 
patient endurance, trials and sufferings, and obedience’787 with appropriate 
spiritual discipline in terms of the practice of askesis, virtue and prayer. 
What matters from the point of view of this thesis and its proposals about 
desire for God and even oneness with God – deification – is that not all 
desire is holy, and when there is destructive desire (such as gluttony, a vice 
sometimes associated with addiction) there is the need to find a remedy, 
whether through spiritual direction or secular forms of psychotherapy788. 
There is thus here a welcome attempt by Cook, himself an expert on 
addiction, to delve into the ambiguity of desire and passion, exploring 
them, and the possible remedies, spiritual and psychological, when the 
passions lead in negative and destructive rather than constructive 
directions. 
   Cook thus makes a link between the work of spiritual guidance based on 
the Philokalia on the one hand and modern psychotherapeutic practice on 
the other. He specifically mentions addictions in this context, drawing a 
parallel between the spiritual approach of The Way of The Pilgrim, for 
example, which is ‘given to the pilgrim in response to his expressed desire 
to achieve unceasing prayer’ and forms of psychotherapy which have a 
different but perhaps complementary aim, that of bringing relief to ‘those 
                                           
786 On this contrast see Evagrios of Pontus, On the Vices Opposed to the Virtues in which he lists nine categories: 
for example, gluttony is opposed to abstinence, avarice to freedom from possessions, anger to patience etc. 
This list is given in full in Cook, op. cit., p.110. 
787 Cook, op. cit. p.114. 
788 Cook devotes a chapter of his book to the study of the relationship between spiritual guidance and 
psychotherapy. 
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who are psychologically overwhelmed by life stresses, and those whose 
behaviour is disturbed (e.g. due to family stress in childhood, or due to 
addiction)’789. While it is important to maintain professional boundaries 
between clinical and spiritual forms of ‘therapy’, might we not be justified 
however in looking for opportunities for providing, in appropriate ways, 
elements of both in our treatment of people with a variety of problems, 
including addiction? 
 
3.7.4 Conclusion to the chapter 
   The hypothesis that underlies this chapter of the thesis is based on the 
view that we will not be able to find a satisfactory methodology for 
understanding the aetiology of addiction, whether from a psychological or 
a theological point of view, without paying attention in the first place to 
the nature of human desiring as a positive experience, and this hypothesis 
is the essence of what we are putting forward as a New Model for 
understanding the nature of addiction, and the best way to help people 
who are suffering from enslavement to drugs or alcohol in particular. This 
positive approach remains true, we are suggesting, even when in some 
cases human appetites, natural and good in themselves, become distorted 
either by attachment to unsatisfactory and even dangerous and illegal 
objects such as heroin, or by the excessive use of legal substances such as 
alcohol. And at a deeper level, working with the ideas of St. Augustine in 
mind, we are suggesting that human desiring is ultimately founded on a 
desire for God, even though the true nature of that desiring may be hidden 
from us or channelled into less satisfactory pursuits: ultimately, on this 
                                           
789 See Cook, op. cit. p.226. 
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view, we assert that Augustine was justified in his declaration that ‘our 
hearts are restless until they rest in you’. 
   But how is desire to be understood better? How can the world of 
psychological theory and theological interpretation of human nature help 
us to understand desire and how it may be expressed in ways that are 
creative and life enhancing rather than destructive of individuals and 
societies? In our survey of psychological theories of desire, particularly in 
relation to the positive psychology school, instantiated for example by the 
writings of Seligman and Carr,  and of theological explorations of desire 
in the writings of Saint Paul and Saint Augustine, and in contemporary 
writers such as David Ford, Timothy Gorringe and Christopher Cook, we 
have tried to establish a view of desire and its fulfilment that is positive 
and holistically health friendly, including elements of ‘spiritual’ health and 
wellbeing. At the heart of that quest is the question posed to a person who 
was at the time ‘in recovery’ regarding his view not so much about what 
had gone wrong in his life that made him an addict, but about his deepest 
wishes for personal fulfilment – that is to say, he was being encouraged to 
think not about what he was recovering from but what he was recovering 
for. 
   When a programme such as this is put into place, we are suggesting, then 
we have an alternative treatment route that might offer a better and more 
hopeful approach than is often the case in psychological treatments where 
highly effective treatments based on psychological and 
psychopharmacological treatment cannot prevent the high rate of relapse 
that follows successful treatment – often within the first year of recovery. 
   It is not only in the clinical environment however that these modest 
proposals might be employed. Looking at the situation from a theological 
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point of view, in relation to Church praxis, it might be that the positive 
approach could form part of a holistic attempt to provide good spiritual 
and pastoral care for those who suffer from addiction problems. We shall 
return to this suggestion in the next chapter of this work. 
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CHAPTER 4  DISCUSSION AND REFLECTIONS ON WHAT HAS BEEN 
PRESENTED, AND SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING ‘NEW MODEL’ 
THINKING. 
Introduction. 
   This chapter does two principal things: in the first place it looks back at what has been 
presented so far, and secondly it begins, via engagement with existing models of pastoral 
care, to see how the ‘new model’ thinking that has been presented can be implemented in 
relation to these models. 
      Outlining the chapter.  
   The thesis set out, in the introductory chapter, five research questions with the aim of 
providing a guideline for what has been discussed. We will begin the current chapter by 
reviewing those questions, showing how they have been answered in the thesis up to this 
point. We will then identify three particularly helpful examples of theoretical and practical 
books on pastoral ministry in order to set up a framework for discussing the new model of 
understanding addiction in the context of current pastoral practice. Having set up this 
framework, we will return to the three books and make more specific suggestions about how 
the new model can be incorporated with them in order to provide effective pastoral care for 
people who have substance dependency problems. We will then make some suggestions 
about how this study might be taken forward in practical terms, both in ministerial training 
settings such a provided by the Anglican dioceses in particular, and in other institutions such 
as hospital chaplaincy. And we will make some suggestions of a more theoretical kind about 
the possibilities for further study and reflection of these matters from both psychological 






4.1 The Research questions reviewed 
   At the beginning of this thesis five research questions were identified. How 
have they been addressed subsequently? 
   Question 1) addresses the debate as to whether addiction exists.  We observed 
that some writers in the psychological literature, such as Jim Orford, have argued 
that addiction is real and should be regarded as a disease; writers such as J B 
Davies and Herbert Fingarette argue that addiction does not exist - the concept 
is to be regarded as a ‘myth’ in the colloquial sense. A useful contribution to this 
debate was made by Orford, as the discussion of his book Excessive Appetites 
illustrated, suggesting that the word disease may be more generally acceptable in 
relation to substance (and process) dependency if it is interpreted in a more 
metaphorical sense, thereby freeing it from the limitations imposed by the 
narrower interpretation of the word that may be implied by specifically clinical 
models. 
   What is undoubtedly true, however, we argue, is that many people who misuse 
alcohol and illicit drugs damage their health in many ways, cause harm to their 
families, and in some cases bring about their own death through overdose. This 
is no ‘myth’: it is true of a large, and perhaps increasing, number of people. There 
is however an ongoing debate about concepts of addiction that would 
undoubtedly benefit from further scrutiny. 
   Question 2) asked about the understanding of the origins of addiction that can 
be found in books and articles that investigate the psychology of addiction. 
Again we found a wide variety of interpretations: some emphasise the ‘disease’ 
model of addiction, others highlight personal choice in relation to life 
experience, while others believe that both disease and choice models together 
play their respective parts, while allowing also for the likely influence of genetic 
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factors, which will continue to be assessed beyond the limited scope of this 
present work. 
   It is our contention that the most significant factor is the context in which a 
person becomes unable to control his or her use of these substances, some of 
which, such as alcohol, are harmless and possibly beneficial, when taken in 
moderation. Circumstances in life experience such as the loss of a job, a partner, 
or a dwelling – and a fortiori a combination of such events – may be sufficient to 
propel an individual into the misuse of ingestible substances. Equally, a change 
in such circumstances for the better may free an individual from slavery to them. 
   Question 3) looked at the same issues from the perspective of theological 
discourse, and here too there was a variety of viewpoints. James B Nelson, with 
his personal history of alcohol dependence, adopts the Alcoholics Anonymous 
‘alcoholic for life’ approach, while others such as Gerald May believed that 
through divine forgiveness and grace the addict can end his harmful indulgence 
in alcohol or drugs. A helpful insight was provided by Kenneth Leech, who sees, 
in the world of drug addiction in particular, much that speaks of mystery, 
darkness and unknowing, and makes valuable links between this and the spiritual 
world of Christianity which can tolerate experiences of despair and death 
because with good spiritual guidance they in turn – and over time – can lead to 
hope, deliverance and resurrection. Leech’s contribution will be explored in 
more detail later in this chapter. 
   We noted conflict that exists when on the one hand a person wishes to use 
potentially addictive substances such as heroin, and on the other, and frequently 
at the same time, experiences a wish to abstain. We have explored this conflict 
in terms of the unity of personality, as analysed by Léon Turner: this subject 
would benefit greatly from further study, beyond the scope of this thesis, 
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particularly in terms of the complex issues raised by the concept of 
consciousness. 
   Question 4) addressed the confusion and at times open conflicts identified in 
questions 2) and 3). In order to avoid over-generalisation we began to search for 
a new model that might help us to understand both the route that people take 
into addiction and also how they might be helped to recover. A conversation 
with an addict led us to propose a model that starts in a completely new place, 
concentrating in the first instance on the individual’s desires and longings and 
aspirations, and then trying to determine the place of addiction with respect to 
those goals. On the basis of this positive insight, it seemed that the natural place 
to look for further illumination was the claim that all human life, rightly 
understood, has at its heart a search for, a longing for, God, whether this is 
recognised or not: and we therefore explored ways in which Augustine’s claim 
that ‘our hearts are restless until they rest in you’ might be the best basis for 
spiritual engagement with an addiction sufferer. 
   Question 5) looked at how the theoretical, client centred, approach suggested 
by the new model might be relevant to the treatment of addiction sufferers both 
in relation to pastoral care offered by clergy and other pastoral ministers in the 
community via churches and other social institutions such as prisons and in the 
clinical interface as provided by health care professionals. It would be good to 
follow up this research beyond the confines of this thesis by facilitating a forum 
including representatives of both pastoral and clinical care of addiction sufferers 






 4.2 The new model and its practical applications 
    
 
   This thesis has suggested that a new pastoral approach to addiction needs be found because 
of the conflicted opinions we have observed in both psychological and theological literature. 
What new model for doing so has emerged from our survey? 
    We reported a conversation that suggested a new model through asking an addicted person 
one relatively straightforward question: ‘What do you want out of life?’ Although he did not 
give a clear answer to this question at the time, he later commented spontaneously that for 
him the process of recovery from addiction had begun to a significant extent in response to 
that question. We will now provide a provisional framework for making these findings the 
basis of a new pastoral strategy for helping addicted people. 
 
   The thesis has focussed on two particular aspects of addiction, namely the ingestion of 
alcohol and illicit drugs. The psychological writing that has been reviewed looks at the 
aetiology of addiction: the theological section explored pastoral and spiritual aspects of the 
phenomenon of addiction. In both cases we found important and helpful information and 
theories about addiction; we concluded however that in both disciplines there remains much 
that is unclear and truly contradictory about the nature of addiction and its treatment, even 
about whether addiction really exists at all, or is in fact a reflection of human beings’ tendency 
to attribute indulgence in particular activities (such as drug misuse) to uncontrollable 
forces790. 
   Because of this unsatisfactory state of affairs, we suggested that we may be in need of a 
new methodology for understanding addiction and treating those who seem unable to 
control their use of alcohol and drugs. As we have seen, a conversation with a drug user led 
to consideration of the subject from a different starting point, that is to say investigation of 
that individual’s own desires and aspirations.  
                                           
790 The argument proposed, as we have seen earlier in the thesis, by J. B. Davies: The Myth of addiction. 
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   On this basis we now feel able to provide three things in this concluding section, namely 
looking at the phenomenon of addiction and its treatment from ontological, epistemological 
and pragmatic perspectives.  
1. Ontological considerations – some definitions. It is our contention, in line with the 
views of many commentators such as Robert West, Griffith Edwards and 
Christopher Cook, all of whose contributions have been noted in the psychological 
theories chapter (chapter 1), that contrary to the views of J. B. Davies (and others), 
addiction does in fact exist, and may in principle be defined as a reward seeking 
activity which has, as Robert West puts it, become ‘out of control’.  
The New Model. According to this model, we can define addiction as a type of 
compulsive behaviour which involves acquired dependency on certain substances, 
and significantly does not accord with the addicted person’s stated goals and 
aspirations for his or her life, even when that person may need help in discovering, 
or rediscovering, those personal goals.  
   On this basis we can thus go a step further and define treatment of addicts as a 
process of discovery about what these goals and aspirations are in order to help the 
addicted person to recognise these goals for himself, and then put in place a structure 
for achieving them, while assessing the role of drug misuse (or other addicted 
behaviours) in relation to those stated goals and purposes. Thus the radically new  
starting point for treatment is the desires, longings and aspirations of the ‘client’ 
rather than debate about the aetiology of addictive behaviour, though that may 
concern us at a later stage. This process is closely linked with the movement known 
as Positive Psychology, as discussed in the thesis, in relation to the work of Martin 
Seligman and others. 
   From a theological perspective we can also define this new model in spiritual terms, 
taking as its starting point the assertion of Saint Augustine of Hippo that God has 
made us for himself, and that our hearts are restless until they rest in him – so a life 
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that is ‘good’, on these terms, is, and only ultimately can ever be, one that is oriented 
towards God as the ultimate good. 
2. Epistemological considerations of the new model. Having given a view of how the 
new model may be defined, in terms of the nature of addiction, and a definition of 
the nature of treatment as we perceive it, we can now look briefly at some of the 
implications of the model and it employment. 
      In the ‘psychological theories of addiction’ chapter791, we explored the writings 
of many psychologists, indicating how they interpret the phenomenon of addiction 
and their consequent strategies for treating people with addiction problems. We 
suggested in that chapter that one of the most impressive contributions was made by 
Jim Orford, particularly in his major work entitled Excessive Appetites. This book, we 
suggest, has in particular three important things to say: 
 
i. It recognises that people move from normal to compulsive use of 
substances, many of which, such as alcohol, are arguably harmless when 
used in moderation. The new model thinking which we are recommending 
here picks up this idea of a progressive movement  towards full addiction, 
and recognises that when people present themselves for treatment, the 
stage of their journey that they have reached into the darkness of 
dependency – which we have referred to as ‘enslavement’ -  must be taken 
into account on an individual basis. This approach would be equally true, 
we would suggest, for both psychological and spiritual and pastoral 
interventions. 
ii. Orford also asserts that addiction, when it occurs, is a form of illness, 
which, when sufficiently damaging to health, may well require some form 
                                           
791 Chapter 1. 
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of treatment, including the use of psychological medicine such as Cognitive 
Behavioural Therapy techniques. The new model is open to all such 
techniques. It is our contention however, that there has often been a very 
disappointing outcome, with high degrees of relapse during the first year 
of treatment. The new model is therefore presented as a way of overcoming 
this difficulty, by starting in a new place, i.e. the aspirations of the client, 
although it is recognised that this approach may not be suitable for 
everyone who needs treatment. It is however, as we suggested above, a 
format that could be used in principle in both psychological and pastoral 
settings 
iii.  Orford further claims that successful treatment of addicted people may 
for many include both moral and spiritual elements, and among the writers 
discussed, he was undoubtedly the most positive about this spiritual 
element, although he is not over prescriptive about how such spiritual 
intervention should be offered. This is clearly very important in terms of 
one of the stated aims of this thesis, as it sets out to provide insights in to 
how scientific (psychological) and theological (pastoral/spiritual) modes of 
thought and therapeutic intervention might be brought into closer 
alignment. 
 
3. Pragmatic Considerations: method of working with the new model, its aims and 
limitations. One obvious approach to the pragmatic element here, which seeks to 
look at co-operation between disciplines, is to make in the first instance links within 
the medical establishment between clinicians and pastors, and thanks to the wisdom 
of the founding fathers and mothers of the NHS who argued vigorously for the 
establishment of chaplaincy in all NHS hospitals, the tools needed for this are to 
some extent already in place. The writer of this thesis has himself been involved in 
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training hospital chaplains (of many faiths and denominations) in caring for people 
with substance dependency problems. But there remains the task of finding a forum 
in which pastors and clinicians can be encouraged towards a mutually respectful and 
open dialogue to discover modalities of treatment which can – in line with Orford’s 
comments about spiritual and moral aspects of addiction – bring effective and lasting 
help to those who are substance dependent. It would also be good to find ways in 
which this proposed programme of shared insight could be extended out of the 
hospital environment and replicated in local communities, possibly via the 
Community Drug and Alcohol Action Teams: here again, we can observe that to 
some extent the tools needed for achieving this are already available. 
   One of the implications of this programme, we have already noted, is the need to 
assess the possibility of working in this way with clients: this depends on a number 
of factors, such as the degree of addiction that a particular person has, their 
willingness to work in this way with psychological therapists and/or pastoral workers 
(chaplains and others) and the possibility of co-morbidity792. 
   Following on from this, it is in our estimation vital that pastors who engage with 
people on the basis of new model thinking should have proper training in the field, 
and a group working at Church House in London is currently looking at the right 
way for this training to be delivered – whether, for example, it would be best to 
introduce the subject at theological college level, or in post ordination (or post 
qualification) courses as provided by The Church of England and other Christian 
denominations. 
   It seems to the author of this thesis that the new model has much to offer addicted 
people, and that it is an area of clinical and pastoral practice where a considerable 
amount of co-operative work could be done between the scientific community, as 
                                           
792 Co-morbidity in this context is the existence of severe psychological or psychiatric conditions alongside, 
but not necessarily connected with, addiction. 
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represented by the psychiatric and psychological professions, and pastoral care 
deliverers, provided that boundaries are respected, and adequate training is made 
available. 
   4.3.What is now offered is a way of linking these theoretical insights to current pastoral  
         models. 
Models Of Pastoral Counselling 
   We are proposing that current society suffers greatly from addiction to substances (e.g. 
alcohol, prescription and non-prescription drugs) or to processes (e.g. gambling or internet 
pornography), partly because of the availability, affordability and social acceptance of such 
things, particularly the use of alcohol. Alongside clinical or even forensic approaches to the 
social problems caused by addiction, we argue that pastoral care endeavours should look at 
the deepest desires and longings of human beings, to enable people with addiction problems 
to find new meaning and purpose in their lives. We would tentatively go further, suggesting 
that this approach, embedded in what the thesis calls the ‘new model’, may have more to 
offer than those which emphasize seeking the causes of addiction. We will now review three 
approaches which have been found helpful in training for pastoral ministry, including further 
reflections on Leech’s contribution, and relate them to the care of addicted people. 
   Richard Osmer’s book Practical Theology provides a comprehensive and well researched 
overview of pastoral care as one aspect of ‘practical theology’: Deborah van Deusen 
Hunsinger’s book Theology and Pastoral Counseling has more specific intentions, linking pastoral 
theology viewed from a psychoanalytic perspective with the theology of Karl Barth. We have 
already discussed Leech in detail, and we will return to his ideas in this chapter after looking 
at Osmer and Hunsinger. 
   We will now look at these writers in detail, and with appropriate critical commentary. We 
will then show how each of these three models might be linked with the new model of care 




4.3.1 Richard Osmer’ book Practical Theology793.  
   This book has been chosen because Osmer has analysed the concept of 
pastoral counselling in a number of ways, in its essence, interpretation and 
practical application. It therefore has a comprehensive scope, drawing on 
the ideas of others in the field, and adding his own suggestions as 
appropriate. He proposes four key questions that can be used to address 
the pastoral care of an individual, focusing on what is happening, why it is 
happening, what ought to be happening, and issues about Church 
leadership in response to these situations. 
   It also happens that he gives as his principal case study an account of 
work with a church member whose problems included the excessive use 
of alcohol, so that in addition to the general analysis of the concept of 
pastoralia, there is also the specific instantiation of how his approach to 
pastoral care might be used to help someone who was indulging in 
substance misuse. 
   Osmer’s model of pastoral care has a number of stages. These are: 
1) The descriptive empirical task, which involves a particular kind of 
attentive listening 
2) The interpretive task, which requires ‘sagely wisdom’. 
3) The normative task, which can be expressed as ‘prophetic 
discernment’. 
4) The pragmatic task – this related to providing leadership of a kind 
which is founded on the theology of service.  
 
 1) On the question of listening (what Osmer calls ‘priestly’ listening794) 
the theme is essentially narrative, as the person being listened to is 
encouraged to tell her life story in a safe and accepting environment. 
                                           
793 Richard R. Osmer, Practical Theology: an Introduction. 
794 This can be misleading: what is intended is to speak of priesthood that is not restricted to ordained 
persons, but in terms of the priestly role of the congregation as depicted in I Peter 25:9 and Revelation 1:6 
and 5:10. See Osmer, op. cit., p.35. 
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In his case study relating to a woman called ‘Olivia’, an alcoholic 
coming from a family of alcoholic parents, the focal problem is one 
of belonging – at seminary for example, where she goes to explore 
her sense of a personal vocation, she is described as being at the 
seminary but not of it. Just as she had lived in a biological family 
without a sense of belonging or being valued, so at seminary she 
remained something of an outsider, and would often, she suggests, 
find more of what she regarded as a truly Christian reception from 
AA members rather than the seminary community who seemed to 
avoid her. The descriptive empirical task here was to observe and 
interpret her feelings of isolation and rejection, and to be aware of 
her deep desire for acceptance in this new ‘family’. Olivia was also 
discovering that the kind of things that ultimately make us happy 
are not externals, even a good relationship with another human 
being, but the spiritual process of finding God, in which our human 
relationships can be helpful795. In relation to the first task there is an 
echo here of the Augustinian theology of desire, and the restlessness 
of the human heart, to which he draws attention at the beginning of 
the Confessions, until a home is found in God. 
   There is however a weakness in this chapter. It gives much 
information of a technical kind on the aetiology of alcoholism, but 
in spite of having identified the Wisdom concept of the outsider as 
having a special place in God’s kingdom, there is no direct 
epistemological link made at this point with the experience of the 
alcoholic who often feels like an outsider, not least, as Olivia found, 
                                           
795 op. cit. p.73. 
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because committed Christian church people can sometimes 
marginalise the alcoholic, and this is very much part of the systemic 
view of alcoholism and its proper treatment. 
 
2) The second, interpretive, task, involving ‘sagely wisdom’, follows on 
from the listening stage. For Olivia, as described in this book, the 
‘wise judgement’ implied by this was founded on reflections on 
much Biblical exposition of the Wisdom theology of the Jewish 
people as described in books such as Ecclesiastes and Job. Wisdom 
is also seen as a characteristic of Jesus, in terms of his eschatological 
reordering of priorities, particularly in terms of wealth796. In this 
context it can be shown that for Jesus there is a new interpretation 
of the situation of the ‘poor, outcast and oppressed’ telling them 
that they are in fact ‘the special beneficiaries of God’s loving care 
and that their plight will be rectified in God’s kingdom’ (as predicted 
for example in Luke 6:17-26.)797. 
 
3) The third, normative, part of the process entails ‘prophetic 
discernment’. Can this be used in the pastoral care of addicted 
people such as ‘Olivia’? Prophetic ministry, in its classic location in 
the books of the Tanach, is often, Osmer suggest, at odds with the 
prevailing ecclesiastical assumptions798. Thus Isaiah ‘counter[s] the 
royal ideology of the temple and the court, as well as the popular 
belief that God’s promise to David meant that Israel would always 
                                           
796 Osmer, p.97. 
797 ibid.  
798 Osmer, op. cit. p. 133 f. 
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be safe from other nations’799. Jesus follows on from this: he not 
only proclaims God’s word in a way that challenges the ecclesiastical 
status quo – he personally embodies the proclamation. In the light of 
this, the work of the prophetically minded pastor today entails ‘the 
task of listening to this Word, and interpreting it in ways that address 
particular social conditions, events, and decisions before 
congregations today’800. One such social condition might well then 
be the engagement of the congregation with the social reality of 
addiction which affects approximately 6-8% of a given 
population801. 
   Osmer provides us with a number of models of prophetic 
discernment in relation to pastoral care. A particularly notable one 
is what Don Browning calls the ethic of equal regard802. This ethic, as 
the words imply, avoids any sense of superiority or paternalism in 
the care of others, including what he sees as the harmful effects of 
a pattern of care based on ‘self-sacrifice’ or ‘self-denial’803. For 
Browning the pattern of equal regard is founded on the 
commandment to love others as one loves oneself. It seems to the 
writer of this thesis that the pastoral (or indeed clinical) care of 
people with addiction problems might well benefit from this type of 
prophetic ministry, as it avoids any suggestion of superiority on the 
part of the care giver, seeking rather to establish the dignity of the 
sufferer, which can be eroded by the use of words like ‘patient’ or 
                                           
799 op. cit., p.134. 
800 op. cit., p.135. 
801 This figure is taken from UK government figures published in 2005 that suggest that more than 4% of the 
population can be defined as ‘harmful’ drinkers. See Appendix 2. 
802 Osmer, op. cit., p.151. Osmer is basing his understanding of Browning’s position on his article “Domestic 
Violence and the Ethic of Equal Regard” in Equality and the Family, a Fundamental Practical Theology of Children, 
Mothers and Fathers in Modern Societies, p.378. 
803 Osmer, op. cit., p.151. 
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even ‘client’, which as Kenneth Leech argues804 can be a form of 
disempowerment. Thus often the best person to help an addicted 
person is someone who has had an addiction problem herself, which 
helps to avoid any suggestion of superiority. 
   It also helps to make deeper sense of the question that seemed in 
one case to catalyse change for the addicted person, by asking about 
what he wants, rather than expecting him to conform to the wishes 
of the carer or society in general. There is, in prophetic terms, an 
issue of justice here which demands a proper recognition and 
evaluation of the dignity of the addicted person. Even allowing for 
the technical theological problems associated with the idea of 
prophecy in terms of its origin in divine initiation rather than human 
choice805, there is a prophetic element here in relation to the pastoral 
care of addicted people in terms of equality that may well prove to 
be a better route than one which is founded on the idea of the 
clinician or pastor as having superior knowledge or skill to the 
‘client’. 
 
4) Osmer’s fourth task is that of pragmatic leadership as expressed 
conceptually as embodying the role of the servant. He identifies 
three models of leadership – task competence, transactional, and 
transforming. All are needed within the life of a congregation, 
Osmer suggests806, but he argues that in the light of what he regards 
                                           
804 Comment on this view of Leech’s theology was made in the chapter discussing his work. 
805 On the proper theological assessment of criteria for prophetic ministry, see R.W.L. Moberly, Prophecy and 
Discernment, p.225, cited and briefly discussed by David Bunch in his D Min. thesis  “Social Trinitarianism and 
Contextual Theology”, p.68 
806 Osmer, op. cit., p.178. 
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as a need for ‘deep change’807 it is transformative leadership that is 
most important. This is based, for Osmer, on a rejection of the 
approach which sets the professional priest or pastor at the centre 
of everything so that all activity radiates out from him or her. The 
servant model challenges and replaces this methodology. 
   The key to this understanding, for Osmer, lies in Gospel pericopes 
in which Jesus radically reinterprets the Messianic role in terms of 
the Suffering Servant, and he locates this theological motif 
particularly in the Gospel of Mark and the letters of Paul. In Mark 
(following Richard Hays’ exegesis of Mark 10:45808) the cross 
becomes the centre of the role of discipleship, interpreting the 
faithfulness required as servanthood as radical obedience to God’s 
will. In Paul’s theology, he identifies an ethic of ‘mutual care and 
service’ that rejects ‘hierarchies of power and social status’ in favour 
of unity and co-operation, and refuses to accept any kind of violence 
within the Church community. In this way, Osmer states809, ‘the 
Christian community gives visible expression to the self-giving love 
of Christ, who exercised God’s royal rule in the form of a servant’. 
   The Christological title ‘Servant’ as found in the gospels is not 
without its own theological problems, however, in terms of Jesus’ 
own self-understanding and his own questionable use of titles such 
as Messiah, Son of God, Son of Man810 etc. Many excellent books 
explore these questions about Christological origins811: but it 
                                           
807 ibid. 
808 Richard Hays, The Moral Vision of the New Testament: A Contemporary Introduction to New Testament Ethics, 
pp.84, and 197, and c.p. Oscar Cullmann, Christology of the New Testament. 
809 Osmer, op. cit., p.191. 
810 Assuming that Son of Man is a title rather than an instance of circumlocutional self reference as Geza 
Vermez argues, contra others such as Morna Hooker. 
811 The reader’s attention is drawn, for example, to James P. Mackey, Jesus the Man and the Myth, and C. F. D. 
Moule, The Origin of Christology. 
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remains open to speculation whether in Osmer’s appropriation of 
Hays’ exegesis of the Suffering Servant title for Jesus, one which is 
not made explicit in the Gospels, too much is being built on a 
slender foundation. 
   Osmer has provided a detailed and helpful approach to pastoral 
care, proceeding in logical steps from the listening, via the 
interpretative and prophetic stages, to a pragmatic engagement with 
the issues facing those who have requested pastoral care. It is a 
symmetrical approach, particularly with respect to addiction, in that 
it offers both clinical (psychological and sociological) interpretations 
of the aetiology of addiction and theological views, in terms of how 
to give appropriate pastoral care to the person who has a problem 
with alcohol or other substances. But it has a revolutionary agenda 
in two senses: firstly it looks at the relationship between the clerical, 
professional pastoral officers of the Church and the congregation 
on an egalitarian, non-hierarchical basis, and secondly, it places the 
person who is being offered help at the centre of the picture rather 
than the helper. Thus the pastor as has the role of servant rather 
than the person with the knowledge and authority to ‘fix’ the 
problem. This willingness on the part of the pastor to divest herself 
of power may contrast with the way in which secular hierarchical 
models of clinical intervention normally work. For the pastor, 
founding his or her work on Osmer’s model, there is ample scope 
for the question that puts the client in the ‘driving seat’ framed in 
questions such as ‘What is it that you want?’, and as we shall observe 




4.3.2 Deborah van Deusen Hunsinger’s Theology and Pastoral Counseling. 
   This book has been chosen as a contrast to Osmer’s work, partly because 
it begins in a different place. Rather than starting with the pastoral issues 
themselves, Hunsinger expounds a theology of care that is based on what 
she describes as a ‘Chalcedonian’ pattern of dialectic, with much detailed 
reference to the work of Karl Barth. It is also of relevance to the thesis in 
terms of the pastoral response to addicted people that she provides a 
detailed case study of a pastoral intervention between a Christian pastor 
and a woman who has misused alcohol. What is particularly significant in 
this book is her use of the Chalcedonian pattern to establish the possibility 
of combining psychoanalytical insights from the Object Relations branch 
of psychotherapy with spiritual elements of care. 
   We have observed that Hunsinger’s model of pastoral counselling is 
based on a Chalcedonian view, similar to the Christological debate of that 
period, because it concerns ‘two natures’. Contrary to Osmer’s approach, 
this is an asymmetrical programme, because Hunsinger argues that 
although the psychological insights of psychoanalysis can be encompassed 
within theological discourse, the same cannot be said of the relationship 
in reverse – psychology cannot ‘contain’ theology812. In her understanding 
of the counselling process, what is entailed is a programme of counselling 
that unites the secular (Object Relations813) and sacred (Barthian) visions 
of human salvation while allowing (in line with the Chalcedonian pattern) 
for their distinctiveness – a bilingual approach. What emerges is a 
fascinating account of a therapeutic alliance between a therapist and her 
                                           
812 Hunsinger, op. cit., p.62ff. 
813 She does not however justify her adoption of this form of psychoanalytic therapy rather than, for example, 
that of Jung. 
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client which looks at the latter’s problems from both psychological and 
theological points of view. For the former, Hunsinger made considerable 
use of Kaufman’s programme of intervention814 in the case of a client 
traumatised by guilt and shame.  For the theological work, she bases much 
of what she says about the interaction on the work of Barth, seeing for 
example, the idea of God as aligned with the suffering, sick and sinful 
aspects of human experience rather than sitting as an absolute judge 
concerned only with the niceties of accurate and perhaps punitive justice. 
   Two important points must be made here: one is that this approach to 
counselling is explicitly Christian in its conceptual framework, and 
presumably could only be attempted within a Christian context. Secondly, 
this therapeutic process depends on making clear moves from the 
psychological to the theological modes, and moving in the opposite 
direction as well, and one wonders in practice how easy it is to do so 
without some sense of disjunction. It is also clearly a ‘Reformation’ church 
approach: it seems unfortunate that no attention is given by Hunsinger to 
the sacramental methods of dealing with guilt that are available more 
readily perhaps in more ‘Catholic’ minded church environments. These 
sacramental approaches have considerable traction in dealing with guilt 
issues: if they did not it is unlikely that people would make use of them. 
   Some criticisms of Hunsinger’s important and groundbreaking work are 
inevitable. It is clear from her work that she regards the relationship 
between the psychological and theological aspects of counselling as 
asymmetrical. But it is open to question how far this asymmetrical pattern 
                                           
814 Hunsinger, op. cit., p.181ff. 
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has really been established beyond question in her book, and whether it is 
really as important as she claims. 
   And on a practical note, although there is much in her carefully balanced 
approach between the two disciplines that is both original and significant, 
it does seem to the present author important to consider how a pastoral 
counsellor could be trained to use the ‘bilingual’ approach that she 
advocates with safety and confidence. It would be helpful to take her work 
forward and explore issues of training and ongoing support of such 
counsellors in ways that she has understandably not been able to address 
in detail in this introductory book – but these things are of great 
importance when counsellors are dealing with vulnerable clients. 
   But the biggest problem here is that although reference is made to the 
long-time drinking problems of the client, Eva, and those of her mother 
also, Hunsinger does not engage with the issue of alcohol at all in terms 
of its relationship to Eva’s problems. She does mention on several 
occasions the fact that Eva believed herself to have been rescued by God 
from addiction to alcohol, but we are not told how this happened. Equally 
we are not given any information about how either therapist or client made 
any connections between the client’s emotional problems and her drinking 
history. This is a pity, as it seems that such a close connection is likely to 
exist. People do not drink excessively without a reason. 
 
4.3.3 Kenneth Leech – Drugs and Pastoral Care 
   We have also mentioned the work of Ken Leech and given an extended 
critique of his contribution to the care of addicts in the chapter on the 
theological understanding of addiction. Why has he been chosen here? 
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   Although some criticisms of his work have been set out in the thesis, he 
does, in our estimation, make some important points about pastoral care 
in general terms, and the relating of this pattern of care to addicted people 
in a more specific sense. An important component of this judgement 
relates to the fact that he alone, of the three writers whose work on 
pastoral care are mentioned in this chapter, had an extensive ministry to 
people with addiction problems over  a number of years. There is however 
another aspect of his book Drugs and Pastoral Care that is relevant to this 
part of the thesis in which we are looking at some models of pastoral care 
in itself, and relating them to the care of addicted people and the 
connections that can be made with the new model. 
   In his chapter entitled “Pastoral care and the role of the Christian 
community”815 Leech sets out a four point analysis of pastoral care, which 
as he comments816, has direct relevance to work undertaken with addicted 
people but also has  a much wider relevance to ‘practical theology’817. The 
four points are as follows: 
 
1) The view can be encountered that addiction is in some sense to be 
regarded as sinful behaviour or as ‘a manifestation of original sin’. 
But as Leech rightly points out818, ‘the context in which addiction 
arises is often ignored’ whereas in fact context is a highly important 
factor in addictive behaviour. That reflection might be true of much 
sinful or immoral behaviour. The key word here for Leech is 
                                           
815 Ken Leech, Drugs and Pastoral Care, pp.86ff. 
816 op. cit., p.99. 
817 Leech uses this term coined originally by Don Browning in his article “Practical theology and political 
theology”: as we have seen, Richard Osmer, who frequently cites Browning, makes “Practical Theology” the 
title of his own major work on pastoralia. 
818 op. cit., p.100 
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‘victim’. He advocates a distinction between the idea of sin as willed 
behaviour on the part of the sinner, and behaviour which is engaged 
because he is the victim of systems that enslave, such as the drug 
trade. Pastoral care will then require a profound engagement with 
that context rather than operating on the basis of generality or any 
superficial judgment of the addicted individual. And this is a point 
that Leech would bring to our attention not just in terms of drug 
use or misuse, but in a more generalised way, in terms of the 
pressures that society places upon individuals, with regard to such 
phenomena as prostitution and homelessness. 
   His use of the word victim finds an echo in the work of 
Mercadante in her book Victims and Sinners, and it raises important 
issues. But it raises semantic problems for the reader: Leech stresses 
the need to avoid the stigmatisation or disempowerment of the 
addict, and yet the very word victim can seem to convey a sense of 
powerlessness, and for this reason it seems to the writer of this 
thesis that the word needs to be used with great care in order to 
avoid the regrettable effects that could be entailed by this paradox. 
 
2) Leech also raises here a question about the nature of God as 
perceived by those who offer pastoral help. God is presented by 
some church folk as a ‘dictator and controller’ rather than a God 
who leaves people free. In other words, Leech argues here, God can 
become for some people an addiction that simply replaces addiction 
to drugs. He reminds us of Marx’s warning about religion as an 
opiate that induces a false sense of reality. Pastoral care in general 
 323 
needs to avoid colluding with this idea of a dictatorial or controlling 
God. 
 
3) One of the most important points that Leech makes is the clear 
injunction not to stigmatise or marginalise the addicted individual 
by assuming that there can be a ‘specific ministry to drug users’819. 
This is very important, because it regards ministry to people with 
drug problems as one aspect of a wider pastoral concern of which 
drug misuse is one facet rather than the whole picture. At a 
theological level, he speaks in this context of the need to engage 
more profoundly with issues of what being human means, in 
theological terms, and how that reality is embedded in the ‘doctrine 
of the Body of Christ in which all are equal’820. This is perhaps a way 
of stating that each person encountered in a pastoral context is to 
be regarded as a unique individual and not labelled ‘addict’, 
‘alcoholic’ or by any other such term, even, he suggests, by using the 
word ‘client’. This will be referred to again when we consider how 
Leech’s pastoral theology can be related to the new model proposed 
in this thesis. 
 
4) Further to this, and perhaps in  a way deriving from it, Leech stresses 
that in the pastoral encounter with people with substance misuse 
problems there must be space for ‘silence, darkness and the way of 
“unknowing”’. 
                                           
819 ibid.  
820 ibid. 
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   This last point is both controversial and of great theological significance. 
We will therefore pay more detailed attention to this crucial aspect of 
Leech’s contribution at this point in his book Drugs and Pastoral Care, 
although the book as a whole has been reviewed in a preceding chapter of 
the thesis. 
   As we have seen in Leech’s approach: 
 
1) As with all pastoral intervention, so with addiction, Leech insists on 
the importance of discerning the context in which problems arise 
for the individual, especially in situations where a person may 
become the victim of circumstance – such as social or economic 
deprivation. 
 
2) As we have already noticed, the pastor is required in Leech’s view 
to avoid behaving with a client in a way that is over directional or 
controlling. Replacing one form of addiction to a drug by another – 
even to God - may in fact be counterproductive in the long term. 
 
3) Leech insists throughout this chapter that there is no such thing as 
a specific ministry to addicted people: this work must be seen as one 
aspect of a ministry to the whole person. To label someone ‘addict’ 
is in itself to deny something of that person’s humanity. 
 
4) Allowing a place of darkness and mystery in this ministry, as in all 
ministries. This awareness leads for Leech into the use of 
appropriate forms of Christian healing ministry, with particular 
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emphasis, as one would expect from an ‘Anglo-Catholic’ priest, on 
the use of the sacraments, particularly ‘anointing and deliverance’821. 
   This approach challenges the kind of clinical or pastoral intervention 
that comes with all the answers pre-packaged, without listening to the 
people with the problems and taking each individual person seriously. 
What is therefore required, Leech suggests, is not a formula of caring that 
is expressed with certainty or clarity or with the hope of ‘immediate 
change’, but a pastoral approach based on willingness on the part of the 
pastor to ‘stay with the pain, the wounds, the brokenness, the repeated 
crises and the darkness in faith and trust’822. Theologically viewed, this 
represents to this author a clear statement of a ‘kenotic’, self-emptying 
approach in which the pastor divests herself of power in order to be 
spiritually available to the person receiving her care. This will also be 
discussed further in relation to the new model later in the thesis. 
 
                                           
821 See: Bunch, Prayer and Prophecy, p.140. 
822 Leech, op. cit., p.100f. 
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4.4 The three models of pastoral care linked to the New Model for understanding 
          addiction 
   We are now in a position to relate the ‘new model’ proposed in this thesis to 
these two approaches to pastoral counselling. 
 
4.4.1 Osmer 
   As we have seen, Richard Osmer presents in his book a detailed analysis 
of the way in which pastoral care can best be provided. It is an impressive 
system, although like many similar systems, it is perhaps somewhat 
idealistic. The process of delivering pastoral care is not always as seamless 
as his fourfold schema might lead us to suppose, and probably does not 
generally move in an orderly way from task one to task four: in fact these 
episodes are more likely to be iterative and retrospective as well as at times 
following a clearly perceptible forward trajectory. An analogy to this might 
well be bereavement counselling, in which although there are relatively 
definable stages on the path to recovery from bereavement, they rarely 
happen in quite the order or with the clarity and efficiency that some text 
book approaches seem to imply823. 
   Despite this criticism of Osmer, one that he is aware of and takes into 
account himself824, there is much useful guidance to be found in his work 
for the training of pastors both before and after authorisation or 
ordination. 
                                           
823 The Cruse Counsellors Training programme, for example, identifies four tasks of mourning: experiencing 
the reality of the death, feeling the pain, adjusting to life without the deceased, and saying goodbye and 
building a new life. See Mary Jones, Secret Flowers, introductory quotation. 
824 See Osmer, Practical Theology, p.11. Osmer views the tasks of theological interpretation with regard to 
pastoral work as a spiral in which previous tasks may need revisiting, rather than as a linear or circular 
process. 
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   On this basis, how might Osmer’s system of pastoral care be inscribed 
onto the new model thinking that we have put forward in this thesis with 
regard to addiction? 
   Two aspects of the model that are relevant are: 
 
1) Emphasis on the client as the centre of the story, not just in terms 
of trying to identify problems in the past that may have impelled the 
person who is addicted into a substance dependent lifestyle, but in 
terms of setting a new agenda for the future. That is not to deny the 
importance of the aetiology of the problem: it is however a way of 
approaching the issues that takes as its starting point the assumption 
that most people have appetites and desires that are in themselves 
good, and if they can be given sufficient prominence from the 
beginning of treatment (whether pastoral or ‘clinical’) then a better 
outcome may be achieved in the long term. 
 
2) The suggestion that, viewed from a theological perspective, and in 
line with much traditional writing ( notably that of St. Augustine, as 
we have seen earlier) all human beings are created with a 
fundamental desire for communion with God, and that it is 
ultimately only in the experience of that communion that they 
achieve the genuine fulfilment of desire, in comparison with which, 
other forms of longing can only be secondary, and may in fact be  a 




   In this context two aspects of Osmer’s system of pastoral care resonate 
well with these two elements of the new model. 
   In the first place, Osmer emphasises the importance of listening. This is 
particularly apparent in his first ‘task’, in which he describes a form of 
listening that is defined as ‘priestly’, not in the narrow sense of what an 
ordained priest alone has the authority to do, but in the broader sense of 
what I Peter 2:5-9 implies by speaking of the whole congregation as a holy 
priesthood, ‘a royal priesthood, a holy nation, God’s own people’825. The 
task of this priesthood, for Osmer, is to observe and interpret the feelings 
of a woman who, because of her personal history, which includes alcohol 
misuse, is at the time in question, characterised by experiences of isolation 
and rejection in relation to church membership. At the heart of this is the 
awareness of the pastor that she is seeking inclusion in the full life of the 
Church, as a deep desire and longing, and the hope that the pastor will 
help her towards achieving that goal. This process of listening to the client 
without imposing any predetermined agenda is an essential first step in the 
new model thinking being proposed here. 
   A second element, which can be linked to the ‘desire’ motif, lies in 
Osmer’s use of the theology of the Suffering Servant, as one of the most 
important aspects of Christology826. This relates in principle to the fourth 
stage of pastoral care identified by Osmer – that of identifying the 
pragmatic task for the pastor. In offering pastoral ministry as a servant, 
there must be room for engaging with the client at every level of her being 
including her spiritual quest, but without imposing too objectively a model 
                                           
825 See Osmer, op. cit., p.35, already referred to in this chapter. 
826 This has been discussed in detail in the previous section on Osmer’s pastoral strategy. 
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   Hunsinger’s book on pastoral counselling makes a strong and explicit 
link between pastoral counselling as a religious enterprise with its roots, as 
she understands it, in Barthian theology on the one hand, and secular 
models on the other – particularly the Object Relations School of 
psychoanalytic psychotherapy827. It is significant that the use of the word 
‘object’ which has a special significance for both psychoanalysis generally 
and Object Relations psychology in particular has a resonance with our 
exploration of the nature and origins of addictions in one specific way. 
   By way of explanation of this assertion we note the possible 
epistemological linkage between psychotherapy and addiction and the 
work of Damian Thompson, whose book The Fix has been mentioned 
earlier. Thompson uses the word ‘object’ in a less specific sense than that 
which is given in psychoanalytical discourse; nevertheless, there is a highly 
significant feature here: he sees addiction as drawing particularly on two 
pathogenic factors in contemporary living, i.e. the pathological movement 
from relating to people to relating to things828, and the ever increasing 
availability of intoxicants, both alcohol and other drugs. 
   The gradual replacement of people by things such as alcohol or drugs in 
the hierarchy of desires is being highlighted here. The key factor for 
Thompson in this context is that, unlike people, drugs make no demands 
                                           
827 See Charles Rycroft, A Critical Dictionary of Psychoanalysis, pp.100ff for a full exploration of these ideas, with 
particular reference to the unconscious formation of internal representations of objects. 
828 Thompson comments that ‘Perhaps the crucial feature of addiction is the progressive replacement of 
people by things’, (op. cit., p.6), a view that he attributes to the work of Craig Nakken in his book The 
Addictive Personality. 
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on us. They do not have needs that we are obliged to meet. We can 
therefore conclude that we are in control of them. This supposed control 
continues until addiction erodes or destroys it, a process which he argues 
is deliberately engineered by those who stand to make a profit from our 
increasing addictions, such as the companies who market alcoholic 
beverages. 
   The argument being presented in this thesis is therefore that individuals 
can form within their minds, at a deeply unconscious level, an object 
representation based on alcohol, drugs, or process addictions such as 
gambling which provide a pleasant and (supposedly) controllable 
sensation in the psyche. Hunsinger is concerned in her Object Relations 
approach to pastoral counselling with the ways in which human beings, 
from an early age, form internal representations of what is most 
meaningful to them. There is a clear hierarchy here involving God, other 
people, and things, such as alcohol. Her client ‘Eva’ might then be seen as 
someone who, as a result of traumatic experiences with her parents, has 
elevated what are perceived initially as controllable objects such as alcohol 
to the place where relationships with people and God would be expected 
to have more significance. 
   When this process has reached the point of addiction or substance 
dependence, the therapeutic endeavour, which could be undertaken at a 
clinical level through psychotherapy, or at a pastoral level (using 
Hunsinger’s approach for example) entails a reversal of that process, so 
that the client is enabled to re-engage with people instead of the drug of 
choice. 
   From  a more specifically religious perspective, the Barthian aspects of 
Hunsinger’s model of pastoral care then plays its part alongside more 
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psychological elements: she observes the way in which Barth argues that 
‘our very being derives from our relationship with God. Our need of God 
will also be reflected in the creaturely sphere in our relationships with one 
another’829. And following from this she links it with Fairbairn’s claim that 
in contrast to the Freudian picture, ‘for Fairbairn human beings are 
fundamentally and irreducibly object seeking’830, rather than focussed 
primarily on the need for the relief of intrapsychic tension at a more 
individualistic, biological level. Thus longing for, hunger for, God and 
human relationships (and in terms of recognising the distortions when 
addiction to ‘things’ takes their place) are fundamental rather than 
secondary aspects of human desiring, and pastoral counselling will work 
towards enabling these relationships to be formed and to flourish. 
   But – and this is where we would argue that the new model enters the 
picture – such a programme of intervention would only be possible when 
the client is able to identify for himself the usefulness of this interpretation 
and decide for himself to work with that image in mind. The new model, 
asking questions of a positive kind, would help to focus the client’s 
thinking on the way in which for him things have taken the place of 
people, and also to suggest, in the case of the religious element housed 
within pastoral counselling, that one of the casualties of this process might 
be God and an engagement with spiritual issues. 
 
4.4.3 Kenneth Leech 
   The first point of contact between Leech’s pastoral approach and the 
new model, it is argued here, is that as with the other writers mentioned 
                                           
829 Hunsinger, op. cit., p.55. 
830 ibid. 
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in this chapter, it is important, as Leech understands it, to see the pastoral 
minister not as a superior being, one who holds the answers to the 
situation, but as one who enters into the encounter with a humble, and 
above all egalitarian, attitude. This is to make the question that is proposed 
in ‘new model’ thinking ‘What do you want from life?’ central to the 
process of pastoral counselling, even though it may be some time before 
the client (a term which, as we have seen, Leech resists) has access to a 
coherent way of answering the question. What matters is that the 
endeavour does not focus primarily on ideas about the aetiology of 
addiction, which may only reflect the ideas of the counsellor, but letting 
the person receiving the counselling approach the subject in his own 
unique way. 
   There is perhaps here an echo of one of the psychological models for 
understanding addiction that we mentioned in a much earlier part of the 
thesis, that of Prochaska and Di Clemente, in their ‘transtheoretical’ or 
‘stages of change’831 approach to working with addicts. As we saw there, 
the first stage on this journey, according to their model, is that of ‘pre-
contemplation’ a stage in which no decision to change one’s behaviour has 
yet been reached, but there is a sense of beginning to move in that 
direction. 
   A second significant aspect of Leech’s position on addiction in his book 
Drugs and Pastoral Care is his willingness to engage with the highly 
mysterious element in the experience of people who are misusing drugs in 
terms of their attempts to journey out of the slavery to such substances. 
The damage may be physical or psychological: often it is both. It also often 
                                           
831 See J. O. Prochaska and W. F. Velicer, “The Transtheoretical Model of Health Behavior Change”. Their 
approach was noted in the earlier chapter of this thesis on psychological understanding of addiction in 
connection with J. B. Davies who, like them, rejects the concept of addiction at an ontological level. 
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has social and economic aspects. For Leech there is also a highly 
significant spiritual dimension involved in this process. But for the pastor 
to engage with this aspect of the journey is to encounter much darkness, 
mystery and uncertainty. It is a journey that is often characterised by 
waiting rather than by rushing into any form of active ministry at an early 
stage in the pastoral encounter. 
   But the use of the phrase ‘journey out of slavery’ might also alert us to 
an epistemological link with the Augustinian approach we have been 
suggesting alongside the ‘client centred’ approach being advocated in 
terms of the new model, which, as we have seen, focuses on desire for 
God. There was for Augustine a long period of darkness and uncertainty 
before he was able to recognise the superior claim of Christian spirituality 
and praxis to all the other religions and philosophies he had encountered 
such as that of the Manicheans832 – and this is helpful because it reminds 
the pastor that in terms of the new model, there may well be, for the 
addicted person, a lengthy time of darkness and uncertainty similar to that 
which Augustine himself experienced before embracing Christianity. 
   The chapter in which Leech looks at this dark, mysterious element of 
addiction is entitled “Pastoral Care and the Christian Community”. He 
emphasizes that ‘there is a central place for silence, darkness and the way 
of “unknowing”’833. He observes that in the care of the addict, which he 
regards as being the concern of the whole Church rather than of a priestly 
élite, ‘it is not possible, much of the time, to see the prospect of immediate 
change, and it is important to stay with the pain, the wounds, the 
brokenness, the repeated crises, and the darkness, in faith and trust’834. 
                                           
832 This journey is chronicled for us in the Confessions. 
833 Leech, Drugs and Pastoral Care, p.100. 
834 op. cit., p.100f.  
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   Human happiness and the fulfilment of desire is thus, in line with 
Augustinian theology, to be found ultimately in the internal process of the 
development of a spiritual relationship, a relationship with God as 
understood by Christianity, rather than by pursuing outward, more 
materialistic goals. Leech, who emphasizes the truth of this proposition in 
his own work, in his book on spiritual direction, for example835, is 
concerned also in Drugs and Pastoral Care to help those who have been 
enslaved by addiction to drugs to discover, or rediscover, a spiritual basis 
to their lives, not as an addition or supplement to their clinical or pastoral 
care but as a vital ingredient of this healing process. 
   It is then this willingness to engage with the darkness without trying to 
avoid it or look for a quick result that is arguably Leech’s most important 
contribution to the world of caring for addicted people, and it fits well 
with the new model, it is argued here, because it allows the persons 
receiving care to be in control, to move at their own pace, and to set their 
own agenda for change when this becomes a possibility. Change, for the 
individual, and with the help of the pastoral counsellor, may then lead to 
recognition of the longing for God which is there, although it may not be 
immediately apparent to the client. This ‘apophatic’ approach to pastoral 
care is also counter-cultural in a society where pressure on health care 
resources of all kinds is increasing, and there is a consequent temptation 
to look for the kind of quick results which so often fails the addicted 
population who often cannot make this kind of immediate lifestyle change. 
 
 
                                           
835 Kenneth Leech, Soul Friend. 
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4.5 Conclusion to this chapter 
   Richard Osmer, Deborah Hunsinger and Kenneth Leech all have 
important insights into pastoral care, and also ideas that resonate well with 
the New Model being proposed in this thesis. So which of them has the 
best claim to help us to understand the pastoral ministry to people with 
addiction problems? 
   Of the three, it seems to the present author that Kenneth Leech does 
that best, not just because he writes convincingly at a theoretical level, but 
because although all three give some account of pastoral interaction with 
people who have addiction problems, Leech worked for many years with 
addicted people in central London who were at such a vulnerable stage of 
their lives, in Soho, and later at St. Botolph’s Church, Aldgate. It is his 
active involvement with this work in practice, and his reflections on it in 
his books that, we argue, gives them a special place of importance. This is 
not least because he is able to offer an approach in which darkness and 
uncertainty are tolerated rather than addressed in too much of a problem 
solving approach that looks for quick results. 
   It is perhaps also worth noting that although both Osmer and Hunsinger 
speak about an addicted person with whom they have been involved, and 
Osmer gives a lengthy section on the nature of addiction and its treatment, 
neither of them makes a sufficiently clear statement about the ways in 
which the alcohol dependent person herself has been affected by her 
substance dependency in terms of her emotional and spiritual trauma and 
the process of healing. 
   And in terms of the new model, Leech’s approach fits particularly well, 
because it allows the client to be regarded in an egalitarian fashion and to 
be, as far as possible, in control of the pastoral interchange, while allowing 
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for the centrality of spiritual awakening as part of the process of 
movement from the enslavement of addiction to freedom in Christ 
through the ministry of prayer and sacrament. 
 
 4.6 A summary of what has been presented.   
   This thesis has addressed the subject of human addiction by focussing on three 
fundamental concerns, which are: 
 
1) How do the available books and articles on addiction from psychological and 
theological perspectives approach the task of understanding what addiction is? 
Some important insights were derived from this part of the study, but there was 
also dissatisfaction with what has been discovered in the process because of the 
wide and at times contradictory range of views that can be found in the literature: 
there are sometimes irreconcilable attitudes observed towards whether: 
1. Addiction is a form of disease, and  
2. Whether a person with an addictive lifestyle such as alcoholism should 
necessarily be regarded as an ‘alcoholic for life’ or  




2) The quest for an alternative theory. Given the disparities in the approaches 
mentioned, and a sense of dissatisfaction with what has been written in some 
respects, the quest then became a search for an innovative theory that might 
avoid some of the problems associated with what has been written before. In 
the light of this a New Model was proposed which starts in a different place 
from earlier ones in that it focuses primarily on the appetites and desires of the 
person with the problem in a positive and individualistic way, rather than 
beginning with an attempt to discover what has caused the addiction. This also 
led to a theological aspect of the issue, arguing that in line with the theology of 
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St. Augustine of Hippo, all human longing has its ultimate destination in a wish 
for a spiritual experience rather than being limited to the secular and materialistic 
aims of humanity, even when this spiritual longing is not recognised. 
 
3) Following on from the provision of this new model for understanding addiction, 
our quest has moved into a more pragmatic area of discourse, as we began to 
look at ways in which these insights might be incorporated into a number of 
templates for pastoral care. Three were identified: as the new model was related 
to each in turn, Leech’s work was given special commendation. 
 
   Having identified these aspects of the exploration of addiction, therefore, and looked 
at how they might best be addressed, we are now in a position to show how this 
approach is already being introduced into some training programmes for Christian 
ministers, and how that initiative might be implemented further at an institutional level 
by co-operation with one of the central governing bodies of the Anglican Church in 
the United Kingdom. 
   Firstly, as was mentioned in the introduction to the thesis, a number of Church of 
England Dioceses, Southwark, Guildford, and London, have already received a 
training session from the writer of the thesis (and colleagues from the relevant secular 
bodies) as part of their continuing ministerial education programmes that incorporate 
the ideas that are embodied in the thesis. It is hoped that input from us into these 
courses will be continued in the future. And some work has been done in this context 
in a number of parishes in west London. A request to the Diocese of Southwark for 
financial backing for a similar project in a Richmond parish is being considered at the 
time of writing. 
   Secondly, at the request of the lead chaplain of two NHS Trust hospitals, in Croydon 
and Kingston, a course has been delivered along similar lines. One advantage of this is 
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that although in the Anglican diocesan programmes the participants were all Christian 
ministers, in the hospital environment there has been an opportunity to widen the 
scope of the training by the participation of people of other Christian denominations, 
and other faiths, thereby broadening the ecumenical aspects of delivery of the subject 
matter which affects people of all types of religious persuasion (and none). 
   Thirdly, by arranging meetings at Church House in Westminster, convened by the 
Policy Advisor of the Mission and Public Affairs Division of the Archbishops’ Council, 
and involving two other medically qualified and also ordained participants836, it has 
been possible to begin to investigate ways in which the need for well-informed pastoral 
intervention on behalf  of addicted people and their families can be addressed not just 
in terms of local initiatives but in terms of the generation of  a response from the 
Church of England at an institutional level to a problem which is widespread in our 
country and should be addressed as a major social concern. It is our belief that the 
New Model proposed in this thesis would fit in well with such a programme. 
   To conclude – what is being proposed in this thesis is a methodology for treating 
addicted people in pastoral situations (and in particular those with alcohol and drug 
dependency problems) which concentrates less on questions of what causes addiction 
and focuses on a more positive engagement with the wishes, longings and aspirations 
of the sufferer, linking this with the theology of St. Augustine in particular. This is a 
cognitive, person centred approach, which builds critically on much of available 
literature about the aetiology of addiction, but avoids the kind of excessive 
generalisation that too often can be found in this primary material. Questions about 
such a person’s deepest wishes become the foundation of such treatment, and in the 
light of this, he or she may be encouraged to think less about what they are recovering 
from, and more about what they are recovering for. 
                                           
836 One of whom is the Reverend Professor Christopher Cook of Durham University, whose writings have 
been discussed at various points in the thesis. 
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   This thesis is thus being presented as the beginning of a way of understanding 
addiction and how people whose lives have been adversely affected by the misuse of 
alcohol and illicit drugs may best be helped, in both clinical and pastoral settings. The 
idea of it as a beginning implies that much more needs to be done. What forms might 
this further investigation take? 
  The research presented here has taken two directions: it has been informed by the 
available writings on the psychological understanding of addiction and by an attempt 
to show how theological ideas, particularly those of Augustine, might be used, both 
separately and also in collaboration. 
   On the psychological side of the equation, it is unsurprisingly the case that books 
and articles on addiction appear with some regularity: only those that were available at 
the time of writing this thesis, and only a representative proportion of these have been 
discussed here. It would be helpful to continue to read and assess such books as they 
appear, looking in particular for those that share the current author’s idea of beginning 
with the aspirations of the client, as an arguably better starting point than retrospective 
attempts to understand the pathways by which individuals become addicted. One such 
recent book is Bepko, Feminism and Addiction, and others such as Kubička and Csémy 
have looked at female role perception in relation to alcohol misuse837. 
  Similarly, on the theological approach, there are new books on particular aspects of 
human desire that contribute to our understanding of this aspect of the subject. The 
volume entitled Faith, Rationality and the Passions, edited by Sarah Coakley, is one 
example of a recent book that tries to find satisfactory theological answers to questions 
about how reason and emotion can be related within Christian discourse. A book 
already mentioned in this thesis would also be worth further study – Christopher 
Cook’s review of the Philokalia looks at the relationship between Christian pastoral 
                                           
837 Kubička and Csémy, “Women’s gender role orientation predicts their drinking patterns”. 
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counselling and secular psychotherapies, and it may be that insights from this book, 
written by someone with a wide experience of working with addicted people, would 
provide more routes into the kind of thinking suggested by our research. There are 
also issues about training, and ways in which this approach, particularly in relation to 
Hunsinger’s bilingual model, might be addressed in the preparation of Christian 
pastoral ministers at all levels. 
   With further time this approach could be developed in greater detail, and it may be 
that, in some form, it might be adapted for use not only in a pastoral setting within the 
life of Christian and other worshipping communities, but also in the holistic clinical 
care offered by General Practitioners, and hospitals and clinics specialising in the care 
of addicted people. What has been identified here is therefore seen by the researcher 
as a way into understanding addiction from a new perspective, with suggestions about 
how the ideas presented might be studied more widely and in more detail, and then 
applied to a number of treatment modalities, both in church based pastoral care plans, 
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Appendix 1 
Diagnostic Guides for Determining Addiction: 
See: Robert West, Theory of Addiction, p.15 
 
1. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual –IV (American Psychiatric   
Association, 1995.) 3 or more occurring in same year suggest addiction: 
(1) Substance is often taken in larger amounts or over longer period than 
intended 
(2) Persistent desire or unsuccessful attempts to cut down or control 
substance use 
(3) A great deal of time is spent in activities necessary to obtain the 
substance or recover from its effects 
(4) Important social, occupational or recreational activities given up or 
reduced because of substance abuse 
(5) Continued use despite knowledge of having a persistent or recurrent 
psychological, or physical problem that is caused or exacerbated by 
use of the substance. 
(6) Tolerance, as defined by either: need for greater amounts of the 
substance in order to achieve intoxication or desired effect; or 
markedly diminished effect with continued use of the same amount 
(7) Withdrawal, as manifested by either: characteristic withdrawal 
syndrome for the substance; or the same (or closely related) substance 
is taken to relieve or avoid withdrawal symptoms. 
 
2. International Classification of Disease-10 (WHO 1992) 
(1) Difficulties in controlling substance taking behaviour in terms of its 
onset, termination, or levels of use 
(2) A strong desire or sense of compulsion to take the substance. 
(3) Progressive neglect of alternative pleasures  
(4) Persisting with substance use despite clear evidence of overtly harmful 
consequences 
(5) Evidence of tolerance, such that increased does of the psychoactive 
substance are required in order to achieve the effects originally 
produce by lower doses. 
(6) A physiological withdrawal state when substance use has ceased or 
been reduced, as evidenced by: the characteristic withdrawal symptom 
for the substance; or use of the same (or closely related) substance 





How many people in this country have a significant problem in relation to alcohol 



















(Department of Health estimates, 2005) 
 
 
Most of the adult population of England are either non-drinkers (12%) or low-
risk drinkers (67.1%), who drink within the Department of Health’s guidelines 








Severely dependent drinkers (< 0.1%)
Moderately dependent drinkers (< 0.4%)
Harmful drinkers (4.1%)
Hazardous drinkers (16.3%) 
Low-risk drinkers (67.1%)
Non-drinkers (12.0%)
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